14 March 1998 Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Congressional Record: March 3, 1998 (Senate)] [Page S1261-S1262] From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:cr03mr98-164] ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS S. 712 At the request of Mr. Moynihan, the names of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Lott) and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Daschle) were added as cosponsors of S. 712, a bill to provide for a system to classify information in the interests of national security and a system to declassify such information. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Congressional Record: March 3, 1998 (Senate)] [Page S1249-S1253] From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:cr03mr98-151] THE GOVERNMENT SECRECY ACT Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I am pleased to join with the distinguished Minority Leader, the distinguished Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and with the distinguished Senator from New York, Mr. Moynihan. Both Senator Moynihan and Senator Helms served with distinction on the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. They are to be congratulated for their efforts. Senator Moynihan and I have spoken repeatedly about his commitment to declassifying information while protecting legitimate secrets. S. 712, the Government Secrecy Act of 1997 [below], is a complex piece of legislation. Chairman Thompson has already held a hearing in the Governmental Affairs Committee. Other committees have legitimate and appropriate concerns about elements of this legislation, including Foreign Relations, Judiciary, Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence on which I serve as an ex officio member. Their concerns should be addressed as we move through the legislative process. I also have a number of concerns that I hope are addressed as the committees consider this legislation. I am concerned about allowing judicial review of executive branch classification decisions. I do not think it is wise or necessary to allow judges to second-guess [[Page S1250]] classification decisions. I am concerned about cost--the cost of classification and the cost of declassification. I hope we can arrive at a legislative outcome that reduces the cost of both. I am concerned about creating a new layer of bureaucracy in an already overly bureaucratic process. It is the agencies themselves that should retain the authority to declassify documents. I am most concerned that we give priority to protecting intelligence sources and methods rather than to a vague and subjective ``public interest'' test. We need to ensure that originating agencies are expressly involved in any declassification process to avoid the mistakes that have recently been made. I also hope there is adequate authority for agencies to meet their legitimate budgetary and source-protection concerns. I am confident that the deliberative process of committee consideration will address my concerns and the legitimate concerns expressed by the Defense Department, the intelligence community, and others. I know that the Director of Central Intelligence testified last month that he wants to sit down with Senator Moynihan and address those concerns in such a way that we protect sources and methods while opening more old intelligence files to the serious researcher and the general public. I hope that this process of committee consideration can be completed this spring and that we can expeditiously schedule floor time for legislation addressing this important issue. I want to close with a special tribute to Senator Moynihan's diligence in this effort. He is not just motivated by the fact that too much information is classified and is kept secret too long. He is also motivated by a scholar's desire to know the truth, and by the historian's desire to fully explain past events. I salute his efforts and share his concerns. Openness is important in our democracy. In the words of the Secrecy Commission, chaired by Senator Moynihan, ``Secrecy is a form of government regulation . . . some secrecy is vital to save lives, bring miscreants to justice, protect national security, and engage in effective diplomacy . . . National Security will continue to be the first of our national concerns, but we also need to develop methods for the treatment of government information that better serve, not undermine, this objective.'' In the words of Chairman Moynihan himself: ``It is time also to assert certain American fundamentals, foremost of which is the right to know what government is doing, and the corresponding ability to judge its performance.'' I could not agree more. I look forward to continuing to work with Senator Moynihan and others in enacting legislation on government secrecy this year. Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the Majority Leader for raising this important issue and am pleased to join him as a co-sponsor of the Government Secrecy Act. I look forward to working with him, the other co-sponsors of the bill, and the relevant committees to move this legislation early in this session. Although some modifications to this legislation may be necessary, I think we can all agree that a democratic government depends on an informed public. This legislation will greatly improve access to government information. By reducing the number of secrets, this legislation will enhance the public's access while at the same time enabling the government to better protect information which is truly sensitive. As the Majority Leader mentioned, for the past five decades, the secrecy system has been governed by a series of six Executive Orders, none of which has created a stable system that protects only that information deemed vital to the national security of the United States. Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the two leaders for their support and welcome them to an effort that began in the 103rd Congress with the adoption of P.L. 103-236, establishing the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. This bi-partisan commission, which I had the privilege of chairing, and on which Senator Helms played an important role, issued its unanimous report last March. The Commission found that the current system neither protects nor releases national security information particularly well. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished leaders, but I am also deeply grateful to the able senior Senator from New York. For too long the government has classified information which has no business being classified. When I came to the Senate, I was a member of the Armed Services Committee and I remember that I went to many classified briefings, only to be informed, in great detail, of everything that was in the New York Times and Washington Post that morning. The most frustrating thing was that we could not talk about the information from those meetings because it was classified. Mr. MOYNIHAN. The central fact is that we live today in an information age. Open sources give us the vast majority of what we need to know in order to make intelligent decisions. Analysis, far more than secrecy, is the key to security. Decisions made by people at ease with disagreement and ambiguity and tentativeness. Decisions made by those who understand how to exploit the wealth and diversity of publicly available information, who no longer simply assume that clandestine collection, i.e. ``stealing secrets'', equates with greater intelligence. We are not going to put an end to secrecy. It is at times legitimate and necessary. But a culture of secrecy need not remain the norm in American government as regards national security. It is possible to conceive that a competing culture of openness might develop which could assert and demonstrate greater efficiency. Mr. HELMS. The Commission by law had two goals: to study how to protect the important government secrets while simultaneously reducing the enormous amount of classified documents and materials. We began our deliberations with the premise that government secrecy is a form of regulation, and like all regulations, should be used sparingly. But I feel obliged to reiterate and emphasize the obvious. The protection of true national security information remains vital to the well-being and security of the United States. Mr. MOYNIHAN. I agree with the Senator. One of the important recommendations of the Commission was a proposal for a statute establishing a general classification regime and creating a national declassification center. The four Congressional members of the Commission, Representatives Combest and Hamilton, Senator Helms, and I, proposed just such a statute last May, the Government Secrecy Act, S.712. Mr. DASCHLE. In deciding that we needed to design a better, more rational classification system, I was moved by the fact that under the current system we are classifying an enormous amount of information each and every year. For example, in 1996 alone, the Federal Government created 386,562 Top Secret, 3,467,856 Secret, and 1,830,044 Confidential items: a total of 5,789,625 classification actions. Mr. MOYNIHAN. Last year the number of officials with the authority to classify documents originally decreased by 959 to 4,420. Presumably, this should reduce the number of classifications, but the number of classifications increased by nearly two-thirds, over 5.7 million. There cannot be 5.7 million secrets a year which, if revealed, would cause ``damage'' to the national security. To paraphrase Justice Potter Stewart's decision regarding the Pentagon Papers, when everything is secret, nothing is secret. Mr. DASCHLE. In addition to costing the taxpayer billions annually, this excessive government secrecy leads to a host of other problems. Secrecy hampers the exchange of information within the government, leads to public mistrust, and makes leaking classified information the norm. I think it would be useful at this point to note that this legislation will not require the disclosure of a single document or fact deemed vital to our national security. Instead, this legislation will prevent the government from stamping ``Classified'' on information that is not sensitive. The Clinton administration has made significant reforms to open government information. For example, last month, Secretary of Energy Federico Pena announced that he would seek to end the practice that considered all atomic weapons information as ``born [[Page S1251]] classified'' and instead would only classify ``where there is a compelling national security interest''. The Department of Energy is to be commended for its efforts in recent years to make available information concerning nuclear tests conducted in this country and their effects on human health and the environment. This is a useful step. However, as the statistics I cited above for 1996 make clear, there is still much more to be done. Mr. MOYNIHAN. Such efforts are welcome and should be encouraged. However, to ensure that they are carried out across the government and in a sustained manner, our Commission proposed that legislation be adopted. Mr. DASCHLE. Greater Congressional oversight of classification policy is long overdue. For too long, classification and declassification policy have been both developed and implemented by bureaucrats, often anonymously. Consideration of the Government Secrecy Act, S.712, will promote an open discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of secrecy, a discussion which is not limited to the views of those who are charged with implementing classification policy. Mr. MOYNIHAN. If the Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy is to serve any large purpose, it is to introduce the public to the thought that secrecy is a mode of regulation. In truth, it is the ultimate mode, for the citizen does not even know that he or she is being regulated. Normal regulation concerns how citizens must behave, and so regulations are widely promulgated. Secrecy, by contrast, concerns what citizens may know. The citizen is not told what may not be known. With the arrival of the New Deal agencies in the 1930s, it became clear that public regulation needed to be made more accessible to the public. In 1935, for example, the Federal Register began publication. Thereafter all public regulations were published and accessible. In 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act established procedures by which the citizen can question and even litigate regulation. In 1966, the Freedom of Information Act, technically an amendment to the original 1946 Act, provided citizens yet more access to government files. The Administrative Procedure Act brought some order and accountability to the flood of government regulations that at time bids fare to overwhelm us. Even so, ``over-regulation'' is a continuing theme in American life, as in most modern administrative states. Secrecy would be such an issue, save that secrecy is secret. Make no mistake, however. It is a parallel regulatory regime with a far greater potential for damage if it malfunctions. Mr. DASCHLE. One of the most striking aspects of the Commission report is the lack of Congressional involvement in the secrecy system. Apart from the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Atomic Energy Act, which only applies to atomic secrets, there are few statutes dealing with these issues. If secrecy is a form of regulation, then this legislation will serve a similar purpose to the Administrative Procedure Act for the secrecy system. And there has been little Congressional oversight. I believe the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, which Senator Moynihan chaired, is only the second statutory examination of the secrecy system. Mr. MOYNIHAN. That is correct--there has been only one other statutory inquiry into this subject. This was the Commission on Government Security, established in 1955 by the 84th Congress, known as the Wright Commission for its Chairman, Lloyd Wright, past President of the American Bar Association. This was a distinguished bipartisan body, which included in its membership Senators John C. Stennis of Mississippi and Norris Cotton of New Hampshire, along with Representatives William M. McCulloch of Ohio and Francis E. Walter of Pennsylvania. The Commission report, issued 40 years ago, is a document of careful balance and great detail. The Commission was concerned with classification as a cost. Free inquiry, like free markets, is the most efficient way to get good results. The Commission set forth a great many proposals ranging from Atomic Energy to Passport Security, but its legislative proposals were concise: the proposal to outlaw by statute ``disclosures of classified information. . . by persons outside as well as within the Government'' was quickly perceived as prior restraint: press censorship. The response was swift and predictable. The recommendation was criticized strongly in articles and editorials in a variety of newspapers, notably by James Reston. And the Commission's recommendations were dropped. Mr. DASCHLE. The Government Secrecy Commission has learned from history and issued much more prudent proposals. Some individuals have raised constitutional concerns regarding this legislation, but the Government Secrecy Act (S. 712) respects the President's constitutional prerogatives by maintaining the authority of the President to establish categories of classified information and procedures for classifying information. The precedent for Congressional action has already been established by the Atomic Energy Act, the Espionage Act, and the National Security Act. Mr. MOYNIHAN. The Government Secrecy Act will provide a framework for our secrecy system which can limit the number of documents initially classified and significantly reduce the backlog of already classified documents. It sets standards for declassification whereby information may not remain classified for longer than 10 years unless the head of the agency which created the information certifies to the President that the information requires continued protection. Information not declassified within 10 years may not remain classified for more than 30 years without another certification. It requires that a balancing test be established in making classification and declassification decisions so that officials must weigh the benefit from public disclosure of information against the need for initial or continued protection of the information under the classification system. The bill also establishes a national declassification center to coordinate and oversee the declassification policies and practices of the Federal Government to ensure that declassification is efficient, cost-effective, and consistent. I thank the Majority Leader for raising his concerns. It is my sincere intention to work with the Majority Leader and other interested Senators to perfect this legislation, so that we might pass it in the coming months. Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise because I have some grave concerns with the current form of the Government Secrecy Act of 1997 (S. 712) and I am pleased that the distinguished Majority Leader and my distinguished colleagues are open to a discussion of this legislation with the goal of establishing the basic principles on which Federal classification and declassification programs are to be based. More stability, reliability, and consistency are needed in the government's approach to both the protection--and I emphasize protection--as well as the release of classified information to the public. The recent compromise of sensitive information through rushed declassification highlights the need for more oversight and accountability of the declassification process. I have serious concerns that S. 712 does not adequately protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods and will unnecessarily cost the taxpayers many hundreds of millions of dollars. I support the Commission on Government Secrecy's finding that the public has a right of access to the large majority of government-held information and that, in general, too much information is classified and kept secret too long. However, secrecy is essential to intelligence, and U.S. security has depended and still depends on secrecy to succeed. We must proceed with caution in our commitment to make more classified information available to the public. In this regard, I am concerned that some provisions of S. 712 erode the Director of Central Intelligence's statutory authority and ability to protect intelligence sources and methods. Further, the bill will cost untold millions to declassify and release the tremendous amount of currently classified material in a way that still protects the most sensitive sources and methods. For example, DOD reports to have over 1.2 billion pages of 25 year and older material of historical value that requires review for declassification. The current estimated average cost of [[Page S1252]] review is $1 a page. This means that the cost of declassification of this group of documents alone will be over $1.2 billion--that's billion with a ``B'', Mr. President. I am also concerned that the so-called Declassification Center created in S. 712 will not correct the problems facing the current declassification system. It will end up being another costly and unnecessary government bureaucracy. Instead, to promote greater accountability, I propose that we create a more effective and enhanced Executive branch oversight function for classification and declassification programs. In addition, I believe sanctions for unauthorized disclosures should be added to the bill. We need to consider new and unique categories of secrecy for our most sensitive intelligence operations--perhaps to include very serious penalties for public discussion of these activities. Finally, I am troubled that the bill leaves open the possibility of judicial review of Executive branch classification decisions. This will undoubtedly lead to costly legal challenges that could result in judicial second-guessing of the Commander-in-Chief on national security matters. I look forward to addressing these and other concerns in our Committee. Our collective goal should be to craft legislation that establishes a sensible framework for a classification and declassification system that continues to protect sources and methods while improving oversight and accountability at an affordable cost. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, for Americans government secrecy is a paradox. In a democracy, it's an unusual action for us to decide to keep something secret from the public, because it's their government. What we do is for the people. It's carried out in their name. So it's unusual to do the public's business in secret. There is only one legitimate reason for our government to keep something secret from its citizens: To keep America safe. As Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I have been exposed to many things that, if made public, would threaten the security of our citizens and our nation. But I have also seen valuable information unnecessarily kept from the public view. Which is why I support this effort to change the way our government classifies and declassifies its information. Secrecy is the exception, not the rule, in these matters for a number of reasons. The first and foremost is that this is government of, by and for the people. The second stems from that old adage ``sunshine is the best disinfectant''. We do a better job in the open, where our ideas and actions are subject to the test of scrutiny, criticism and feedback, than we do in secret. And third, because information we gather belongs to the people, we should make sure information they can use--in their own lives, in their own businesses, and, most important, in making decisions as citizens in a democracy--is provided to them when we can make it available without compromising our safety. We make the unusual decision to keep things secret for a reason: Because those secrets help to keep Americans safe. Our government classifies information to help protect our citizens and preserve the security of our nation. When the Director of Central Intelligence goes to the President or to Congress to tell us of the threats our nation faces, he can do so because there are men and women around the globe risking their lives to provide our nation's leaders with the information they need to protect our country. Whether the intelligence deals with foreign leaders, terrorists, narcotics traffickers, or military troop movements, our government needs to keep certain information secret or our nation's security will suffer. Yet much of the information on foreign countries collected by our Intelligence Community can and should be shared with the American people. With the growth of open source information and widespread availability of information technology, the American public is also increasingly a consumer of intelligence. We live in a very complex world, with intertwining relationships between nations shaped by history and culture. It is difficult for policymakers--those of us who study foreign policy, who have access to classified information and analysis, and who receive detailed government briefings--to get the information we need for an informed view on foreign policy issues. Our citizens have an even more limited amount of information available to help them understand what occurs outside our nation's border. Which is why I believe the more information the American public has with which to understand foreign policy the better. Mr. President, we need to continue to protect ``sources and methods'', a term of art which refers to the people working to collect intelligence and the means by which they do so. Yet, when we acquire information whose release will not threaten sources and methods, or have information so dated that the people and means used to collect it are no longer in jeopardy, the government should release this information to the public. We must act this year to reverse a fifty year trend and reduce government secrecy, including intelligence secrecy. The classification system has been regulated by executive order for five decades, with new executive orders contradicting previous ones and producing new costs for all agencies involved. What is or is not a secret should not be subject to a change in political leadership. Congress should place in statute the concept of what is or is not classified information, and provide general standards for classifying and declassifying information. Mr. President, Congress bears some of the responsibility for the status of our nation's classification policy. The Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy was not able to find a single example of a congressional hearing on the issue of executive branch secrecy policy. At the very least, Congress needs to improve its oversight of this issue. As part of this effort, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is scheduled to hold a hearing on this issue later this year. Senators Moynihan and Helms have shown great leadership in addressing the issue of governmental secrecy. Their work on the Secrecy Commission has helped provide the Senate with the necessary context and analysis of government secrecy we need to address this issue. Their legislation S. 712, the Government Secrecy Act of 1997, goes a long way towards outlining a balanced government policy which protects the most sensitive information while allowing the public access to as much information as possible. In my discussions with Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, I have learned that the Intelligence Community does have concerns with the current version of S. 712. The CIA's concerns include their desire that the originator of classified information be in charge of its declassification, and that the classification and declassification process not be subject to judicial review. I look forward to working with Senators Helms and Moynihan, with Director Tenet, and the Administration to develop legislative language which meets the twin goals of keeping America safe and ensuring our government responds to the needs of its citizens for information. Because the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are responsible for the vast majority of information that requires classification, I believe the committees responsible for oversight of these entities--the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence--should have the opportunity to review S. 712. I hope that such a sequential referral can be arranged. Mr. President, we seek legislation that is in balance. We seek secrecy legislation which protects the safety of our citizens and the security of our nation, but also ensures that our government's policies, actions, and information will be as open as possible to its citizens. We must help keep America safe, while also assuring that our actions truly reflect those of a government of, by and for the people. I look forward to the challenge. I yield the floor. Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I appreciate the attention being given to the Government Secrecy Act, S. 712, by Senator Lott and Senator Daschle. I also wish to commend Senators Moynihan and Helms for the hard work they have put into this issue as Senate members of the Commission on Protection and Reducing Government Secrecy. [[Page S1253]] To review the entire secrecy system, Congress established the Secrecy Commission in 1994. Last year, the Commission issued its final report. The Governmental Affairs Committee held a hearing on the Commission's recommendations when they were first issued. Among the recommendations of the Commission was establishing a statutory basis for our secrecy system. Apart from nuclear secrets, there has never been a coordinated statutory basis for establishing and maintaining government secrets. Consequently, there is little coordination among agencies on how information is determined to be secret, little accountability among classifying officials, and little Congressional oversight of the government's secrecy activities. The Commission also described how the secrecy system functions as a form of government regulation, imposing significant costs on the government and the private sector. It is time to begin reviewing these costs and identify which secrets really need to be kept and which do not. Like other areas of government regulation, we need to inject a cost/benefit analysis into the process to be sure that those secrets we do keep are worth the cost. The Government Secrecy Act is an issue of good government reform that needs consideration by Congress. I intend to work with Senator Glenn, the Ranking Member of the Governmental Affairs Committee, to report an amended S. 712 very soon. The United States needs a secrecy system that does a better job of identifying those secrets which truly must be kept, and which then can truly keep them secret. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I concur that this is an important issue that our Committee takes very seriously. We held a hearing on the Commission's report last year, and I know that the Chairman has wanted to return to this matter this year. The question of establishing a statutory framework for classification and declassification has long been a matter of debate. Our own committee held extensive hearings on this subject in 1973 and 1974. The current system is governed by Presidential executive order, and, as the Majority Leader noted, this has led over time to inconsistencies in policies and procedures. Some have questioned, however, whether legislation is needed. I believe that it is proper for Congress to legislate on this subject, while of course still respecting the authority of the President in this area. This principle of shared authority was recognized in the passage of the Atomic Energy Act, the Espionage Act, and the National Security Act. If Congress acts now to establish a statutory classification and declassification system, we should take a similarly balanced approach. Balance is also needed in our approach to considering the legislation in the Senate. While S. 712 has been properly referred to our committee, the Committee on Governmental Affairs, the bill raises important issues of interest to the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Armed Services Committee, and the Committee on Foreign Relations. I am fully committed to working with each of these committees as the bill moves forward. ____________________ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [Added by JYA] [DOCID: f:s712is.txt] 105th CONGRESS 1st Session S. 712 To provide for a system to classify information in the interests of national security and a system to declassify such information. _______________________________________________________________________ IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES May 7, 1997 Mr. Moynihan (for himself and Mr. Helms) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs _______________________________________________________________________ A BILL To provide for a system to classify information in the interests of national security and a system to declassify such information. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Government Secrecy Act of 1997''. SEC. 2. PURPOSE. It is the purpose of this Act to promote the effective protection of classified information and the disclosure of information where there is not a well-founded basis for protection or where the costs of maintaining a secret outweigh the benefits. SEC. 3. FINDINGS. The Congress makes the following findings: (1) The system for classifying and declassifying national security information has been based in regulation, not in statute, and has been governed by six successive Executive orders since 1951. (2) The Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, established under Public Law 103-236, issued its report on March 4, 1997 (S. Doc. 105-2), in which it recommended reducing the volume of information classified and strengthening the protection of classified information. (3) The absence of a statutory framework has resulted in unstable and inconsistent classification and declassification policies, excessive costs, and inadequate implementation. (4) The implementation of Executive orders will be even more costly as more documents are prepared and used on electronic systems. (5) United States taxpayers incur substantial costs as several million documents are classified each year. According to figures submitted to the Information Security Oversight Office and the Congress, the executive branch and private industry together spent more than $5.2 billion in 1996 to protect classified information. (6) A statutory foundation for the classification and declassification of information is likely to result in a more stable and cost-effective set of policies and a more consistent application of rules and procedures. (7) Enactment of a statute would create an opportunity for greater oversight by the Congress of executive branch classification and declassification activities, without impairing the responsibility of executive branch officials for the day-to-day administration of the system. SEC. 4. CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION. (a) Classification For National Security Reasons.--The President may, in accordance with this Act, protect from unauthorized disclosure information in the possession and control of the executive branch when there is a demonstrable need to do so in order to protect the national security of the United States. The President shall ensure that the amount of information classified is the minimum necessary to protect the national security. (b) Procedures for Classification and Declassification.-- (1) In general.--The President shall, to the extent necessary, establish categories of information that may be classified and procedures for classifying information under subsection (a). The President shall, concurrently with the establishment of such categories and procedures, establish, and allocate resources for the implementation of, procedures for declassifying information previously classified. (2) Publication of categories and procedures.-- (A) The President shall publish notice in the Federal Register of any categories and procedures proposed to be established under paragraph (1) with respect to both the classification and declassification of information, and shall provide an opportunity for interested agencies and other interested persons to submit comments thereon. The President shall take into account such comments before establishing the categories and procedures, which shall also be published in the Federal Register. (B) The procedures set forth in subparagraph (A) shall apply to any modifications in categories or procedures established under paragraph (1). (3) Agency standards and procedures.--The head of each agency shall establish standards and procedures for classifying and declassifying information created by that agency on the basis of the categories and procedures established by the President under paragraph (1). Each agency head, in establishing and modifying standards and procedures under this paragraph, shall follow the procedures required of the President in paragraph (2) for establishing and modifying categories and procedures under that paragraph. (c) Considerations in Determining Classification and Declassification.-- (1) In general.--In determining whether information should be classified or declassified, the agency official making the determination shall weigh the benefit from public disclosure of the information against the need for initial or continued protection of the information under the classification system. If there is significant doubt as to whether information requires such protection, it shall not be classified. (2) Written justification.-- (A) Original classification.--The agency official who makes the decision to classify information shall identify himself or herself and shall provide in writing a detailed justification for that decision. (B) Derivative classification.--In any case in which an agency official classifies a document on the basis of information previously classified that is included or referenced in the document, that agency official shall identify himself or herself in that document. (d) Standards for Declassification.-- (1) Initial classification period.--Information may not remain classified under this Act for longer than a 10-year period unless the head of the agency that created the information certifies to the President at the end of such period that the information requires continued protection, based on a current assessment of the risks of disclosing the information, carried out in accordance with subsection (c)(1). (2) Additional classification period.--Information not declassified prior to or at the end of the 10-year period referred to in paragraph (1) may not remain classified for more than a 30-year period unless the head of the agency that created the information certifies to the President at the end of such 30-year period that continued protection of the information from unauthorized disclosure is essential to the national security of the United States or that demonstrable harm to an individual will result from release of the information. (3) Declassification schedules.--All classified information shall be subject to regular review pursuant to schedules each agency head shall establish and publish in the Federal Register. Each agency shall follow the schedule established by the agency head in declassifying information created by that agency. (4) Assessment of existing classified information.--Each agency official responsible for information which, before the effective date of this Act-- (A) was determined to be kept protected from unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national security, and (B) had been kept so protected for longer than the 10-year period referred to in paragraph (1), shall, to the extent feasible, give priority to making decisions with respect to declassifying that information as soon as is practicable. (e) Reports to Congress.--Not later than December 31 of each year, the head of each agency that is responsible for the classification and declassification of information shall submit to the Congress a report that describes the application of the classification and declassification standards and procedures of that agency during the preceding fiscal year. (f) Amendment to Freedom of Information Act.--Section 552(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``(1)(A) specifically authorized to be classified under the Government Secrecy Act of 1997, or specifically authorized, before the effective date of that Act, under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national security (as defined by section 7(6) of the Government Secrecy Act of 1997), and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to that Act or Executive order;''. SEC. 5. NATIONAL DECLASSIFICATION CENTER. (a) Establishment.--The President shall establish, within an existing agency, a National Declassification Center, the functions of which shall be-- (1) to coordinate and oversee the declassification policies and practices of the Federal Government; and (2) to provide technical assistance to agencies in implementing such policies and practices, in accordance with this section. (b) Functions.-- (1) Declassification of information.--The Center shall, at the request of any agency and on a reimbursable basis, declassify information within the possession of that agency pursuant to the guidance of that agency on the basis of the declassification standards and procedures established by that agency under section 4, or if another agency created the information, pursuant to the guidance of that other agency on the basis of the declassification standards and procedures established by that agency under section 4. In carrying out this paragraph, the Center may use the services of officers or employees or the resources of another agency, with the consent of the head of that agency. (2) Coordination of policies.--The Center shall coordinate implementation by agencies of the declassification policies and procedures established by the President under section 4 and shall ensure that declassification of information occurs in an efficient, cost-effective, and consistent manner among all agencies that create or otherwise are in possession of classified information. (3) Disputes.--If disputes arise among agencies regarding whether information should or should not be classified, or between the Center and any agency regarding the Center's functions under this section, the heads of the agencies concerned or of the Center may refer the matter to the President for resolution of the dispute. (c) National Declassification Advisory Committee.-- (1) In general.--There is established a 12-member National Declassification Advisory Committee. 4 members of the Advisory Committee shall be appointed by the President and 2 members each shall be appointed by the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the minority leader of the House of Representatives. (2) Membership.--The members of the Advisory Committee shall be appointed from among distinguished historians, political scientists, archivists, other social scientists, and other members of the public who have a demonstrable expertise in declassification and the management of Government records. No officer or employee of the United States Government shall be appointed to the Advisory Committee. (3) Duties.--The Advisory Committee shall provide advice to the Center and make recommendations concerning declassification priorities and activities. (d) Annual Reports.--The Center shall submit to the President and the Congress, not later than December 31 of each year, a report on its activities during the preceding fiscal year, and on the implementation of agency declassification practices and its efforts to coordinate those practices. SEC. 6. INFORMATION TO THE CONGRESS. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the withholding of information from the Congress. SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS. As used in this Act-- (1) the term ``Advisory Committee'' means the National Declassification Advisory Committee established under section 5(c); (2) the term ``agency'' means any executive agency as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code, any military department as defined in section 102 of such title, and any other entity in the executive branch of the Government that comes into the possession of classified information; (3) the term ``Center'' means the National Declassification Center established under section 5(a); (4) the terms ``classify'', ``classified'', and ``classification'' refer to the process by which information is determined to require protection from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to this Act in order to protect the national security of the United States; (5) the terms ``declassify'', ``declassified'', and ``declassification'' refer to the process by which information that has been classified is determined to no longer require protection from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to this Act; and (6) the term ``national security of the United States'' means the national defense or foreign relations of the United States. SEC. 8. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Act shall take effect 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- See also H.R. 1546 for identical House Resolution introduced on May 7, 1997, by Representatives Hamilton and Combest. http://jya.com/hr1546.txt