18 December 1999
Source: http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel/terror.pdf (494K, hardcopy of 121 pages)

ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS
DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

I. ASSESSING THE THREAT

15 December 1999

See Part 1: http://cryptome.org/tp-terr-pt1.htm

III. A RETROSPECTIVE: THE LESSONS OF AUM SHINRIKYO

The 1995 sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway marked a turning point in the history of terrorism.¹³² Indeed, it has become the defining incident for all discussion about terrorist use of CBRN weapons. For the first time, a nonstate group had used a chemical weapon against civilians. Subsequent investigations by the Japanese authorities, the press, and the U.S. Congress revealed that Aum had even more sinister terrorist ambitions. Beginning in 1990, cult scientists sought to develop biological weapons, and on a number of occasions, Aum members sprayed biological material in an attempt to kill large numbers of people, including members of the Japanese royal family. Testimony during the trials of the Aum leadership also alleged that the cult had unsuccessfully attacked U.S. military bases in Japan, including the naval installation at Yokohama.¹³³

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132 For the most complete account of the Aum sect's aims, motivations, and capabilities see David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum (London: Hutchinson, 1996). See also D.W. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo (New York and Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1996) and the recently published book by Robert Jay Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence, and the New Global Terrorism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1999).

133 Sheryl WuDunn, Judith Miller, and William J. Broad, "How Japan Terror Alerted World,'' New York Times, May 26, 1998. Although most of Aum's original leadership is in jail, the cult remains active in Japan and Russia. Kevin Sullivan, "Japan Cult Survives While Guru Is Jailed', Washington Post, September 28, 1997.

More than four years later, the attack's implications are still as fiercely debated as they are incompletely understood. Was the incident a harbinger of future terrorist actions or a dramatic aberration? Had a profound taboo been broken by Aum's use of chemical weaponry or were the circumstances, capabilities, and resources at the disposal of this particularly idiosyncratic religious group so unique as to defy duplication or emulation by more common and stereotypical terrorist organizations?

This chapter considers these questions and related issues raised by the Aum attack. Specifically, it examines the implications of the group's ambitious research and development efforts -- spanning chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons aspirations -- and assesses the inferences and lessons that can be drawn from the apocalyptic cult's activities, in the context of deliberations about and U.S. domestic preparedness for potential acts of CBRN terrorism.

The Aum Shinrikyo and the "New Terrorism''

Until the Tokyo attack, most terrorism experts and other observers of this phenomenon could take solace in the belief that terrorists were fundamentally rational.¹³⁴ The conventional wisdom that therefore followed was that terrorists would

134 See, for example, the studies conducted by RAND during the 1970s for Sandia National Laboratories and, in particular, Gail Bass, Brian Jenkins, et al., Motivations and Possible Actions of Potential Criminal Adversaries of U.S. Nuclear Programs (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND , R-2554-SL, 1980).

refrain from using CBRN weapons simply because they could make few realistic demands by threatening the use of such indiscriminate weapons. In this context, it was further argued that the terrorists' aims and objectives could just as easily be attained or realized through less extreme measures than the detonation of a nuclear device, the dispersal of radioactive materials,¹³⁵ or by attacks employing either biological or chemical warfare weapons. In perhaps the most important book written on terrorism in the 1970s, Walter Laqueur clearly echoed this school of thought, concluding unambiguously that, "It can be taken for granted that most of the terrorist groups existing at present will not use this option, either as a matter of political principle or because it would defeat their purpose.''¹³⁶

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135 See, for example, the discussion in Peter deLeon, Bruce Hoffman, et al., The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism: A Reexamination (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND , N-2706, 1988), pp. 4--6.

136 Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), p. 231.

The terrorists' perceived obsession with controlling events was also regarded as an important constraint.¹³⁷ "Terrorists, like war planners,'' one unidentified expert opined at a mid-1980s symposium on the subject of nuclear terrorism, "believe they can control what they start . . . and CB [chemical and biological agents] seems too uncontrollable.'' Hence, this line of argument went, terrorists would most likely eschew weapons that could not be discriminatingly targeted against their enemies only. Indiscriminate weapons could also harm their ethnic brethren, co-religionists, or that often declared but amorphous constituency, the so-called "people.'' Of equal significance was the argument that, whereas terrorists had mastered operations using conventional weapons, they would doubtless be very wary of venturing into such unknown territory as CBRN weapons. Like most ordinary people, terrorists were also believed to harbor profound fears about dangerous substances of which they knew little and, if handled improperly, would affect them as adversely as the substances would their intended targets. Even when experts in the 1970s thought about possible terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, the prevailing consensus was that terrorists would obviously prefer nuclear or radiological weapons to chemical or biological ones.¹³⁸ As Brian Jenkins, perhaps that era's most influential terrorism expert, explained in a paper presented at the same conference noted above:

Terrorists imitate governments, and nuclear weapons are in the arsenals of the world's major powers. That makes them "legitimate.'' Chemical and biological weapons also may be found in the arsenals of many nations, but their use has been widely condemned by public opinion and proscribed by treaty, although in recent years the constraints against use seem to be eroding.¹³⁹

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137 Jeffrey D. Simon, Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons: A Discussion of Possibilities (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-3771-AFMIC, 1989), p. 12.

138 Robert L. Beckman, "Rapporteur's Summary,'' in Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (eds.), Nuclear Terrorism: Defining the Threat (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), p. 13.

139 Brian Michael Jenkins, "Is Nuclear Terrorism Plausible?'' in Ibid., p. 31.

But most important, there was a general acceptance of the observation made famous by Jenkins that: "Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead.''¹⁴⁰ This maxim was applied directly to potential terrorist use of CBRN weapons and in turn was often used to explain the paucity of actual known plots, much less verifiable incidents. In this context, Jenkins argued in a 1975 paper assessing potential terrorist use of radiological or nuclear weapons that

Scenarios involving the deliberate dispersal of toxic radioactive material . . . do not appear to fit the pattern of any terrorist actions carried out thus far . . . . Terrorist actions have tended to be aimed at producing immediate dramatic effects, a handful of violent deaths -- not lingering illness, and certainly not a population of ill, vengeance-seeking victims . . . . If terrorists were to employ radioactive contaminants, they could not halt the continuing effects of their act, not even long after they may have achieved their ultimate political objectives. It has not been the style of terrorists to kill hundreds or thousands. To make hundreds or thousands of persons terminally ill would be even more out of character.¹⁴¹

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140 Brian Michael Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict'' in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.), International Terrorism and World Security (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 15.

141 Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Santa Monica, Calif.: P-5541, November 1975), pp. 6--7.

This was also the conclusion reached by a contemporary of Jenkins, the noted authority on subnational conflict, J. Bowyer Bell. He too had dismissed the possibility that terrorists might target a commercial nuclear power plant in hopes of engineering a meltdown or large-scale atmospheric release of radioactive materials on similar grounds of political expediency and logical instrumentality. "[T]here is no evidence,'' Bell wrote in 1978,

that terrorists have any interest in killing large numbers of people with a meltdown. The new transnational television terrorists want media exposure, not exposure of the masses to radioactive fallout. And finally, the technological capacities of organizations with sufficient military skills to launch an attack . . . are not great. The mix of motive, military and technological skills, resources, and perceived vulnerability simply does not exist.¹⁴²

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142 J. Bowyer Bell, A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence (New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. 121.

Despite the events of the mid-1980s -- when a series of high-profile and particularly lethal suicide car and truck-bombings were directed against American diplomatic and military targets in the Middle East (in one instance resulting in the deaths of 241 Marines) -- many analysts saw no reason to revise these arguments. In 1985, Jenkins, for example, reiterated that, "simply killing a lot of people has seldom been one terrorist objective . . . Terrorists operate on the principle of the minimum force necessary. They find it unnecessary to kill many, as long as killing a few suffices for their purposes.''¹⁴³ In the revised version of his earlier work, Laqueur similarly emphasized that

Groups such as the German, Italian, French, Turkish or Latin American terrorists are unlikely to use nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons, assuming that they have any political sense at all -- an assumption that cannot always be taken for granted. They claim to act on behalf of the people, they aspire to popular support, and clearly the use of arms of mass destruction would not add to their popularity.¹⁴⁴

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143 Jenkins, The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 6.

144 Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1987), p. 319.

In sum, the conventional wisdom held that terrorists were not interested in killing but in publicity. Violence was employed less as a means of wreaking death and destruction than as a way to appeal to and attract supporters, focus attention on the terrorists and their causes, or attain tangible political aims and concessions -- for example, the release of imprisoned brethren, some measure of political autonomy, independence for an historical homeland, or a change of government. Terrorists, it was therefore argued, themselves believed that only if their violence were calculated or regulated would they be able to obtain the popular support or international recognition they sought or achieve the political ends that they desired.

Since the Tokyo incident, however, these long-standing assumptions have increasingly been called into question by terrorist attacks that have not only involved CBRN weapons but that also have caused large numbers of casualties -- such as the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings and, more recently, the massive explosions at the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. As these and other particularly lethal incidents in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Russia, and elsewhere have demonstrated, the more traditional and familiar types of ideological, ethno- nationalist and separatist organizations who dominated terrorism for the past 30 years -- and on whom many of our most fundamental assumptions about terrorists and their behavior are based -- have now been joined by a variety of different terrorist entities with less readily comprehensible nationalist or ideological motivations. This new generation of terrorists not only embraces far more amorphous religious and millenarian aims but in some cases are themselves less cohesive organizational entities with a more diffuse structure and membership.¹⁴⁵

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145 See, for example, the analysis of the international terrorist campaign allegedly orchestrated by Osama bin Laden in Neil King, Jr., "Moving Target: Fighting Terrorism Is Far More Perilous Than It Used to Be,'' Wall Street Journal Europe, 25 August 1998. This type of loose, networked (as opposed to hierarchical) organization also reflects the "Leaderless Resistance'' strategy advocated by the Christian paramilitary, white supremacist movement in the United States today. "Leaderless Resistance,'' also called "phantom cell networks,'' lays down a strategy of violence perpetrated by "autonomous leadership units'' (e.g., cells) operating independently of one another that, it is intended, will eventually join together to create a chain reaction leading to a nationwide, white supremacist revolution. "Leaderless Resistance'' is described in the white supremacist adventure novel, Hunter, written by William Pierce (under the pseudonym Andrew MacDonald) and published by National Vanguard Books in Hillsboro, Virginia. Hunter, it should be noted, is the sequel to The Turner Diaries (which Pierce/MacDonald also wrote) -- the novel described by the FBI as the "bible'' of the American white supremacist movement and is thought to have inspired Timothy McVeigh's attack on the Federal office building in Oklahoma City.

The emergence of obscure, idiosyncratic millenarian movements -- such as Aum; the militantly antigovernment, Christian white supremacist militias in the United States that are fuelled by a volatile mixture of religious, racial, and seditious dicta;¹⁴⁶ and the shadowy, transnational extremist Islamic movement that has been linked to the World Trade Center bombing, the attacks in 1995 and 1996 on U.S. military targets in Saudi Arabia, the 1997 slaughter of Western tourists in Luxor, and the embassy bombings in East Africa -- represents a different and potentially more lethal threat than the more familiar, traditional terrorist adversaries. As former U.S. Senate staff member John Sopko explained in one of the first analytical efforts to map the contours of the "new face of terrorism'' and assess the implications of Aum's activities on future potential terrorist use of CBRN weapons:

. . . past assumptions that those in possession of weapons of mass destruction are rational, informed opponents who calculate the risks and benefits before using such force do not apply when these groups are driven by "divine intervention,'' messianic leadership or suicidal instincts. As one FBI terrorist specialist notes, "it is extremely difficult to deal with someone not playing with a full deck of cards.''¹⁴⁷

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146 For a more complete analysis of the cement that bonds together this seemingly diverse and disparate collection of citizen militias, tax resistors, antifederalists, bigots, and racists, see Bruce Hoffman, Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Terrorism in the United States (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND , R-3618, 1988), pp. 26--27.

147 Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation Threat,'' p. 15.

The appearance of these new types of adversaries, accordingly, may require an equally profound change in our thinking about terrorist interest in CBRN weapons. Their markedly different motivations and intentions, coupled with their aspirations toward more lethal capabilities -- compared with the conservatism of their more traditional, secular counterparts -- may already have set in motion a drift toward the use of less discriminate weapons. It was, of course, international terrorist Osama bin Laden's alleged interest in developing a chemical warfare capability for use against U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia that was cited to justify the August 1998 American cruise missile attacks on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum.¹⁴⁸ Information has subsequently emerged alleging that, in 1993, a follower of bin Laden's had attempted to purchase enriched uranium in hopes of fabricating a nuclear weapon;¹⁴⁹ while other unconfirmed (and perhaps less reliable) reports have surfaced that bin Laden may have already acquired a tactical nuclear weapon or at least attempted to do so.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, according to U.S. intelligence sources, the fugitive terrorist leader retains a continuing interest in acquiring chemical and biological weapons.¹⁵¹ Although the veracity of all these reports cannot be confirmed through open source literature, they nonetheless suggest a chilling confluence of motive and opportunity perhaps leading to capability. Admittedly, any number of technical factors greatly inhibit the deployment and effective use of an illegally acquired nuclear weapon. Similarly, there remain formidable¹⁵² (but perhaps not insurmountable) barriers that would attend the construction and detonation of even a primitive device.¹⁵³ At the same time, however, it is fundamentally troubling that terrorists today may increasingly be thinking along these lines. Moreover, it is sobering to consider, as one terrorism scholar suggests, that terrorists' interest in chemical and biological weapons might be impelled by their frustrations in trying to acquire a real nuclear capability.¹⁵⁴ These developments have already prompted at least some of terrorism's leading analysts to revise their previous thinking on the WMD issue. In his seminal 1996 article, which defined the new era of terrorism in the post--Cold War world, Laqueur observed: "Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction does not mean that most terrorists are likely to use them in the foreseeable future, but some almost certainly will, in spite of all the reasons militating against it.''¹⁵⁵ This point was even more forcefully presented in the book that followed. "In an earlier work I warned against overrating the danger of terrorism,'' Laqueur writes,

which was neither a new phenomenon nor as politically effective as we are often led to believe. . . . While I decried the idea that terrorism was steadily growing into a global threat, I also wrote that it could become one as the result of technological developments. . . . The ready availability of weapons of mass destruction has now come to pass, and much of what has been thought about terrorism, including some of our most basic assumptions, must be reconsidered. The character of terrorism is changing, any restraints that existed are disappearing, and, above all, the threat to human life has become infinitely greater than it was in the past.¹⁵⁶

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148 See Barbara Crossette et al., "U.S. Says Iraq Aided Production of Chemical Weapons in Sudan,'' New York Times, 25 August 1998; Michael Evans, "Iraqis linked to Sudan Plant,'' The Times (London), 25 August 1998; James Risen, "New Evidence Ties Sudanese To Bin Laden, U.S. Asserts,'' New York Times, 4 October 1998; Gregory L. Vistica and Daniel Klaidman, "Tracking Terror,'' Newsweek, 19 October 1998. 149 Benjamin Weiser, "U.S. Says Bin Laden Aide Tried to Get Nuclear Material,'' New York Times, 26 September 1998; and, Michael Grunwald, "U.S. Says Bin Laden Sought Nuclear Arms,'' Washington Post, 26 September 1998.

150 Michael Binyon, "Bin Laden 'now has nuclear arsenal','' The Times (London), 7 October 1998.

151 Statement for the record of Louis J. Freeh before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, 4 February 1999 at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/freehct2.htm.

152 See, for example, the compelling arguments presented in Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Nuclear Terrorism -- Hysterical Concern or Real Risk?,'' Aussenpolitik -- German Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 46, no. 3. (1995) World-Wide Web Page of the International Security Net, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich (http://www.ethz.ch/au-pol/kamp.htm), pp. 4--7. See also, Karl-Heinz Kamp, "'Loose Nukes': A Distant But Still Critical Threat,'' Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 19 August 1996.

153 On the surmountable hurdles regarding the relative ease with which a radiological device could be constructed see Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, pp. 57--61; and, Arbman, "A Swedish View on Nuclear Terrorism,'' pp. 56--57, 59 and 60.

154 There is evidence that suggests both Aum and bin Laden either turned to, or redoubled, their efforts to develop chemical and/or biological capabilities when their respective nuclear ambitions could not be realized. See Gavin Cameron, "Multi-track Micro-proliferation: Lessons from the Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaida,'' Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 22, no. 4 (September-December 1999), forthcoming.

155 Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism,'' Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 5 (September-October 1996), p. 34.

156 Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 7.

The Lessons of Aum: A Reassessment

The repercussions of the Tokyo nerve gas attack have exerted a profound impact, beyond that incident itself, on our thinking CBRN terrorism. This is not surprising, given the 12 persons who were killed and the thousands of casualties thought to have been caused by the attack. Moreover, it was only after the subway incident that evidence came to light revealing the enormity of Aum's catastrophic ambitions. When police raided the sect's laboratories following the nerve gas attack, for example, they found enough sarin to kill an estimated 4.2 million persons.¹⁵⁷ In addition, Aum had either already produced or had plans to develop other powerful nerve agents, such as VX, tabun, and soman; chemical weapons, such as mustard gas and sodium cyanide; and deadly biological warfare pathogens that included anthrax, the highly contagious disease known as Q-fever¹⁵⁸ -- and possibly the deadly Ebola virus as well.¹⁵⁹ Aum's most ambitious project, however, was doubtless its efforts to develop a nuclear capability. To this end, the group had purchased a 500,000-acre sheep station in a remote part of Western Australia. There, they hoped to mine uranium to be shipped back to Aum's laboratories in Japan, where scientists using laser enrichment technology would convert it into weapons-grade nuclear material.¹⁶⁰

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157 Richard Lloyd Parry, "Sect's poisons "could kill 4.2m','' The Independent on Sunday (London), 26 March 1995; and, Andrew Pollack, "Japanese Police Say They Found Germ-War Material at Cult Site,'' New York Times, 29 March 1995.

158 Reuters, "Aum Cult Gas Cache,'' International Herald Tribune (Paris), 13 December 1996. See also, National (Japanese) Police Agency, "Aum Shinrikyo: An Alarming Report on the Terrorist Group's Organization and Activities,'' Shoten (Tokyo), no. 252 (1995), pp. 10--12; Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 10, 95--97, 121--125, 151, 211--221 and 232.

159 Following an outbreak of Ebola in Zaire in 1992, Asahara and 40 followers traveled to that country ostensibly on a humanitarian aid mission. Associated Press and Agence France-Presse, "Cult 'studied deadly Ebola virus','' New York Times, 25 April 1995. See also, Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 96--97.

160 Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 85, 126--133; 190--192 and 208; and, Sopko, 'The Changing Proliferation Threat', p. 13.

The group had also assembled an impressive array of conventional weaponry. Aum is believed to have purchased large quantities of small arms from Russian sources and to have been in the market for advanced weaponry, such as tanks, jet fighters, surface-to-surface rocket launchers, and even a tactical nuclear weapon. What is known is that Aum succeeded in obtaining a surplus twin-turbine Mi-17 helicopter -- complete with chemical spray dispersal devices. The group also planned -- and had gone as far as to acquire -- sophisticated robotic manufacturing devices, to produce at least 1,000 operational replicas of Russia's world-famous AK-47 assault rifle along with one million rounds of ammunition. Finally, the sect had determined how to manufacture TNT and the central component of plastic explosives, RDX.¹⁶¹

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161 See Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 76, 88, 107--112, 151, and 190--193; Campbell, "Excerpts from Research Study: 'Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism: Proliferation by Non-State Actors,''' pp. 35--37; Ron Purver, "Chemical Terrorism In Japan'' (unpublished paper by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, Canada, June 1995), p. 15; and, National Police Agency, "Aum Shinrikyo: An Alarming Report on the Terrorist Group's Organization and Activities,'' p. 10.

As this inventory of armaments and technological and engineering accomplishments suggests, Aum was no ordinary terrorist group. Rather than the handful of men and women with limited training, technical capabilities, and resources, that has long colored our conception of the archetypal terrorist organization, Aum was -- by any measure -- unique. It was a religious movement with upwards of 60,000 members, with offices in New York, Germany, Australia, and Sri Lanka -- in addition to Japan and Russia.¹⁶² Aum had assets estimated to be as high as $1 billion¹⁶³ -- at least in the hundred millions. It recruited graduates with scientific and engineering degrees from Japan's leading universities and provided them with state-of-the-art laboratories and with lavish budgets to fund the group's variegated weapons R&D programs.¹⁶⁴ Indeed, up to 80 scientific personnel were detailed to work on the group's chemical weapons programs, according to one estimate; its biological weapons research, however, never employed more than perhaps 20 persons at most.¹⁶⁵

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162 U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Part I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 16. See also, Andrew Pollack, "Japanese Sect May Struggle To Get By Without Its Leader,'' New York Times, 17 May 1995; Alessandra Stanley, "Russians Shut Down Branch of Japanese Sect,'' New York Times, 30 March 1995; and, William J. Broad, "Seismic Blast: Bomb or Quake?,'' New York Times, 23 January 1997. One account, however, puts Aum membership at 10,000 persons. See Kevin Sullivan, "Japan Cult Survives While Guru is Jailed,'' Washington Post, September 28, 1997.

163 U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 16; and, Broad, "Seismic Blast: Bomb or Quake?,'' 23 January 1997. Indeed, when police searched Asahara's office, they reportedly discovered 22 pounds of gold and about $7.5 million in cash. See Shoichi Okawa, "Aum Shinrikyo,'' at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ cults/a-z-cults/a_cults.html.

164 Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 199--222.

165 Telephone interviews by RAND research staff with Professor Anthony Tu, July 21, 1999, and Milton Leitenberg, July 16, 1999.

Despite Aum's considerable financial wealth, the technical expertise that it could call on from its well-educated members, and the vast resources and state-of-the- art equipment at their disposal, the group could not effect even a single truly successful chemical or biological attack. On at least nine occasions the group attempted to disseminate botulinum toxin (Clostridium botulinum) or anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) using aerosol means; each time they failed either because the botulinum agents they grew and enriched were not toxic or the mechanical sprayers used to disseminate the anthrax spores became clogged and inoperative.¹⁶⁶ Even the more successful sarin attack on the Tokyo subway would almost be laughable, if not for the tragic deaths of 12 persons and harm caused to thousands more. For all its sophisticated research and development, the best means the group could find to disseminate the nerve gas was in plastic trash bags that had to be poked open with sharpened umbrella tips to release the noxious mixture.¹⁶⁷

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166 Two attempts were made with anthrax and seven with botulinum toxin. Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century, p. 62.

167 Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo, pp. 126 & 129.

Finally, the group's distinct lack of success in wreaking the mass destruction or mass casualties ascribed to these types of weapons, despite the considerable resources at its disposal, speaks volumes about the challenges facing any less-endowed terrorist organization. New research has revealed that, of the 5,000 persons who received medical treatment in the aftermath of the subway attack, the vast majority suffered from shock or emotional upset, or evidenced some psychosomatic symptom. Accordingly, the number of persons physically injured or affected by the attack may be much lower than previously reported.¹⁶⁸

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168 Milton Leitenberg, "The Experience of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo Group and Biological Agents,'' Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 11, no. 4 (Winter 1999), forthcoming.

In sum, Aum's experience suggests -- however counterintuitively or contrary to popular belief -- the significant technological difficulties faced by any nonstate entity in attempting to weaponize and disseminate chemical and biological weapons effectively.¹⁶⁹ Although the Aum experience represents only a single point of reference, it provides a striking refutation of the claim about the ease with which such weapons can be fabricated and made operational. Public officials, journalists, and analysts, for example, have repeatedly alleged that biological attacks in particular are relatively easy for terrorists to undertake. According to one state emergency management official, biological weapons "are available -- and easy to make. . . . One does not need a degree in microbiology to make this work, being able to read is enough. . . . It's not like enriching uranium.''¹⁷⁰ Similarly, both the White House and some senior FBI officials have previously argued that the information needed to develop chemical and biological weapons can be readily obtained from the Internet and other open sources.¹⁷¹ Although some biological and chemical agents may be easier to develop than others, such claims do not readily square with the facts known about the Aum incident, given Aum's experience and its concerted, years-long R&D activities.¹⁷²

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169 Indeed, this same point can also be made of the formidable hurdles faced by many established states in developing their own effective weapons programs in the same areas of chemical, biological, and nuclear warfare.

170 Quoted in Grant Sasek, "Officials in State Warn of Biological Terrorism,'' Helena Independent Record (http://billingsgazette.com/region.990125_reg009.html).

171 See, for example, the White House, "Fact Sheet on Combating Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62,'' May 22, 1998, accessed at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/pdd-62.htm, which states that, "easier access to sophisticated technology means that the destructive power available to terrorists is greater than ever. Adversaries may thus be tempted to use unconventional tools, such as weapons of mass destruction, to target our cities and disrupt the operations of our government''; statement for the record before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 28 January 1998, http://www.fbi.gov/ congress/98archives/threats.htm, of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh: "The ease of manufacturing or obtaining biological and chemical agents is disturbing. Available public source material makes our law enforcement mission a continuous challenge.''; and statement of Robert J. Burnham, Chief, Domestic Terrorism Section, before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 19 May 1999, http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/bioleg3.htm, which states that, "literature containing recipes and modes of dissemination are available through 'how to' literature and over the Internet.''

172 In the words of one senior intelligence analyst, "while popular culture can explore the potential BW threat, actually developing and using an effective biological weapon poses certain technological challenges.'' U.S. Congress, "Statement by Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation John A. Lauder on the Worldwide Biological Warfare Threat,'' House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 3 March 1999, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/lauder_speech_030399.html

While much information has emerged since the 1995 attack regarding Aum's chemical and biological warfare activities, crucial details are still missing or remain hidden that might conclusively reveal precisely why Aum's ambitious efforts in both these areas failed. Japanese authorities have released little public information, and the cult itself is believed to have destroyed key evidence regarding its bioterrorism programs. Moreover, a senior Aum official with extensive knowledge about these programs was himself murdered by the group.¹⁷³ Accordingly, the majority of what we do know has come mostly from court documents and testimony pertaining to the trials of leading cult members. According to one expert, who has followed both the Aum and other actual and putative biological terrorist incidents closely, "Too little is known about the Aum's activities to determine why they failed.''¹⁷⁴

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173 Sheryl WuDunn, Judith Miller, and William J. Broad, "How Japan Terror Alerted World,'' New York Times, 26 May 1998.

174 Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes, p 24.

Nevertheless, it is possible to use the available unclassified information to make some informed, preliminary hypotheses about why the cult did not achieve its bioterrorism objectives. These fall into three interrelated categories:

First, Aum was unable to surmount the challenge of acquiring sufficiently lethal strains of botulinum toxin and anthrax bacilli. Although terrorists have obtained biological agents from nature or cultured these pathogens themselves, acquiring virulent strains appears to be a major challenge. While Aum apparently developed a lethal biological agent that they used to contaminate cult members' food, the strains of botulinum toxin and B. anthracis they used in their attacks, which were intended to cause mass casualties, were either insufficiently toxic or were disseminated in quantities too small to have any lethal effects.¹⁷⁵ The mistakes that Aum made in its attempt to develop a lethal strain might not be repeated in the future by other terrorists. Moreover, it is possible that terrorists in the future may steal highly lethal pathogens or toxins from government or private facilities. Indeed, illicit acquisitions of biological agents have already taken place. In May 1995, for example, the FBI arrested Larry Wayne Harris, a one-time member of the American white supremacist organization, the Aryan Nations, who had acquired freeze-dried Yersina pestis, the organism that causes plague, from the American Type Culture Collection in Rockville, Maryland, using falsified documents.¹⁷⁶ Sophisticated terrorists may also seek to culture pathogens or toxins "in-house'' or acquire them from nature; but as the Aum case suggests, this is a far greater challenge than is generally thought.

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175 Ibid., p. 62.

176 Ibid., pp. 184--185. It should be noted, however, that Harris maintained that he needed the cultures to pursue his interest in developing medical treatments for the disease. Subsequent investigations uncovered no information suggesting a more malevolent intention, and Harris was indicted only for wire fraud (e.g., for misrepresenting himself on the order form to purchase the organism).

Second, Aum found that it was extremely difficult to prepare chemical and biological agents for dissemination and dispersal. As the group learned from its failed biological attacks, dissemination remains a major hurdle for any terrorist seeking to kill with biological agents on a mass scale. Drying anthrax spores or other living organisms for the purpose of aerosolization demands great skill as well as sophisticated equipment. Even if terrorists manage to acquire a lethal pathogen, it appears relatively easy to destroy large amounts of it unintentionally during the aerosolization process. An alternative to a dry aerosol is the use of a liquid slurry. But as Aum discovered when it attempted to disseminate anthrax bacillus from the roof of its Tokyo building, slurries are likely clog sprayers. Terrorists may overcome these dissemination hurdles by using a highly contagious agent, such as smallpox -- itself a highly infectious organism -- assuming that they could overcome the difficulty in acquiring it.¹⁷⁷ According to a former Soviet biological warfare expert, "with smallpox, you [could simply] use people as disseminators.''¹⁷⁸

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177 Only two WHO-authorized repositories for smallpox exist. One is at the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, and one is in Russia, at the State Research institute of Virology and Biotechnology. There are suspicions, however, that illicit stockpiles of smallpox exist in other parts of Russia, and perhaps elsewhere.

178 Quoted in Richard Preston, "The Demon in the Freezer,'' The New Yorker, July 12, 1999, p. 56. Preston also quotes a bioterrorism expert who claims to have discovered a credit-card sized machine used by the silicon-chip industry that is capable of making "an invisible mist of particles in the one-to-five micron size range -- that size hangs in the air for hours, and gets into the lungs. You can run it on a camcorder battery.'' Ibid., p. 60.

Third, there were the limitations imposed on Aum's biological weapons effort by the nature of the organization itself. Terrorists hoping to acquire and use biological weapons on a mass scale face a major hurdle within their own organizations. Unless terrorists steal or are given an effective system, they will have to create one. This requires scientific and other technical expertise, sophisticated equipment, financial resources, and the management and leadership to plan and organize a complex enterprise. Cult-like terrorist organizations -- the ones that appear to have the greatest interest in biological weapons -- may be least suited to meet the complex demands associated with a bioweapon program. Throughout the existence of its biological weapons program, Aum scientists seemed hampered by the cult's fickle and irrational leadership and by poor scientific judgment and a lack of experience in working with such agents as B. anthracis and botulinum toxin.¹⁷⁹ Aum scientists, socially and physically isolated and ruled by an increasingly paranoid leader, became divorced from reality and unable to make sound judgments.¹⁸⁰

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179 Falkenrath et al., America's Achilles' Heel, p. 23.

180 Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It, p. 158.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On the publication date of this report, the Panel will have been formally conducting business for about six months, and will have had three official meetings -- the most recent on December 13, 1999. During that time, substantial information and authoritative analyses have been presented to or have come to the attention of the Panel and its members. Moreover, the Panel is composed of members who have significant expertise and broad experience in this field.

Based on the information provided, the thorough analysis of the potential threats contained in this report, and the collective knowledge and experience of its members, the Panel has drawn some initial conclusions and is making several broad recommendations. In its two subsequent annual reports, the Panel will make more comprehensive and definitive recommendations on a variety of topics.

These initial conclusions and recommendations should not be construed to suggest that the Federal government -- either in its executive or legislative branch -- currently undertake a major restructuring for this (or any other) potential crisis. The recommendations are intended to propose solutions to this critical national problem to assist in making Federal programs and activities more effective and efficient.

It is axiomatic that, the better we prepare, through a broad spectrum of antiterrorism and counterterrorism activities, the more likely we are to reach the ideal situation -- the deterrence, prevention, or interdiction of any terrorist event before it occurs. Given the nature of the potential threats, it is likely that no amount of preparation will cover all possible threat scenarios, and that adequate measures must be undertaken to respond, if an event should occur, in a way that will -- first and foremost -- minimize human casualties, and that will also mitigate damage to property and to the environment.

In order to achieve these inter-related goals -- effective deterrence, prevention, interdiction, and response -- efforts at all levels of government must be concerted, concentrated, and collective.¹⁸¹

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181 The Panel notes with much interest the recent announcement by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of its plan to reorganize the bureau, creating a separate Counterterrorism Division, which will focus on terrorist threats, domestic preparedness, and critical infrastructure protection. See "FBI to Restructure, Adding Emphasis on Crime Prevention,'' The Washington Post, November 11, 1999, p. A2.

Threat Assessments and Analyses

This report observes that there has not been universal agreement on several aspects of the potential threat or threats from terrorists who may use or attempt to use CBRN devices or other "weapons of mass destruction.'' Early in its deliberations, the Panel determined that, for it to make well-reasoned and informed assessments and to offer substantive, comprehensive, and articulate policy recommendations to the nation's executive and its legislature, a complete, current, and realistic analysis of the potential domestic threats from terrorists was an essential condition precedent to fulfilling the Panel's legislative mandate. With some condensation, this report sets forth the analysis commissioned by the Panel.

That fundamental philosophy -- the need for comprehensive, definitive, authoritative, articulate assessments and analyses of the potential domestic threats from terrorists on a continuing basis -- has application to policymakers at all levels of government who may have any responsibility for addressing this issue.

Because the United States is very much an open society, it always will be vulnerable to terrorism. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that, just because a particular locality or facility is vulnerable to terrorist attack at any point in time, a credible threat exists that can exploit that vulnerability. On the other hand, because of the potential catastrophic consequences of a successful incident perpetrated by a terrorist using a CBRN or other device that has the capability to cause "mass destruction'' or "mass casualties,'' agencies at all levels must be diligent in developing and assessing information on credible terrorists threats. Only through thorough, comprehensive, articulate, and continuing threat assessments and analyses will appropriate entities at the various levels of government be able to conduct the ensuing risk and vulnerability assessments, to develop and conduct activities to counter any credible threat, or to respond if an event occurs. A recent report of the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) entitled "Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks,''¹⁸² succinctly states:

A formal assessment of the domestic-origin threat, combined with existing assessments of the foreign-origin threat, would provide an authoritative, written, comprehensive, intelligence community view on specific chemical and biological terrorist threats. . . . Soundly performed risk assessments could help ensure that specific programs and related expenditures are justified and targeted according to the threat and risk of validated terrorist attack scenarios generated and assessed by a multidisciplinary team of experts.¹⁸³

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182 GAO/NSIAD-99-163, September 1999. The report is the fourteenth comprehensive analysis in an impressive list of reports on combating terrorism. The report and its related predecessors may be ordered from the GAO or accessed at its Website at: http://www.gao.gov

183 Ibid., at p. 3.

The Panel has indicated its concern about a preoccupation with the "worst-case scenario,'' and the attendant assumption that any lesser incident can be addressed equally well by planning for the most catastrophic threat -- ignoring the fact that higher-probability/lower-consequence attacks might present unique challenges of their own. As noted, this approach may not be the best means of setting budgetary priorities and allocating resources. The Panel is convinced, therefore, that more attention should be directed to assessments of the higher probably, lower consequence end of the potential terrorist threat spectrum -- not at the expense of, but in addition to, assessments and analyses of the higher consequence threat scenarios.

The Panel has been provided with the recent FBI report on "Project Megiddo,'' and considers that effort to be clearly within the ambit of the foregoing assessment and recommendations. With respect to this topic, and other recommendations and initiatives addressed elsewhere in this report (notably on the subject of information sharing, which follows), the Panel is sensitive to the civil liberties implications and issues that may arise in the course of such activities. In the interest of sustaining the broadest-possible public support, the Panel urges officials at all levels of government to ensure that the civil liberties of our citizens are protected.

A National Strategy

Based on the Panel's threat analysis, other relevant information that has come to its attention, and the knowledge and experience of its own members, the Panel is convinced that a national strategy to address the issues of domestic preparedness and response to terrorist incidents involving CBRN and other types of weapons is urgently needed.

Combating terrorism is clearly a national issue, but the responsibility for the domestic response to a terrorist CBRN incident is not necessarily -- and will almost never be exclusively -- a Federal one. For a response to those incidents described as "higher probability, lower consequence,'' the Federal role is essentially one of providing support to state and local responders, fundamentally in reaction to a request for assistance. It is at the local and state level where the task of the initial response and, in almost every case, the primary responsibilities lie. It is only in the case of a catastrophic event -- certainly possible, but of the "lower probability, higher consequence'' type -- that major responsibilities will reside at the Federal level. Federal involvement in an incident, which could include numerous civilian departments and agencies as well as military entities, will be defined by the nature and severity of the incident. As an example, in any case where an incident may be a terrorist act, the FBI will have an initial involvement in an investigation; if the incident is determined to be terrorism, the FBI will assume a leading role. Nevertheless, the Federal role will, in most cases, be supportive of state and local authorities, who traditionally have the fundamental responsibility for responding.

At the same time, the Federal government can and must provide significant support and assistance, both in preparation and in the event that such an incident actually occurs. There are considerable Federal resources that can be brought to bear in the areas of planning, training, standards, research and development, and equipment. Consequently, there needs to be a "Federal Government Strategy'' component of the national strategy -- one which clearly articulates Federal responsibilities, roles, and missions, and distinguishes those from state and local ones. Federal funding, and the activities and programs of a number of Federal agencies, to address domestic preparedness and response to such incidents, have increased dramatically in recent years, especially in the wake of the New York World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings, and the Aum Shinrikyo attack in the Tokyo subway system. Despite good intentions, and recent improvements in coordination and implementation, Federal programs addressing the issue appear, in many cases, to be fragmented, overlapping, lacking focus, and uncoordinated. The Federal component of a national strategy can help to reduce the redundancy, confusion, and fragmentation of current Federal efforts.

Representatives of the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO)(which will be discussed in more detail below) have stated that the NDPO will develop a "national strategy'' to address domestic preparedness issues. Given the fact that the responsibility for the initial and, in large measure, continuing response to any such incident will likely fall most heavily on the backs of state and local responders, the Panel suggests that a true national strategy must have a "bottom-up'' approach -- that it be developed in close consultation and collaboration with state and local officials, and the law enforcement and emergency response communities from across the country. This Panel can help to forge that collaboration. Moreover, any such national strategy -- despite its "bottom-up'' structure -- must have the direct leadership, guidance, and imprimatur of the President. Only that way can a strategy can have a truly national tenor; but more importantly, it will contain a comprehensive, articulate expression by the nation's chief executive of the appropriateness of and distinctions between the Federal role and missions and those at state and local levels.

By focusing on higher probability/lower consequence threats, while recognizing and addressing concerns about lower-probability/higher-consequence events, a national strategy can lay the groundwork for assessing and monitoring the threat, and for making adjustments to response strategies as required. As has been argued elsewhere, too much of the Federal effort to date -- even those programs that ostensibly are designed to enhance state and local response capabilities -- has been predicated on the tacit assumption that preparing for the "worst case'' will automatically encompass lesser threats. The foregoing analysis suggests otherwise, because the nature and scale of the consequences can vary so widely. This needs to be recognized and articulated at the national level.

The Panel is aware of the "Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan'' -- recently released (September 1999) by the Attorney General of the United States, under the auspices of Department of Justice "lead agency'' responsibility -- as well as the interagency working group process dedicated to "WMD preparedness'' within the National Security Council structure. Although significant steps in the right direction, the five-year plan does not equate to a comprehensive, fully coordinated national strategy -- nor for that matter even the Federal government component of such a strategy -- one with clear, concise, and unambiguous leadership and direction from the President in consultation with all who share responsibility for related Federal efforts.

The Panel also recommends that any such strategy include, within its purview, incidents involving more conventional weapons -- such as conventional high-explosive or fabricated weapons (e.g., the type used in the Oklahoma City bombing) -- that have the potential to cause significant casualties or physical damage; as well as incidents involving CBRN devices that may not be capable of producing "mass casualties'' but that can, nevertheless, produce considerable fear, panic, or other major disruptions to the infrastructure or economy of the potential domestic target.

Considering the serious nature and potential consequences of any terrorist incident, the Panel is convinced that comprehensive public education and information programs must be developed, programs that will provide straight-forward, timely information and advice both prior to any terrorist incident and in the immediate aftermath of any attack. The national strategy should lay the groundwork for those programs.

Complexity of the Federal Structure

As indicated by the charts at Appendix A, which depict departments and agencies that have various programs addressing antiterrorism or counterterrorism, or both, the Federal bureaucratic structure is massive and complex. In various forums, state and local officials consistently express frustration in understanding where or how to enter this bureaucratic maze to obtain information, assistance, funding and support. In addition, Federal programs, especially those involving grants for funding or other resources, may be overly complicated, time-consuming, and repetitive.

In recent months, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, pursuant to its "lead- agency'' role (specified in the related Presidential Decision Directives) for crisis management for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, was directed by the Attorney General of the United States to organize, within its own resources, a National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO). The ostensible purpose of the NDPO is to serve as a focal point and "clearinghouse'' for related preparedness information and for directing state and local entities to the appropriate agency of the Federal government for obtaining additional information, assistance, and support. There has been discussion about the issue of whether the FBI is the appropriate location or whether the NDPO structure and approach is the most effective way to address the complexities of the Federal organization and programs designed to enhance domestic response capabilities. The Panel is convinced that the concept behind the NDPO is sound, and notes with interest that the Congress has recently authorized and appropriated funds ($6 million) for the operation of the NDPO. While that authority will give the NDPO some wherewithal to operate and to hire persons from outside the FBI, The Panel has seen no specific direction to other Federal agencies to provide personnel or other resources to the NDPO, to assist in a concerted, well-coordinated effort.¹⁸⁴

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184 Some Federal agencies have, however, agreed to "detail'' personnel to the NDPO.

Congressional Responsibilities

In much the same way that the complexity of the Federal bureaucratic structure is an obstacle -- from a state and local perspective -- to the provision of effective and efficient Federal assistance, it appears that the Congress has made most of its decisions for authority and funding to address domestic preparedness and response issues with little or no coordination. The various committees of the Congress continue to provide authority and money within the confines of each committee's jurisdiction over one or a limited number of Federal agencies and programs.¹⁸⁵ The Panel recommends, therefore, that the Congress consider forming an ad hoc Joint Special or Select Committee, composed of representatives of the various committees with oversight and funding responsibilities for these issues, and give such an entity with authority to make determinations that will result in more coherent efforts at the Federal level.

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185 With coordination from the Office of Management and Budget, and the National Security Council staff, the budget submission from the Executive "rolls up'' -- for display purposes -- all related programs to combat terrorism, including those designed to strengthen domestic preparedness. Nevertheless, representatives of the Executive Branch must "market'' those programs to the individual oversight and appropriating committees.

Information Sharing

State and local officials express the need for more "intelligence'', and better information sharing among entities at all levels on potential terrorist threats. While the Panel is acutely aware of the need to protect classified national security information, and the sources and methods by which it may have been obtained, the Panel believes that more can and must be done to provide timely information -- up, down, and laterally, at all levels of government -- to those who need the information to provide effective deterrence, interdiction, protection, or response to potential threats.¹⁸⁶ This may entail granting security clearances to additional officials at the state and local level. And as noted, the FBI report on Project Megiddo, and the briefings of its findings to state and local officials, is salutary.

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186 From discussions at Panel meetings, and from comments that have been made by officials in other forums, information-sharing apparently has been improving in recent months.

The Panel is also aware of efforts in the Los Angeles area, in connection with the operational area terrorism working group (TWG) composed of LA county and municipal agencies, and the area's terrorism early warning (TEW) group; and of the multi- jurisdictional effort in New England aimed at collective information sharing of terrorist and other criminal threats. Those initiatives, as well as others that have been formed under the auspices of the FBI program to establish joint terrorism task forces, could be models for other regional programs, and for Federal interface with state and local jurisdictions, to improve and facilitate information sharing.

The Panel is convinced that efforts in this area must be based on the use of the most modern information technology available.

Definitions and Terms of Reference

Many of the terms and definitions that are essential to the instant discussion are ambiguous and confusing. The definition contained in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) Act -- which directed specific actions in this arena, and which has been used as the basis for the development of others -- defines "weapons of mass destruction'' as

. . . .any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of --
(A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors;
(B) a disease organism; or
(C) radiation or radioactivity.

Nevertheless, 18 U.S.C, Section 2332a, which makes it a Federal crime -- carrying a maximum penalty of death or life imprisonment -- to use "certain weapons of mass destruction,'' includes in its definition of such weapons not only definitional elements substantially similar to those contained in NLD, but also "any destructive device as defined in section 921'' of that title, which includes

(A) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas

(i) bomb,
(ii) grenade,
(iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces,
(iv) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one- quarter ounce,
(v) mine, or
(vi) device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding clauses;

(B) any type of weapon (other than a shotgun or a shotgun shell which. . .is generally recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes) by whatever name known which will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant, and which has any barrel with a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter; and

(C) any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into any destructive device described in subparagraph (A) or (B) and from any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any which a destructive device may be readily assembled.

While the Title 18 definition is more inclusive in terms of certain conventional explosive devices that do not fit within the traditional categories of chemical, biological, radiological or other nuclear devices, both definitions beg the question of what constitutes a "significant number of people.'' A single CBRN or conventional weapon that is neither intended nor has the capability "to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people'' is not included within the actions proscribed; but could, either alone or in a series of actual or threatened events create panic or other significant disruptions.

A recent GAO report on Combating Terrorism flatly states, "no federal agency has defined what constitutes 'mass casualties'.''¹⁸⁷

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187 GAO/NSIAD-99-163, at p. 6.

And several Federal agencies (e.g., the FBI and the Department of Defense) have their own definition of terrorism.

The Panel recommends that there be a revision and codification of universal, unambiguous, and easily understandable definitions of the various terms used in this context.

The Department of Health and Human Services has arbitrarily determined that it will use the figure of 1,000 casualties for planning purposes in establishing its Metropolitan Medical Response System.

Standards, and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

The Panel will devote significant attention during its current fiscal year activities to standards, especially for training and equipment. Given the likelihood that multiple jurisdictions in one or more states, as well as agencies of the Federal government, will be involved in any serious terrorist incident, it will be critical that every responder in a particular emergency function be trained to the same standard. The types of equipment used by response entities -- detection devices, personal protective equipment, and communications equipment -- must be compatible and inter-operable. The Panel commends the efforts being undertaken by the Interagency Board (IAB) for Equipment Standardization and InterOperability -- composed of representatives of various Federal, state, and local entities, as well as some nongovernmental professional organizations -- in its attempt to develop a national "standardized equipment list,'' to provide responders at all levels with a resource with which to make better-informed decisions about the selection and acquisition of equipment. Such efforts are a positive step toward ensuring better compatibility and inter-operability of equipment among potential responders.

Local responders continue to express frustration at the vast array of devices and equipment available from industry that may have application for domestic preparedness for terrorist attacks. At the same time, some have expressed displeasure at the fact that certain items, previously purchased by local responders, do not measure up to the claims of manufacturers.

In order to develop and maintain operationally effective standards for equipment compatibility and inter-operability, the Panel has determined that more research and development is required to meet local responder needs. Given the significant costs associated with sophisticated equipment, such as certain chemical and biological detection devices, emphasis should be placed on the development of multi-purpose pieces of equipment, which can be used not only in the terrorism context, but which will also have application in other fields, such as the detection of naturally transmitted infectious diseases.

To help to reassure responders that the equipment that is being used is in fact capable of doing what it is designed to do, it is likely that an ambitious program of independent testing and evaluation will have to be undertaken. The Panel recognizes that any such program will likely have to be conducted -- because of its national implications -- under Federal sponsorship; and will require the addition or reallocation of significant resources.¹⁸⁸ For reasons that are self-evident, local responders are insisting that testing be done with "live'' agents.

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188 At a recent conference of the IAB, it was noted by an official from the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health that there are some 7,000 respiratory devices -- mostly protective masks -- that have potential application to a response to a chemical or biological incident, and that to test a device properly will take form four to six weeks -- per device.

The Panel is aware of a project being undertaken by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), an agency the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs, which is ultimately designed to be a "consumer report'' catalogue of available equipment that meets certain listed standards.

The Issue of "Who's in Charge''

Increasingly, the Panel and its supporting staff have heard the question raised, "When an incident occurs, who's in charge?'' The Panel has initially concluded that there is no single answer to the question -- a determination will likely have to be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration, among other factors, the nature of the incident; the perpetrator source; the actual or potential consequences immediately and over time; and the then-current capabilities for effective response at various levels. In every actual terrorist incident, non-Federal local responders will always be in charge initially, unless of course the incident occurs on a military or other Federal reservation which has its own response capability. Even in the latter case, an incident may be of such proportions that non-Federal responders may be just as engaged, if not more so, as the Federal responders on the government enclave may be.

The issue may be compounded by the fact that certain responsibilities at the Federal level have been bifurcated. Under the related Presidential Decision Directives, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has the "lead agency'' responsibility for "crisis management,'' while the Federal Emergency Management Agency is "lead'' for "consequence management.'' The "five-year plan,'' recently released by the Department of Justice, acknowledges that

there is often no clear point in time when resolution of a terrorist incident moves from the crisis to the consequence management stage. Indeed, these phases may occur simultaneously or, in some cases, the consequence management phase may actually precede the identification of a terrorist event.¹⁸⁹

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189 "Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan,'' p. 21.

At this point, the Panel reserves judgment on the issue of whether changes should be made in Federal "lead agency'' responsibilities, but will include the issue as a "thread'' which runs throughout its consideration of many aspects of preparations for response at all levels.

Many local responders are also justifiably concerned that Federal agents will assume command following almost any terrorist attack. In more discrete terms, local responders express concern that, having established an excellent relationship with Federal agencies at the local or regional level, when the "planes from Washington'' start to arrive, local agencies will be faced with an entirely new team -- one which may set different ground rules than those to which local responders and their local or regional Federal counterparts have previously agreed. Nevertheless, in various forums, local responders have noted improvement in this area during the past year, especially in the out-reach and bridge-building initiatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

When an actual incident is or becomes one that requires a major Federal response, to the point that a Federal entity may have to "take command'' of an operation, the issue of when and how an appropriate "hand-off'' from local to Federal authorities takes place continues to be a significant one for resolution -- sooner rather than later. While the Panel is aware that the issue is being addressed in inter-agency and inter governmental agreements, and is being included in a number of exercises, efforts by entities at all levels must, in the opinion of the Panel, be accelerated to provide the necessary agreed-on templates for such hand-offs to take place. This issue, especially any specific agreements that may be reached between Federal and local officials, should always be included in related training, exercises, and other appropriate forums, to ensure that any such transition will be as smooth as possible in an actual operation.

Summary

Regardless of the level of consequences from a terrorist event, we must as a nation ensure that we have programs that will provide the capabilities for local, state, and Federal authorities to respond effectively. Existing local, state and national response systems, used for a variety of emergency situations, may provide a solid foundation for preparedness for a terrorist incident. Managing the consequences of any type or size terrorist event may require, however, a somewhat different approach on the part of state and local officials and their Federal partners. Thus, we must ensure a basic ability for the three levels of government to integrate activities laterally and vertically in the development of policy and operational guidelines.

V. PLANNED PANEL ACTIVITIES FOR THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR

Having obtained the comprehensive "benchmark'' threat analysis contained in the foregoing sections of this report, and considering additional analyses and other significant information that has come to its attention, the Panel has embarked on an ambitious program of activities for the current fiscal year, which began October 1.

As noted in section one, the enabling legislation that created the Panel charged it with five specific responsibilities:

• To assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for incidents involving WMD;

• To assess the progress of Federal training programs for local emergency responses to incidents involving WMD;

• To assess deficiencies in programs for response to incidents involving WMD, including a review of unfunded communications, equipment, and planning requirements, and the needs of maritime regions;

• To recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with respect to Federal agency WMD response efforts, and for ensuring fully effective local response capabilities for WMD incidents; and

• To assess the appropriate roles of state and local government in funding effective local response capabilities.¹⁹⁰

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190 For purposes of the Panel's activities and recommendations, it has included the state level within the scope of its mandate.

Activities in the current year will be particularly focused on the first three of the Panel's responsibilities. The Panel, in its next annual report due to the President and the Congress on December 15, 2000, will provide a comprehensive report of those activities, along with additional analyses, conclusions, and recommendations. Comprehensive analyses, conclusions, and recommendations with respect to the fourth and fifth responsibilities, as well as those related to maritime regions, will be contained in the third and final annual report, due December 15, 2001. The Panel will likely make some interim recommendations in connection with those latter responsibilities in its next report.

Comprehensive Review and Analysis of Federal Programs

The panel, in conjunction with its supporting FFRDC, will undertake a thorough review and analysis of existing Federal programs that are designed, in whole or in part, to support or enhance domestic preparedness programs for terrorist incidents involving CBRN weapons. That review and analysis will include, among other things, consideration of:

• The complexity of the Federal organizational structure for providing information, assistance, or enhancements to local responders

• Duplicative or overlapping Federal programs for or obstacles to providing such information, assistance, or enhancements

• Analyses of the potential effectiveness and efficiency of each such program, based on the program description, additional information provided by the affected Federal agency, and other information available to the Panel

The review and analysis will place particular emphasis on those areas specifically mentioned in the enabling legislation: training, communications, equipment, planning requirements, the needs of maritime regions, and coordination among the various levels of government.

As a key element in its review and analysis of Department of Defense programs, the Panel will consider appropriate missions of the U.S. armed forces, in either direct or supporting roles, for responses to such terrorists incidents, with emphasis on an evaluation of the effectiveness of the current and proposed structure of military organizations for responses across the entire spectrum of potential threats.

Based on presentations given to the Panel, other information that has come to the Panel's attention from a variety of sources, and discussion among Panel members, the review and analysis of equipment issues will include a focus on research, development, testing, and evaluation of equipment currently available, as well as emerging technologies. In addition, the Panel's review and analysis will also place special emphasis on the development and timely dissemination of various categories of critical information between and among entities at the Federal, state, and local level.

Survey of Local Responders and State Emergency Management and Response Organizations

The Panel is cognizant of the fact that many local responders -- "first responders'' as they are frequently called -- have participated in one or more surveys on the issues being addressed by this Panel. Nevertheless, given the dynamic nature of the potential threats, coupled with a number of initiatives and activities in this arena at the Federal, state, and local level, which have been and are proposed to be undertaken contemporaneously with the Panel's efforts, the Panel has determined that it is important to have current responses to questions about issues that may also have been addressed in prior surveys, as well as responses to specific questions that may not have been previously asked. As in the case of the review and analysis of Federal programs outlined above, the survey will be designed to elicit the views of those surveyed with respect to the efficacy of current Federal programs, particularly in the areas of training, equipment, planning, communications, and Federal agency coordination among the various levels of government. The survey will be conducted with a targeted survey audience that will include all geographic regions of the country, and in states and localities with a broad range of population densities.

Interviews with Federal, State, and Local Officials

To complement the first two activities outlined above, members of the Panel and staff of the supporting FFRDC will conduct interviews with selected senior and mid- level officials at the Federal, state, and local level -- including, at the local level, law enforcement, fire services, emergency and other medical providers, public health personnel, and other emergency service officials. The purpose of the interviews will be to obtain more detailed information on programs and activities currently being conducted in certain jurisdictions, as well as specific proposals or recommendations that any of those persons interviewed may have to improve or enhance Federal efforts designed to strengthen local emergency responses to any such incident.

The specific officials to be interviewed will be determined at the December 1999 and subsequent meetings of the Panel. As in the case of the survey, interviews will be conducted with officials in several geographic regions of the country, and in states and localities with a broad range of population densities. Certain officials will be selected based on the depth of involvement of that official, or his or her state or locality, in efforts already undertaken by that state or locality to prepare for responses to terrorist incidents involving CBRN weapons. Nevertheless, officials will also be interviewed in some jurisdictions or agencies that have undertaken little or no preparation for potential response operations.

Case Studies

With the assistance of its supporting FFRDC, and in collaboration with other entities, the Panel will conduct a series of case studies that will focus on lessons learned, in several jurisdictions, from actual incidents and hoaxes of terrorism involving the potential use of CBRN weapons or other "weapons of mass destruction'' -- including, in the latter terminology, more conventional weapons with actual or potential mass-casualty results; and of several jurisdictions at the state or local level that have devoted significant resources to the preparation for a response to such an incident. The purpose of the case studies will be to review and analyze, in a consolidated form, the full range of elements and issues involved in each specific plan or actual response.

Standards

In parallel with the foregoing efforts, the Panel and the staff of its supporting FFRDC will also undertake a comprehensive analysis of the issue of standards for adequate preparation and response, which will include the status of existing, or the development of, appropriate standards in the areas of:

• Training for responders at all levels

• Equipment

• Notification procedures

• Communications

• Planning

On the assumption that no individual locality, arguably no individual state, will have the wherewithal by itself to respond to an incident that actually involves mass casualties or mass destruction -- that responders from many jurisdictions will be required to augment or perhaps supplant responders in a locality where an incident occurs -- standards in each of the areas listed above will be critical to an effective response.¹⁹¹ In conducting this analysis, the Panel will consult with a variety of law enforcement, fire services, emergency and other medical, public health, and other emergency services professional organizations, which have, in many cases, established standards for other purposes within their specific fields of endeavor. The Panel will also consult with various Federal entities -- agencies within the Departments of Health and Human Services, Defense, and Justice, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to mention a few -- which are or have been involved in establishing standards in other contexts. Assessment and analyses of the Panel will be designed to determine, among other things, certain "baseline'' standards for both training and equipment. In the equipment category, determinations by the Panel will not include the endorsement of any particular commercial product.

____________________

191 The Panel is aware that the currency and sustainment of a particular level of training, as well as the maintenance of any equipment acquired by or provided to a response entity, are issues in this subject area. The Panel will, therefore, emphasize those issues in its research and analysis.

Participation in Related Activities

Panel members and the staff of its supporting FFRDC will continue to attend and to participate in a variety of conferences, symposiums, exercises, meetings, and congressional hearings where terrorism, CBRN and WMD, and related domestic preparedness issues are discussed. As part of its continuing deliberations and in the development of its annual reports, the Panel will also review and analyze the reports and recommendations emanating from such activities, as well as relevant reports, recommendations, or analyses of other public and private organizations and experts in the field.

Continuing Threat Analysis

As indicated in previous sections of this report, the nature, scope, and sources of potential threats from terrorists, who may seek to use CBRN weapons, is exceptionally dynamic. A continuing, comprehensive analysis of the potential threats from terrorists, and attendant issues of the risks and vulnerabilities associated with those threats, will be critical to the development and implementation of any strategy, plan, or program to prepare for and to provide an effective domestic response to such an incident. As an integral part of its efforts, the Panel will continue to monitor, from a variety of entities and sources, related information and intelligence, both classified and open-source, on the nature and sources of potential threats.

Cyber Terrorism

This report does not specifically address any issues related to cyber terrorism. A strict interpretation of the Panel's enabling legislation, and related Federal statutes that provide definitions of "weapons of mass destruction,'' would indicate that the issue is not within the purview of the Panel's mandate. Nevertheless, the Panel has concluded that the issues of cyber terrorism and the forms of terrorist activities that the Panel has considered thus far are so inter-related that the Panel cannot ignore the issue. The Panel will, therefore, consider issues related to cyber terrorism in its activities, and include in its subsequent reports appropriate conclusions and recommendations on the subject.

Future Meetings of the Panel

The Panel has met and will plan to continue to meet at least once in each calendar quarter -- normally in the last month of the quarter -- for the duration of its existence.¹⁹² In the course of those meetings, the Panel will continue to obtain and to discuss information relevant to its congressional mandate. The Panel also plans to conduct several of its meetings in different parts of the country, to elicit the views and recommendations of the public at large on this issue of critical national importance.

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192 The dates, times, and locations of the two upcoming meetings of the Panel will normally be determined at each of the Panel's quarterly meetings, and will subsequently be posted to the Panel's public Website at: http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel/

APPENDIX A -- FEDERAL ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE FOR COMBATING TERRORISM

The charts that follow are intended to depict, in two-dimensional form, the organizational structure of the Federal government for dealing with all aspects of combating terrorism -- intelligence, law enforcement, health and medical, energy, commercial, diplomatic, military, research and development -- both domestically and internationally, including deterrence, prevention, interdiction, and response.

The charts include references to the interagency working group structure for "weapons of mass destruction preparedness'' under the auspices of National Security Council structure, and to a similar intra-departmental structure with the Department of Defense.

The charts only depict structure down to the Assistant Secretary and the "bureau'' or "agency'' level, and do not, therefore, include every "program office'' with any responsibility for any of these issues.

[Thirteen charts in PDF format are available as a Zipped file: http://cryptome.org/tp-terr-a.zip (190K)]

APPENDIX B—PANEL CHAIR AND MEMBERS

The Honorable James S. Gilmore, III, Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Chair

James Clapper, Jr. (Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Retired), Private Consultant, and Former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Chair

L. Paul Bremer, Private Consultant, and Former Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism, U.S. Department of State

Raymond Downey, Commander, Special Operations, City of New York Fire Department

George Foresman, Deputy State Coordinator, Department of Emergency Services, Commonwealth of Virginia

William Garrison (Major General, U.S. Army, Retired), Independent Consultant, and Former Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s Delta Force

Ellen M. Gordon, Administrator, Emergency Management Division, Department of Public Defense, State of Iowa, and President, National Emergency Management Association

James Greenleaf, Independent Consultant, and Former Associate Deputy for Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Dr. William Jenaway, Corporate Executive, and Chief of Fire and Rescue Services, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania

William Dallas Jones, Director, Office of Emergency Services, State of California

Paul M. Maniscalco, Past President, National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians, and Deputy Chief/Paramedic, NYFD EMSC

Ronald S. Neubauer, Chief of Police, St. Peters, Missouri, and Immediate Past President, International Association of Chiefs of Police

Kathleen O’Brien, City Coordinator, City of Minneapolis, Minnesota

Dr. M. Patricia Quinlisk, Medical Director/State Epidemiologist, Department of Public Health, State of Iowa

Patrick R. Ralston, Executive Director, State Emergency Management Agency; Executive Director, Department of Fire and Building Services; and Executive Director, Public Safety Training Institute, State of Indiana

William Reno (Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Retired), Former Senior Vice President of Operations, American Red Cross

Dr. Kenneth Shine, President, Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences

Ellen Embry, U.S. Department of Defense Representative

APPENDIX C—PANEL ACTIVITIES DURING FISCAL YEAR 1999

For reasons that are stated in the main body of the report, the first two official meetings of the Panel (in June and September 1999) concentrated specifically on the potential threats of terrorism involving CBRN weapons. In the course of those meetings, the Panel received the following formal briefings:¹⁹³

• Dr. Christopher Davis, InSight International, “The Threat of State-Sponsored Biological Terrorism” (unclassified), which provided information on the CBRN weapons programs of the former Soviet Union and Russia, as well as CBRN programs in Iraq

• Larry K. Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency, “Threat Posed to the U.S. by International Terrorism Using Chemical and Biological Weapons” (classified)

• Commander John Weidner, Acting Director, Office of Emergency Response, Defense Programs, Department of Energy, “Nuclear Terrorism: The Threat from Explosives Employing Fissile and Non-Fissile Materials” (classified)

• Elizabeth Q. Ten Eyck, Director, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Nuclear Terrorism: The Threat from Radioactive Release and Attacks on Commercial Power Plants” (classified)

• Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, Director, Combating Terrorism Transnational Threats, National Security Council, “Terrorism and WMD: The Threat to the U.S. and the National Policy in Response” (classified)

• Dr. Floyd P. Horn, Administrator, Agricultural Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “The Potential Terrorist Threat to U.S. Agriculture and Livestock” (unclassified)

• Robert M. Burnham, Section Chief, Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism Planning Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “The Threat of WMD Terrorism in the United States” (unclassified)

• Thomas Kuker, Director, National Domestic Preparedness Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “The National Domestic Preparedness Office: Roles and Responsibilities” (unclassified)

____________________

193 Details of the Panel’s sessions and minutes from those meetings (as well as from the Panel’s organizational meeting in April 1999), an extract of the enabling legislation, a list of Panel members, and the Charter of the Panel, may all be accessed at the Panel’s dedicated web site at: http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel/

The Panel also received briefings from several individual members of the Panel on their personal and institution perspectives as local responders:

• Raymond Downey, Commander, Special Operations, Fire Department of the City of New York

• Paul M. Maniscalco, Past President, National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians, and Deputy Chief/Paramedic, NYFD EMSC

• Kathleen O’Brien, City Coordinator, City of Minneapolis, Minnesota

In addition, the Panel was also briefed by another Panel member, James Clapper (Lt. Gen., USAF, Retired), former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, on the Integrated Threat Data Base Initiative, currently under consideration at the Department of Defense.

At its September 1999 meeting, the Panel also received a briefing from The Honorable Curt Weldon (R-PA), Chairman of the Military Research and Development Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, the sponsor of the Panel’s enabling legislation.

In parallel with these efforts, the RAND research staff, tasked with providing research and analytical support to the Panel, was directed to focus its attention on the threat issue during these first six months of the Panel’s existence. RAND provided to the Panel members extensive threat-related research and analysis covering the broad spectrum of risks from CBRN devices and agents, and potential sources of terrorism involving their use.

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APPENDIX E—INTERAGENCY COMMENTS

The Panel provided a draft of the Report to be circulated within the Federal interagency process. The following agencies provided comments on the draft report.

Following receipt of the comments, each agency was contacted given the opportunity to have its comments included in their entirety in this appendix. As of the date of the publication of the Report, the only agency that requested that its comments be included is the National Domestic Preparedness Office. In the event that an agency wants its comments provided separately after the report is published, those comments will be forwarded to the President and the Congress under separate cover.

Comments Received

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Threat Reduction)
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict]
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
The Joint Staff
Department of the Army

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

National Domestic Preparedness Office
Domestic Terrorism/Counterrorism Planning Section

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Office of Emergency Preparedness, National Disaster Medical System

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Office of Emergency Response

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

U.S. Coast Guard

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D. C. 20535-0001

December 1, 1999

MEMORANDUM TO: Ms. Ellen Embry

Special Assistant to the ASD/Reserve Affairs

FROM: Thomas Kuker /S/

Director
National Domestic Preparedness Office

SUBJECT: Draft Review: First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report of the Department of Defense WMD Advisory Panel. The National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) appreciates the work of the Panel thus far and the thoroughness of the report.

The enclosed document constitutes the National Domestic Preparedness Office's (NDPO) input to the report. The NDPO point of contact for this matter is Unit Chief Gary Rohen, telephone (202) 324-9032, facsimile (202) 324-2224.

enclosure

The NDPO recommends that the draft report be edited to
reflect the following changes:

Page 72, line 22:

Delete: "Although representatives of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's NDPO have stated that the NDPO
will develop a national strategy..." replace with, "the NDPO
will develop a national strategy...

(The NDPO should not be referred to as "the FBI's" - it was
conceptualized by the Attorney General, the NSC, and other agencies
as an interagency office, which will ultimately include federal,
state, and local representatives. For purely administrative
purposes, it is housed in the FBI.) Additionally, the National
Strategy is the foundation of the NDPO's mission, not merely a
statement of NDPO representatives.)

Page 73, line 4:

add after last sentence:

"A coherent national strategy for domestic preparedness will
depend on the needs and capabilities of individual
jurisdictions. The NDPO's incorporation of state and local
planning groups and state points of contact through each
governor's office, as well as utilization of the State and
Local Advisory Group to the NDPO, will ensure that a bottom-up
approach is attained.

(The NDPO strongly concurs with the draft report
requirement that the National Strategy have a "bottom-up"
approach.)

Page 74, line 11:

delete "has organized", replace with "was directed by
the Attorney General to organize..."

Page 74, line 27: add after last sentence:

"When necessary, the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Preparedness (WMDP) Group, as outlined in Presidential
Decision Directive 62, will provide the conduit for
interagency coordination and dispute resolution below
the Principals level. The WMDP Subgroup I, Assistance
to State and Local Authorities (ASLA) will be the
vehicle to accomplish these tasks. Although the
National Security Council is the Chair, the National
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection,
and Counter-terrorism has offered to relinquish this
position to the Director, NDPO, for this purpose, as
the NDPO serves as the national voice of the state and
local emergency communities. The appointment of the
NDPO Director will serve to elevate issues of state
and local stakeholders for resolution to the highest
levels of government. This relationship between the
ASLA Subgroup and the Director NDPO in no way alters
the reporting or command channels between the NDPO and
the Attorney General, and reflects the evolution of
the NDPO in that the Federal Leadership Advisory Group
is replaced by ASLA in an attempt to work through
existing mechanisms for federal coordination and avoid
duplication of effort among agencies."

Page 76, line 5:

insert after last sentence:

"In keeping with stakeholders' recommendations that
the federal government improve the information sharing
process with the state and local authorities, the NDPO
will focus the majority of its resources and efforts
to facilitate the dissemination of WMD-related
information among federal, state, and local offices
and agencies. The NDPO's Information Sharing program
incorporates various mechanisms to accomplish this,
including Special Bulletins, a toll-free assistance
number, websites, a monthly newsletter, and public
speaking assistance."

APPENDIX F—RAND STAFF PROVIDING ANALYTICAL SUPPORT TO THE PANEL

Project Leaders

Bruce Hoffman (1/99-9/99)
Michael Wermuth (9/99-Present)

Research Staff for the Report

Jennifer Brower
Peter Chalk
Bruce Hoffman
Gregory Jones
Richard Mesic
William Rosenau
Michael Wermuth

Administrative Support

Nancy Rizor
Priscilla Schlegel

Other RAND Research Staff Providing Analytical Support

James Bartis
Roger Brown
Marvin Heinze
William Hix
Jeffrey Isaacson
Brian Jenkins
Leslie Lewis
Kenneth Myers
Jonathan Schachter
James Nickerson
John Schrader
Lorne Teitlebaum
Traci Williams

International Security and Defense Policy Center (National Defense Research Institute)

Jeffrey Isaacson, Program Director

[End]

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