18 December 1999. Thanks to DS.
Source:
http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel/terror.pdf
(494K, hardcopy of 121 pages)
Full file is available Zipped: http://cryptome.org/tp-terr.zip (108K)
First Annual Report
to
The President and The Congress
of theADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS
DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
I. ASSESSING THE THREAT
15 December 1999
THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR
TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
James S. Gilmore, III Chairman
James Clapper, Jr. L. Paul Bremer Raymond Downey George Foresman William Garrison Ellen M. Gordon James Greenleaf William Jenaway William Dallas Jones Paul Maniscalco Ronald S. Neubauer Kathleen O'Brien M. Patricia Quinlisk Patrick Ralston William Reno Kenneth Shine Ellen Embrey*
* U.S. Department of Defense |
15 December 1999
The President Dear Mr. President: On behalf of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is my pleasure to submit to the Congress the first of three annual reports of the advisory panel. The advisory panel is authorized and the annual reports are required by Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998). The advisory panel held its first official meeting on 9 June 1999, and has held additional meetings on 22 September and 13 December 1999. The advisory panel intends to continue to meet at least once in each calendar quarter, and will hold meetings in various parts of the country. The report provides an analysis of potential U.S. domestic threats from terrorists. It contains several conclusions and recommendations for consideration by the President and the Congress, as well as information on the activities of the advisory panel for the current fiscal year. Subsequent reports will provide specific conclusions and recommendations on those issues specified in the enabling legislation. Very respectfully, |
Please address comments or questions to:
RAND
1333 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-4707 Telephone: 202-296-5000 FAX:
202-296-7960
The Federally-Funded Research and Development Center providing support to
the Advisory Panel
[Note: Omitted are same letters addressed to Vice-President Al Gore, House Speaker Dennis Hastert, Senate Pro Tem Strom Thurmond, House Majority Leader Richard Armey, House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle.]
Report Structure and Rationale
Many government officials and concerned citizens believe that "it is not a question of if, but when'' an incident will occur that involves the use by a terrorist of a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapon -- a so-called "weapon of mass destruction'' (WMD) -- that is designed, intended, or has the capability to cause "mass destruction'' or "mass casualties.'' In recent years, some have depicted terrorist incidents as causing catastrophic loss of life and extensive structural and environmental damage as not only possible but probable. Such depictions do not accurately portray the full range of terrorist threats. While such a devastating event is within the realm of possibility, the first annual report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (the "Panel'') delves into a broad range of issues, chronicles actual terrorist attacks, considers potential terrorist incidents, and attempts to answer the fundamental questions of "Who?,'' "What?,'' and "Why?;'' and accordingly begins to consider what must be done to prepare for the "When.''
Chapter Two of the report chronicles CBRN schemes, attempts, and actual attacks by terrorists and the known or assumed motives or intentions behind them, with a thorough analysis of such incidents, in an attempt to provide insight into the current discussion of potential threats and possible consequences. That portion of the report focuses as well on the potential for incidents involving CBRN devices that are more probable, and will have less than mass-casualty consequences; but which could, nevertheless, have devastating effects -- economically, politically, or psychologically. Chapter Two also provides an overview and analysis of the principal issues involving the threat posed to the United States by terrorist use of CBRN weapons, the identification of the range of potential adversaries and perpetrators who might employ such weapons, and the dimensions of the threat given the individual types of weapons and their technical and material requirements. In turn, Chapter Two explores in some detail the difficulties inherent in producing any CBRN weapon that has truly mass-destructive or mass-casualty capabilities.
Chapter Three of the report focuses on an analysis of the circumstances and facts -- as they have come to light -- surrounding the 1995 attack in the Tokyo subway system by the fanatic, apocalyptic religious cult, the Aum Shinrikyo. That seminal event -- the first time a nonstate group had used a chemical weapon against civilians -- is a benchmark against which all potential terrorists' attacks involving chemical or biological weapons will likely be measured in the near term. The analysis delves into all of the implications of that most ambitious undertaking -- including extensive research and development efforts spanning chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons aspirations -- but one that ultimately fell far short of its intended purposes. Specifically, it examines the implications of the group's attempts in the CBRN arena and assesses the inferences and lessons that can be drawn from Aum's activities, in the context of deliberations about and U.S. domestic preparedness for potential acts of CBRN terrorism.
The report describes, in Chapter Four, some preliminary conclusions and hypotheses reached by the Panel, based on a thorough analysis and discussion of the threat and other information presented to the Panel, and the relevance of that analysis and information to the broader issues of preparedness, planning, training, and coordination at the Federal, state and local levels. The Panel makes several initial broad policy recommendations, as a result of its first two official meetings, and analyses and information provided to it, on such topics as the need for a national strategy to address domestic response to terrorism; a better understanding by both policymakers and responders of the threats; the complexity of the current Federal structure; inherent problems associated with the manner in which Congress and the Executive Branch have addressed the issue; the need for more comprehensive and authoritative threat assessments and related analyses; the requirements for better information sharing among governmental entities at all levels; the need for clear, concise, and consistent definitions and terms of reference; the necessity for standards in planning and training, for the compatibility and interoperability of equipment among responders, and related research, development, test, and evaluation issues; and the issue of who or what entity is "in charge'' if an event does occur.
The report concludes with an overview of the activities of the Panel being
undertaken in the current fiscal year, which include a comprehensive review
of related Federal programs; a survey of local and state emergency management
and response officials; interviews with a number of related Federal, state,
and local officials; case studies of jurisdictions where such events have
occurred or been threatened; and future meetings of the Panel.
Working Definitions Used in the Report
For reasons of clarity and precision, the report uses the term CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) terrorism, in preference to the more commonly used, yet potentially misleading term, "weapons of mass destruction'' or WMD.1 It is intended that the term CBRN, within the construct of this report, include potential terrorist attacks on industrial chemical facilities that do not necessarily involve an actual CBRN weapon, where the purpose is to engineer the hazardous release of a toxic gas or gases as a means to kill and injure surrounding populations.
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1 The NLD (Nunn-Lugar-Domenici) Act defines a "weapon of mass destruction'' as "any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of -- (A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; (B) a disease organism; or (C) radiation or radioactivity.''
Nevertheless, with the exception of nuclear weapons, none of the unconventional weapons by itself is, in fact, capable of wreaking mass destruction, at least not in structural terms. Indeed, the terminology "weapons of mass casualties'' may be a more accurate depiction of the potentially lethal power that could be unleashed by chemical, biological, or nonexplosive radiological weapons. The distinction is more than rhetorical and is critical to understanding the vastly different levels of technological skills and capabilities, weapons expertise, production requirements, and dissemination or delivery methods needed to undertake an effective attack using either chemical or biological weapons in particular.2
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2 Although biological agents "are often described as 'weapons of mass destruction,' it does not follow that the ability to inflict mass casualties is an intrinsic property. Key variables in determining the impact of a [biological] terrorist attack are the quantity of agent employed and the means of dissemination.'' See Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, "An Unlikely Threat,'' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 4 (July/August 1999), which can be accessed at: http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1999/ja99/ja99tucker.html
The definition of terrorism employed in this report, and used as the framework for the Panel's deliberations to date,3 is essentially one used by RAND for more than a quarter of a century. Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm, through acts designed to coerce others into actions they otherwise would not undertake or into refraining from actions that they desired to take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be violations of the rules of war, if a state of war existed. This violence or threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. The perpetrators are usually members of an organized group, although increasingly lone actors or individuals who may have separated from a group can have both the motivation and potentially the capability to perpetrate a terrorist attack. Unlike other criminals, terrorists often claim credit for their acts. Finally, terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage that they cause.4
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3 Several Federal agencies (e.g., the FBI and the Department of Defense) have their own definition of terrorism.4 Karen Gardela and Bruce Hoffman, The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism for 1986 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-3890-RC, 1990), p. 1 (with slight modifications), which in turn is taken from Brian Michael Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND , P-5261, 1974).
For the purposes of this report, a terrorist group is defined as a collection of individuals belonging to an autonomous nonstate or subnational revolutionary or antigovernment movement who are dedicated to the use of violence to achieve their objectives. Such an entity is seen as having at least some structure and command and control apparatus that, no matter how loose or flexible, nonetheless provides an overall organizational framework and general strategic direction.5 This definition is meant to include contemporary religion-motivated and apocalyptic groups, such as the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult and other movements that seek theological justification or divine sanction for their acts of violence. Although religion, often coupled with rofound millennialist convictions, is of course the predominant motivation of such groups, their aims and objectives inherently involve a quest for power -- in this specific context, power used to defend the faith, to defeat secular enemies, or to establish a national, or even aglobal, hegemony based on that particular sect's (or its leaders') self-defined theological precepts.
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5 The "Leaderless Resistance'' strategy embraced today by the far-right paramilitary white supremacist movement in the United States would be included in this definition and the words "loose and flexible'' have been deliberately included in the above to take into account this phenomenon. "Leaderless Resistance,'' also called "phantom cell networks,'' lays down a strategy of violence perpetrated by "autonomous leadership units'' (e.g., terrorist cells) operating independently of one another that, it is intended, will eventually join together to create a chain reaction leading to a nationwide, white supremacist revolution. Although no clear, identifiable chain of command is evident in this structure, overall ideological direction and strategic guidance is nonetheless disseminated to individuals both actively and passively by leading white supremacist figures and key racist umbrella organizations. The "Leaderless Resistance'' strategy is meant specifically to maximize security and thwart penetration and compromise from law enforcement personnel. Adherents of this strategy thus strike when the opportunity presents itself and against targets that have often been previously designated in hate literature or posted on the Internet by persons or organizations within this loose framework. The concept of "Leaderless Resistance'' is described in the white supremacist adventure novel, Hunter, written by William Pierce (under the pseudonym Andrew MacDonald) and published by National Vanguard Books in Hillsboro, Virginia. Hunter, it should be noted, is the sequel to The Turner Diaries (which Pierce/MacDonald also rote) -- the novel described by the FBI as the "bible'' of the American white supremacist movement (Quoted in Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism in the United States and the Potential Threat to Nuclear Facilities (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND , R-3351-DOE, 1986), p. 42.
As the quest for power is inherent to politics, violence committed by these groups as having a political intent is, in the opinion of the Panel, terrorist in nature. In Aum's case, for example, the group's objective in staging the 1995 nerve gas attack was (among other aims) to lay the foundation for a revolt against the Japanese government that would result in the creation of a new regime dedicated to the service of the sect's founder and leader, Shoko Asahara.
This report also includes a discussion of potential acts of state-sponsored terrorism employing CBRN weapons. State-sponsored terrorism is defined here as the active involvement of a foreign government in training, arming, and providing other logistical and intelligence assistance as well as sanctuary to an otherwise autonomous terrorist group for the purpose of carrying out violent acts on behalf of that government against its enemies. State-sponsored terrorism is, therefore, regarded as a form of surrogate warfare.
Excluded from this report are acts of violence committed by bona fide state
agents -- that is, clandestine acts of sabotage perpetrated by military,
intelligence, or security officials in the service of a foreign government's
armed forces or intelligence agencies. Though the distinction between a
state-sponsored act of terrorism and an act of clandestine sabotage by a
state agent may seem semantic, it is a critical difference that distinguishes
terrorism from warfare and from the type of violence examined in this report.
Having said that, the Panel nevertheless acknowledges capabilities must also
exist for responding to such an incident, and that the foregoing distinction
will, therefore, likely be lost on those who must respond to an incident
involving the use of any one of a number of very lethal agents in the CBRN
arsenal, regardless of the perpetrator.
Cyber Terrorism
This report does not specifically address any issues related to cyber terrorism. A strict interpretation of the Panel's enabling legislation, and related Federal statutes that provide definitions of "weapons of mass destruction,'' would indicate that the issue is not within the purview of the Panel's mandate. Nevertheless, the Panel has concluded that the issues of cyber terrorism and the forms of terrorists activities that the Panel has considered thus far are so inter-related that the Panel cannot ignore the issue. The Panel will, therefore, consider issues related to cyber terrorism in its activities, and include in its subsequent reports conclusions and recommendations on the subject.
The possibility that terrorists will use "weapons of mass destruction (WMD)''6 in this country to kill and injure Americans, including those responsible for protecting and saving lives, presents a genuine threat to the United States. As we stand on the threshold of the twenty-first century, the stark reality is that the face and character of terrorism are changing and that previous beliefs about the restraint on terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) devices may be disappearing. Beyond the potential loss of life and the infliction of wanton casualties, and the structural or environmental damage that might result from such an attack, our civil liberties, our economy, and indeed our democratic ideals could also be threatened. The challenge for the United States is first to deter and, failing that, to be able to detect and interdict terrorists before they strike. Should an attack occur, we must be confident that local, state, and Federal authorities are well prepared to respond and to address the consequences of the entire spectrum of violent acts.
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6 For reasons of clarity and precision, the report uses the term CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) terrorism, in preference to the more commonly used, yet potentially misleading term, "weapons of mass destruction'' or WMD.
In recent years, efforts have clearly been focused on more preparations for such attacks. The bombings of the World Trade Center in New York and Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, coupled with the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack in Tokyo and the U.S. embassy bombings this past summer, have heightened American concern and have already prompted an array of responses across all levels of government. At the same time, the country's seeming inability to develop and implement a clear, comprehensive, and truly integrated national domestic preparedness strategy means that we may still remain fundamentally incapable of responding effectively to a serious terrorist attack.
The vast array of CBRN weapons conceivably available to terrorists today can be used against humans, animals, crops, the environment, and physical structures in many different ways. The complexity of these CBRN terrorist threats, and the variety of contingencies and critical responses that they suggest, requires us to ensure that preparedness efforts are carefully planned, implemented, and sustained among all potential responders, with all levels of government operating as partners. These threats, moreover, will require new ways of thinking throughout the entire spectrum of local, state, and Federal agencies. Effecting true change in the culture of a single government agency, much less achieving fundamental changes throughout and among all three, presents formidable hurdles. Nonetheless, the nature of these threats and their potential consequences demands the full commitment of officials at all levels to achieve these goals. Indeed, the need to ensure that a strategic national vision regarding domestic preparedness is in place, so that the country is better able to counter these threats and to respond effectively to the challenges that they present, is among the reasons that this congressionally mandated Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction was established.
The enabling legislation7 directs the Panel to assess Federal efforts to enhance domestic preparedness, the progress of Federal training programs for local emergency responses, and deficiencies in Federal programs for response to terrorist incidents involving WMD; to recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination of Federal agency response efforts and for ensuring fully effective local response capabilities for WMD terrorism incidents; and to assess appropriate state and local funding for response to WMD terrorism.8
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7 Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998).8 For purposes of the Panel's activities and recommendations, it has included the state level within the scope of its mandate.
To meet those objectives, the Panel determined that it must first understand the full range of potential CBRN threats from terrorists, based on the belief that without a fundamental understanding of the threats, preparedness efforts by Federal, state, and local entities could be misguided, uncoordinated, and wasteful.
The Panel's analysis of such threats points out that CBRN terrorism has emerged as a U.S. national security concern for several reasons:
The reasons terrorists may perpetrate a WMD attack include a desire to kill as many people as possible as a means "to annihilate their enemies,'' to instill fear and panic to undermine a governmental regime, to create a means of negotiating from a position of unsurpassed strength, or to cause great social and economic impact.
Given any of those potential motives, the report identifies the "most likely terrorists groups'' to use CBRN as fundamentalist or apocalyptic religious organizations, cults, and extreme single-issue groups but suggests that such a group may resort to a smaller-scale attack to achieve its goal. The analysis, however, indicates two additional possibilities:
In the latter case, nevertheless, the Panel concludes that several reasons work against state sponsorship, including the prospect of significant reprisals by the United States against the state sponsor, the potential inability of the state sponsor to control its surrogate, and the prospect that the surrogate cannot be trusted, even to the point of using the weapon against its sponsor.
The Panel concludes that the Nation must be prepared for the entire spectrum of potential terrorist threats -- both the unprecedented higher consequence attack, as well as the historically more frequent, lesser consequence terrorist attack, which the Panel believes is more likely in the near term. Conventional explosives, traditionally a favorite tool of the terrorist, will likely remain the terrorist weapon of choice in the near term as well. Whether smaller-scale CBRN or conventional, any such lower-consequence event -- at least in terms of casualties or destruction -- could, nevertheless, accomplish one or more terrorist objectives: exhausting response capabilities, instilling fear, undermining government credibility, or provoking an overreaction by the government. With that in mind, the Panel's report urges a more balanced approach, so that not only higher consequence scenarios will be considered, but that increasing attention must now also be paid to the historically more frequent, more probable, lesser consequence attack, especially in terms of policy implications for budget priorities or the allocation of other resources, to optimize local response capabilities. A singular focus on preparing for an event potentially affecting thousands or tens of thousands may result in a smaller, but nevertheless lethal attack involving dozens failing to receive an appropriate response in the first critical minutes and hours.
While noting that the technology currently exists that would allow terrorists to produce one of several lethal CBRN weapons, it also describes the current difficulties in acquiring or developing and in maintaining, handling, testing, transporting, and delivering a device that truly has the capability to cause "mass casualties.'' Those difficulties include the requirement, in almost all cases, for highly knowledgeable personnel, significant financial resources, obtainable but fairly sophisticated production facilities and equipment, quality control and testing, and special handling. In many cases, the personnel of a terrorist organization run high personal safety risks, in producing, handling, testing, and delivering such a device. Moreover, the report notes, the more sophisticated a device, or the more personnel, equipment, facilities, and the like involved, the greater the risk that the enterprise will expose itself to detection and interdiction by intelligence and law enforcement agencies -- particularly in light of the emerging attention focused on terrorism today.
The report explains, with some specificity, the challenges involved in each of the four device or agent topic areas -- biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological -- which suggests that some public pronouncements and media depictions about the ease with which terrorists might wreak genuine mass destruction or inflict widespread casualties do not always reflect the significant hurdles currently confronting any nonstate entity seeking to employ such weapons. The report acknowledges, nevertheless, that the situation now facing a terrorist could change dramatically because of new discoveries, further advances in technology, or other material factors. No matter how difficult or improbable such higher-consequence incidents may be, prudence requires that appropriate steps be taken across the broad spectrum of terrorist threats to deter, prevent, or interdict a terrorist event before it occurs or failing that, to respond in a way that will -- first and foremost -- minimize human casualties and also mitigate damage to property and to the environment.
Part of the report focuses on the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway, which marked the first time that a nonstate group had used a chemical weapon against civilians. The conventional wisdom -- that terrorists were not interested in killing, but rather in publicity, or were concerned about a loss of popular support or international recognition -- has increasingly been called into question, not only by the Aum event but also by others, such as the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings.
Nevertheless, Chapter Three, which chronicles Aum's attempts to develop a variety of lethal agents or devices, indicates that, despite Aum's considerable resources and the superior technical expertise and state-of-the-art equipment and facilities at its disposal, the group could not effect a truly successful chemical or biological attack. The lesson of Aum is that any nonstate entity faces organizational and significant technological difficulties and other hurdles in attempting to weaponize and deliver chemical and biological weapons, arguably providing a refutation of the suggestion voiced with increasing frequency about the ease with which such weapons can be made and used.
The report contains several conclusions and recommendations, as a result of the threat analysis and other information provided to the Panel and the collective expertise and experience of its members:
The report concludes with an overview of the activities of the Panel being undertaken in the current fiscal year:
PREFACE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
CONTENTS
II. ASSESSING THE THREAT: CBRN TERRORISM AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY AND PREPAREDNESS
CBRN Terrorism's Emergence as a National Security Concern
Reasons and Rationales Behind Potential CBRN Terrorism
Agricultural Terrorism
State-sponsored Terrorism
Other Higher Probability/Lower Consequence Threats
Impediments to Developing Effective WMD Capabilities
Biological Terrorism
Chemical Terrorism
Nuclear Terrorism
Radiological Terrorism
The CBRN Terrorist Threat in Perspective
Summary
[Balance in preparation]
III. A RETROSPECTIVE: THE LESSONS OF AUM SHINRIKYO
The Aum Shinrikyo and the "New Terrorism''
The Lessons of Aum: A Reassessment
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Threat Assessments and Analyses
A National Strategy
Complexity of the Federal Structure
Congressional Responsibilities
Information Sharing
Definitions and Terms of Reference
Standards, and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
The Issue of "Who's in Charge''
Summary
V. PANEL ACTIVITIES FOR THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR
Comprehensive Review and Analysis of Federal Programs
Survey of Local Responders and State Emergency Management and Response Organizations
Interviews with Federal, State, and Local Officials
Case Studies
Standards
Participation in Related Activities
Continuing Threat Analysis
Cyber Terrorism
Future Meetings of the Panel
A -- FEDERAL ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE FOR COMBATING TERRORISM
B -- PANEL CHAIR AND MEMBERS
C -- PANEL ACTIVITIES DURING FISCAL YEAR 1999
D -- BIBLIOGRAPHY
E -- GLOSSARY
F -- RAND STAFF PROVIDING ANALYTICAL SUPPORT TO THE PANEL
In recent years, the United States has focused increasing attention and resources on countering the threat of terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. The main catalyst behind this concern was the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway, in which 12 persons were killed and more than 5,000 injured. This incident, perpetrated by an apocalyptic Japanese religious sect, the Aum Shinrikyo, appeared to underscore both the vulnerabilities and potentially catastrophic consequences of unprotected societies and ill-prepared governments in the face of indiscriminate attacks by enigmatic adversaries employing so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Two years earlier, the bombing of New York City's World Trade Center by Islamic fundamentalists had demonstrated that the United States itself was not immune to acts of terrorism intent on causing large numbers of casualties. Indeed, the six persons who perished in that attack and the approximately 1,000 others who were injured paled in comparison to the tens of thousands who might have been harmed had the terrorists' plans to topple one of the Trade Center's towers into the other actually had succeeded. If any further evidence were needed of this potential, it was provided less than a month after the Tokyo attack when Timothy McVeigh used a large truck bomb to demolish the Alfred P. Murrah Federal office building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 persons and injuring hundreds more.
In the wake of these incidents, a new era of terrorism was perceived by experts10 and government officials11 alike who foresaw a potentially bloodier and more destructive age of violence emerging as we approached the twenty-first century. The changes in terrorism that they described raised concerns in the United States, especially within Congress and the Executive Branch, about the implications of evolving terrorist threats that were now seen to include use of CBRN weapons. Congressional legislation was passed and Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) were implemented that sought to strengthen the ability of the United States to prevent and respond to terrorist acts involving CBRN weapons within our borders. Among the most significant of these initiatives was PDD 39, which President Clinton signed in June 1995, less than three months after the Oklahoma City bombing. This executive order sought to reduce the nation's vulnerability to terrorist attacks, especially those involving mass casualties and/or CBRN weapons: directing Federal agencies to improve domestic response capabilities to manage the consequences of attacks employing such unconventional weapons.12 The following year, Congress passed "The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act,'' also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) Act. This legislation was derived from a series of hearings conducted in 1995 and 1996 that had not only highlighted the growing dangers posed by potential terrorist use of CBRN weapons and the need to curtail the risk of nuclear materials theft and diversion from the former Soviet Union's hemorrhaging stockpiles, but also the inadequate state of domestic preparedness efforts to respond to such threats. The key domestic component of the NLD Act, accordingly, focused on programs designed to enhance state and local emergency response capabilities to incidents of CBRN terrorism.13
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10 See, for example, Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD: Preliminary Hypotheses,'' Non-Proliferation Review, vol. 4, no. 3, (Spring-Summer 1997), pp. 45--53; Brad Roberts (ed.), Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses (Alexandria, Va.: The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997); the "Roundtable Article'' in Politics and the Life Sciences, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 167--183, (especially the contributions by Jonathan B. Tucker, "Chemical/ Biological Terrorism: Coping with a New Threat'' and "Measures to Fight Chemical/Biological Terrorism: How Little Is Enough?''); and, John F. Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation Threat,'' Foreign Policy, no. 105 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 3--14.11 See, for example, Testimony of the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, William O. Studemann, Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, House Judiciary Committee, 6 April 1995 at: http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/1995/dci_testimony_4695.html; Louis J. Freeh, Speech to the Annual Meeting of the American Jewish Committee, Washington, D.C., 4 May 1995 at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/dirspch/94-96archives/amjc.htm; and, U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Parts I, II, III (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), passim.
12 See PDD 39, 21 June 1995 at http://www.fas.org.irp/offodcs/pdd39.html. PDD 39 designated the FBI as the lead Federal agency for managing all terrorist crises, including those perpetrated with CBRN weapons that either occur in the U.S. or break U.S. law. FEMA was designated as the lead Federal agency for managing the consequences of mass--casualty terrorist attacks, including those employing CBRN weapons. The FBI, FEMA, and other Federal agencies were further directed to review the adequacy of their response plans to CBRN terrorism. See the analysis of PDD 39 in Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 268--275.
13 Among other things, the NLD Act required the Department of Defense (DoD) to "carry out a program to provide civilian personnel of Federal, state, and local agencies with training and expert advice regarding emergency response to a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction or related materials.'' DoD has undertaken to do that training, initially in 120 cities. The Act also allocated funds for the Department of Health and Human Services (DHSS) for the establishment of metropolitan emergency medical response teams (commonly referred to as "Metropolitan Medical Strike Force Teams''), which has been initiated for 27 cities on a national basis. (Public Law 104-201, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Title XIV -- Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, 23 September 1996)
In the respectively three and four years since both of these measures were promulgated, Federal spending on terrorism in general and on CBRN terrorism in particular has increased considerably. The contrast is all the more striking given the paucity of funds allocated for these activities prior to the 1995 Tokyo nerve gas attack and the bombing in Oklahoma City. In fiscal year 1996, for example, the principal Federal agencies involved in activities to combat terrorism spent $5.7 billion; for fiscal year 2000 the President's budget request called for $10 billion to be devoted to counterterrorism programs and efforts -- a sum almost double the 1996 amount and nearly $3 billion more than the sum originally required for fiscal year 1999.14 The budgetary increases for key individual agencies are even more pronounced. Only $7 million was allocated to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in 1996 for its bioterrorism initiatives; by comparison, $230 million has been requested for DHHS programs in fiscal year 2000 -- an increase of more than 3,000 percent.15 The Office of Justice Programs in the Department of Justice has experienced an equally profound increase in its resources to support state and local domestic preparedness programs. These activities had a zero budget line in fiscal year 1997: they received a budgetary allocation of $21 million in 1998; followed by a nearly fivefold increase in fiscal year 1999 to $120 million; with a sum of $162 million requested in that office's fiscal year 2000 budget.16
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14 Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, "Combating Terrorism: Observation on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism,'' 11 March 1999, pp. 1 and 6.15 The increased funds will provide for expanded disease surveillance programs, improvements in its communications capabilities, and the establishment of regional laboratories. See Ibid., p. 7.
16 These monies are to be devoted to training and equipment for local responders and for the establishment of national training centers. See Ibid., p. 8.
Yet, despite these many new legislative and programmatic initiatives and appreciably increased funding levels, valid concerns remain that the United States is still not appropriately organized and prepared to counter and respond to the threat of either mass-casualty or CBRN terrorism. Authoritative oversight bodies, such as the U.S. General Accounting Office, for instance, have argued that this rapid growth in expenditures and attendant proliferation of ambitious programs and broad initiatives has occurred in the absence of the critical analysis and rigorous prioritization needed to establish clear and well-defined requirements for these efforts.17 In the absence of such measures, the GAO and other critics have argued, coordination among the multiplicity of Federal agencies involved in these efforts cannot be ensured, much less the effective provision of needed support and assistance by these same agencies to their counterparts at the state and local levels. This need is especially acute among so-called "first responders''18 -- that is, the fire, emergency medical services, public health, other medical providers, and emergency management and law enforcement personnel at the state and local levels who are most likely to be the first on the scene in the event of any terrorist incident and, in the case of an attack involving a CBRN weapon, who would have the primary responsibility to address the immediate consequences in coping with and managing such an event.
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17 Ibid., pp. 2--3.18 The Panel has chosen to use "local responders'' -- as opposed to "first responders'' -- to characterize those persons and entities that are most likely to be involved in the early stages following a terrorist attacks. That characterization includes not only law enforcement, fire services, emergency medical technicians, emergency management personnel, and others who may be required to respond to the "scene'' of an incident, but also other medical and public health personnel who may be required to provide their services in the immediate aftermath of an attack.
Accordingly, Congress directed the establishment of a panel of private citizens19 to assess current capabilities for domestic response to terrorist acts that involve WMD, and to recommend appropriate policies and strategies for managing and mitigating the effects of such incidents.20 Specifically, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (hereafter referred to as "the Panel'') is charged with five main responsibilities. They are:
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19 Private citizens of the United States are all citizens of the United States not currently employed by the United States government, including nonappropriated fund instrumentalities, or members of the United States armed forces on active duty, and who are not barred from employment or service under a United States government contract.20 The legislation establishing the panel is contained in section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261 (H.R. 3616), 105th Congress, 2nd Session), October 17, 1998).
21 For purposes of the Panel's activities and recommendations, it has included the state level within the scope of its mandate.
The legislation that established the Panel called for the Secretary of Defense to enter into contract with a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) to provide the appropriate analytical and logistical support to facilitate the Panel's performance of these tasks. RAND's National Defense Research Institute was selected as the FFRDC contractor for this purpose.
The legislation also mandated that the Panel submit to the President and to the Congress a report setting forth its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving Federal, state, and local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving WMD no later than December 15 of each year, beginning in 1999 and ending in 2001. This report represents the fulfillment of part of that requirement, and as such presents the Panel's first annual report.
A principal focus of this report is on the threat dimension of CBRN terrorism. From the outset of its work, the Panel concluded that Federal, state, and local domestic response capabilities for potential acts of CBRN terrorism could not be critically assessed, neither could well-informed public policy be developed, in the absence of a thorough understanding of the threat -- specifically, the type and magnitude of attacks for which each of the above jurisdictional levels of government is charged with preparing.22 The Panel, moreover, sees the threat not as a rigidly static phenomenon but as a dynamic and evolving one that requires constant monitoring, assessment, and evaluation. For example, the fundamental assumptions, on which critical legislation, such as the NLD Act, and executive orders, such as PDD 39, were based, arose from incidents that had then only recently occurred. The Panel was thus concerned that conclusions reached during the 1995--1996 time frame regarding the threats might possibly have derived from information that was not then as complete or as well understood as it is today or that was unduly influenced by threat perceptions that were either reactive or distorted by insufficient opportunity for detailed analysis and deliberate reflection.23
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22 Opening Statement of the Hon. James S. Gilmore, III, Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, at the first meeting of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, RAND, Washington, D.C., 9 June 1999. See http://www.rand.org/organizations/nsrd/terrpanel/minutes.6.9.html.23 Similar arguments have been presented by both the GAO and independent experts in testimony before the U.S. Congress. See the three statements of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives on (1) "Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism,'' 11 March 1999; (2) "Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives,'' 16 March 1999; and (3) "Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,'' 20 October 1999; as well as testimony before the same subcommittee by John Parachini, Senior Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, "Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat,'' 20 October 1999.
As a result, the Panel commissioned the staff of its supporting FFRDC, RAND, to provide an articulate, comprehensive, and current assessment and analysis of the potential domestic threats from terrorists who might seek to use a CBRN device or agent. That assessment and analysis, with some condensation, is embodied in this report.
The Panel has drawn some conclusions from that comprehensive assessment and analysis of the potential threats, from briefings and other information provided to the Panel and from the Panel's collective knowledge and experience. Furthermore, the Panel is recommending several procedural changes and is proposing that several issues be addressed in the near term, both in Congress and in the Executive Branch. Those conclusions and recommendations are contained in Chapter Four. The Panel will make more specific recommendations on funding priorities and programmatic changes in subsequent annual reports.
Until recently, most Americans thought that terrorism was something that happened elsewhere. However frequently U.S. citizens and interests were the target of terrorists abroad, many nonetheless believed that the United States itself was somehow immune to such violence within its own borders. Terrorism, accordingly, was regarded as a sporadic -- albeit attention-grabbing -- problem that occasionally affected Americans traveling or living overseas and concerned only those U.S. government agencies with specific diplomatic and national security responsibilities. If the 1993 World Trade Center bombing shattered that complacency, then the explosion in Oklahoma City two years later dramatically underscored the breadth of grievances felt toward the U.S. government. The list of potential adversaries had seemed suddenly to grow from the foreign radicals and religious extremists located in other regions of the world about whom we had always worried, to include wholly domestic threats, such as those posed by the militantly antigovernment, white supremacist organizations that had come to light in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City tragedy. In addition, even mentally deranged loners, like the so-called "Unabomber,'' were seen as also presenting a serious terrorist danger to their fellow Americans.
The threats confronting the United States in the post--Cold War era have become more diffuse and amorphous and are disturbingly as frequently homegrown as they are foreign. Terrorism, it is also argued, is changing -- with new adversaries, evidencing new motivations and different rationales, having surfaced both in the United States and elsewhere. The resurgence of extreme, Manichean24 religious imperatives, for example, coupled with the breakdown of traditional group constraints and the proliferation of millennialist, apocalyptic25 cultist sentiments are the key factors associated with this development, and are among the main concerns to those charged with protecting and defending the United States against terrorist attack. In this respect, a new terrorist mindset is seen to have emerged -- one that might not draw the line at mass, indiscriminate murder involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. The next part of this chapter, accordingly, examines this development, and assesses the rationales and motivations that would most likely impel terrorists to employ CBRN weapons.26
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24 Manichean groups adhere to the dualistic religious system of Manes, a combination of Gnostic Christianity, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, and various other elements, with a basic doctrine of a conflict between light and dark -- matter being regarded as dark or evil.25 Apocalyptic and millenarian beliefs both concern themselves with a preordained event that will bring about the end of human history but differ on what will happen after this event. Millenarian doctrines promise their adherents that this cataclysmic episode will deliver them from a world of increasing evil and corruption to one of perfection and peace. Apocalyptic dogmas, on the other hand, focus on the imminent eschatological event and do not concern themselves with their believers' existence after that time. See Martha Lee, "Violence and the Environment: The Case of 'Earth First!''' Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 7, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 110; See also Michael Barkun, "Introduction: Understanding Millennialism,'' Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 7, no. 3 (Autumn 1995).
26 It is of course impossible within the context of this report to consider on an individual basis every terrorist organization active throughout the world today and to determine the threat that it poses regarding the potential use of CBRN weapons. Distinct groups will almost certainly hold different views on the various advantages and disadvantages associated with CBRN weapon use -- the idiosyncratic nature of which would clearly need to be considered in any detailed "WMD'' terrorism threat assessment.
CBRN Terrorism's Emergence as a National Security Concern
Since the end of the Cold War, and especially in the wake of the New York and Oklahoma City bombings and Aum Shinrikyo attacks in Japan -- which has specific CBRN implication that are described and analyzed in detail in the next chapter -- there has been a dramatic shift in the perceived threat of CBRN terrorism. This has been especially evident in the United States, where, as previously noted, Federal funding for domestic preparedness and homeland defense programs aimed WMD terrorism has increased enormously. What accounts for this sudden shift in direction and appreciation of what was previously dismissed as a far less realistic threat scenario? A number of developments seem to be relevant.
First, terrorism itself has arguably shown a marked trend toward greater lethality. While some observers point optimistically to the decline in the number of international terrorist incidents during the 1990s as a noteworthy and salutary development in the struggle against terrorism, the percentage of terrorist incidents with fatalities has paradoxically increased. For example, at least one person was killed in 29 percent of terrorist incidents in 1995. This represents the highest ratio of fatalities to incidents recorded since 1968.27 The U.S. Department of State has also called attention to this trend of increasing terrorist lethality in its own authoritative annual compendium and analysis, Patterns of Global Terrorism.28 As the 1998 State Department analysis reports:
There were 273 international terrorist attacks during 1998, a drop from the 304 attacks we recorded the previous year and the lowest annual total since 1971. The total number of persons killed or wounded in terrorist attacks, however, was the highest on record: 741 persons died, and 5,952 persons suffered injuries.29
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27 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Victor Goldberg, 1998), p. 201, citing the RAND Chronology of International Terrorism.28 See Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State Publication 10433, 1997), p. 1; and, idem, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State Publication 10535, 1998), p. 1.
29 Idem, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State Publication 10610, 1999), p. 1.
This development, moreover, conforms to a pattern of worldwide terrorist activity observed throughout the current decade. The trend toward increased lethality becomes more apparent, for example, when statistics over time are analyzed and compared. Between 1990 and 1996, for instance, a total of 50,070 people were killed in the combined indigenous terrorist incidents (against fellow citizens or foreigners within the terrorists' country's borders) and international terrorist attacks around the world. This nearly doubles the 28,110 who lost their lives in comparable incidents in the 14 years between 1970 and 1983. With respect to nonfatal casualties, the figures are even more dramatic. The 69,833 injured in such incidents between 1990 and 1996 more than triples the figure of 18,925 recorded between 1970 and 1983, with the annual average rising more than sevenfold, from 1,352 (1970--1983) to 9,976 (1990--1996).30 Indeed, in a study conducted by two American economists involving time-series techniques and different data sets to measure whether international terrorism has become more deadly during the 1990s, they similarly conclude that, "Despite a decline in transnational terrorism of nearly fifty incidents per quarter during some of the post--Cold War era, terrorism still presents a significant threat. This conclusion follows because each incident is almost 19 percentage points more likely to result in death or injury as compared with the previous two decades.''31
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30 Pinkerton's Risk Assessment Services (PRAS), Terrorism, 1990--1996 (Washington, D.C.: Pinkerton's Risk Assessment Services Inc., 1991--1997); Alex Jongman, "Trends in International and Domestic Terrorism in Western Europe, 1968--88,'' Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 4, no. 4 (Winter 1992), p. 36.31 Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening? A Time Series Investigation,'' Unpublished ms. (October 1998), p. 21.
This growing proclivity toward violence appears to be evidence of a portentous shift in terrorism, away from its traditional emphasis on discrete, selective attacks toward a mode of violence that is now aimed at inflicting indiscriminate and wanton slaughter. Certainly such attacks as the 1993 car bomb attack that convulsed Bombay, India; the 1994 truck bomb explosion outside a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina; the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City; the 1996 suicide truck bomb attack against the Central Bank in Colombo, Sri Lanka; and, the 1998 twin U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, all illustrate this development.32 The implication, therefore, is that terrorism is now on an escalation spiral of lethality that may well culminate in the indiscriminate use of CBRN weapons. Second, the dangers posed specifically by chemical and biological weapons have become increasingly apparent. In part, this is a function of the demise of the Cold War preoccupation with the nuclear dimension of international relations.33 Perhaps more significant, however, is the possibility that, given the ongoing travails of the Russian economy, poorly paid, disgruntled former Soviet scientists might attempt to sell their expertise in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons on the "open market'' to terrorists or rogue states.34
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32 These attacks resulted in the following fatalities: 317 killed in the Bombay attacks; 96 killed in Buenos Aires; 168 dead in Oklahoma City; 86 killed in the Sri Lanka suicide bombing; and the 258 persons killed in the Kenyan and Tanzanian embassy bombings.33 Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD: Preliminary Hypotheses,'' Non-Proliferation Review, vol. 4, no. 3 (Spring-Summer 1997), p. 45.
34 See Graham T. Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material (Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 1996), passim; Carnegie Corporation of New York, "Heading Off A New Nuclear Nightmare: Illicit Trade in Nuclear Materials, Technology, and Know-How,'' Carnegie Quarterly, vol. xii, nos. 2-3 (Spring-Summer 1996), pp. 1--7; CSIS Task Force Report, Global Organized Crime Project, The Nuclear Black Market (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), passim; Falkenrath et al., America's Achilles' Heel, passim; Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, pp. 89--106; and, Peter Chalk, "The Evolving Dynamic of Terrorism,'' The Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 53, no. 2 (1999), p. 163.
Finally, a precedent for mass destruction may have been set in the guise of the 1995 Aum nerve gas attack. That incident, as described in detail in Chapter Three, represented the first widely known attempt by a nonstate group to use a CBRN weapon with the specific intent of causing mass civilian casualties.35 Moreover, Aum's use of such an exotic weapon as sarin may have raised the stakes for terrorists everywhere, who now might feel driven to emulate or create their own version of the Tokyo attack to attract attention to themselves and their causes. As Jenkins observed shortly after the Tokyo attack, "It breaks a taboo and has psychological import. Others will ask whether such tactics should be adopted by them. It is now more likely that at least some of them will say 'yes'.''36
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35 James K. Campbell, "Excerpts From Research Study 'Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism: Proliferation by Non-State Actors','' Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 9, no. 2 (Summer 1997), p. 29.36 Quoted in David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum (London: Hutchinson, 1996), p. 200.
Reasons and Rationales Behind Potential CBRN Terrorism
If, in fact, we are approaching a new era of "super'' CBRN terrorism, why would groups seek to escalate to this level? One can identify five possible motivating rationales.
First, and at the most basic level, may be simply the desire to kill as many people as possible. CBRN weapons could give a terrorist group the potential ability (especially if a nuclear weapon were used) to wipe out thousands, possibly even hundreds of thousands, in a single strike. The following statement of a former FEMA director gives an indication of the potential killing power of these agents compared to conventional high explosives (HE): "To produce about the same number of deaths within a square mile, it would take 32 million grams of fragmentation cluster bomb material; 3,200,000 grams of mustard gas; 800,000 grams of nerve gas; 5,000 grams of material in a crude nuclear fission weapon; 80 grams of botulinal toxin type A; or only 8 grams of anthrax spores.''37 Such weapons would provide terrorists with the perfect means to seek revenge against, even to annihilate, their enemies, however defined, categorized, or otherwise determined.38
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37 Louis Giuffrida, "Dealing with the Consequences of Terrorism -- We Are Not Yet Where We Must Be,'' Terrorism. An International Journal, vol. 10, no. 1 (1987), p. 7338 See, for instance, Roger Medd and Frank Goldstein, "International Terrorism on the Eve of a New Millennium,'' Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 20, no. 3 (July-September 1997), p. 292.
A second reason for groups to seek to escalate to the CBRN level could be to exploit the classic weapon of the terrorist -- fear. Terrorism, in essence, is a form of psychological warfare. The ultimate objective is to destroy the structural supports that give society its strength by both showing that the government is unable to fulfill its primary security function and, thereby, eliminating the solidarity, cooperation, and interdependence on which social cohesion and functioning depend.39 Viewed in this context, even a "limited'' terrorist attack involving CBRN agents would have disproportionately large psychological consequences, generating unprecedented fear and alarm throughout society.40 The 1995 Aum sarin nerve gas attack, for instance, which resulted in 12 deaths, not only galvanized mass panic in Tokyo, it also shattered the popular perception among the Japanese people who, hitherto, had considered their country to be among the safest in the world. Moreover, it served to galvanize American attention to CBRN terrorism, despite taking place overseas.41
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39 Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, The Evolving Dynamic, (London: MacMillan, 1996), p. 13; Martha Crenshaw, "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism,'' Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 16, no. 3 (1972), p. 388.40 Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Analysis of Trends and Motivations (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND , P-8039, 1999), p. 53; Jeffrey D. Simon, Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons: A Discussion of Possibilities (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-3771-AFMIC, December 1989), p. 8.
41 Despite the initial and continuing reaction in Japan and around the world to the Aum chemical and biological weapons program and the prosecution of several of its members the group is apparently back in operation, although its plans for further terrorists activity are unclear.
A third possible rationale for resorting to CBRN weapons could be the desire to negotiate from a position of unsurpassed strength. A credible threat to use a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon would be unlikely to go unanswered by a government and could, therefore, provide an organization with a tool of political blackmail of the highest order.42
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42 It should be noted, however, that any terrorist group would face two major obstacles in attempting to use CBRN weapons for political blackmail. First would be the difficulty of establishing the credibility of the organization's coercive threat by demonstrating that it does, in fact, possess a CBRN weapon. Second would be the problem of defining the conditions for the return of the weapon and the fulfillment of the terrorists' demands, both of which would be virtually impossible without leaving open the possibility of a double-cross by either the government in question or the perpetrators themselves. For further details see Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism in the United States and the Potential Threat to Nuclear Facilities (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND , R-3351-DOE, 1986), p. 5; Brian Michael Jenkins, The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND , P-7119, July 1985), p. 10.
A fourth reason, with specific reference to biological agents, could derive from certain logistical and psychological advantages that such weapons might offer terrorists. A biological attack, unlike a conventional bombing, would not likely attract immediate attention, and could initially go unnoticed, only manifesting itself days or even weeks after the event. This would be well suited to groups that wish to remain anonymous, either to minimize the prospect of personal retribution or to foment greater insecurity in their target audience by appearing as enigmatic, unseen, and unknown assailants.43 As Jeffrey Simon observes, "[W]hile we tend to think about biological weapons as agents of mass destruction -- which they certainly can be -- there is also a more 'practical' side to these weapons from the terrorists' perspective.''44
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43 For an interesting discussion on why terrorists may be less willing to take credit for their acts, see Bruce Hoffman, "Why Terrorists Don't Claim Credit,'' Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 1--6 and 18--19.44 Simon, Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons, p. 10.
Fifth, a group may wish to use CBRN weapons, and more specifically biological agents, to cause economic and social damage by targeting a state's or region's agricultural sector. On several previous occasions in other parts of the world, terrorists have contaminated agricultural produce or threatened to do so. Between 1977 and 1979, more than 40 percent of the Israeli European citrus market was curtailed by a Palestinian plot to inject Jaffa oranges with mercury. In 1989, a Chilean left-wing group that was part of an anti-Pinochet movement claimed that it had laced grapes bound for U.S. markets with sodium cyanide, causing suspensions of Chilean fruit imports by the United States, Canada, Denmark, Germany, and Hong Kong.45 In the early 1980s, Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka threatened to infect Sri Lankan rubber and tea plantations with nonindigenous diseases as part of a total biological war strategy designed to cripple the Sinhalese-dominated government.46
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45 See Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: A New Threat to Public Safety? Conflict Studies No. 295 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1996/1997), pp. 13--14; Ron Purver, The Threat of Chemical/Biological Terrorism. Commentary No. 60 (Ottawa, Canadian Security Intelligence Service,1995), p. 7; and David Rapoport, "Terrorists and Weapons of the Apocalypse,'' paper presented before the "Future Developments in Terrorism Conference,'' Cork, Ireland, March 1999, pp. 13--14.46 W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century (Washington, D.C.: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, 1999) p. 175. See also Rohan Gunaratna , War and Peace in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1987), pp. 51--52.
Many Western countries remain particularly susceptible to this form of aggression, given the integrated and intensive nature by which farm animals are bred, transported, and sold, as well as the high degree of genetic homogeneity and concentration found in their main crop-growing regions.47 Disrupting this vital and vulnerable industry could not only damage the economy, it could also undermine confidence in government's capability to protect the very rudiments of American society. Moreover, it would underscore the terrorists' coercive potential without crossing the threshold of mass murder and could potentially avoid the attendant risk of attracting massive government reprisals.
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47 In the United States, for instance, it would not be uncommon to find livestock feedlots containing between 5,000 and 10,000 animals at any given time. The outbreak of a contagious disease at one of these facilities would be extremely difficult to control and could easily necessitate the wholesale destruction of all the animals, a formidable and, arguably, unrealistic task.
Based on this analysis, the most likely terrorist groups that would seek
to cause mass civilian casualties with CBRN weapons are fundamentalist religious
organizations or cults that embrace adversarial, Manichean worldviews, or
other extremist single-issue groups. The uncompromising and absolute dualism
of such organizations lends itself to highly extreme mechanisms of violence
legitimization that could easily justify CBRN use. For the most part, however,
these groups lack the means to translate their desire for mass murder into
effective action. As such, it is more probable in the near term that CBRN
employment will be a small-scale attack designed to elicit far greater
psychological reactions. However, there are two scenarios that are conceivable
exceptions to this hypothesis. One is the use by terrorists of biological
agents as a way of destroying, or at least undermining, an adversary's
agricultural base. Such discrete, deliberate attacks, as noted above, have
the potential to cause sociopolitical and economic damage without crossing
the threshold of mass civilian casualties and, thereby, attracting the type
of public and governmental revulsion that this would entail. The other would
necessitate state-sponsorship, which has the advantage of enabling terrorists
to leapfrog the technical hurdles associated with CBRN weaponization and,
thereby, allow them to translate their desires into meaningful action. Given
the extreme, although potentially very different, consequences that might
result from either category, examining each in more detail is worthwhile.
Agricultural Terrorism
One area of the CBRN terrorism debate that deserves more attention concerns the biological threat to agriculture.48 Weaponizing pathogenic agents to destroy livestock and crops is far easier than creating munitions designed to kill hundreds, much less thousands, of people. This latter process requires at least a limited knowledge of microbiology, something not required in agricultural delivery. Over the years, farm animals have become progressively more disease-prone as a result of increased stress levels brought about by intensive antibiotic and steroid treatment programs, as well as by husbandry changes designed to elevate the volume of meat production and the quality and value of meat products. In addition, many more agents are highly infectious to animals than is the case with humans. Many of these agents will spread quickly because of the vertical integration of modern farming practices.
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48 Agriculture, as used in this report, is intended to include the production of crops, livestock, and poultry.
Sabotaging organic agricultural material is potentially just as easy. All major food crops come in a number of varieties, each generally suited to specific soil and climatic conditions and with differing sensitivities to particular diseases. Plant pathogens, in turn, exist in different strains with varying degrees of contagion to individual crop types. A terrorist could take advantage of these properties to isolate and disseminate disease strains that are most able to damage one or more of a state's major arable food supplies. Intensive fertilizer and pesticide/herbicide treatment programs, designed to increase production yields, compound this potential threat, creating the possibility of highly resistant "super diseases'' and nonnative organisms and weeds that could be deliberately harvested and introduced with devastating effect.49
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49 Correspondence between RAND project research staff and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) officials, Washington, D.C., July-September 1999. See also Agricultural Research Service (ARS), Agriculture's Defense Against Biological Warfare and Other Outbreaks (Washington, D.C.: USDA, 1961); Corrie Brown, "Emerging Animal Diseases,'' in W.M. Schield, W. Craig, and J. Hughes, eds., Emerging Infections 3 (Washington, D.C.: ASM Press, 1999); Siobhan Gorman, "Bioterror Down on the Farm,'' National Journal 27 (July 1999); and John Gordon and Steen Beech-Nielson, "Biological Terrorism: A Direct Threat To Our Livestock Industry,'' Military Medicine, vol. 151 (July 1986).
Quite apart from their operational ease, bioattacks against agriculture are also comparatively risk free. They do not cross the threshold of mass human killing (at least directly) and are, therefore, unlikely to attract an especially strong government reaction in the way that a civilian bioattack would. Just as important, because there is no large-scale loss of human life, perpetrators may, by targeting the attack discretely, be able to avoid a substantial loss of political support or perceived loss of "legitimacy.'' There is little danger of inadvertent infection, as nonzoonotic diseases (which do not affect humans) can be used, while attacks themselves can be executed in such a way that they mimic natural disease occurrences -- helping both to delay suspicion as well as reduce residual dangers of detection.50
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50 Rogers, Whitby, and Dando, "Biological Warfare Against Crops,'' p. 72; Gordon and Beech-Nielson, "Biological Terrorism: A Direct Threat to Our Livestock Industry,'' p. 362; and, Stephen Goldstein, "US Could Face New Terror Tactic: Agricultural Warfare,'' The Philadelphia Inquirer, 6 June 1999.
In essence, a concerted biological attack against an agricultural target offers terrorists a virtually risk-free form of assault, which has a high probability of success and which also has the prospect of obtaining political objectives, such as undermining confidence in the ability of government or giving the terrorists an improved bargaining position. This may be especially true if the agricultural bioterrorism attack is part of a carefully planned escalation -- each attack or threatened attack having the potential to be more severe, perhaps more lethal -- to attain the terrorists' ultimate objectives. This is important, as one of the main factors that appears to have limited terrorist experimentation with WMD is lack of predictability, defined in terms of both state and popular reaction and of the perceived inability to carry out the operation in question effectively with minimal risk to the terrorists themselves.
The consequences of a successful bioattack on a sector of a country's meat or food-crop base could extend beyond the immediate agricultural community to affect other segments of society. A successful attack could result in local or regional economic destabilization and even the disruption of overseas commerce in the trade of a particular commodity, especially if foreign importers moved to erect trade barriers as a "protective'' measure.51
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51 See, for instance, Corrie Brown, "The Impact and Risk of Foreign Animal Diseases,'' Vet Med Today, vol. 208, no. 7 (1996); and Judith Miller, "Administration Plans to Use Plum Island to Combat Terrorism,'' The New York Times, 21 September 1999.
Failing to prevent the release of contagious agents against crops and livestock would also undoubtedly prompt a loss confidence in the government and may lead citizens to question the effectiveness of existing contingency planning against CBRN terrorism in general. The mechanics of dealing with a mass act of agricultural bioterrorism could generate additional public fallout in the form of criticism from animal rights activists and farmers, particularly if containment operations required the large-scale culling of high-risk, but not necessarily disease-showing, livestock.52
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52 Correspondence between RAND project research staff and USDA officials, Washington, D.C., July-September, 1999.
Beyond immediate economic and political ramifications, biological attacks against agriculture have the potential to undermine social stability, to create fear, and to galvanize public opinion against the government. Infected farms would have to be quarantined and perhaps permanently closed, affecting not only the agricultural workers themselves, but also the employees of businesses that rely on their produce.53
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53 See, for instance, Brown, "The Impact and Risk of Foreign Animal Diseases.''
If attacks involved zoonotic diseases, a major public scare could well result -- particularly if human deaths occurred -- allowing terrorists to create a general atmosphere of fear and anxiety without having to carry out mass indiscriminate civilian slaughter.
The U.S. agricultural sector is especially vulnerable to agroterrorism, given its vertical integration and the way in which animals are bred, transported, and sold in this country, as well as the high degree of genetic homogeneity and concentration found in America's main crop-growing regions. Moreover, readily available and relatively inexpensive livestock and produce are important to the health of the U.S. economy. Domestic cattle ranchers and dairy farmers earn between $50 billion and $54 billion a year through milk and meat sales, a figure that rises to more than $100 billion, once related domestic industries and services are taken into account.54 While that figure is a tiny fraction of the total U.S. Gross Domestic Product,55 disrupting this vital and vulnerable industry could cause economic damage beyond the specific livestock or other agricultural commodity, as well as undermine confidence in the responsible stewardship of much of what is seen as contributing to the "American way of life,'' from fast-food outlets to clothing, pharmaceuticals, transportation, entertainment, and general public safety.
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54 Ellen Shell, "Could Mad Cow Disease Happen Here?'' The Atlantic Monthly, (March 1998); and, "Stockgrowers Warned of Terrorism Threat,'' The Chieftain, 19 August 1999.55 U.S. GDP for 1999 is estimated to be approximately $9 trillion (chain weighted). Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
State-Sponsored Terrorism
As will be discussed in greater detail below, one of the most significant barriers associated with CBRN terrorism relates to the difficulties of actually transforming nuclear or radiological material or chemical or biological agents into effective weapons suitable for mass destruction. This particular problem would be greatly reduced, however, if terrorist groups were able to benefit from external state-sponsored CBRN weapons programs. Several countries with a record of actively supporting terrorism are known, or at least alleged, to have embarked on the covert development of one or more CBRN capacities. The fear is that one of these states might be prepared to sponsor a CBRN attack, either to expand its own regional influence or as a way of contesting the prevailing power structure of the dominant international system.
In the current global context, the most important of these polities include Iraq, Iran, Sudan, and North Korea. All of these "rogue'' states continue to shun internationally accepted norms of behavior; remain -- at least outwardly -- irreconcilably opposed to the major Western powers; and persist in their support for antigovernment movements, a number of which exhibit highly violent, Manichean tendencies and worldviews. Should any one of these countries view it in their wider geopolitical interest to provide a "client'' group with the wherewithal to carry out a major CBRN attack, including a finished weapon, the prospect for a true act of mass destruction would become a distinct possibility.
Particular attention has focused on the proliferation threat emanating from Iraq, especially since the extent of its chemical and biological warfare programs became apparent in the years following the 1990--1991 Persian Gulf War. Independent weapons inspectors currently claim that Baghdad possesses no less than 3.9 tons of VX gas, 4,000 tons of ingredients to make chemical weapons, and at least 25 missile warheads containing germ agents -- including anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin -- that have yet to be declared to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).56 Fears have been expressed that Saddam Hussein might provide some of these agents to American extremist organizations, such as antigovernment militias, as well as to other transnational groups fighting "hostile NATO countries,'' in retaliation for the punitive sanctions imposed on his country since 1991.57 Iran has also been the focus of growing concern, largely due to the extreme anti-Western sentiments shared by the country's clerical elite and the vitriolic opposition they express to the U.S. military and political presence in the Middle East.58 In 1996, American and Israeli intelligence sources warned that Teheran was holding stocks of chemical and biological agents -- as well as a portable aerosol generator that could be used to disseminate anthrax -- for possible future terrorist strikes against major American cities.59
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56 Gary Milholin and Kelly Nugent, The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, reproduced in "Germs, Atoms and Poison Gas: The Iraqi Shell Game,'' The New York Times, 20 December 1998. In addition to this material, Milholin and Nugent, whose report was based on reports from UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), claim Baghdad has yet to disclose the whereabouts of approximately 600 tons of ingredients for VX gas; up to 3,000 tons of other poison gas agents; 500 bombs with parachutes to deliver gas or germ payloads; approximately 550 artillery shells filled with mustard gas; 107,500 casings for chemical weapons; 31,658 filled and empty chemical munitions; at least 157 aerial bombs filled with germ agents; and spraying equipment to deliver germ agents by air.57 See, for instance, "Iraq Revenge Fears as Extremists are Held,'' The Daily Telegraph (UK), 20 February 1998; "Anthrax Alert on Duty-Free Spirits,'' The Times (UK), 24 March 1998; and "UK Ports on Alert Over Deadly Anthrax From Report,'' CNN World Wide News, 24 March 1998.
58 Richard Falkenrath, "Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism,'' Survival, vol. 40, no. 3 (Autumn 1998), p. 57.
59 "Iran Ready to Unleash Germ Warfare: US,'' The Australian, 8 December, 1996.
Attention has also focused on North Korea ever since the country's covert nuclear weapons program was discovered in 1994. Concern has grown in tandem with the country's deteriorating internal condition and rising tensions in this part of Northeast Asia. In particular, there is a growing fear that the Pyongyang regime will support a chemical, biological, or even nuclear terrorist attack on American forces in South Korea -- and perhaps even on U.S. soil -- in a last-ditch attempt to undermine Washington's backing for Seoul and, in so doing, augment its own bargaining position with South Korea. In the wake of the bombings against the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Sudan has additionally been brought under increasing scrutiny, with U.S. and British officials both claiming that Khartoum has chemical and biological weapons programs that have allegedly provided support to the Osama bin Laden terrorist network.60
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60 See W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century (Washington, D.C.: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, March 1999), pp. 35--36. Al Venter, "North Africa Faces New Islamic Threat,'' Jane's Intelligence Review Pointer (March 1998), p. 11.
Although one can never completely discount the possibility that any one of
these or other "terrorist-prone'' states (such as Libya and Syria) will
deliberately assist a terrorist proxy in its acquisition of a CBRN capability,
three main factors appear to militate against such a scenario. First, governments
that have devoted considerable time, effort, and resources to a covert buildup
of their CBRN capacity -- sometimes at the expense of international legitimacy
-- are unlikely to want to place these weapons in the hands of groups over
which they have no ultimate control. The sponsor in question would likely
have no direct ability to influence how the weapons are ultimately used (this,
in the final analysis, being the decision of the surrogate group). Moreover,
there would doubtless be grave concerns regarding the security of the weapons
once in the hands of the terrorist proxy, the security infrastructure and
resources of which are unlikely to match those of the supporting state.
Second, if it were ever discovered that a terrorist CBRN attack had been
perpetrated with agents procured from a third party state sponsor, extremely
strong, international pressure would build to strike back at the supplier.
In this respect, the U.S. cruise missile attack on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical
plant in Khartoum, Sudan, following last year's embassy bombings, arguably
sent a powerful deterrent message to would-be state sponsors or suppliers
of such unconventional weapons to international terrorists. More important,
if the targeted state happened to be a nuclear power, retaliation could well
be in the form of a nuclear counterattack, something the U.S. has specifically
suggested on a number of occasions. Third, given the unpredictable nature
of the terrorist groups that would be most interested in gaining a CBRN capacity,
the possibility of proxies using weapons against the supporting state itself
could never be entirely discounted by the terrorists' patron.61
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61 For more on these barriers see Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism. A New Threat to Public Safety? Conflict Studies No. 295 (1996), p. 8; Carl-Heinz Kamp, "An Overrated Nightmare,'' The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52, no. 4 (1996), p. 33; and, Simon, Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons, p. 7, footnote 3.
Accordingly, rogue regimes should be viewed in the same manner as "mainstream'' nation-states in the sense that, for the most part, they act according to clearly defined cost/benefit ratios -- the classic statecraft of realpolitik. While there may well be some advantage to supporting a CBRN terrorist attack against an enemy state, the national and international ramifications of being implicated in such an assault are sufficiently significant that even outlaw governments would likely be deterred from considering this course of action. That is, the costs of sponsoring CBRN terrorism would be perceived as outweighing the benefits. As long as this holds true, one can reasonably expect state sponsorship of terrorism to continue to adhere to the form that it has traditionally taken since the late 1960s, namely the limited provision of guns, explosives, ordnance, money, and safe havens.62
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62 This point was also made by Parachini in his testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives "Combating Terroism: Assessing the Threat,'' 20 October 1999, pp. 15--16.
It is significant that, to date, there is no evidence that any formal link exists between terrorist groups and state-assisted CBRN programs. Indeed, a 1997 assessment made by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) states:
Most of the state sponsors have chemical or biological or radiological material in their stockpiles and therefore have the ability to provide such weapons to terrorists if they wish. However, we have no conclusive information that any sponsor has the intention to provide these weapons to terrorists . . . . The likelihood is believed to be low.63
Other Higher-Probability/Lower-Consequence Threats
As noted earlier, the Panel believes that the historically more frequent, lesser consequence terrorist attack, is more likely in the near term -- one involving a weapon on a relatively small-scale incident, using either a chemical, biological or radiological device (and not a nuclear weapon), or conventional explosives. Rather than having the intention of inflicting mass casualties, such an attack could be designed to cause a limited number of casualties, but at the same time cause mass panic. Such an attack could be more along the lines of the biological terrorism incident that occurred in the U.S. a decade before the 1995 Aum nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway -- although the perpetrators' intention in that instance was not to cause panic. Nevertheless, even limited casualties could precipitate a disproportionate psychological response among the public. The resulting panic by citizens who perceive that they have been exposed, but who (like many in Tokyo) in reality have not been exposed, could effectively paralyze response capabilities even among the most prepared.
In 1984, members of a religious cult led by the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh contaminated the salad bars of ten restaurants in The Dalles, Oregon, with salmonella bacteria, in the hope of debilitating the local populace and thereby rigging a key municipal election in the cult's favor. Although their plot was unsuccessful in achieving the group's political aims,64 some 751 people reportedly became ill with salmonella gastroenteritis as a result of the attack.65 Interestingly, the event was not immediately reported and it was only later that the group's activities came to light. Perhaps because no one (fortunately) perished, it did not, moreover, receive the often feverish media attention that has accompanied many of the recent domestic anthrax hoaxes or, for example, the recent scare posed by the outbreak of West Nile Fever in New York City. The Rajneesh incident, furthermore, inspired none of the "copycat'' or similar repeat attacks that might have been expected; nor did it provoke any hoaxes.
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63 Quoted in Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes, p. 37.64 Mary Thornton, "Oregon Guru Disavows Rajneeshism, Vows to Survive Investigations,'' Washington Post, 20 October 1985; and, Peter H. King, "Guru Revels in Revelation of a 'Paradise' Defiled,'' Los Angeles Times, 22 September 1985.
65 Thomas J. Trk et al., "A Large Community Outbreak of Salmonellosis Caused by Intentional Contamination of Restaurant Salad Bars,'' JAMA (Journal of the American Medical Association), vol. 278, no. 5, 6 August 1997, pp. 389--395.
An equally plausible scenario is a series of simultaneous (or near-simultaneous) terrorist attacks using or threatening to use chemical, biological or radiological materials, mounted across a city, a wider metropolitan area or geographical region, or even a number of locations throughout the United States. The intent would similarly not be to kill large numbers of people or wreak mass destruction but to exhaust the capabilities of local authorities rapidly, thus creating panic, instilling widespread fear, and likely undermining confidence in government -- perhaps even deliberately provoking counterproductive governmental and law enforcement overreaction. Such attacks need not kill anyone, to prove to negate governmental preparedness plans by overwhelming existing response capabilities. The comparative ease with which such low-level chemical, biological, or radioactive incidents could be orchestrated, at least in contrast to the more considerable resources and lower assurances of success that a true WMD or mass-casualties attack would entail, might therefore appeal more to prospective CBRN terrorists. The effects, though certainly less catastrophic, might be sufficient to achieve the terrorists' principal aims.
Indeed, the ease with which the Russia, for example, was thrown into panic this past August and September, by a handful of enigmatic adversaries using conventional terrorist weapons and tactics, is evidence that terrorists can still ably achieve their objectives of fear and intimidation without resorting to more exotic weaponry or futuristic tactics -- an important lesson for the United States not to discount the continuing use by terrorists of explosives and other conventional weapons. Attention to the "worst-case scenario'' of lower-probability/higher-consequence CBRN terrorism should not be at the expense of higher-probability/lower-consequence incidents, such as the conventional terrorist bombings that rocked Moscow, or deliberate, more terrorist, discrete attacks involving smaller amounts of chemical, biological, or radioactive materials.66 This point is demonstrated by another incident in Moscow four years ago that was claimed by Chechen rebels. In November 1995, on the first anniversary of the outbreak of fighting between Russia and the breakaway Republic of Chechnya, Chechen separatists threatened to detonate radiological devices in and around that city.67 The rebels attempted to back up their threat by directing a Russian television news crew to a site in a popular Moscow park where the Chechens had buried a large radioactive parcel containing approximately 70 pounds of cesium-137.68 Admittedly, this incident neither involved an actual nuclear weapon or device, nor did it, pose any immediate danger to the news crew or any passersby. Nevertheless, it was sufficient to generate considerable alarm within Russia and to attract worldwide attention to the Chechens, their cause, and their demands -- precisely the terrorists' primary objectives.
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66 See Bruce Hoffman, "Conventional Terrorism Still Works,'' Los Angeles Times Sunday Opinion Section, 26 September 1999, p. M2.67 Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation Threat,'' p 3.
68 See Transcript of NTV Television News, "Chechen Commander Basayev Warns Radioactive Packages Planted in Russia Ready to Explode,'' 23 November 1995; Michael Spector, "Chechen Insurgents Take Their Struggle to a Moscow Park,'' New York Times, 24 November 1995; Brian Killen, "Russia: Moscow Radioactive Parcel Harmless, Officials Say,'' Reuters Business Briefing (London), 24 November 1995; and, "Russia: Moscow Radioactive Parcel Sparks Chechen-Raid Fear,'' Reuters (London), 24 November 1995; "Russian Film Crew Alleges Chechen Connection in Moscow Radiation Scare,'' Interfax News Agency (Moscow), 24 November 1995; "Chechen separatists hid case of radioactive cesium,'' Agence France Presse, 23 November 1995; and, "Rebel's Threat to Moscow,'' Daily Telegraph (London), 25 November 1995.
Such scenarios, however, are at odds with the focus of current policy and preparedness efforts -- which have been based on less than comprehensive information and analysis -- which seem to emphasize the lower-probability/higher-consequence attacks at the expense of higher-probability/lower-consequence incidents. The guiding assumption has been that smaller-scale, non-mass-casualty events are a lesser-included contingency that can be addressed adequately by preparations for higher-end mass-casualty attacks.69 This is by no means axiomatic. The higher- probability/lower-consequence incident will more likely require a state and local response -- perhaps exclusively -- rather than the lower-probability/higher-consequence event that would almost assuredly emphasize Federal action. Moreover, the number of threats involving the use of smaller-scale CBRN devices continues to increase (although most turn out to be hoaxes).70
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69 This issue emerged as a salient area of concern to the Panel as a result of information provided to it by the local responder and medical communities as well as by State and local government officials. Accordingly, during subsequent phases of the project further attention and investigation will be focused on this specific issue.70 The number of criminal investigations opened by the FBI in response to threats regarding the use of CBRN materials has grown considerably in recent years: from 37 incidents in 1996 to 74 in 1997 to 181 in 1998. Three-quarters of these have threatened biological release, with anthrax the agent most frequently cited. The vast majority of these threats, however, have been "determined to be non-credible . . . have been small in scale and committed primarily by individuals or smaller splinter/extremist elements of right wing groups which are unrelated to larger terrorist organizations.'' Statement for the Record of Robert M. Burnham, Chief, FBI Domestic Terrorism Section, before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 19 May 1999, at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/bioleg3.htm
By continuing a policy that emphasizes high-end threats, there is a very
real danger of failing to optimize state and local response capabilities
to deal with the more probable terrorist threats confronting the United States
today.
Impediments to Developing Effective WMD Capabilities
The detailed description, in Chapter Three, of the Aum Shinrikyo incidents suggests that the hurdles faced by terrorists seeking to develop true weapons of mass casualties and mass destruction are more formidable than is often imagined. This report does not argue that terrorists cannot produce and disseminate biological or chemical agents capable of injuring or indeed killing relatively small numbers of persons (such as the Aum event) or perhaps inflicting serious casualties even in the hundreds. The point is that creating truly mass-casualty weapons -- capable of killing in tens of thousands, much less in the thousands -- requires advanced university training in appropriate scientific and technical disciplines, significant financial resources, obtainable but nonetheless sophisticated equipment and facilities, the ability to carry out rigorous testing to ensure a weapon's effectiveness, and the development and employment of effective means of dissemination. Developing a nuclear weapon requires even greater skills, financial resources, and infrastructure. In these respects, accordingly, the resources and capabilities required to annihilate large numbers of persons -- i.e., to achieve a genuinely mass-casualty chemical and biological weapon or nuclear/radiological device -- appear, at least for now, to be beyond the reach not only of the vast majority of existent terrorist organizations but also of many established nation-states.71 Moreover, significant personal risks are run by those who would be involved in the acquisition, development, production, testing, and handling of any such lethal weapon or agent.72 The Panel recognizes that, while the analysis indicates significant difficulties currently faced by terrorists who may wish to perpetrate a major CBRN incident, such a catastrophic event is within the realm of possibility. Therefore, the Panel believes that comprehensive capabilities must be developed to respond to incidents across a broad spectrum.
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71 The same point is made in Falkenrath et al., America's Achilles' Heel, pp. 30--34.72 These points are echoed in a recent U.S. government report entitled, "Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks,'' U.S. General Accounting Office (NSIAD-99-163) (September 1999), pp. 10--15.
There is an important corollary to the previously mentioned requirements inherent in such an undertaking (personnel, money, facilities, equipment, testing, and related logistics). All of that activity inevitably will materially increase the risk of exposure of the terrorist group to detection by intelligence and law enforcement agencies.73
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73 Even in the case of Aum there was ample intelligence pertaining to the group and its various nefarious activities that was in fact known to the Japanese authorities months before the Tokyo subway attacks. However, for a variety of reasons, this information was either willfully ignored or deliberately disregarded. For example, in June 1994, the group had tried to kill three judges presiding over a civil suit brought against Aum in the town of Matsumoto. Members of the group sprayed the apartment block where the judges were sleeping with sarin. Seven persons were killed and more than 250 others were admitted to hospital with nerve-gas induced symptoms (although taken seriously ill, the judges survived). Amazingly, though, a report subsequently issued by a special unit of the Tokyo metropolitan police department's criminal investigation laboratory pointing to the nerve gas' presence in the environs of the judge's residence went ignored -- despite a record of repeated local complaints of strange odors emanating from the sect's nearby compound alongside previously raised questions about unexplained disappearances of both former Aum members and other individuals who had attempted to investigate the sect's activities (see Jonathan Annells and James Adams, 'Did terrorists kill with deadly nerve gas test?', Sunday Times (London), 19 March 1995. Interestingly, this news account was published only a day before the nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway took place). The lesson from the Aum case, therefore, is less a matter of having intelligence, than being able to recognize its significance and being prepared to act decisively based on such information.
The Panel acknowledges that the situation now facing a terrorist, who may
seek to use a CBRN weapon to achieve mass effects, could change dramatically
because of new discoveries, further advances in technology, or other material
factors. This is particularly true with respect to potential improvements
in aerosolization techniques and processes; advances in the isolation,
purification, stability, and quality of certain biological strains; or
enhancements to delivery devices, such as nozzles or other sprayers. Future
progress in any two or more areas would be especially troubling. Nevertheless,
a survey of the challenges that currently confront any terrorist group attempting
to develop its own "WMD'' capability is illustrative.
Biological Terrorism
There are at least four primary acquisition routes that terrorists could conceivably pursue in acquiring a biological warfare capability. They are
The principal obstacle is less the development of a biological agent than the development of a genuinely lethal strain of the agent in sufficient quantities to cause mass casualties -- precisely as Aum's experience indicates. Acquiring the "most infectious and virulent culture for the seed stock is the greatest hurdle,'' a former senior official in the U.S. military's biological warfare program maintains.74 As Aum clearly demonstrated, this is not an easily surmountable obstacle. The most obvious route would be by attempting to acquire the strain from nature, e.g., obtaining potentially lethal anthrax spores from soil and then culturing sufficient quantities to produce mass casualties. While theoretically conceivable, this is nonetheless difficult in practice and doubtless well beyond the capabilities of most terrorist groups.
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74 Quoted in Sheryl WuDunn, Judith Miller, and William J. Broad, "How Japan Terror Alerted World,'' New York Times, May 26, 1998.
Acquiring a biological agent of sufficient virulence is only one of the prerequisites for conducting biological terrorism on a mass scale. As Ken Alibek, one of the former Soviet Union's leading biological weapons scientists has argued, the "most virulent culture in a test tube is useless as an offensive weapon until it has been put through a process that gives it stability and predictability. The manufacturing technique is, in a sense, the real weapon, and it is harder to develop than individual agents.''75 Airborne viral agents, in particular, are extraordinarily difficult to work with, since the mass production, packaging, and storage of viruses are by themselves difficult and complicated tasks, demanding advanced biotechnical skills,76 in addition to the attendant risks to personnel involved in the process.
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75 Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard (New York: Random House, 1999), p. 97.76 Raymond Allen Zalinskas, "Terrorism and Biological Weapons: Inevitable Alliance?'' Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Autumn 1990), p. 51.
In the specific case of botulinum toxins, there are difficulties in purifying these agents, which then will likely become unstable once they are purified. According to one biological warfare authority, "maintaining the high toxicity in the culture and the properties of the toxin as you purify it are what you have to have a lot of years [of experience] to know how to do.''77 The same problem of maintaining toxicity during the purification process hampered U.S. government researchers during the Cold War. They discovered that attempting to achieve 95 percent purity of a biological agent -- the level needed to render it effective as a weapon -- in turn reduced the bulk amount of the toxin by 70--80 percent.78
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77 Quoted in Tom Waters, "The Fine Art of Making Poison,'' Discover, August 1992, p. 33.78 Faced with such difficulties, the United States abandoned its efforts to develop botulinum toxin as a biological warfare agent. Interview by RAND staff with David Franz.
Producing other types of bioterrorism agents similarly requires training, advanced techniques, and specialized equipment. In the case of B. anthracis, for example, transforming the bacterium into spore form suitable for use in a wide-scale terrorist attack necessitates a combination of skill and extreme care during a production technique that involves the application of heat or chemical shock. During all stages of the process, B. anthracis, like all other biological agents, must also be continuously tested to ensure its purity and lethality and thus its utility for weapons purposes. Although small-scale laboratory testing might be concealed, any larger- scale tests will likely invite the attention of law enforcement or intelligence agencies. Indeed, any group aiming at developing a weapon capable of inflicting mass casualties would almost certainly require sophisticated, though not exotic, laboratory equipment. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, this would include "fermenters, large- scale lyophilizers or freeze dryers, class II or III safety hoods, High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters, and centrifuges.''79 Estimates for the cost of equipping a facility for the production of biological agents for mass-casualty terrorist operations vary widely but would likely seem to fall anywhere in the $200,000 to $2 million range -- certainly not trivial sums.
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79 Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 104th Congress, 1st Session, Part I, October 31 and November 1, 1995, p. 529.
Although there remains a widespread public perception that it is easy to acquire and use highly lethal biological agents, there is no clear consensus among analysts about how much scientific and technological expertise and prior training are needed. Some authorities maintain that having an "experimental microbiologist and a pathologist, or someone who combines these capabilities, would be crucial. . . . [s]upplemented with a little help and advice from an aerosol physicist and a meteorologist.''80 Other experts are even more conservative in their assessments. In their view, the creation of a mass-casualty biological weapon would entail scientific teams composed of persons highly trained in "microbiology, pathology, aerosol physics, aerobiology, and even meteorology.''81 The acquisition of dedicated staff with the appropriate scientific and engineering knowledge and credentials may, therefore, be the greatest hurdle to developing an effective biological terrorism capability. Finding trained and skilled personnel, who could also overcome obstacles of perhaps working in less-than-ideal environments and who are willing to participate in mass murder, is a profound organizational roadblock, inherent to terrorist development of biological weapons, that is perhaps too readily discounted.82 In addition, the paranoid, stressful, and fantasy-prone atmosphere almost certain to be present in a terrorist organization most likely to seek to acquire biological weapons would make it difficult for personnel to perform efficiently the careful and demanding work required for a successful program. In the case of Aum, the atmosphere within the cult, characterized by extreme paranoia, intense stress, and widespread delusion, likely contributed to its failure to develop an effective biological weapons capability. That atmosphere could exist in any number of potential terrorist organizations with similar intentions or motivations.
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80 B.J. Berkowitz et al., Superviolence: The Civil Threat of Mass Destruction Weapons (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Adcon Corporation, 29 September 1972), p. 8--65.81 Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Literature (Ottawa: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, June 1995), p. 11.
82 Conrad V. Chester, "Obstacles to Large-Scale Biological Terrorism,'' paper presented at the Annual Meeting of Doctors for Defense Preparedness, Las Vegas, Nev., September 22, 1991, p. 3.
Finally, terrorists intent on inflicting hundreds of thousands of casualties with biological agents would have to create an aerosol cloud to disseminate the toxin. Aerosol clouds can be created from biological agents in either a mud-like liquid ("slurry'') form or in a dried, talcum powder-like form. The latter is far more difficult. In the case of B. anthracis, turning the spores into a powder requires the use of large and expensive centrifuges and drying apparatus. Powder, moreover, clings to surfaces, making it both difficult to handle and more probable that those handling it will accidentally infect themselves.83 In addition, the drying process needed to create a pathogenic powder tends to kill inordinate amounts of the organisms. The use of slurry, on the other hand, while less technically challenging, still presents significant problems. For example, the slurry must be continuously refrigerated until it is used, and unless it is extremely pure, material is likely to settle at the bottom of a container and clog the sprayer or aerosol dissemination device. As is detailed below, this is precisely what happened when Aum Shinrikyo members sprayed what they believed to be a lethal strain of B. anthracis from the roof of a Tokyo building in 1993.84 A slurry concoction is also tricky to disseminate as an aerosol of particles of an optimal size -- in other words, that will readily be inhaled into the victims' lungs.85 Disseminating particles of the proper size (1--5 microns) is critical to the success of any large-scale attack. Building a disseminator capable of dispersing 1- to 5-micron particles in dry form would, however, be a major technical hurdle for any prospective biological terrorist.86 That being said, the dissemination itself could conceivably be physically accomplished in any number of different ways: from low-flying airplanes, crop dusters, trucks equipped with sprayers, or with an aerosol canister situated in one place and activated by a remote timing device.
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83 Frederick R. Sidell, M.D., William C. Patrick, III, and Thomas R. Dashiell, Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group, 1998), p. 232.84 WuDunn, Miller, and Broad, "Japan Germ Terror,'' p. A10.
85 Zalinskas, "Iraq's Biological Warfare Program,'' p. 144.
86 Chester, "Obstacles,'' p. 3.
Even if a terrorist group succeeded in producing a virulent biological agent, even if it conducted rigorous tests to ensure that virulence was maintained, and even if it prepared the agent properly for aerosolization and acquired the proper equipment with which to disseminate it, at least one major hurdle would remain. As bioagents are aerosolized and become airborne, they decay rapidly. It is estimated, for example, that 90 percent of the microorganisms in a slurry are likely to die during the process of aerosolization.87 Environmental conditions are likely to reduce the effectiveness of biological agents still further. Sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes reduce the ability of pathogens to survive and multiply, although biological agents dispersed in a subway station or other enclosed area may not be subjected to conditions as adverse as those in open areas. Potential users of biological weapons must, therefore, take into account other disruptive meteorological conditions as well. Rain will wash most aerosol particles out of the air, and high local wind speed will disrupt an aerosol cloud.
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87 Jonathan B. Tucker, "Bioterrorism: Threats and Responses,'' in Joshua Lederberg, ed., Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 1999), p. 302.
In sum, while the technical challenges in producing an effective biological weapon are not insurmountable, they are neither as straightforward nor as simple as has often been claimed and presented publicly. The latter view, based on the limited information previously available, has heretofore primarily served as the basis for the public and for many decisionmakers to draw conclusions about the direction of related public policy. The level of difficulty was in fact what Aum discovered for itself and why it elected to pursue, in tandem with its continuing biological weapons R&D program, a concerted and even more expensive effort to produce chemical weapons.88 Moreover, as previously mentioned, the requirements to amass personnel, money, facilities, equipment; to conduct testing; and to execute related logistics tasks, will materially increase the risk of exposure to detection by intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
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88 Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 85--86.
Chemical Terrorism
Chemical agents fall into four broad categories:
Although any of these agents could be used for the purpose of causing mass-casualty attacks, it appears likely that terrorists would reject most of them. In the case of choking agents, for example, very large amounts would be needed to inflict mass fatalities. Blister agents, while capable of causing injury on a large scale, are very unlikely to cause death en masse. VX and other V-series nerve agents would also be unlikely candidates, because the technical challenges associated with weaponizing them are formidable. Sarin, on the other hand, is highly toxic, volatile, and relatively easy to manufacture. Indeed, it was these same qualities that attracted Aum Shinrikyo's scientists to sarin and why Shoko Asahara, the group's leader, so enthusiastically supported the ambitious chemical weapons R&D program that they pursued in parallel to the cult's biological efforts.89 Accordingly, for these reasons, it is perhaps worthwhile to focus on the technological requirements needed to produce sarin, especially because it is the only chemical agent to have been employed successfully for mass-casualty purposes by a terrorist group, even though its ultimate use fell far short of the effects intended.
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89 Ibid.
Although often referred to as a nerve "gas,'' sarin is, in fact, a liquid at any ambient temperature. When in vapor form, it is heavier than air and, as a result, will cling to floors, sink into basements, and gravitate toward low terrain. Like all nerve agents, sarin works by interfering with the mechanisms through which one's nerves communicate with one's bodily organs, causing the latter to become highly overstimulated.90 Although the effects on persons who inhale small amounts of vapor -- such as occurred in the 1995 Tokyo subway attack -- normally are limited to tightness in the chest, shortness of breath and coughing; victims who inhale larger amounts soon lose consciousness, go into convulsions, and stop breathing altogether.
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90 Sidell, Patrick, and Dashiell, Chem-Bio Handbook, p. 72.
It has sometimes been claimed that producing sarin and other nerve agents is a relatively easy process, to the extent, according to one authority, that "ball-point pen ink is only one chemical step removed.''91 While sarin may be less complicated to synthesize than other nerve agents, the expertise required to produce it should not, however, be underestimated. The safety challenges involved would, at a minimum, require skill, training, and special equipment to overcome. For this reason, the level of competency required for producing sophisticated chemical nerve agents, including sarin, will likely be on the order of a graduate degree in organic chemistry and/or actual experience as an organic chemist -- not simply a knowledge of college-level chemistry, as is sometimes alleged.
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91 Wayman C. Mullins, "An Overview and Analysis of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism: The Weapons, Strategies and Solutions to a Growing Problem,'' American Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1992), pp. 108--109.
Moreover, as with biological weapons, developing a means to disseminate sarin effectively is likely to prove a far greater challenge to terrorists than is producing the agent itself. Although sarin's high volatility greatly simplifies weaponization, terrorists who may seek to cause mass casualties will need a fairly sophisticated means of spreading the agent in sufficiently large quantities over their intended target area. For wide coverage in an open area, such as a city, an airplane equipped with a suitable industrial or crop sprayer could be a satisfactory mechanism for dissemination. Alternatively, terrorists could equip a truck and drive through the target area, taking care, of course, to ensure that its passengers are properly sealed off from the chemical agent. Temperature, wind speed, inversion conditions, and other meteorological factors, however, would likely determine the effectiveness of any attack. For example, as sarin and other chemical agents are exposed to the environment, they tend to be dispersed by the wind, which necessitates the use of large amounts of material to ensure that a given target receives a sufficiently high dose.
In fact, the need to produce and disperse sufficiently large amounts of sarin or other chemical agents to achieve the mass-casualty levels that may be sought by terrorists arguably drawn to chemical weapons in the first place ironically may be the biggest disincentive for their use. A U.S. Defense Department model illustrates the problem.92 Releasing ten kilograms (22 pounds) of sarin into the open air under favorable weather conditions covers about one-hundredth of a square kilometer with lethal effects. Since population densities in U.S. urban areas are typically around 5,000 people per square kilometer, such an attack would kill about 50 people. Releasing 100 kilograms (220 pounds) of sarin into the open air affects about ten times as much area and therefore would kill approximately 500 people. Releasing 1,000 kilograms (2,200 pounds) into the open air would cover several square kilometers, killing about 10,000 people. Thus, only in an open-air attack using amounts approaching 1,000 kilograms of sarin would the effects become distinctly greater than that attainable by such traditional terrorist means as conventional explosives. One way for terrorists to overcome these problems would be to carry out an attack in an enclosed space, such as a domed stadium, office building, or subway system.93
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92 The model, known as VLSTRACK 3.0, was developed by the Dahlgren Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Virginia.93 An attack on an enclosed structure would of course require less sarin to be effective. There are, however, operational problems associated with conducting chemical attacks in such environments that would first have to be overcome. The perpetrators, for example, will first need to heat the sarin to make it volatile; otherwise, the formation of sarin vapor would be slow enough to allow the victims to flee the area as they experienced early symptoms of exposure.
Again, Aum's experiences in the chemical weapons domain are instructive. Clearly, the cult was able to acquire the knowledge, chemicals, and equipment needed to synthesize sarin. It was an expensive research and development effort, with cost estimates as high as $30 million. Aum's 80-man program, housed in state-of-the-art facilities, was led by a Ph.D.-level scientist, and it took at least a year between the time of conception and the initial production of sarin. Nevertheless, the Tokyo subway attack, and the cult's earlier sarin attack in Matsumoto, succeeded in killing (though no less tragically) only a dozen people.
Given these impediments, a terrorist interested in harming large numbers of persons might prefer to attempt to engineer a chemical disaster using conventional means to attack an industrial plant or storage facility, rather than develop and use an actual chemical weapon. In this way, significant technical and resource hurdles could be overcome, as well as reducing the profile of the terrorist organization to potential detection by intelligence or law enforcement agencies.
Common industrial and agricultural chemicals can be as highly toxic as bona fide chemical weapons and, as the 1984 Bhopal, India, catastrophe demonstrated, just as (if not even more) effective when unleashed on a nearby populace. In that incident, a disgruntled employee at a pesticide plant precipitated an explosion in one of the storage tanks by simply adding water to it. In the massive release of methyl isocyanate that followed, the noxious fumes affected thousands of people living near the plant. Four months later, some 1,430 persons were reported to have died as a direct result of the leak -- a figure that increased to the 3,800 reported by Indian officials seven years later. A total of 11,000 persons were listed as having been disabled or harmed from exposure to the gas94 -- in both instances, exponentially greater numbers than Aum was able to achieve in its attacks using sarin.
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94 Jessica Stern, "Apocalypse Never, but the Threat Is Real'' in "WMD Terrorism: An Exchange,'' Survival, vol. 40, no. 4 (Winter 1998--1999), p. 177.
Nuclear Terrorism
Perhaps the only certain way for terrorists to achieve bona fide mass destruction would be to use a nuclear weapon. In this area, however, the challenges are arguably the most formidable.
Although the collapse of the Soviet Union heightened Western fears about security at Russian military facilities, it appears that Russian strategic and tactical weapons are perhaps more secure than had been initially feared.95 Where there may be particular concern, however, is during their transportation for maintenance or dismantling, when the Russian weapons apparently are not subject to the same strict security measures.96 But even if terrorists were able to steal or acquire through black market purchase a stolen nuclear weapon, they would still face a number of significant obstacles in using or detonating it. Strategic nuclear warheads are immense and would be extremely difficult to move either easily or clandestinely. Tactical nuclear weapons, such as artillery projectiles, admittedly, are far lighter and easier to conceal, making them potentially much more attractive items for terrorist theft or illicit acquisition. Moreover, many tactical nuclear weapons, and most strategic nuclear devices, are equipped with permissive action links (PALs) or other protective mechanisms designed to prevent accidental or unauthorized detonation.97 In addition, some nuclear devices have tamper-proof seals that will disable the weapon if unauthorized personnel attempt to disassemble it. It would be extremely difficult, therefore, for terrorists to circumvent or overcome these built-in protective measures; some of the smaller tactical weapons (including the KGB's alleged nuclear bombs concealed in small suitcases) admittedly may have had little or no protective devices or locks installed and, thus, the safety measures designed to thwart unauthorized detonation would be more easily overcome.98 In the absence of assurance about the status and control of all Russian nuclear weapons, we must remain vigilant.
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95 Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Nuclear Terrorism is Not the Core Problem,'' Survival, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Winter 1998--1999), p. 170.96 Oleg Bukharin, "Nuclear Safeguards and Security in the Former Soviet Union,'' Survival, Vol. 36, no. 4, p. 62.
97 Peter deLeon et al., The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism: A Reexamination, N-2706 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, January 1988).
98 See also, Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 89--99.
Terrorists who were either unable or unwilling to steal a nuclear device or were unsuccessful in obtaining one on the putative black market that has surfaced in the countries of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact,99 might attempt to build one themselves. Their first hurdle, however, would be in acquiring sensitive nuclear material (SNM), that is, either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium (Pu) suitable for fashioning a nuclear device.100 Mining and processing uranium or building a reactor to create plutonium would of course be impractical (although, it should be noted, Aum's most grandiose aims embraced this possibility); terrorists would, therefore, have to steal SNM or conceivably purchase it on the black market. A number of authorities in recent years repeatedly have expressed concern about illicit access to nuclear materials and technology, particularly in the former Soviet Union. Minatom, the Russian entity with responsibility for nuclear weapons, has itself complained about a lack of qualified personnel and adequate control systems, and the security at HEU storage facilities has also been reported to be grossly inadequate.101
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99 For detailed analyses of this issue, see Bruce Hoffman with David Claridge, "Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials,'' Conflict Studies nos. 314/315 (London), January/February 1999; Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Nuclear Terrorism -- Hysterical Concern or Real Risk?,'' Aussenpolitick -- German Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 46, no. 3. (1995) World-Wide Web Page of the International Security Net, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich (www.ethz.ch/au-pol/kamp.htm); Phil Williams and Paul N. Woessner, "The Real Threat of Nuclear Smuggling,'' Scientific American, vol. 274, no. 1 (January 1996); William C. Potter, "Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Leakage from the Post-Soviet States,'' Arms Control Today, October 1995; Rensselear W. Lee III, "Post-Soviet Nuclear Trafficking: Myths, Half-Truths, and the Reality,'' Current History, October 1995; Phil Williams and Paul N. Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking: An Interim Assessment,'' Transnational Organized Crime, vol., 1, no. 2 (Summer 1995); and, Oleg Bukharin and William Potter, "Potatoes Were Guarded Better,'' The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May-June 1995.100 U-235 and Pu-239 are optimal weapons grade material for use in a nuclear weapon. However, a device using reactor grade, mixed isotope plutonium was detonated successfully during the 1960s. While less efficient, reactor grade material would presumably be easier to acquire. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, April 1996), p. A-1.
101 Malcolm Gray and William Lowther, "The 'Loose Nukes,''' Maclean's, Vol. 109, No. 17, pp. 25--26.
Given this apparent lack of security, and the fact that 250 tons of HEU and 50 tons of weapons-grade plutonium has been stockpiled in Russia,102 the risk of illicit acquisition from SNM storage facilities should be considered a serious threat. Potentially less worrying, however, is the supposed "black market'' for these substances. Between 1992 and 1996, more than 1,000 claims were made involving the illicit sale and smuggling of nuclear material;103 however, only six instances were substantiated, and none of those involved the quantities needed to construct an effective "homemade'' device that could cause mass casualties -- thereby suggesting that the black market, if it exists at all, is limited in size and grossly exaggerated in impact.104
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102 Bukharin, "Nuclear Safeguards,'' p. 59.103 Tom Wilkie, "Terrorists and the Bomb,'' World Press Review, Vol. 43, No. 9, p. 36. It is worth noting, however, that due in part to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, "individual commercial power reactors are neither the most vulnerable nor the most fruitful sites for diverting nuclear materials.'' OTA, Technologies Underlying WMD, p. 131.
104 To be sure, small amounts of SNM have been diverted illegally, apparently from Russian facilities. It is worth noting, however, that all of the SNM stolen to date is not sufficient to make a single nuclear device and that reported thefts of weapons grade material have dropped in recent years. Ongoing improvements in Russian nuclear security procedures should further reduce the incidents of theft. OSD, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1997), accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/trans.html#terrorism.
Building a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruction presents Herculean challenges for terrorists and indeed even for states with well-funded and sophisticated programs. According to one analysis, minimum requirements include "personnel, skills, information, money, facilities, equipment, supplies, security, special nuclear materials. . . and, usually, other specialized and hard-to-obtain material.''105 According to another assessment, a successful program hinges on
obtaining enough fissile material to form a super-critical mass for each of its nuclear weapons (thus permitting a chain reaction); arriving at a weapon design that will bring that mass together in a tiny fraction of a second, before the heat from early fission blows the material apart; and designing a working device small and light enough to be carried by a given delivery vehicle.106
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105 Berkowitz et al., Superviolence: The Civil Threat of Mass Destruction, p. 7-2. The general steps involved in producing a nuclear weapon are described in Appendix I. The resources required to fabricate plutonium and uranium devices are outlined in Appendix II.106 OTA, Technologies Underlying WMD, p. 129.
It is important to emphasize that the above represents the minimum requirements. If each one is not met, concludes the assessment, "one ends up not with a less powerful weapon, but with a device that cannot produce any significant nuclear yield at all or cannot be delivered to a given target.''107
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107 Ibid., p. 129.
That being said, it is clear that certain types of nuclear devices are easier to create than others.108 Two types of weapons systems, for example, can create nuclear fission: the implosion device and the "gun'' type. In the former, explosives compress a sphere of HEU or plutonium into a small ball, thus achieving supercriticality and a nuclear chain reaction. Even the simplest implosion weapon, however, requires the fabrication of complex components, such as high-explosive lenses, high-performance detonation systems, and fusing and firing circuitry.109 The gun-type device, on the other hand, employs HEU exclusively. Using a high explosive, the system fires a subcritical HEU projectile into a subcritical cylinder of HEU to form a solid mass of critical material. Although it uses relatively scarce HEU, the gun-type device is considered technically easier to fabricate; and many analysts accordingly argue that terrorists attempting to make a bomb "in house'' will build a gun-type device.
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108 There is a consensus among experts that building a fusion or thermonuclear weapon is well beyond the capability of any terrorist organization. For this reason, these devices will not be considered in this paper.109 Falkenrath et al., America's Achilles' Heel, pp. 135--136.
There is disagreement, however, about what level of expertise and other resources are required to construct such a weapon. According to one authority, "most states and some exceptionally capable non-state actors'' could build a highly destructive 10-kiloton weapon in several months at a cost of a few hundred thousand dollars -- assuming they had access to sufficient quantities of fissile material.110 Other experts, however, are far more skeptical in their estimates of the capabilities required. Although much of the information about nuclear weapons design and production has become public knowledge during the past 50 years, it is still extraordinary for nonstate entities to attempt to embark on a nuclear weapons R&D program.111 Indeed, even technical requisite knowledge and hands-on experience are not enough to build an effective nuclear weapon. As an Office of Technology Assessment report explains, "[k]nowledge must be supplemented by industrial infrastructure and the resources to carry a nuclear weapon program to completion. The technologies for building cars and propeller-driven airplanes date back to early in this century, but many countries still cannot build them indigenously.''112
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110 Ibid., p. 126.111 Berkowitz et al., Superviolence, p. 8-5. Given the complexity and range of the tasks involved, it appears highly unlikely that any single individual would possess all of the knowledge and skills required to fabricate even a crude nuclear weapon. J. Carson et al., "Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?'' in Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, eds., Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 58.
112 OTA, Technologies Underlying WMD, p. 150.
Moreover, the fact that a number of states -- despite aid from other nuclear powers, their own intense motivations, the provision of considerable resources, alongside concerted espionage activities designed to support their R&D programs -- still struggle to build a nuclear weapon capability, suggests that the technical challenges remain immense.113 In the case of South Africa, for example, it took scientists and engineers -- who were endowed with a large and sophisticated infrastructure -- four years to build their first gun-type system.114
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113 Kamp, "An Overrated Nightmare,'' p. 53.114 David Hughes, "When Terrorists Go Nuclear: The Ingredients and Information Have Never Been More Available,'' Popular Mechanics, Vol. 173, No. 1, pp. 57--59.
Nevertheless, any nuclear weapons program will inevitably involve a number
of people, and significant resources, equipment, and facilities. As noted
earlier, all of that activity inevitably will materially increase the risk
of exposure of the terrorist group to detection by intelligence and law
enforcement agencies.
Radiological Terrorism
In the view of some authorities, theft of a nuclear device or building a weapon "in house'' are the least-probable courses of action for a prospective nuclear terrorist. Far more likely -- for all the reasons cited above -- is the dispersal of radiological material in an effort to contaminate a target population or distinct geographical area.115 The material could be spread by radiological dispersal devices (or RDDs) -- i.e., "dirty bombs'' designed to spread radioactive material through passive (aerosol) or active (explosive) means. Alternatively, the material could be used to contaminate food or water. This latter option is, however, considerably less likely given the huge quantities of radioactive material that would be required. The fact that most radioactive material is not soluble in water means that its use by a terrorist would be unlikely and impractical, if the purpose is to contaminate reservoirs or other municipal water supplies, because the radioactive material will settle out or be trapped in filters. Those factors, coupled with the fact that any radioactive material will present safety risks to the terrorists themselves, collectively indicate the serious difficulties for any adversary attempting to store, handle, and disseminate it effectively.
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115 U.S. Congress, OTA, Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, July 1991), p. 20.
Radiological weapons kill or injure by exposing people to radioactive materials, such as cesium-137, iridium-192, or cobalt-60. Victims are irradiated when they get close to or touch the material, inhale it, or ingest it. With high enough levels of exposure, the radiation can sicken and kill. Radiation (particularly gamma rays) damages cells in living tissue through ionization, destroying or altering some of the cell constituents essential to normal cell functions.116 The effects of a given device will depend on whether the exposure is "acute'' (i.e., brief, one time) or "chronic'' (i.e., extended).
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116 See: "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons,'' compiled and edited by Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, prepared and published by the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of Energy, 1977.
There are a number of possible sources of material that could be used to fashion such a device, including nuclear waste stored at a power plant (even though such waste is not highly radioactive), or radiological medical isotopes found in many hospitals or research laboratories. Although spent fuel rods are sometimes mentioned as potential sources of radiological material, they are very hot, heavy, and difficult to handle, thus making them a poor choice for terrorists. Other sources, such as medical devices, might be much easier to steal and handle. These materials, however, have a lower specific activity than the materials in reactor fuel rods (although large unshielded sources are quite dangerous). Presumably, terrorists could steal a device (either in transit or at the service facility or user location) and remove the radioactive materials. Radioactive materials are often sintered in ceramic or metallic pellets. Terrorists could then crush the pellets into a powder and put the powder into an RDD. The RDD could then be placed in or near a target facility and detonated, spreading the radiological material through the force of the explosion and in the smoke of any resulting fires. Of course, the larger the radioactive material dispersal area, the smaller the resulting dose rate.
Although incapable of causing tens of thousands of casualties, a radiological device, in addition to possibly killing or injuring any people who came into contact with it "could be used to render symbolic targets or significant areas and infrastructure uninhabitable and unusable without protective clothing.''117 A combination fertilizer truck bomb, if used together with radioactive material, for example, could not only have destroyed one of the New York World Trade Center's towers but might have rendered a considerable chunk of prime real estate in one of the world's financial nerve centers indefinitely unusable because of radioactive contamination. The disruption to commerce that could be caused, the attendant publicity, and the enhanced coercive power of terrorists armed with such "dirty'' bombs (which, for the reasons cited above, are arguably more likely threats than terrorist use of an actual fissile nuclear device), is disquieting.
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117 Robins, "How Realistic is the Threat?'', p. 53. In November 1995, in one of the few recorded incidents of nuclear terrorism, Chechen rebels placed Cesium-137 in a busy Moscow park. Although the material was packed in a protective canister, and thus posed no real threat, the incident embarrassed the Russian government, which may have been the Chechens' goal. OSD, Proliferation (1997). Most other criminal acts involving nuclear facilities or materials have been in the form of sabotage. In 1982, for example, the terrorist wing of the African National Congress destroyed nonoperational reactors at two South African power stations. Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 72.
The CBRN Terrorist Threat in Perspective
"Since 1996, the number of weapons of mass destruction threats called in to fire fighters, police and the FBI has increased fivefold. The threat comes not just from conventional weapons, like the bomb used in Oklahoma City, but also from chemical weapons, like the nerve gas agent that killed 12, but injured thousands in Tokyo, in the subway, just four years ago; and even from biological weapons that could spread deadly disease before anyone even realized that attack has occurred."I have been stressing the importance of this issue, now, for some time. As I have said repeatedly, and I want to say again to you, I am not trying to put any American into a panic over this, but I am determined to see that we have a serious, deliberate, disciplined, long-term response to a legitimate potential threat to the lives and safety of the American people.''
President Clinton118____________________
118 Remarks By The President to 17th Annual Legislative Conference Of The International Association of Fire Fighters, Hyatt Regency Hotel, Washington, D.C., 15 March 1999, p. 3 at http://www.usia.gov/topical/pol/terror/99031502.html.
As the President's remarks suggest, there is a thin line between prudence and panic. The challenge in responding to the threat of potential terrorist use of CBRN weapons is to craft defense capabilities to respond to an incident if it occurs that are not only both cost-effective and appropriate, but dynamic enough to respond as effectively as possible in a wide a range of circumstances or scenarios. Because of the extreme consequences that could result from a successful attack involving nuclear or radiological material or a chemical or biological agent, even the remotest likelihood of one cannot be dismissed as insignificant. The challenge, therefore, is to avoid reaction too strongly to only one aspect of the problem, while still preparing adequately for a threat that remains uncertain but could nonetheless have profound repercussions.119
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119 For analytical conclusions that agree in part, but also diverge in certain respects with the analyses contained in sections two and three of this report, see "Supporting Research and Analysis,'' "The Phase I Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment for the First Quarter of the 21st Century,'' The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century (also known as the "Hart-Rudman Commission''), September 15, 1999, which can be accessed at: http://www.uscns.gov/Reports/reports.htm
A critical step in this process is to reconsider the "worst-case scenario'' threat assessment approach that has dominated domestic planning and preparedness for potential acts of CBRN terrorism.120 The narrow focus lower-probability/higher- consequence threats, which in turn posit virtually limitless vulnerabilities, does not reflect the realities of contemporary terrorist behavior and operations. "This kind of analysis,'' Brian Jenkins recently warned in testimony before Congress, "can degenerate into a fact-free scaffold of anxieties and arguments -- dramatic, emotionally powerful, but analytically feeble.''121 Similarly, at the same congressional hearing, another expert, John Parachini, counseled that the "apparent over reliance on worst- case scenarios shaped primarily by vulnerability assessment rather than an assessment that factors in the technical complexities, motivations of terrorists and their patterns of behavior seems to be precisely the sort of approach we should avoid.''122 The main weakness in such an approach is in the axiomatic assumption that any less serious incident can be addressed equally well by planning for the most catastrophic threat -- ignoring the fact that higher-probability/lower-consequence attacks might present unique challenges of their own.
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120 This same argument has been made repeatedly by Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives in (1) "Combating Terrorism: Observation on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism,'' 11 March 1999; and (2) "Combating Terrorism: Observation on the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,'' 20 October 1999; as well as by Parachini in "Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat'' and Brian Michael Jenkins in their testimony before the same House subcommittee on 20 October 1999.; and the Hinton testimony "Combating Terrorism: Observation on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives,'' before the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs and Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Appropriations, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-12, General Accounting Office Washington, D.C., 16 March 1999.121 Jenkins, "Testimony,'' 20 October 1999, p. 4.
122 Parachini, "Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat,'' 20 October 1999, p. 17.
Finally, this approach may be the least efficacious means of setting budgetary priorities and allocating resources and indeed assuring the security of our country. In its future assessments and analyses of resource allocation and priorities, the Panel will look closely at the issue of whether current U.S. government policies may be -- as some have suggested -- fundamentally an attempt to overcompensate for previous years of neglect and the dismissal of the domestic terrorist threat, through spending that is divorced from any rigorous appreciation or detailed understanding of current terrorist trends. This was precisely the point made by Henry L. Hinton, Jr., the Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, when he testified before Congress in March 1999. "The [most] daunting task before the nation,'' he argued,
is to assess -- to the best of its ability -- the emerging threat with the best available knowledge and expertise across the many disciplines involved. The United States cannot fund all the possibilities that have dire consequences. By focusing investments on worst-case possibilities, the government may be missing the more likely threats the country will face. With the right threat and risk assessment process, participants, inputs, and methodology, the nation can have greater confidence that it is investing in the right items in the right amounts. Even within the lower end of the threat spectrum -- where the biological and chemical terrorist threat currently lies -- the threats can still be ranked and prioritized in terms of their likelihood and severity of consequences. A sound threat and risk assessment could provide a cohesive roadmap to justify and target spending. . . .123____________________
123 Hinton, "Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives,'' GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, 16 March 1999, pp. 4--5.
Indeed, at a time when the "high-end'' terrorist threats involving mass destruction CBRN weapons, the series of apartment building bombings that occurred in Russia and Dagestan during August and September 1999 is a salutary reminder of how terrorists can still achieve their dual aim of fear and intimidation through entirely conventional means and traditional methods -- using bombs to blow things up.124 This fact has important implications for U.S. counterterrorism preparedness. As fanatical and irrational as terrorists often appear, they remain remarkably conservative operationally, adhering to the same uncomplicated weapons and tactics on which they have relied for more than a century. Given the limited resources and constrained capabilities typical of most terrorists, they perhaps reflexively shun weapons and tactics that either cannot be relied on completely or that pose such enormous complexities in terms of their employment (e.g., achieving effective dispersal or dissemination) as to border on the unappealing, if not useless.125 For this reason, it more probable that terrorists will remain essentially content with the limited killing potential of their handguns and machine guns and the slightly higher rates that their bombs can achieve.126 In other words, they seem to prefer the assurance of the modest success provided by their more conventional weapons and traditional tactics to the risk of failure inherent in more complex and complicated operations involving CBRN weapons. Indeed, of the more than 9,000 incidents since 1968, fewer than 100 evidence any indication of terrorists plotting or attempting to use chemical, biological or radiological weapons, or to steal or otherwise fabricate nuclear devices on their own.127
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124 Hoffman, "Conventional Terrorism Still Works,'' Los Angeles Times Sunday Opinion Section, 26 September 1999.125 And see "Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks,'' U.S. General Accounting Office (NSIAD-99-163) (September 1999), pp. 10--15.
126 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Bruce Hoffman, "Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum,'' Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 6, no. 3, (Autumn 1994). This was subsequently reprinted in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.), In Athena's Camp: Preparing For Conflict In The Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997), pp. 339--368.
127 Review of incidents recorded in the RAND Chronology of International Terrorism, 1968--present.
There is another relevant paradox affecting terrorist behavior. Terrorists have long been seen as far more imitative than they are innovative.128 To date, however, no similar or copycat act of terrorism, which at the time was thought might likely follow in the wake of Aum's use of sarin nerve gas, has materialized. In this respect, the Tokyo subway incident has been the exception rather than the rule in terms of terrorist behavior. "This fact gains significance,'' Jenkins also observed in his recent testimony, "when we note that past terrorist and criminal innovations -- airline hijackings, political kidnappings, malicious product tampering -- were promptly imitated. And terrorist attacks involving chemical and biological agents, if they do occur, are likely to remain rare events -- they will not become the truck bomb of the next decade.''129
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128 Brian Michael Jenkins, International Terrorism: The Other World War (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND , November 1985, R-3302-AF), p. 12.129 Jenkins, "Testimony,'' 20 October 1999, pp. 2--3.
It should be noted that, as serious and potentially catastrophic as a domestic terrorist CBRN attack might prove, it is highly unlikely that it could ever completely undermine the national security, much less threaten the survival, of the United States as a nation. This point should be self-evident, but given the rhetoric and hyperbole with which the threat of CBRN terrorism is frequently couched, it requires reiteration. Even Israel, a comparatively small country in terms of population and landmass, who throughout its existence has often been isolated and surrounded by enemy states and subjected to unrelenting terrorist attack and provocation, has never regarded terrorism as a paramount threat to its national security and longevity, worthy of profligate budgets or the diversion of disproportionate resources and attention.130 To take any other position risks surrendering to the fear and intimidation that is precisely the terrorist's stock in trade. Indeed, following the 1995 nerve gas attack, the Japanese government did not fall, widespread disorder did not ensue, nor did society collapse. There is no reason to assume that the outcome would be any different in the United States. "The strength and resilience of liberal-democratic societies in the face of such threats,'' one analyst points out, "tend to be underestimated.''131 America's ability to address these challenges and cope with their consequences should likewise not be underestimated.
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130 Grard Chaliand, "Preface'' to Bruce Hoffman, Le Mechaniqu Terrorisme (Paris: Calmann Levy, 1999), p. 9.131 Joseph F. Pilat, "Apocalypse Now -- or Never?'' in "WMD Terrorism: An Exchange,'' Survival, vol. 40, no. 4 (Winter 1998--1999), p. 174.
Summary
In sum, even if the motives of terrorists may be changing in such a way that they are becoming more lethal, and even if this in turn may lead them to contemplate ever more bloody and heinous acts that might lead to the use of CBRN weapons, these trends do not necessarily imply that terrorists have either the requisite scientific knowledge or technical capabilities to implement their violent ambitions. Accordingly, as easy as some argue that it may be for terrorists to culture anthrax spores or brew up a concoction of deadly nerve gas, the effective dissemination or dispersal of these viruses and poisons still presents serious technological hurdles that greatly inhibit their effective use. Indeed, the technological difficulties and other impediments encountered by a group as well endowed as Aum -- the apocalyptic religious cult whose activities are most directly responsible for precipitating our current concern over terrorism and CBRN weapons -- is precisely the case in point.
This is not to suggest, however, that there either is no threat of terrorist use of CBRN or that it is one that should be dismissed or discounted. Indeed, as noted above, the difficulties now facing a terrorist, who may seek to use a CBRN weapon to achieve mass effects, could change dramatically, because of new discoveries, further advances in technology, or other material factors. Moreover, any assessment of a potential terrorist group or organization should seek to determine -- through the terrorists' doctrine, dogma, public pronouncements, and the like -- into which of two general categories the organization may fall:
1. Those organizations who seek some type of support for their cause; or2. Those who simply do not care.
It is the latter type for which we should have the greatest concern in terms of potential use of a "mass-effect'' CBRN device.
What this section has argued is that some public pronouncements and media depictions, about the ease with which terrorists might wreak genuine mass destruction or inflict widespread casualties, do not always reflect the significant hurdles currently confronting any nonstate entity seeking to employ such weapons. In this respect, it should be stressed that a limited terrorist attack involving not a WMD per se, but an unconventional chemical, biological, or radiological weapon on a deliberately small scale -- either alone or as part of a series of smaller incidents occurring either simultaneously or sequentially in a given location -- could have disproportionately enormous consequences, generating unprecedented fear and alarm, and thus serving the terrorists' purpose just as well as a larger weapon or more ambitious attack with massive casualties could have. Hence, the issue here may not be as much a ruthless terrorist's use of some WMD designed to achieve mass casualties, as the calculated terrorist's use of some unconventional weapon to achieve far-reaching psychological effects in a particular target audience. To focus on weapons of truly "mass destruction'' may, therefore, be missing the point and sidestepping the potential, credible threats posed by terrorists in this regard. As the evidence presented in this section suggests, it will likely not be the destruction of an entire city (as often proclaimed by fictional thriller writers and some government officials), but the far more deliberate and delicately planned use of a chemical, biological, or radiological agent for more discrete purposes.
By the same token, policymakers should assume, for planning purposes, that terrorism will continue to increase in both the number of actual incidents and threats, as well as in lethality. For the reasons stated above, the current hurdles for developing and delivering a true "weapon of mass destruction'' are formidable, but, as noted, that situation could, in the future, take a nasty turn for the worse. Plans and programs to deter, detect, interdict, prevent, or respond to incidents must be designed to be flexible and adaptable to changing threats. Intelligence and other information collection and sharing techniques and procedures will need to be improved. As noted elsewhere, continued monitoring and assessments of this dynamic and amorphous threat will be critical to countering this challenge effectively.
See Part 2: http://cryptome.org/tp-terr-pt2.htm