13 December 1999
Source:
http://infosec.nosc.mil/TEXT/PRODUCTS/CRYPTO/index.html
Stand Alone/Legacy KG-94/94A, KG-194/194A (Walburn Family); KIV-19 In-Line Network Encryptor E-HHX Embeddable INFOSEC Product (EIP) Embedded KG-66/66A, KGR-66 (KUTA); KGV-68 (NOBLEMAN)
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The security challenges confronting Department of the Navy information technology resources are multiplying rapidly with the exponential growth of interconnected systems for producing and exchanging data and information. As interconnectivity increases and the threats to information technology become more sophisticated and diverse, Department of the Navy systems become inherently more vulnerable to surreptitious access and malicious attacks. The fast-paced advances of technology drive Department of the Navy reliance on commercial technologies and services; however, many of these solutions may offer only minimal defense against the Information Warfare threat activity and must be augmented by Information Systems Security disciplines and focused management decisions to ensure protection of DoN information technology resources. These INFOSEC Products are available to our customers in order to support their missions. If you require further information or assistance with any of these products, please contact the Point of Contact (POC) on that individual product or the Navy INFOSEC Technical Assistance Center (ITAC) Toll-Free 1.800.304.4636 or DSN: 563.8878/8879. |
Last updated on: Thursday, July 22, 1999 08:50:24
Repair/Maintenance | POC | Acquisition Authority | Contract Information
DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The KG-40/40A is a half-duplex digital device used to provide cryptographic security protection for Navy Link 11 and any data communications meeting Tactical Data Information Link (TADIL) A data standards. It links the computer and the data terminal set. The KG-40A serial configuration (KG-40A-S) is used in the Airborne Tactical Data System (ATDS) and the parallel configuration (KG-40A-P) is used in the Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS). The KG-40A is a mandatory modified version of the older KG-40, which incorporates variable fill capability. The modification entails replacement of a printed circuit board (motherboard) and the front panel assembly. The KG-40A provides enhanced security using an improved cryptographic algorithm and electronic key capability. Because the KG-40A key is a standard 128-bit key, it can only be keyed by the AN/CYZ-10 Data Transfer Device (DTD) or a KOI-18 Common Fill Device (CFD). It cannot accept key from the KYK-13 Electronic Transfer Device (ETD) or from the KYX-15 Net Control Device (NCD). The KG-40A is an UNCLASSIFIED controlled cryptographic item (CCI) when unkeyed and is interoperable with the KG-40. When the KG-40A is keyed, classification equals that of the key installed. The KG-40A peripheral equipment includes the MT-4417/S Parallel Mount, MT-4416/A Serial Mount, and KGX-40A Remote Control Unit (RCU).
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency (NSA) has determined that this product does not process, store, or utilize a date in its operations. Therefore, the year 2000 problem does not affect this product; NSA memo of 12 Jun 98 applies.
Physical Characteristics
Power:
Environmental:
MTBF: 1,000 hours
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DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The KG-84A/C are cryptographic equipment developed to ensure secure transmission of digital data. The KG-84C is a Dedicated Loop Encryption Device (DLED), and both the KG-84A/C are General-Purpose Telegraph Encryption Equipment (GPTEE). The KG-84A is primarily used for point-to-point encrypted communications via landline, microwave, and satellite systems. The KG-84C is an outgrowth of the Navy high frequency (HF) communications program and supports these needs. The KG-84A and KG-84C are devices that operate in simplex, half-duplex, or full-duplex modes. The KG-84C contains all of the KG-84 and KG-84A modes, and a variable update counter, improved HF performance, synchronous out-of-sync detection, asynchronous cipher text, plain text, bypass, and European TELEX protocol. The KG-84 (A/C) is certified to handle data at all levels of security. The KG-84 (A/C) is a Controlled Cryptographic Item and is UNCLASSIFIED when unkeyed. Keyed KG-84 equipment assumes the classification level equal to that of the keying material used.
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency (NSA) has determined that this product does not process, store, or utilize a date in its operations. Therefore, the year 2000 problem does not affect this product; NSA memo of 12 Jun 98 applies.
Physical Characteristics
Data Rate:
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UNIT COST No longer produced |
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DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The WALBURN Family (KG-81, KG-94/194, KG-94A/194A, KG-95-1,2, and R) equipment consists of high-speed bulk encryption devices used primarily for encryption of microwave trunks, high-speed landline circuits, video teleconferencing, and T-1 satellite channels. WALBURN Family devices are certified to encrypt and decrypt up to TOP SECRET. They are UNCLASSIFIED controlled cryptographic items (CCIs) when unkeyed. These devices provide full-duplex/simplex encryption for all classification levels and are cryptographically compatible and interoperable (within their respective data rates). KG-81: Provides full-duplex encryption of digital trunks. It is rack mounted using the HNF-81-1/2 interconnect housing frame. The KG-81 is used primarily at major communications stations for bulk data and video encryption. KG-94: Provides emerging low and medium tactical and nontactical digital trunk encryption. It is rack mounted using the HNF-81-1/2 interconnect housing frame and supports the Joint Tactical Communications program in association with Marine Corps AN/TTC-42 and AN/TRC-170 switches. KG-94A: Is an environmentally repackaged, ruggedized version of the KG-94 that supports the Marine Corps unit level circuit switches (SB-3865) and the Digital Wideband Transmission System(DWTS). KG-194: Is a less costly version of the KG-94 that incorporates a remote keying capability and implements FIREFLY technology. The KG-194 is used for digital and voice bulk encryption at major communications stations. KG-194A: Is a less costly ruggedized version of the KG-194. It satisfies the same basic requirements as the KG-94A, incorporates a remote keying capability, and implements FIREFLY technology. KG-95: Is a general-purpose, high-speed, full-duplex, fixed-plant, key-generating encryption device used for video, data links, missile test range communications (KG-95-1), and DS-3 (45 Mbps) telephone trunks (KG-95-2). Its capabilities include remote operation, remote status check, and remote over-the-air rekey exchange, in addition to new key management techniques and a fiber optics interface. The KG-95R is a composite of two KG-95-2s in a redundant configuration.
KIV-19: Is a miniaturized KG-194 that is functionally equivalent and interoperable with the KG-194 and KG-194A. The KIV-19 is not intended to replace the KG-194 and KG-194A but to fill new requirements and unique backfit requirements that have strict size and weight constraints. The KIV-19 is certified to secure all classification levels and categories. It is an UNCLASSIFIED controlled cryptographic item (CCI) when unkeyed. When keyed, the equipment carries a classification equal to that of the key installed.
HNF-81-1: Is approved for all levels of classified traffic and is designed to have one or two KG-81, KG-94, or KG-194 cryptographic devices. The terminal blocks in the rear of the HNF-81-1 provide connections between the input or output cabling and the connectors.
HNF-81-2: Is approved only for the transmission of unclassified or previously encrypted traffic unless it is transmitting bypassed information with prior approval of National Security Agency(NSA). The HNF-81-2 is mechanically similar to the HNF-81-1 except the terminal blocks in the rear of the frame are mounted on printed wiring boards giving the user cryptographic bypass ability.
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency (NSA) has determined that KG-81/94/94A/194/194A/95 and KIV-19 do not process, store, or utilize a date in their operations. Therefore, the year 2000 problem does not affect these products; NSA memo of 18 Dec 97 applies.
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DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The KGR-96 is a receive-only, digital data decryptor that provides security for the Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE) (AN/USQ-101 [V]), which is used to copy the Tactical Data Information Exchange System (TADIXS)-Bravo and the TRE and (TRAP) Data Dissemination System (TDDS) broadcast on fleet flagships and major combatants. The KGR-96 can be controlled and monitored either locally, using front panel controls and indicators, or remotely, using signals that are input and output on rear panel connectors. Additionally, the KGR-96 features include local or remote key filling, power transient protection, and self-test. It is interoperable with the KG-46 and the KGT/R-62. The KGR-96 requires two different keys, unique to each piece of equipment, for input by the user before processing traffic. Keying/rekeying is accomplished through the front panel fill connection or remotely through the rear panel connector (only one key may be remotely refilled). The rectangular shaped KGR-96 is designed for mounting in an MT-4841/U, which can mount two KGR-96s. The equipment is deployed on major naval shore stations, major naval surface ships, and submarines; is certified to receive up to TOP SECRET level traffic; and when unkeyed is classified SECRET No Foreign Nationals.
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency (NSA) has determined that this product does not process, store, or utilize a date in its operations. Therefore, the year 2000 problem does not affect this product; NSA memo of 12 Jun 98 applies.
Physical Characteristics
Data Rate: Decrypts synchronous serial data at any rate between 1Kbps and 10Mbps
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DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The KGV-8/8A/8B/8C miniature secure data units (SDUs) are general-purpose, half-duplex, removable, and embeddable communications security (COMSEC)/transmission security (TRANSEC) modules that support the implementation of the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) terminals in ships and aircraft for the Department of the Navy (DON). The user installs the module as a plug-in to the front of the AN/URC-107(V) JTIDS terminal. JTIDS is a high-capacity, secure, jam-resistant, tactical data and voice communications system that provides classified information distribution, relative navigation, and identification capabilities. The KGV-8 Family supports over-the-air rekey and can perform automatic key rollover at the end of the cryptographic period. The KGV-8 Family is intended for integration into a host system that controls its operation (e.g., clock and status indicators). It is interoperable with the KGV-11 family, COMSEC/TRANSEC Integrated Circuit (CTIC) DS-101 Hybrid (CDH), KG-66, KGR-66, KGV-68, KI-37, KGV-15, KGV-13, and KG-87. It is certified to encrypt and decrypt up to TOP SECRET. It is an UNCLASSIFIED controlled cryptographic item (CCI) when unkeyed. When keyed its classification equals that of the key installed.
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency (NSA) has determined that this product does not process, store, or utilize a date in its operations. Therefore, the year 2000 problem does not affect this product; NSA memo of 12 Jun 98 applies.
Physical Characteristics
Power:
Environment:
MTBF:
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DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The KGV-11/11A/11C are general-purpose, half-duplex, removable communications security (COMSEC)/transmission security (TRANSEC) modules that protect various control channels and orderwires for the following systems:
The KGV-11 is a National Security Agency (NSA) COMSEC device to incorporate the smart fill protocol (DS-101) using the AN/CYZ-10 Data Transfer Device for its key loading. It supports over-the-air rekey and can provide automatic key rollover at the end of the cryptographic period. A KGV-11 is intended for integration into a host system that controls its operation (e.g., clock and status indicators). The KGV-11 can accommodate time-division multiple access communications systems, broadcast, point-to-point, satellite command and control, and secure conferencing systems; it is deployed to strategic and tactical ground, air, surface, and subsurface platforms. It is interoperable with the KGV-8 family, COMSEC/TRANSEC Integrated Circuit (CTIC) DS-101 Hybrid (CDH), KG-66, KGR-66, KGV-68, KI-37, KGV-15, KGV-13, and KG-87. It is also certified to encrypt and decrypt up to TOP SECRET. It is an UNCLASSIFIED controlled cryptographic item (CCI) when unkeyed. When keyed its classification equals that of the key installed.
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency (NSA) has determined that this product does not process, store or utilize a date in its operations. Therefore, the year 2000 problem does not affect this product; NSA memo of 12 Jun 98 applies.
Physical Characteristics
Power:
Environment:
MTBF:
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DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The KIV-6 Cryptographic Computer is a component of the Combined Interrogator Transponder (CIT) Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), Mark (MK) XII AN/APX-111(V) and AN/APX-113 IFF, which is installed on the F/A-18, F/A-16, and SH-60 helicopters. The Commander in Chief (CINC) rules of engagement specify that positive identification of an airborne target is required before employing air-to-air weapons beyond visual range. The CIT/IFF with KIV-6 Computer provides the capability to positively identify an aircraft as friend or foe and to utilize air-to-air missiles beyond the pilot’s visual range. The intent of CIT/IFF program was to select a Non-Developmental Item (NDI) with minor modifications incorporated to perform specific Department of the Navy (DON) requirements. The Receiver/Transmitter (R/T) Radio is a CIT/IFF system that is composed of the following: Interrogator Transponder (IT), Fuselage-Mounted Antenna Array (FMA), Beam Forming Network (BFN), and associated contractor-furnished equipment (CFE) interconnect cabling. The IT can generate interrogations and process transponder replies in IFF modes 1, 2, 3/A, C, and 4. The FMA is used to support interrogator function and is composed of five identical blades and an antenna position control. The BFN accepts commands from the IT and routes radio frequencies to the five antenna outputs. The KIV-6 performs Mode 4 encryption and decryption functions contained in the CIT/IFF. The encryption/decryption keys are electronically loaded through a connector located on the front panel, at connector J1 which accepts the AN/CYZ-10 DTD, operating in the DS-102 mode. Fault detection/isolation of a failed KIV-6 is determined by the CIT’s Built-In Test (BIT). The KIV-6 ensures secure Mode 4 transponder/interrogator performance, as it applies to the AN/APX-111 for the F/A-18, or the AN/APX-113 IFF system for the F-16, and the helicopters.
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency (NSA) has determined that this product does not process, store, or utilize a date in its operations. Therefore, the year 2000 problem does not affect this product; NSA memo of 12 Jun 98 applies.
Physical Characteristics
Power: 3 W maximum
Environmental:
MTBF: 51,000 hours
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DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The KIV-7 family of embeddable KG-84 communications security (COMSEC) modules are lightweight, compact, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) cryptographic devices that provide protection for digital and voice communications. The KIV-7 provides security protection through TOP SECRET, dependent on the classification of the fill key. There are currently three models in the KIV-7 family: the normal speed (KIV-7), the high-speed (KIV-7HS), and the high-speed revision A (KIV-7HSA). The KIV-7 cryptographic device was designed as a miniaturized KG-84A/C and intended to be completely interoperable with KG-84A/Cs, however, the KIV-7 and the KIV-7HS contain the Windster processor chip, which has some performance anomalies that prevent total KG-84A/C interoperability. The KIV-7HSA with the Presidio processor chip is being evaluated to ensure it resolves the Windster chip anomalies and is scheduled to be available in FY99. Only the high-speed version (KIV-7HS) is now being manufactured. The miniaturization of the KIV-7 family units makes them suitable for space and load constrained environments (e.g., aboard submarines or vehicle mount). The KIV-7 has storage for up to 10 traffic encryption keys, which simplifies multinet communications. A removable cryptographic ignition key (CIK) prevents unauthorized access and protects all internally stored keys. The KIV-7 fill interface is compatible with both DS-101 (AN/CYZ-10 Data Transfer Device [DTD]) and DS-102 (KYK-13, KYX-15, KOI-18) common fill devices. When unkeyed or when the CIK is removed; and not collocated, the KIV-7 is handled as an UNCLASSIFIED controlled cryptographic item (CCI). When the KIV-7 is keyed, it is handled at the classification level of the highest level of stored key. The KIV-7 Rack Assembly provides both electrical and mechanical interfaces to accommodate 2, 4, or 8 KIV-7 units. The 19-inch rack assembly is designed for installation into any standard 19-inch cabinet that meets the design requirements of RS-410. The assembly contains two interchangeable power supplies and an automatic switchover circuit.
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency (NSA) has determined that this product does not process, store, or utilize a date in its operations. Therefore, the year 2000 problem does not affect this product; NSA memo of 12 Jun 98 applies.
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DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The KW-46 is a simplex system designed to provide communications security (COMSEC) for the Fleet Broadcast System. The KW-46 consists of the TSEC/KWT-46 transmitter and KWR-46 receiver. The KWR-46 is a low-level device that performs on-line decryption of digital message, record, and data traffic received over the fleet broadcast system at data rates from 50 bps to 9.6 kbps in asynchronous, stepped, or synchronous modes. The KWR-46 uses a continuous synchronization pattern situated directly in the transmitted traffic. The KW-46 will process up to and including TOP SECRET information. The KWR-46 is used for over-the-air transfer (OTAT) of crytographic material to support KG-84A/C use. The KWR-46 also supports North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Broadcast, the Navy Standard Teleprinter (NST), low frequency (LF)/high frequency (HF) R-2368 receiver equipment, and the High Speed Fleet Broadcast (HSFB). The KWR-46 is used on ships; the KWT-46 is located ashore. Unkeyed KWR-46 equipment is classified CONFIDENTIAL. Keyed KWR-46 equipment assumes the classification level equal to that of the keying material used. Electronic key fill of the KWR-46 will only be accomplished through the utilization of the General-Purpose Tape Reader KOI-18/TSEC and AN/CYZ-10, DTD.
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency (NSA) has determined that this product does not process, stor,e or utilize a date in its operations. Therefore, the year 2000 problem does not affect this product; NSA memo of 12 Jun 98 applies.
Physical Characteristics
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DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION Embeddable Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) Product (EIP) users include communications systems that use MIL-STD-1533 VERSA module Eurocard (VME) bus technology. EIP provides link-level, time-of-day encryption/decryption for time-division multiple access (TDMA) networks and subscriber-level, packet-based message indicator (MI) encryption/decryption. At the link level, EIP can be used as an in-line network encryptor(INE) and has the advantage of being embedded in the host system versus a separate end cryptographic unit (ECU) (e.g., TACLANE/FASTLANE). EIP supports network multilevel security segregation of users on a common transmission control protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP) network. There are two primary communications scenarios for the use of EIP: communications between subscribers/users of a network, and communications between network nodes across communications links. The encryption function in these two scenarios is referred to as subscriber encryption and link encryption, respectively. EIP supports both intra-platform and inter-platform communications. As a subscriber device, it is used to encrypt data before it enters the network domain and to attach a bypassed clear text TCP/IP header used to route the data to another node, either on the same platform (ship, ground station, aircraft) or to another platform. As a link encryption device, it is used for inter-platform communications only, providing encryption of data just before transmission over the communications link, as well as limited bypass of control information (for modem/radio setup, or timing). The graphic below shows, in a general setting, the wide scope of the communications architecture of EIP. The subscriber encryption applications are shown in the upper left portion of the graphic below, and the link encryption uses are depicted in the lower right portion. The key operational concept is that of embedding EIP into an existing (or developing) communication system/subsystem/network. For subscriber/user encryption, EIP can be embedded directly into a workstation computer system (enlarged view, upper left), provided the necessary interfaces are already available. It can be embedded directly into a subscriber interface system (enlarged view, upper middle). EIP is intended to directly support IP traffic as well as traffic from tactical data subscribers to bring in legacy users not currently using IP traffic. EIP supports multicast traffic in both subscriber operational configurations and can also serve as a network encryption system located between a local area network and wide area network. To support this, EIP can be embedded in a stand-alone closed box (enlarged view, upper right) which can provide a variety of protocols and interfaces, as needed. This open system approach to encryption supports a wide range of existing applications, as well as unknown future applications. A new interface or protocol could be supported by bringing in a commercial off-the-shelf adapter for the RED and/or BLACK portion of the closed system. EIP is a controlled cryptographic item (CCI). When an EIP has all keys zeroized (i.e., "Zeroize All" command sent to EIP from a DS-101 compatible fill device such as an AN/CYZ-10 Data Transfer Device [DTD]) and is removed from the host system, it is handled as an UNCLASSIFIED CCI. When an EIP has keys loaded, it is handled at the classification of the highest loaded key. Cryptographic key insertion of an EIP is limited to key load via the DS-101 key fill port. Distribution of cryptographic key types is accomplished manually (or automatically) through the use of a DTD. EIP is not directly involved in the distribution of key.
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency (NSA) has determined that this product does not process, store, or utilize a date in its operations. Therefore, the year 2000 problem does not affect this product; NSA memo of 12 Jun 98 applies. Type: The EIP is a single 6U form factor VME board, mounted in a host chassis containing other VME boards performing host system functions. Physical Characteristics
Key Storage: 8 wrapped keys in nonvolatile memory and 64 unwrapped keys in volatile memory
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POC| Acquisition Authority | Contract Information | Cost | COMSEC Equipment Validation Information Access
DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The FASTLANE ® (KG-75) encryptor provides high-speed, transparent, low-latency security services for multimedia applications across both local and wide area asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) networks. FASTLANE provides an effective solution because of its ability to take advantage of ATM's bandwidth-on-demand services. FASTLANE supports a variety of communication modes with flexibility and robust key management. It provides authentication plus end-to-end protection of user information at all levels up to TOP SECRET/sensitive compartmented information (SCI). The encryptor supports point-to-point and point-to-multipoint (multicast) communications, switched and permanent virtual circuits, simplex and duplex communications. FASTLANEs may be transparently nested behind other FASTLANEs, allowing formation of cryptographically isolated enclaves that communicate across enclaves of a lower security level. Users can select the security level that the encryptor operates at for each session. A FASTLANE (Release 3 in 1999) will operate dynamically at multiple security levels when attached to a trusted host computer that indicates the security level of each ATM connection. In the multilevel mode of operation, a single FASTLANE will allow information at different security levels to be transported across a single network. The FASTLANE can support a maximum of 4,096 active cryptographically isolated ATM connections and can be upgraded to support 16,000 ATM connections. A FASTLANE may support an individual user or can be shared by a local area network (LAN) or multi-user computer-based group. FASTLANE may be rekeyed electronically or physically. FASTLANEs are interoperable with KG-175 (TACLANE) in the ATM mode. FASTLANE Release 1 is classified SECRET when unkeyed. FASTLANE Releases 2 and 3 are UNCLASSIFIED controlled cryptographic items (CCIs) when unkeyed. When the FASTLANE is keyed, its classification equals that of the key installed.
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency (NSA) has determined that this product is not compliant with Year 2000 requirements; NSA memo of 12 Jun 98 applies. FASTLANE Release 1 and Release 2 are "Not Compliant" with Y2K only because the display in the front panel of the FASTLANE does not display correctly beyond Year 2000. FASTLANE operation has no problem with Year 2000 issue. Release 3 units and Release 3 upgrade kits, which are year 2000 compliant will be available in 4th Quarter 1999. Release 1 and 2 buys through NSA include upgrade to Release 3. Since Release 3 is a factory upgrade, upgraded units will be provided to replace existing units in the field. Existing units will then be returned to the FACTORY for next round of upgrades. Physical Characteristics
Data Rate: DS-1 (1.54Mbps), DS-3 (45 Mbps), OC-3 (155 Mbps), OC-12 (622 Mbps) Power: 110/220 Vac, 75W Environment: 10ºC to 30ºC", Fixed Plant, Ground Benign Battery: Lithium sized, 3.6 V (Manufacture: Soft America, San Diego, CA, Part# L533600-BA, Button Type) MTBF: 25,000+ hours
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UNIT COST Release 1 and Release 2 are no longer available. Starting in May 1999 Release 3 may be purchased by direct sales from GTE or through Federal Data Corporation (FDC) contracting agent. Normally, a FASTLANE is procured with and OC-3 interface; however, FASTLANE data rates may be modified with the purchase of a replacement line card kit. The Navy centrally procures INE and requests to CNO N643 will result in issue without cost to program to validated users.
National Security Agency (NSA) contracting agent
COMSEC Equipment Validation
Information Access
CEVI Database Access
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DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION Short for Tactical FASTLANE ® the KG-175 (TACLANE) and is being developed by National Security Agency (NSA) for security on internet protocol (IP) and asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) networks for the individual user or for enclaves of users at the same security level. KG-175 is a low-cost, Type 1, key-agile, in-line network encryptor for deployment in Department of Defense (DOD) tactical and strategic networks. KG-175s meet the needs of users who must communicate securely over legacy tactical internet networks Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) packet network, Secret Internet Protocol Network (SIPRNET), and emerging ATM networks. KG-175s provide encryption for IP datagram traffic. ATM traffic, and IP datagrams are encapsulated in ATM cells to support a variety of IP, ATM and mixed network configurations. KG-175s can be used to overlay Secure Virtual Networks on top of existing public and/or private network infrastructures. Key management includes automatic key generation via public key cryptography. TACLANE not only employs access control, but includes compromise recovery that is suitable for tactical as well as fixed network environments. It uses a cryptographic ignition key (CIK) that renders the device unusable and UNCLASSIFIED when it is removed.
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency (NSA) has determined that this product is under development and will be compliant with Year 2000; NSA memo of 12 Jun 98 applies.
Physical Characteristics
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| KG-189 HIGH
SPEED STRATEGIC TRUNK ENCRYPTOR
POC | Acquisition Authority | Contract Information
DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The KG-189 is the next generation of trunk encryptors designed to be compatible with Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) standard interfaces. It provides optical transport at both the RED and BLACK interfaces to communications systems. The KG-189 program currently consists of models supporting three standard SONET data rates:
The KG-189 is designed as a single chassis with interchangeable cards allowing the KG-189 to upgrade from OC-3 to OC-12 with minimal cost and no impact on installation. The KG-189 supports benign fill capability, traditional key, and remote loading of FIREFLY vectors. It is approved for use at all classification levels.
CHARACTERISTICS
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[No date]
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DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The Versa Module Eurocard (VME) Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) Module (VIM) product is the next generation TOP SECRET trunk encryption device (30-day key storage capability), which utilizes the Advanced INFOSEC Microprocessor (AIM) technology expected certification by National Security Agency (NSA) 3QFY99. The VIM product is designed to replace multiple trunk encryption devices (TEDs), is fully programmable, and can be enhanced in the future to allow for the replacement of "end of life" cryptographic algorithms. The VIM can be configured to mix and match 64 standard key generation algorithms simultaneously (e.g., 64 channel combinations of KG-40, 81, 84A/C, 94/A, 112, 135, 194, KG-96, KGV-8, 11, 13, 23, KIT-1C, HE-57/58, KY-68, KYV-5). VIM is the equivalent cryptography of 64 end cryptographic units (ECUs) in a single VME module, drastically reducing the current mass of racks, power distribution strips, fixed plant adapters, cables, and patch panels. VIM units are UNCLASSIFIED controlled cryptographic items (CCIs) when not keyed and when keyed their classification equals that of the key installed. Full AIM certification is scheduled for completion in April 1999.
CHARACTERISTICS Year 2000 compliancy to be determined.
Physical Characteristics
Power: 25 W typical MTBF: 20,000 hours
LIFE CYCLE SUPPORT
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Repair/Maintenance | POC | Acquisition Authority | Contract Information
DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The CORNFIELD Multi-Chip Module (MCM) provides simultaneous independent encryption/decryption of one or more channels of synchronous data. The CORNFIELD is software programmable providing flexibility for future algorithms and backwards compatibility for existing algorithms. All algorithms and keys can be loaded through the DS-101 or DS-102 fill port interfaces and can store up to 8 algorithms and 64 keys. The CORNFIELD will provide over-the-air rekey (OTAR) functionality, algorithm storage, power transient detection, and built-in test capability. The CORNFIELD provides four modes of operation including high performance mode, low-power mode, sleep mode, and battery backup mode. In high performance mode, the CORNFIELD can process data rates up to 40 Mbps per channel. In the low-power mode, the CORNFIELD can process data rates up to 2 Mbps per channel. In the sleep mode, the clock to the encryption/decryption channels is internally inhibited. Data will not be processed in the sleep mode. During the battery backup mode, the MCM is turned off while keys are preserved.
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency (NSA) has determined that this product does not process, store, or utilize a date in its operations. Therefore, the year 2000 problem does not affect this product; NSA memo of 12 Jun 98 applies.
Physical Characteristics
Power: 0.5 W to 2 W, 5 Vdc (nominal) MTBF: 100,000 hours
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Repair/Maintenance | POC | Acquisition Authority | Contract Information
DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The Programmable Embeddable Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) Product (PEIP), is a cryptographic core designated E-HLU. The E-HLU is a multichannel, reprogrammable, cryptographic processing unit that will support multiple (up to 10) algorithm applications and future evolution and deployment of new cryptographic algorithms. PEIP will support multiple algorithms by associating keying material with algorithms in a channel. The PEIP may be combined with custom input/output (I/O) modules to address the unique interface requirements of various applications. The PEIP will be able to download and store several algorithms, allowing it to switch between algorithms during operation. The PEIP will perform cryptographic functions such as encryption, decryption, key stream generation, authentication, security self-tests, and key management functions. The E-HLU must be hosted on a VME interface card providing application-specific input/output modules that address the unique interface requirements of various applications. Phase 1 PEIP development will replace KG-38 clock start (CS) units to satisfy Submarine Low Frequency/Very Low Frequency (LF/VLF) Versa Module Eurocard (VME) Bus Receiver (SLVR) requirements. The KG-38 CS is a digital key generator used to provide security in point-to-point and broadcast communications systems. These units are a source of pseudorandom key bits used to provide encryption/decryption, bandspreading, and debandspreading of LF/VLF communication links. The combination E-HLU with SLVR interface nomenclatured is the KOV-17 Phase 1 PEIP development will be receive-only, reprogrammable, and software-based cryptography. Phase 2 PEIP will include transmit capability. Phase 3 will include benign fill and benign key generation. All phases will support software downloads of new cryptographic algorithms and allow up to 10 algorithms to be configured per unit.
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency has determined that this product contains an embedded product that is Year 2000 compliant; NSA memo of 12 Jun 98 applies. Size: PEIP is a single mezzanine board installed on a 6U form factor VME board and mounted in a host chassis containing other VME boards performing host system functions.
Physical Characteristics
Key Storage: 32 keys per algorithm, with possible 10 algorithms per unit
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Repair/Maintenance | POC | Acquisition Authority | Contract Information
DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The KUTA family includes the KG-66/66A and KGR-66 devices and NOBLEMAN refers to the KGV-68. These devices, along with the KGR-68 and KGV-68B, are used to secure weapon systems, aircraft telemetry, and data link encryption applications at test ranges. Additionally, with prior National Security Agency (NSA) approval, KUTA/NOBLEMAN units can be used for remotely staffed and unstaffed, high-risk, data link encryption applications on a case-by-case basis.
The KUTA/NOBLEMAN family is interoperable with the KG-67, KG-135, and SO-66 (Mode B only), and accepts key via the AN/CYZ-10, KOI-18, KYK-13, or KYX-15A. It is certified to encrypt/decrypt up to SECRET; however, two devices can be used in an upgrade configuration to achieve a higher level of classification. KUTA/NOBLEMAN units are UNCLASSIFIED controlled cryptographic item (CCI) when unkeyed. When keyed, their classification equals that of the key installed.
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency (NSA) has determined that this product does not process, store, or utilize a date in its operations. Therefore, the year 2000 problem does not affect this product; NSA memo of 12 Jun 98 applies.
Physical Characteristics
LIFE CYCLE SUPPORT
LIFE CYCLE DOCUMENTATION
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Repair/Maintenance | POC | Acquisition Authority | Contract Information
DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The HAYFIELD MCM is a programmable four-channel receive-only device developed for receivers used to decrypt the Tactical Receive Equipment and Related Applications (TRAP) Data Dissemination System (TDDS) broadcast. It incorporates DS-102 and DS-101 key loading and is Electronic Key Management System (EKMS) compatible. It has internal storage for six algorithms and 64 keys and is capable of performing over-the-air rekey (OTAR). The HAYFIELD MCM is packaged in a 160-pin quad flat pack. The initial application is for the KGR-96 function only, but other algorithms are being developed in software for incorporation into HAYFIELD. These include the KGV-11 function, the KG-84 function for secondary imagery reception, and the KG-40A function (High Speed Fleet Broadcast). The HAYFIELD MCM is certified to decrypt traffic TOP SECRET/SI and below. The HAYFIELD is an UNCLASSIFIED controlled cryptographic item (CCI) when unkeyed. When keyed, it carries the classification level of the traffic key loaded into the host equipment. The HAYFIELD MCM is currently used on the KGV-113 COMSEC board and installed in the Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal (MATT).
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency (NSA) has determined that this product does not process, store, or utilize a date in its operations. Therefore, the year 2000 problem does not affect this product; NSA memo of 12 Jun 98 applies.
Physical Characteristics
Power: +5 VDC @ 1 Ampere for operation
Environment: Ground Tactical Environment (-40°C
to +85°C) MTBF: Calculated at 167,000 hours using MIL-HDBK-217F criteria
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DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION The U-TVB THORTON communications security/transmission security integrated circuit (CTIC) DS-101 Hybrid (CDH) incorporates the CTIC very large scale integration (VLSI) in a hybrid configuration with DS-101 keying and other support circuitry. Like CTIC, it supports COMSEC and TRANSEC. CDH is functionally equivalent to the THORNTON modules (notably the KGV-8B and KGV-11B) and to CTIC, a National Security Agency (NSA) Standard Embeddable Product. CDH can obtain cryptographic synchronization in one of three operational modes: Mode A, characterized by over-the-air reception of synchronization patterns; Mode B, which is self-synchronizing over-the-air; and Mode C, which requires no over-the-air synchronization. It contains Random Access Memory (RAM) for the internal storage of 64 RED, CSESD-11 keys and also the storage of 9 DS-101 Key Encryption Keys (KEKs). It can also be keyed over-the-air through the use of a KOK-13 remote rekey device and can perform an automatic key rollover at the end of the cryptoperiod. The CDH package is a 114-lead leaded chip carrier. CDH is a powerful and flexible device that provides all of the benefits of the CTIC as well as the support circuitry necessary for operation. (Note: Depending on application, the CDH is available in several configurations.) The CDH is certified to secure TOP SECRET data and below. The CDH is an UNCLASSIFIED controlled cryptographic item (CCI) when unkeyed. When keyed, it carries a classification equal to the of the key that has been loaded. It is intended for embedded applications requiring COMSEC and/or TRANSEC protection and is being used or considered for use in several time-of-day based Air Force, Army, Navy, and multi-nation systems. The CDH is compatible with the KGV-8/8A/8B/8C, KGV-11/11A/11B/11C, CTIC, KG-66, KGR-66, KGV-68, KI-37, KGV-15, KGV-13, and KG-87. The CTIC is currently used on the KGV-26 COMSEC board and installed in the Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal (MATT).
CHARACTERISTICS National Security Agency (NSA) has determined that this product does not process, store, or utilize a date in its operations. Therefore, the year 2000 problem does not affect this product; NSA memo of 12 Jun 98 applies.
Physical Characteristics
LIFE CYCLE SUPPORT
LIFE CYCLE DOCUMENTATION
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AND RELATED DEVICES
Reference: CMS 1A Article 610
Chief Naval Operations (N643) validation approval is required for all cryptographic equipment and associated ancillary devices that are not contained in the CNO Secure Voice and Record/Data Plan (i.e., DON allowance document for cryptographic equipment and related devices.)
Prior concurrence from Immediate Superior In Command (ISIC) is required prior to submission to CNO. Submit requests for review, validation, and approval using the following format:
CNO WASHINGTON DC//N643/N61//
INFO: ISIC
Administrative Chain of Command
CMC WASHINGTON DC//CSB// (USMC Commands only)
COGARD TISCOM ALEXANDRIA VA//OPS4// (CG commands only)
DCMS WASHINGTON DC//30//
SPAWARSYSCEN CHARLESTON SC//721//
Subject: REQUEST FOR CRYPTO EQUIPMENT VALIDATION
Justification for the operational requirement, including the detail that will permit establishment of its relative priority in the general program.
A block diagram of the existing and/or proposed circuit.
The type and general reliability of the transmission medium.
Identification of all terminals on the proposed circuit.
The estimated, average daily volume of classified and unclassified traffic to be handled on the proposed circuit, the maximum classification of that traffic, and any special requirements for such traffic to include throughput requirements.
Expected use of the proposed circuit.
The nomenclature and quantity of terminal equipment required for the proposed circuit (including an indication of equipment on hand).
Remarks pertinent to compliance with guidance provided by OPNAVINST C5510.93 (series) concerning minimizing compromising emanations or other electromagnetic radiation.
A statement of ability to comply with security criteria, or a description and estimated cost of any modification that may be required.
When landline connections are involved, identify the command that will pay for the telephone lines and/or lease telephone company MODEMs, etc.
A statement that maintenance personnel qualified in accordance with OPNAVINST 2221.3 (series) will be available or that an increase of such personnel will be required to maintain the cryptographic equipment.
Specify the date material is needed.
CMS account number.
CRYPTO EQUIPMENT VALIDATION REQUEST EXAMPLES |
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EXAMPLE CRYPTO EQUIPMENT VALIDATION REQUEST |
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ANOTHER EXAMPLE CRYPTO EQUIPMENT VALIDATION REQUEST |
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EXAMPLE REQUEST FOR MULTIPLE CRYPTO EQUIPMENT VALIDATION |
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