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Safeguards Systems Concepts for Nuclear Material Transportation

/ssnm/ssnm-transport.htm

REPRESENTATIVE ADVERSARY ACTION - NO. 3 C

__________________________________________________________________

TRANSPORT MODE: Highway

ADVERSARY TYPE: Dissidents

ATTACK PURPOSE: Diversion

OBJECTIVE: Political/Sociological

INTENDED SSNM USE: Detonation of a nuclear device

__________________________________________________________________

ADVERSARY RESOURCES AND ATTRIBUTES

1. Personnel Characterization: Medium Threat Level

7 to 12 People

2. Arms: High Threat Level

Pistols, Shotguns, 50-Caliber machine gun, AR-15's, bazooka, M-79 grenade launcher

3. Intelligence Information: High Threat Level

Know convoy configuration, route, and destination, escort and crew strength, LLEA response capabilities, convoy radio frequencies schedules, and procedures; crew habits and operational patterns.

4. Experience & Knowledge: High Threat Level

Adversaries have military combat and heavy equipment experience

5. Dedication: High Threat Level

Willing to accept loss of life

6. Organization, Planning, Training & Security: High Threat Level

Extensive

7. Money: Medium Threat Level

$25,000 to $50,000

8. Transportation: High Threat Level

1 Truck cab (Interchangeable with SSNM trucks)

3/4 Ton Truck (with 50 caliber machine gun mounted on it)

1 Van (containing men with M-79's)

1 Camper (containing men with M-79's)

1 Panel Truck (containing men with bazooka)

9. Equipment: High Threat Level

Plastic explosives

Heavy duty dollies and pneumatically operated jacks

Variety of hand tools

Scanners of convoy frequencies

CB Radios

__________________________________________________________________

MODE OF ATTACK: Force

__________________________________________________________________

ATTACK FEATURES

1. Target SSNM:

239 PuO₂

2. Attack Zone:

On main highway artery in desolate area.

3. Preparation:

The activities around the shipping locations enroute, and at the destination are continuously monitored so as to gain the overt information described under "Intelligence Information." A strategically placed "insider" supplies the dissidents with the balance of the information. Training is conducted in weapons use and coordinated attack timing is refined. Radio activated plastic explosives are attached to the base of the radio antenna at the LLEA site nearest to the attack site. Two dissidents start out from the opposite direction with the truck cab. The rest of the vehicles pick up the convoy enroute at various points. The van and the 3/4-T truck stay in front of the convoy, the camper trails and keeps the convoy in sight. The panel truck with the bazooka is parked off road at the ambush site. Coordination (timing) is maintained by coded CB transmissions.

4. Convoy Immobilization:

As the lead escort is sighted by the panel truck parked off the road, a radio signal is sent to the man near the LLEA antenna ordering him to demolish it; the van slows down and the camper speeds up: both open fire with the M-79's on the leading and trailing escorts, respectively. The SSNM truck is now in a position near the parked panel truck. The cab is destroyed with bazooka fire. Elapsed time: 30 seconds. The 3/4-T truck (with 50-caliber machine gun) is used to take out survivors and chance passers-by.

5. Access to SSNM Containers and Getaway:

The dissidents' truck cab is hitched to the SSNM trailer and towed 30 miles to a wrecking yard owned by one of the attacking force. (Heavy duty dollies and pneumatic jacks are used, if required, to move the trailer, i.e., if immobilization devices were activated.) The SSNM is extracted from truck within 24 hours and moved to a clandestine laboratory 200 miles away.

6. Attack Duration:

15 Minutes (through escape initiation).

FEMA Mount Weather Continuity of Government facility from ARIN. Note Executive Office of the President (eop.gov) email address:

    OrgName:    FEMA 
    OrgID:      FEMA-4
    Address:    19844 Blueridge Mt. Rd
    City:       Bluemont
    StateProv:  VA
    PostalCode: 20135
    Country:    US

    NetRange:   63.161.169.0 - 63.161.169.255 
    CIDR:       63.161.169.0/24 
    NetName:    SPRINTLINK
    NetHandle:  NET-63-161-169-0-1
    Parent:     NET-63-160-0-0-1
    NetType:    Reassigned
    Comment:    
    RegDate:    2003-02-28
    Updated:    2003-02-28

    RTechHandle: MBA15-ARIN
    RTechName:   Baig, Mirza 
    RTechPhone:  +1-202-395-0990
    RTechEmail:  mbaig@oa.eop.gov 

    # ARIN WHOIS database, last updated 2006-12-07 19:10
    # Enter ? for additional hints on searching ARIN's WHOIS database.

A2 responds:

There are no digital versions of the other Gang profiles that have been released by the agency, but someone could submit a FOIA request to the agency for the redacted material in the reports and then submit an administrative appeal in a further attempt to get the material that had been redacted.  A rational review by an unbiased examiner would likely result in the release of more material from the documents.

It appears that the word "gang" is the word redacted in the instances specified.

A writes:

Could you please enquire if there are digital versions of the other Gang Profiles?  I note the pdf for Gangster Disciples is not redacted at all!  I was disappointed the Hells Angel's (HAMC) file was redacted so much.

Could you ask your readers to speculate as to what the single word is that is redacted whenever the HAMC is referred to?  It could be 'gang', but why redact that?  Or it could be 'unit' or 'cell'  -- much more provocative. There have been hints here and there of the HAMC being used by US intelligence agencies to distribute illegal drugs.  This is not a good example, but one I found:

http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/9712/ch03p1.htm

A Cryptome visitor today from a famous US nuclear weapons laboratory logged in from Google looking for "lightning protection for nuclear weapons." Well, now. Trusting earth dwellers might have expected that ancient threat of god to have been solved early in the era of nuclear terror. The solution may have been lost, forgotten or carefully hidden by the imposition of ever greater information classification, compartmentalization and institutional stupidity. Google pointed the visitor to this file: /nuke-fuse.htm

Intrigued about what the solution might be, a follow-up Google search on the topic offered these unsettling comments on the US premier nuclear warhead assembly/disassembly plant at Pantex, TX:

http://www.deprep.org/1997/fb97s12a.htm

Status of Lightning Safety at the Pantex Plant

Pantex currently uses two types of lightning protection systems for nuclear explosive facilities. The oldest systems consist of air terminals, down conductors, and a continuous buried ground ring electrode (counterpoise) around the perimeter of the building. Newer systems consist of poles and overhead wires grounded to a counterpoise. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) reviewed these lightning protection systems and the effects of lightning at Pantex in 1993 and concluded that nuclear weapon assembly at Pantex is extremely safe from the abnormal lightning environments (K. O. Merewether and K. C. Chen, Evaluation of the Electromagnetic Effects Due to Direct Lightning to Nuclear Explosive Areas at Pantex, November 1993). The following are staff observations on the analysis done by the Mason & Hanger Corporation (MHC) and SNL to characterize the lightning threat to nuclear explosives, the controls developed to mitigate that threat, and the implementation and preservation of those controls.

Analysis of the Hazard to Nuclear Explosive Operations from Lightning. Although SNL completed an analysis in 1993 of the lightning threat at Pantex, the underlying assumptions made in this SNL analysis were not fully communicated to MHC. According to a later memorandum (K. Merewether [SNL] to D. Miller [MHC], June 16, 1997), the conclusions in the 1993 report were based on the following assumptions: (1) that Pantex could take credit for a Faraday cage/isolation scheme in which reinforcing bars in the concrete structures provide a partial Faraday cage (this Faraday cage limits the interior voltages in the bays and cells), (2) that adequate bonding of electrical penetrations into the bays and cells existed, and (3) that weapon operations at Pantex allowed a large enough standoff distance to preclude current flowing or arcing into the weapon. Assumptions (2) and (3), however, were not valid for most facilities at Pantex.

MHC was not aware of the full implications of the above basic assumptions made by SNL. The lack of knowledge concerning the bonding condition of electrical penetrations into nuclear explosive areas was discussed in the 1997 memorandum, which stated that the Faraday cage/isolation scheme (which allows Pantex to consider a potential lightning threat of only 10 kV and 900 A) is valid only if all conducting penetrations are bonded to the Faraday cage at their points of entry.

After discussing the issue for several weeks, DOE, MHC, and SNL appear to have reached a general agreement on the nature of the threat posed by lightning to nuclear explosive operations at Pantex. To date, however, there still has been no comprehensive technical analysis which outlines the nature of the threat posed by lightning at all nuclear explosive facilities and the ability of existing (or proposed) engineered design features and administrative controls to mitigate that threat.

Development of Controls. A draft SNL report, Interim Lightning Safety at Pantex, documents conclusions from its analyses to date and gives Pantex specific interim guidelines for controls applicable to some weapons, namely the B83, W79, W88, B61­5, and W62. MHC agreed to identify unbonded penetrations into active bays and cells, and to bond them at their entry points when possible. In addition to the weapons bays and cells cited above, the bays and cells used for W69 dismantlement also received attention as MHC prepared for those operations.

Implementation and Preservation of Controls. Based on a review of existing surveillance practices at Pantex for lightning suppression systems, the Board's staff is concerned that the implementation and preservation of the design features and administrative controls in place at Pantex to mitigate the threat from lightning are not commensurate with the potential hazards of lightning and the long­term mission of the facilities. These staff observations are summarized below.

* The latest drafts of Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) for nuclear explosive facilities in Zones 4 and 12 reviewed by the staff do not consider the lightning protection systems to be safety controls. The design of the explosives and the facilities in which they are housed are assumed to provide the primary protection from lightning strikes. However, there are no technical safety requirements or equivalent controls which clearly outline the design parameters and administrative controls important to lightning safety and the surveillance requirements necessary for adequate maintenance.

Although various controls for certain nuclear explosive operations have been identified as a result of recent discussions between SNL and MHC on lightning safety, there has been insufficient effort to provide uniform formalization of these controls in authorization basis documents.

* The frequencies of visual and electrical preventive maintenance inspections of systems, structures, and components providing lightning protection at Pantex do not conform to the recommendations made in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 780 for structures housing explosive materials. NFPA 780 recommends visual inspection of lightning protection systems every 7 months for corrosion, broken wires, or broken connections. It also recommends electrical tests, such as continuity and ground resistance tests, every 14 months. M&H, however, performs visual inspections annually and electrical inspections every 47 months. The SNL assertion that lightning safety at Pantex is dependent on proper bonding of electrical penetrations points to the need at Pantex for more inspection and testing of systems, structures, and components associated with lightning safety.

And the admission of unsatisfactory resolution:

http://www.deprep.org/1999/fb99s21a.htm

Background. In September 1997, the Board requested that DOE prepare a detailed technical report providing a comprehensive analysis of the hazards posed to nuclear explosive operations by lightning, the controls necessary to prevent and mitigate those hazards, and the path forward for implementing and preserving the identified controls. In response, DOE formed a lightning protection project team tasked to define a technically justifiable lightning protection control scheme for Pantex nuclear explosive operations. As discussed in detail in previous staff reports, MHC has made significant progress in implementing certain engineered and administrative controls for lightning protection in nuclear explosive bays and cells at Pantex. In May 1999, DOE submitted the first draft of the requested report to the Board. In the transmittal letter, DOE committed to providing a detailed path forward on lightning protection as part of a deliverable for the Board's Recommendation 98-2, due in June 1999. The last path forward supplied to the staff by DOE was in an April 1999 project plan.

Issue. Despite the progress made during the past 2 years, DOE and MHC continue to struggle with the development and implementation of administrative controls for lightning protection at Pantex. In their current state, those administrative controls are scattered throughout various facility and program procedures, plant standards, engineering instructions, engineering procedures, and standing orders. Determining which operations are allowed during lightning warnings and which must be shut down can involve a complicated search of multiple site documents.

Many of the key analyses (e.g., for roof slot bonding, transportation carts, vacuum chambers) required of SNL in the Lightning Protection Project Plan are overdue. Completion of these analyses might allow certain administrative controls to be replaced, in part, by more rigorous engineered controls. Given the limited personnel resources available and the lack of prioritized requirements from DOE or MHC, however, there is no firm commitment on the part of SNL to complete these analyses in the near future.

Recently, MHC's efforts to implement administrative controls for transportation during lightning warnings have been further complicated by increasingly restrictive direction from SNL, the design laboratory for many of the electrical circuits in nuclear weapons. In a letter of June 29, 1999, SNL issued the following recommendation to DOE: ASandia recommends that nuclear weapons, in any configuration, not be transported in unprotected areas during lightning warnings or lightning storms. This represents a more conservative position than that taken by SNL in a letter of September 23, 1998, to MHC, which identified several weapon configurations for which MHC was allowed to take some credit for lightning protection.

The logical corollary to the June 29, 1999, recommendation (that nuclear weapons in any configuration should be in a protected area during lightning warnings) has an even greater impact on MHC's attempts to identify adequate lightning protection controls for Pantex operations. During lightning warnings, this corollary would require shutting down such Zone 12 operations as vacuum chamber activities, purge and backfill, and hoisting, in addition to the transportation operations specifically addressed by SNL's recommendation. The corollary would also have a significant impact on Zone 4 staging activities. The bonding and isolation controls implemented in most Zone 12 facilities have not been implemented in Zone 4. Therefore, all of Zone 4 must be considered an unprotected area. It is not practical, however, to remove all nuclear explosives from Zone 4 during lightning warnings.

DOE and MHC Path Forward. MHC's response to SNL's recommendation was not to evaluate ongoing operations and initiate changes necessary to implement the recommendation. Instead, MHC offered DOE a Justification for Continued Operations (JCO) that actually lifted several restrictions already in place related to nuclear explosive operations during lightning warnings. The only justification offered in the JCO for relaxing lightning controls was the lack of technical basis accompanying the SNL recommendation. Also worth noting is that MHC chose to forward this JCO to DOE for approval despite strongly worded objections by MHC's nuclear explosive safety personnel, who pointed out the lack of a technical analysis supporting the MHC position.

According to local Amarillo Area Office personnel, DOE has requested that MHC retract this JCO and revise it to allow exceptions to SNL's recommendation only when supported by some technical analysis (operations involving mechanical safe and arm detonators, for example). DOE has also requested that MHC provide some justification for continued staging operations in Zone 4 and supply more detailed information on the operational impact of strict compliance with the SNL recommendation. At the time of the meeting between the Board's staff and DOE and MHC, there was no schedule for revision of the JCO. In the interim, MHC will continue to operate under its varied collection of procedures, standards, instructions, and standing orders. As a long-term solution, MHC will revise its recently issued Technical Safety Requirements to reflect the controls identified in the JCO.

In addition to the path forward proposed by DOE, MHC could prioritize specific requests to SNL to complete technical analyses that might allow some of the more restrictive administrative controls to be replaced, at least in part, by engineered controls. Given the absence of any credited controls for Zone 4 staging operations (assuming the traditional lightning protection systems are ineffective, and the full-up weapons cannot be credited with protecting themselves), it would also be prudent for MHC to complete analysis (through SNL) of Zone 4 facilities for lightning protection. It would be advisable as well to implement any required engineered (bonding) or administrative (isolation distance) controls as soon as possible. To expedite closure of the lightning protection issue, DOE could encourage better communication between MHC and SNL, and it could assist both contractors with prioritizing and scheduling remaining work.

Conclusion. The analysis and control of lightning-related hazards to nuclear explosives at the Pantex Plant is hampered by incomplete evaluations, and incomplete facility and procedural modifications. Completion of this analysis, which is largely the responsibility of SNL, is lagging behind the schedule in the Lightning Protection Project Plan. In the interim, SNL has produced correspondence concluding that some activities and weapon configurations are sufficiently protected from lightning to allow continued operations during electrical storms. SNL has also provided a more conservative input suggesting that virtually no transportation of nuclear explosives be conducted during lightning warnings.

During the past 2 years, MHC has implemented many safety improvements suggested by the lightning protection project team to enhance lightning protection at Pantex. However, the physical facility modifications are not complete, and MHC has not addressed lightning protection upgrades in Zone 4. Additionally, the convoluted system of procedures that directs Pantex operations during lightning warnings has not been clarified sufficiently to ensure that the actions expected of all workers will be carried out. Finally, MHC recently proposed a JCO that is not conservative, and suggests relaxing controls beyond the limits justified by any current analyses from either SNL or MHC.

DOE has taken action to ensure that MHC develops a JCO that is reasonable, but allows only technically justified exceptions from SNL's recent conservative input. It is important that MHC implement its lightning protection strategy in a simple, comprehensive, and consistent manner such that the procedures will be reliably executed. Finally, it appears that DOE should provide additional guidance to SNL to ensure that the analyses that are key to the final resolution of this issue are completed as soon as possible.

The Prophetic John Sweeney

* Posted by Martin Bright

* 27 November 2006

The terrible, terrible Litvinenko story reminds me of something my old friend and former colleague John Sweeney wrote in 2000. It was an investigation into the Moscow apartment block bombings that pointed the finger at Vladimir Putin. He couldn’t get the piece in his own newspaper, the Observer, at the time so he wrote it for the magnificent US website cryptome. It made for chilling reading back then, but even more so now.

http://www.newstatesman.com/200617110061

A writes:

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-nuke5dec05,0,680978.story?coll=la-home-headlines

The big leap would involve the self-destruction of the weapon without dispersing radioactivity or causing an explosion. The system would be able to destroy the electronic and mechanical components, rendering the plutonium and uranium materials unusable for construction of a crude improvised device.

How? That's secret. But one possible approach is that the bomb would contain a powerful acid or other chemical that would poison the uranium and plutonium. The resulting sludge theoretically could be reprocessed, but that would require transportation to a highly specialized chemical-processing factory.

..........

Its not that secret.  You can poison a fission device with neutron absorbers, e.g., boron. 

You can also make plutonium suitable for fizzles only, by adding a high spontaneous-fission material to it.  If that S-F material is the same element, its very tough to separate. Pretty much only a State can do this.

This is why weapons-grade Pu is baked only a short time; bake it longer and you get isotopes that spontaneously fission, making premature detonation when imploded (fizzle) likely.

So a "street-safe" device would have some normally shielded higher isotopes of Pu separated from the good stuff in the pit; when tampering is detected the higher isotopes are melted into the good stuff, spoiling that material even if the adversary rebuilt the pit, explosive lenses, initiators, etc.

Barry Smtih writes:

This attachment is extremely relevant. The use of polonium 210 to trigger nuclear weapons and it's dispersal into the atmosphere at Australian and Pacific tests sites are significant.

The tragic death of the Russian dissident Alexander Litvinenko, apparently resulting from his disagreement with the methods of the Kremlin, is a extremely sad event which also highlights the extremes of actions that can be undertaken by some Governments wishing to conceal their covert actions.

The fatal results following the ingestion of polonium 210 by Litvinenko bring into sharp focus the lack of research that can be identified in the subject study for internally deposited radiation emitters including polonium.

Attached is a document sent to Sir William Penney on 29th December 1954, identifiying large amounts of alpha producing polonium to be used in the Kittens Trials. It is obvious from the usage amounts that a minimum of 100 curies of polonium 210 would be available in an aerosol format by each major weapon as well as each minor trials firing. This radio-active presence is much more than than the 15 curies of cobalt-60 used in the "dirty" bomb test that was code named Tadje.

A lethal dose of 10 Sieverts (minimum amount ingested by Litivinenko) would weigh 0.12 micrograms of polonium 210.

 No attempt was made in the Adelaide University study to estimate doses resulting from polonium, particulary for those Australians taking part in the 1953-and 1955 Kitten Trials at Emu and Maralinga. The first four trials at Emu in 1953 and the 1955 trials at Maralinga are not covered in the Australian Participants in British Nuclear Tests (Treatment) Bill 2006.

This is a seriously careless omission by both the Adelaide University and in the Parlimentary Library briefing provided to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.

There is also a need to question the motives of a Government that pursued its objective of joining the 'nuclear club," without accepting its duty of care for ex-servicemen who were deliberately ordered into a seriously hazardous environment in pursuit of this aim.

Barry Smith ( British Nuclear Test Veteran)

Attachment: Kittens1955.pdf

EXPORT CONTROLS: Agencies Should Assess Vulnerabilities and Improve Guidance for Protecting Export-Controlled Information at Companies

Commerce and State have not fully assessed the risks of companies using a variety of means to protect export-controlled information. The agencies have not used existing resources, such as license data, to help identify the minimal protections for such exports. As companies use a variety of measures for protecting export-controlled information, increased knowledge of the risks associated with protecting such information could improve agency outreach and training efforts, which now offer limited assistance to companies to mitigate those risks. GAO’s internal control standards highlight the identification and management of risk as a key element of an organization’s management control program. GAO also found that Commerce’s and State’s communications with companies do not focus on export-controlled information. For example, Commerce’s and State’s Internet Web sites do not provide specific guidance on how to protect electronic transfers of export-controlled information, a point raised by almost one fourth of the company officials GAO interviewed.

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0769.pdf

__________

EXPORT CONTROLS: Agencies Should Assess Vulnerabilities and Improve Guidance for Protecting Export-Controlled Information at Universities

To mitigate the risk of technology and knowledge falling into the wrong hands, the U.S. government—primarily the Departments of State and Commerce—controls the transfer of defense and “dual use” information. However, controlling the transfer of such information presents special challenges. U.S. export control regulations allow foreign students and researchers without export licenses to partake in fundamental research, defined to mean basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which are ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific community.2 U.S. policymakers recognize that foreign students and researchers have made substantial contributions to U.S. research efforts, but the potential transfer of knowledge of controlled defense-related technologies to their home countries could have significant consequences for U.S. national interests.

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0770.pdf

Espionage involves peeking at the other fellow's hand, marking the cards, cooking the books, poisoning the well, breaking the rules, hitting below the belt, cheating, lying, deceiving, defaming, snooping, eavesdropping, prying, stealing, bribing, suborning, burglarizing, forging, misleading, conducting dirty tricks, dirty pool, skulduggery, blackmail, seduction, everything not sporting, not kosher, not cricket. In short, espionage stands virtue on its head and elevates vice instead.

-- Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage, Joseph E. Persico, 2001.

A sigs:

"Every normal man must be tempted at times to spit upon his hands, hoist the black flag, and begin slitting throats." -- H.L. Mencken

Information Battlespace

During the Civil War, the Defenses of Washington (1862) - a circumferential ring of fortified installations - successfully safeguarded the vulnerable city. Since 11 September, 'next-generation' technologies are administering sprawl's unrestrained landscapes. Streets, sidewalks and back yards that shape the suburban imagination are being re-imaged in military-grade surveillance and satellite-based GPS. Constructed in real and near-real time, sprawl's unpredictable legacy of subdivisions, culs-de-sac, big-box retailers, parking lots, fast-food franchises and high-tech corridors are being reconceptualized as 'battlespace,' the multidimensional battlefield constructed by sensor and reporting technologies that conduct intelligence collection, surveillance and reconnaissance. Reconstituted in GIS scene mapping and mission planning softwares, suburban sanctuaries are captive to command-and-control arsenals which have supplanted the omniscient bird's-eye overview.

New technologies reveal latent infrastructures of political control already embedded in suburban landscapes. They expose consumer-driven sprawl as uniquely manipulable information space. The single-family home is a rich lode of sensitive information about debt, cars, credit cards, banking, taxes, travel, school performance and medical history. Data mining's invasive pattern-recognition algorithms - developed from statistics, artificial intelligence and machine learning - scour massive databases on behalf of the government, seeking 'interesting knowledge.' Sprawl's complex information space has become captive to panoptic schemes of 'multiple cartographies of surveillance.'

-- Deborah Natsios, National Security Sprawl, December 27, 2005 (Cartome)

Full List of 3,151 US Military Dead in Iraq and Afghanistan Latest Dead December 10, 2006 -- 3 The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Staff Sgt. James Kristofer R. Ciraso, 26, of Bangor, Maine, died of injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his military vehicle in Baghdad, Iraq, on Dec. 7. Ciraso was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. They died of injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near their unit while on patrol during combat operations in Baghdad, Iraq, on Dec. 7. Both soldiers were assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 509th Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Fort Richardson, Alaska. Killed were: Staff Sgt. Henry W. Linck, 23, of Manhattan, Kan. Spc. Micah S. Gifford, 27, of Redding, Calif. December 9, 2006 -- 7 The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. They died Dec. 6 in Ar Ramadi, Iraq, of injuries sustained when an improvised explosive device detonated near their HMMWV during combat operations. They were assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Giessen, Germany. Killed were: Capt. Travis L. Patriquin, 32, of Texas. Spc. Vincent J. Pomante III, 22, of Westerville, Ohio. The Department of Defense announced today the death of five soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. They died Dec. 6 in Hawijah, Iraq, of injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near their vehicle while on patrol. Killed were: Sgt. Jesse J.J. Castro, 22, of Chalan Pago, American Samoa. Cpl. Jason I. Huffman, 23, of Conover, N.C. Spc. Joshua B. Madden, 21, of Sibley, La. Spc. Yari Mokri, 26, of Pflugerville, Texas. Pfc. Travis C. Krege, 24, of Cheektowaga, N.Y. Castro, Huffman, Madden and Krege were all assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Mokri was assigned to the 3rd Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division. December 8, 2006 -- 5 The Department of Defense announced today the death of a Marine who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Cpl. Dustin J. Libby, 22, of Presque Isle, Maine, died Dec. 6 while conducting combat operations in Al Anbar province, Iraq. Libby was assigned to 2nd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, Calif. The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Spc. Nicholas R. Gibbs, 25, of Stokesdale, N.C., died Dec. 6 in Ar Ramadi, Iraq, of injuries suffered when he came in contact with enemy forces using small arms fire while conducting observation and security operations. Gibbs was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Giessen, Germany. The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Cpl. Billy B. Farris, 20, of Bapchule, Ariz., died Dec. 3 in Taji, Iraq, of injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle while conducting escort operations. Farris was assigned to the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Wash. Sgt. Jay R. Gauthreaux, 26, of Thibodaux, La., died Dec. 4 in Balad, Iraq, of injuries suffered in Baqubah, Iraq, when in improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle while on patrol. Gauthreaux was assigned to the 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. The Department of Defense announced today the death of a Marine who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Lance Cpl. Brent E. Beeler, 22, of Jackson, Mich., died Dec. 7 while conducting combat operations in Al Anbar province, Iraq. Beeler was assigned to Marine Forces Reserve’s 1st Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment, 4th Marine Division, Lansing, Mich. December 7, 2006 -- 5 The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Staff Sgt. Robert L. Love Jr., 28, of Meridian, Miss., died Dec. 1 in Ar Ramadi, Iraq, of injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle during combat operations. Love was assigned to the 16th Engineer Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Giessen, Germany. Spc. Marco L. Miller, 36, of Longwood, Fla., died Dec. 5 at Landstuhl Medical Center, Landstuhl, Germany, of injuries suffered Dec. 3 in Taji, Iraq, from enemy indirect fire while conducting an escort mission. Miller was assigned to the 3rd Battalion Support Company, 20th Special Forces Group, Camp Blanding, Fla. The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Spc. Jordan W. Hess, 26, of Marysville, Wash., died Dec. 5 at Brooke Army Medical Center, San Antonio, Texas, of injuries suffered on Nov. 11 in Ta'Meem, Iraq, when an improvised explosive device detonated near his combat patrol. Hess was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Schweinfurt, Germany. The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Sgt. Yevgeniy Ryndych, 24, of Brooklyn, N.Y., died Dec. 6 in Ar Ramadi, Iraq, of injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his unit while on patrol. Ryndych was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colo. The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Spc. Kenneth W. Haines, 25, of Fulton, N.Y., died Dec. 3 in Balad, Iraq, of injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle while on patrol in Abu Hishma, Iraq. Haines was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery, 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. December 6, 2006 -- 7 The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Sgt. Keith E. Fiscus, 26, of Townsend, Del., died Dec. 2 in Baghdad, Iraq, of injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his HMMWV during combat operations.He was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Pfc. Nicholas D. Turcotte, 23, of Maple Grove, Minn., died Dec. 4 in An Nasiriyah, Iraq, from injuries suffered in a vehicle accident. He was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 135th Infantry, West St. Paul, Minn. The Department of Defense announced today the death of two Marines who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Maj. Joseph T. McCloud, 39, of Grosse Pointe Park, Mich. Cpl. Joshua C. Sticklen, 24, of Virginia Beach, Va. Both Marines died Dec. 3 when the CH-46 helicopter they were in crashed in Al Anbar province, Iraq. They were assigned to 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division, III Marine Expeditionary Force, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Capt. Shawn L. English, 35, of Westerville, Ohio, died Dec. 3 in Baghdad, Iraq, of injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his HMMWV during combat operations.He was assigned to the 577th Engineer Battalion, 1st Engineer Brigade, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. The Department of Defense announced today the death of a Marine who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Lance Cpl. Thomas P. Echols, 20, of Shepherdsville, Ky., died Dec. 4 while conducting combat operations in Al Anbar province, Iraq. He was assigned to 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C. The Department of Defense announced today the death of a sailor who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Hospitalman Christopher A. Anderson, 24, of Longmont, Colo., died Dec. 4 as a result of enemy action in Al Anbar Province, Iraq.Anderson was a Navy Corpsman assigned to 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 2nd Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, based in Camp Lejeune, N.C. December 5, 2006 -- 4 The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Pfc. Ross A. McGinnis, 19, of Knox, Pa., died of injuries suffered when a grenade was thrown into his vehicle in Baghdad, Iraq. McGinnis was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Schweinfurt, Germany. The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier previously listed as Duty Status Whereabouts Unknown while supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Spc. Dustin M. Adkins, 22, of Finger, Tenn., was pronounced dead Dec. 4 of injuries suffered after the Chinook helicopter he was in made an emergency landing near Haditha, Iraq, Dec. 3. He was assigned to the Group Support Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group, Fort Campbell, Ky. The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Pvt. Troy D. Cooper, 21, of Amarillo, Texas, died Dec. 3 of injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle in Balad, Iraq. Cooper was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. The Department of Defense announced today the death of an airman who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Capt. Kermit O. Evans, 31, of Hollandale, Miss. died when the U.S. Marine Corps CH-46 helicopter he was riding in made an emergency water landing in western Al Anbar Province, Dec. 3. He was assigned to the 27th Civil Engineer Squadron, Cannon Air Force Base, N.M. and was deployed with the 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing, Balad Air Base, Iraq. December 4, 2006 -- 4 The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Staff Sgt. John L. Hartman Jr., 39, of Tampa, Fla., died Nov. 30 in Baghdad, Iraq, of injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his HMMWV during combat operations. He was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Ga. The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. They died Dec. 2 in Fallujah, Iraq, of injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near their HMMWV during security operations. They were assigned to the 2nd Combined Arms Battalion, 136th Infantry, Crookston, Minn. Killed were: Spc. Bryan T. McDonough, 22, of Maplewood, Minn. Spc. Corey J. Rystad, 20, of Red Lake Falls, Minn. The Department of Defense announced today the death of a Marine who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Lance Cpl. Jesse D. Tillery, 19, of Vesper, Wis., died Dec. 2 from wounds suffered while conducting combat operations in Al Anbar province, Iraq. Tillery was assigned to 2nd Assault Amphibian Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C. December 3, 2006 -- 1 The Department of Defense announced today the death of an airman deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Maj. Troy L. Gilbert, 34, of Litchfield Park, Ariz., died Nov. 27 when his F-16C fighter crashed 20 miles northwest of Baghdad, Iraq. Maj. Gilbert was assigned to the 309th Fighter Squadron, Luke Air Force Base, Ariz., and was previously carried as "Duty Status Whereabouts Unknown," awaiting positive DNA identification of remains from the crash site. December 2, 2006 -- 2 The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Staff Sgt. Jeremy W. Mulhair, 35, of Omaha, Neb., died Nov. 30 in Taji, Iraq, of injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle during reconnaissance operations. Mulhair was assigned to the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Cpl. Jonerik Loney, 21, of Hartselle, Ala., died Nov. 28 in Hit, Iraq, of injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle during combat operations. Loney was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Baumholder, Germany. December 1, 2006 -- 2 The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. Pfc. Theodore M. West, 23, of Richmond, Ky., died Nov. 29 in Baghdad, Iraq, of injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle during combat operations. West was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. Spc. Chris Kleinwachter, 29, of Wahpeton, N.D., died Nov. 30 in Ghazni, Afghanistan, of injuries suffered when his vehicle rolled over during combat operations. He was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 188th Air Defense Artillery, Grand Forks, N.D.
Calendar of the Dead
Year 1
March 2003	59	April 2003	92	May 2003	31	June 2003	34	July 2003	42	August 2003	37
September 2003	33	October 2003	47	November 2003	84	December 2003	49	January 2004	43	February 2004	31
Total Dead War Year 1 -- 582
Year 2
March 2004	42	April 2004	129	May 2004	80	June 2004	52	July 2004	60	August 2004	67
September 2004	79	October 2004	62	November 2004	140	December 2004	79	January 2005	101	February 2005	65
Total Dead War Year 2 -- 958   Total 2 War Years -- 1,540
Year 3
March 2005	45	April 2005	62	May 2005	88	June 2005	89	July 2005	65	August 2005	108
September 2005	61	October 2005	90	November 2005	96	December 2005	72	January 2006	66	February 2006	62
Total Dead War Year 3 -- 904 Total 3 War Years -- 2,444
Year 4
March 2006	45	April 2006	71	May 2006	84	June 2006	85	July 2006	48	August 2006	70
September 2006	81	October 2006	110	November 2006	77	December 2006	40	January 2007		February 2007
Total Dead War Year 4 -- 707

Cryptome/JYA Archives

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Cryptomb 19    January-June 2006

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CRYPTOME TEN YEARS DVD Cryptome offers its archives on a single DVD (CDs no longer offered). Donate $25 for a DVD of the Cryptome 10-year archives of 35,000 files from June 1996 to June 2006 (~3.5 GB). Click Paypal or mail check/MO made out to John Young, 251 West 89th Street, New York, NY 10024. Archives include all files of cryptome.org, cryptome2.org, jya.com, cartome.org, eyeball-series.org and iraq-kill-maim.org. Cryptome INSCOM DVD. Cryptome offers with the Cryptome DVD an INSCOM DVD of about 18,000 pages of counter-intelligence dossiers declassified by the US Army Information and Security Command, dating from 1945 to 1985. No additional contribution required -- $25 for both. The DVDs will be sent anywhere worldwide without extra cost. Note on Paypal. Due to Paypal's notices being occasionally spam-filtered, please send a separate e-mail with a mailing address to: cryptome[at]earthlink.net. Free DVDs will be sent to public and .edu libraries which make a request to Cryptome: cryptome[at]earthlink.net. Requests from the PRC and "rogue nations" invited.

Cryptome welcomes documents for publication that are prohibited by governments worldwide, in particular material on freedom of expression, privacy, cryptology, dual-use technologies, national security, intelligence, and secret governance -- open, secret and classified documents -- but not limited to those. Documents are removed from this site only by order served directly by a US court having jurisdiction. No court order has ever been served; any order served will be published here -- or elsewhere if gagged by order. Bluffs will be published if comical but otherwise ignored. Send by e-mail, fax or mail: Cryptome Administrator: John Young Cryptome Email Change: New address: cryptome[at]earthlink.net. It would help to start the subject line with "Cryptome." Tel: (US) 212-873-8700 Fax: (US) 212-787-6102 Mail: 251 West 89th Street, New York, NY 10024 April 25, 2002: New PGP 6.5.8 Key: ID: 0xA126BC05 Fingerprint: 4BBD 49A8 9116 52FF 9CF9 C411 443D 0394 A126 BC05 -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.8 for non-commercial use <http://www.pgp.com> mQGiBDzIDV0RBADOVJH14G1R6CV1QzxGSQ79DbkssL848Ua3qm9NPKpyzqv5XPXA oixYh16Hf/yc/ryEDhlgTvbm9X358TxRIpKMVHsZbK7It5AGIPWQVI7g3zGV/G8v Y8d70fgc9ORC+UvEC6CPW4Z2pygX4vo4ye3wgjIhTC2UKfDiXYOiu6x+KQCg/xtQ +JD+nwVSyjFW8oTzVn7IXpkEAI/nCbzV0XTE737mKGK4DBUscfiU2Xc01WNOK5S+ QEE0dor/2QWMCHaNbq1moQv2HBYgkkT6i71XKVWAP2Pzq7Erc5ItYIli2cTNIGUm A3R2MTxC6nFoeEiEv48NjJ0XqjoJ2lvgTAf9ypWB8FFW4wmUwZS7bvyhRNyjh9gN pm29A/9IybcyobfplalyMeAEy0LVEFw1B3exwz+7C4b0SFpLp+DXk3i6lV3VsomY fTMiLqIJfhKjCsj/0taV1n1KbQSSY5d8MokkHjqvDvKGp+cMu/tXFfuXu5UnHpoX LKTQ6ki9a0S6xZenu8b2sH6J2IFFRFNIaGmLdfeHpRdbYJRAJLQdSm9obiBZb3Vu ZyA8anlhQHBpcGVsaW5lLmNvbT6JAE4EEBECAA4FAjzIDV0ECwMCAQIZAQAKCRBE PQOUoSa8BSmpAJ4ofGY8+/B95KIaQEa2iGV/Gu0XPQCg17M5aeom1YeCEJkfj7Oz YyFbymC5BA0EPMgNXRAQAPkYoH5aBmF6Q5CV3AVsh4bsYezNRR8O2OCjecbJ3HoL rOQ/40aUtjBKU9d8AhZIgLUV5SmZqZ8HdNP/46HFliBOmGW42A3uEF2rthccUdhQ yiJXQym+lehWKzh4XAvb+ExN1eOqRsz7zhfoKp0UYeOEqU/Rg4Soebbvj6dDRgjG zB13VyQ4SuLE8OiOE2eXTpITYfbb6yUOF/32mPfIfHmwch04dfv2wXPEgxEmK0Ng w+Po1gr9oSgmC66prrNlD6IAUwGgfNaroxIe+g8qzh90hE/K8xfzpEDp19J3tkIt AjbBJstoXp18mAkKjX4t7eRdefXUkk+bGI78KqdLfDL2Qle3CH8IF3KiutapQvMF 6PlTETlPtvFuuUs4INoBp1ajFOmPQFXz0AfGy0OplK33TGSGSfgMg71l6RfUodNQ +PVZX9x2Uk89PY3bzpnhV5JZzf24rnRPxfx2vIPFRzBhznzJZv8V+bv9kV7HAarT W56NoKVyOtQa8L9GAFgr5fSI/VhOSdvNILSd5JEHNmszbDgNRR0PfIizHHxbLY72 88kjwEPwpVsYjY67VYy4XTjTNP18F1dDox0YbN4zISy1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy 1obEAxnIByl6ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWakXUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XrPdYX AAICEACuZswqMS6FfW3ekuj76PB4jn80MGLLoVFYtSv2wclq5auWyBt5c5QXKNk/ T74a+PKcTN5VxoVq7kDDbjnrsdl1yKq7PszRMM62eLWak+6bKMR2kGVMBTp5+8M4 bZUVX4WsQaTqGQthdZQLnHKxCF6by12wUXDdRfmfpomf5O8VDVlNAUhUJ1WpOBFD uXiHuS8KonPrRoHtjWDqyUFvMUvEvlB7y0KxMXsTUIyRYc8CujZZUo2GFs0D2H3H tKu2ate7yAoEBYCuMlvuZWCcgVJUto9bXjHM1kQqHaAGHm+a2jYMcatKlDDkkDp1 h3PNqzQOUI75hUg4vLiwMUeVaSyLqDKtz9YogH8n3gCvAPjNdeF+bdaNfVgzbLEk +stfCIEzRlBUsT70scpfFsyMP2Je/jiYwJNwBrxjUwJ4Ip1Dfc4bX8BRaG8s+fFi URjockN1RXkXicaRNFoxl0ld1kNHGB02PkFEdcTXTRJf4Gi5UQznO01ODpnI6/hv 4wW0+RdPg2sdpRmOVm7t563T+wxh3vSa6o1x4TPdshuDbQyQ63YGHKziB5CNCIvQ xwHrZIIywN/1G6jknr0ajTB/saEZkuNE77H2FjB498Bp7Swggu/+n8a2AC6dSJ57 E1SCHoZJHTP3lIFJXpv38zFiyi2I5IVFVTIExeT4IN/BEhnwmIkARgQYEQIABgUC PMgNXQAKCRBEPQOUoSa8BeBdAKD1J9FP0ubxgdQWkQj5s+7l9erEbACg7dFMejUV JxbAXr+qUgDWS1X10Bg= =QVLR -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

Cartome is a companion site to Cryptome. It is an archive of spatial and geographic documents on privacy, cryptography, dual-use technologies, national security and intelligence -- communicated by imagery systems: cartography, photography, photogrammetry, steganography, climatography, seismography, geography, camouflage, maps, images, drawings, charts, diagrams, imagery intelligence (IMINT) and their reverse-panopticon and counter-deception potential. Administrator is architect Deborah Natsios, longtime Cryptome partner.

Fight the Bot To combat rogue bots which waste about 25% of Cryptome's bandwidth, siphoning hundreds, even thousands of files at a time, repeatedly, bypassing means and methods of blocking them, the collection is seeded with a few hidden trojans and viruses -- which cannot be downloaded by conventional access to files. Bots which gulp more than 100 files per day will swallow these gluttony pills and explode. Since the fatheaded users of rogue bots do not read this caution, the file names of the pills will be posted here periodically for respectful downloaders to cleanse any toxins inadvertently grabbed.  No published file will be contaminated. The Cryptome DVD will be clean except for the DIRT trojan which is ID'ed on the disk -- and any unknown toxins planted in contributions.

A caution on bots: Cryptome is attacked several times a day, like many other sites, nearly always by rogue bots, or bots set by default to siphon everything, including deep links, until a new user learns to trim the wide mouth suck. Java, WGet and Webdup are the worst offenders, but not the only ones, because they come ready to siphon everything until reconfigured. Hog bots suck thousands of files in a session before pole-axed. Prime offenders also are the ravenous searching and indexing engines, which 24/7 roam the web repeatedly gobbling the same files, or trashing with 304s for files already indexed. Because these pigs shutout other readers, Cryptome blocks any address which downloads more than 100 files per session, and that often requires blocking an entire domain for providers which assign a random address per session. About every six months Cryptome lifts all blocks (except for eternal offenders), now about 200. If blocked send a message to cryptome[at]eartlink.net, with affected domain name or IP number. Until the block is lifted, use an anonymizer like anonymizer.com; or many recommend anonymouse.org. Please don't unleash bots, or pinch their gorge. ______________________________ Russia Mirror: http://www.jar2.com/cryptome.ru/ Quintessenz mirror: http://cryptome.quintessenz.org/mirror/ Sabotage mirror: http://cryptome.sabotage.org Thanks to SC for crypto software: http://caunter.ca/crypto.html