28 May 1999
Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/fr-cont.html

See related Cox Report: http://www.house.gov/coxreport/

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

[Congressional Record: May 26, 1999 (Senate)]
[Page S5982-S6011]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr26my99-163]


        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). Under the previous order, the
Senate will resume consideration of S. 1059, which the clerk will
report.
  The legislative assistant read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1059) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
     year 2000 for military activities of the Department of
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed
     Forces, and for other purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
  Pending:

  McCain/Levin amendment No. 393, to provide authority to carry out
base closure round commencing in 2001.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I see no other Senator here at this moment.
I believe there is another Senator who will be here at about 10:30 to
offer another amendment, but I would like to submit an amendment for
consideration at this point.

                           Amendment No. 394

(Purpose: To improve the monitoring of the export of advanced satellite
 technology, to require annual reports with respect to Taiwan, and to
     improve the provisions relating to safeguards, security, and
        counterintelligence at Department of Energy facilities)

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative assistant read as follows:

       The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Lott] proposes an
     amendment numbered 394.

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under
``Amendments Submitted.'')
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I am pleased to offer this amendment on
behalf of myself, and Senators Warner, Shelby, Murkowski, Domenici,
Specter, Thomas, Kyl, and Hutchinson.
  This package is the product of the serious investigative and
oversight work performed by the relevant committees and other Senators
who have devoted considerable attention to the issues of satellite
exports, Chinese espionage, lax security at DOE facilities, foreign
counterintelligence wiretaps, and more. I commend my cosponsors and
others for their helpful efforts in this regard.
  I have stated that the damage to U.S. national security as a result
of China's nuclear espionage is probably the greatest I have seen in my
entire career. And, unfortunately, the administration's inattention
to--or even hostility towards--counterintelligence and security has
magnified this breach.
  It is simply incredible that China has acquired sensitive, classified
information about every nuclear warhead in the U.S. arsenal. But this
apparently is precisely what happened.
  It is simply incredible that American companies illegally provided
information to the Chinese that will allow them to improve their long-
range missiles aimed at American cities. But this apparently is exactly
what happened.
  It is simply incredible that American exports were delivered to
certain Chinese facilities that will assist their weapons of mass
destruction program. But this apparently is exactly what happened.
  It is simply incredible that it took this administration 2 years from
the date the National Security Adviser was

[[Page S5983]]

first briefed by DOE officials on the problem of Chinese espionage at
the nuclear weapons laboratories, to sign a new Presidential directive
to strengthen counterintelligence at the labs and elsewhere. But this
apparently is exactly what happened.
  And, after all this, it is simply incredible that the President would
claim that all this damage was a result of actions of previous
administrations and that he had not been told of any espionage that had
occurred on his watch. But this is exactly what the President said in a
mid-March press conference.
  As I have stated previously, the Congress must take several steps to
better understand what happened and how it happened, and to lessen the
likelihood of a recurrence of such events in the future.
  First, we must aggressively probe the administration to determine the
facts. We know much of what happened. But we don't have all the facts,
and we certainly don't know why certain events unfolded the way they
did. We need to get to the bottom of that.
  Several committees are exploring aspects of this scandal, and it is
multi-faceted: DOE security; whistleblower protections;
counterintelligence at the FBI; CIA operations; export controls;
illegal campaign contributions; the Justice Department; the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA; DOD monitoring of satellite
launches in China; waivers of laws for companies under investigation
for illegal activities; and much, much more.
  Second, we must take all reasonable steps now to remedy problems we
have identified to date. Does this mean that the actions recommended in
this bill, or in this amendment, will solve the problem of lab security
for all time? Of course not. But they do represent important first
steps in addressing the myriad problems that have emerged during the
various on-going investigations.
  For example, we know that security and counter-intelligence at the
labs was--and is--woefully inadequate. We can take steps to begin to
fix that problem.
  We know that the Clinton Commerce Department failed miserably to
adequately control and protect national security information as it
relates to commercial communications satellites and rocket launchers.
We took steps last year in the Defense authorization bill to help
protect national security by transferring from Commerce to State the
responsibility for reviewing license applications for such satellites.
  Third, we must hold appropriate executive branch officials
accountable for their actions. This means we need to understand why
certain Clinton administration officials acted the way they did. Why,
for example, were DOE intelligence officials told they could not brief
the Congress on aspects of this espionage investigation and its
implications? Why did the Reno Justice Department refuse to approve a
wiretap request? Why was a certain suspect's computer not searched
much, much earlier when, in fact, the suspect had agreed several years
earlier to such a search? And why was a waiver granted for the export
of a satellite built by an American company that was under
investigation by the Department of Justice and whose head was the
single largest individual contributor to the Democratic National
Committee?
  In posing these and other questions, does this mean the Senate is on
some partisan witch-hunt? Absolutely not. I recognize that a full
understanding of this issue requires going back decades.
  For example, the reports recently issued by the Senate Intelligence
Committee and the Cox Committee in the House reviewed documents from
prior administrations.
  But simply saying that errors were made in previous administrations
cannot and does not absolve this President and this administration from
responsibility. In fact, this administration's record in the area of
security and counter-intelligence, in its relations with China, and in
several other areas, leaves much to be desired.
  As I said before, there are some steps we can and should take now.
For example, the Defense authorization bill before us now proposes
several important measures regarding Department of Energy security and
counterintelligence. Likewise, the intelligence authorization bill
includes several legislative proposals on this topic as well.
  My amendment is entirely consistent with, and indeed builds upon,
those two vital legislative measures. Allow me to describe what this
amendment proposes to do.
  First, it seeks to address the Loral episode, wherein the President
approved a waiver for the export of a Loral satellite for launch on a
Chinese rocket at the same time Loral was under investigation by the
Justice Department for possible criminal wrong-doing.
  This amendment requires the President to notify the Congress whenever
an investigation is undertaken of an alleged violation of U.S. export
control laws in connection with the export of a commercial satellite of
U.S. origin.
  It also requires the President to notify the Congress whenever an
export license or waiver is granted on behalf of any U.S. person or
firm that is the subject of a criminal investigation.
  I am absolutely convinced that had these ``sunshine'' provisions been
in effect at the time of the Loral waiver decision, I doubt very
seriously that the President would have issued his decision in favor of
Loral.
  Second, the amendment requires the Secretary of Defense to undertake
certain actions that would significantly enhance the performance and
effectiveness of the DOD program for monitoring so-called ``satellite
launch campaigns'' in China and elsewhere.
  For instance, under this amendment, the DOD monitoring officials will
be given authority to halt a launch campaign if they felt U.S. national
security was being compromised. In addition, the Secretary will be
obligated to establish appropriate professional and technical
qualifications, as well as training programs, for such personnel, and
increase the number of such monitors.
  Furthermore, to remove any ambiguity as to what technical information
may be shared by U.S. contractors during a launch campaign, the
amendment requires the Secretary of Defense to review and improve
guidelines for such discussions. Finally, it requires the Secretary to
establish a counter intelligence program within the organization
responsible for performing such monitoring functions.
  Third, my amendment enhances the intelligence community's role in the
export license review process. This responds to a clear need for
greater insight by the State Department and other license-reviewing
agencies into the Chinese and other entities involved in space launch
and ballistic missile programs. In this regard, it is worth noting that
the intelligence community played a very modest role in reviewing the
license applications for exports that subsequently were deemed to have
harmed national security.
  This section also requires a report by the Director of Central
Intelligence on the efforts of foreign governments to acquire sensitive
U.S. technology and technical information.
  Fourth, based on concerns that China continues to proliferate missile
and missile technology to Pakistan and Iran, this amendment expresses
the sense of Congress that the People's Republic of China should not be
permitted to join the Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR, as a
member until Beijing has demonstrated a sustained commitment to missile
nonproliferation and adopted an effective export control system. Any
honest appraisal would lead one to the conclusion, I believe, that
China has not demonstrated such a commitment and does not have in place
effective export controls.
  Now we know, from documents released by the White House as part of
the Senate's investigation, that the Clinton administration wanted to
bring the PRC into the MTCR as a means of shielding Beijing from
missile proliferation sanctions laws now on the books. This section
sends a strong signal that such an approach should not be undertaken.
  Fifth, the amendment expresses strong support for stimulating the
expansion of the commercial space launch industry here in America. As
we have seen recently with a number of failed U.S. rocket launches,
there is a crying need to improve the performance of U.S.-built and
launched rockets. This amendment strongly encourages efforts to promote
the domestic commercial space launch industry, including through the
elimination of legal or regulatory barriers to long-term
competitiveness.

[[Page S5984]]

  The amendment also urges a review of the current policy of permitting
the export of commercial satellites of U.S. origin to the PRC for
launch and suggests that, if a decision is made to phase-out the
policy, then launches of such satellites in the PRC should occur only
if they are licensed as of the commencement of the phase-out of the
policy and additional actions are taken to minimize the transfer of
technology to the PRC during the course of such launches.
  Sixth, the amendment requires the Secretary of State to provide
information to U.S. satellite manufacturers when a license application
is denied. This addresses a legitimate concern expressed by U.S.
industry about the current export control process.
  I not that each of these recommendations was included in the Senate
Intelligence Committee's ``Report on Impacts to U.S. National Security
of Advanced Satellite Technology Exports to the PRC and the PRC's
Efforts Influence U.S. Policy.'' That report was approved by an
overwhelmingly bipartisan vote, so there is nothing partisan whatsoever
in these recommendations.
  My amendment also requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an
annual report on the military balance in the Taiwan Straits, similar to
the report delivered to the Congress earlier this year. That report, my
colleagues may recall, was both informative and deeply troubling in its
assessment that the PRC has underway a massive buildup of missile
forces opposite our friend, Taiwan.
  Annual submission of this report will assist the Congress in working
with the administration in assessing future lists of defense articles
and services requested by Taiwan as part of the annual arms sales talks
between the U.S. and Taiwan.
  Eighth, the amendment proposes a mechanism for determining the extent
to which then-Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary's ``Openness
Initiative'' resulted in the release of highly-classified nuclear
secrets. We already know, for example, that some material has been
publicly-released that contained highly-sensitive ``restricted Data''
or ``Formerly Restricted Data.''
  While we are rightly concerned about what nuclear weapons design or
other sensitive information has been stolen through espionage, at the
same time we must be vigilant in ensuring that Mrs. O'Leary's
initiative was not used, and any future declassification measures will
not be used, to provide nuclear know-how to would-be proliferators in
Iran, North Korea, and elsewhere.
  Ninth, the amendment proposes putting the FBI in charge of conducting
security background investigations of DOE laboratory employees, versus
the Office of Personnel Management as is currently the case. I applaud
the Armed Services Committee for including additional funds in their
bill for addressing the current backlog of security investigations.
  Tenth, and lastly, the amendment proposes increased
counterintelligence training and other measures to ensure classified
information is protected during DOE laboratory-to-laboratory exchanges,
should such exchanges occur in the future. For example, having trained
counter-intelligence experts go along on any and all visits of lab
employees to sensitive countries, is a small but useful step in the
direction of enhanced security.
  Mr. President, I readily concede that this package of amendments will
not solve all security problems at the Nation's nuclear weapons
laboratories. Nor will it solve the myriad problems identified to date
in the Senate's on-going investigation of the damage to U.S. national
security from the export of satellites to the PRC or from Chinese
nuclear espionage.
  These are, as I mentioned before, small but useful steps to address
known deficiencies. Most of these recommendations stem from the
bipartisan report issued by the Intelligence Committee.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to support this important amendment.
  In summary, good work has been done by the Cox committee in the House
of Representatives. They should be commended for the work they have
done in this critical area. They should be commended for the fact that
it has been bipartisan. It would have been easy for them to veer into
areas or procedures that would have made it very partisan. They did not
do that.
  The same thing is true in the Senate. The Senate has chosen so far
not to have a select committee or a joint committee. The Senate has
continued to try to do this in the normal way.
  We have had hearings by the Intelligence Committee. They have done
very good work. Chairman Shelby has been thoughtful and relentless, and
he continues in that way. The Armed Services Committee, under Senator
Warner, the Energy Committee, under Senator Murkowski, Foreign
Relations, Governmental Affairs--all the committees with jurisdiction
in this area have been having hearings, they have had witnesses, and
they have been coming up with recommendations.
  As a matter of fact, some of the recommendations that have been
developed are included in this Department of Defense authorization
bill. I understand other proposed changes to deal with these security
lapses and with counterintelligence will be included in the
intelligence authorization bill that will come up in early June.
  I do not believe we should rush to judgment. We should make sure we
understand the full ramifications of what has happened. We should not
say it has been just this administration or that administration or the
other administration. This is about the security of our country. I
agree with Congressman Dicks when he quoted former Senator Henry
Jackson about how, when it comes to national security, we should all
just pursue it as Americans.
  This amendment I have just sent to the desk is a further outgrowth of
some of the information we have found through some of the hearings that
have occurred. There were some provisions in it that I am sure would
have evoked some criticism, and we have taken those out, so that we can
take our time and deal more thoughtfully with it over a period of time.
  We are going to have to deal with the Export Administration and the
fact that law was allowed to lapse back in 1995. But there are some
things we can do now. To reiterate, this is what this amendment will
do:
  First, it requires the President to notify the Congress whenever an
investigation is undertaken of an alleged violation of U.S. export
control laws in connection with the export of a commercial satellite of
U.S. origin.
  It will also require the President to notify the Congress whenever an
export license or waiver is granted on behalf of any U.S. person or
firm that is the subject of a criminal investigation.
  Second, the amendment requires the Secretary of Defense to undertake
certain actions that would significantly enhance the performance and
effectiveness of the DOD program for monitoring so-called satellite
launch campaigns in China and elsewhere.
  Third, the amendment will enhance the intelligence community's role
in the export license review process and requires a report by the DCI
on the efforts of foreign governments to acquire sensitive U.S.
technology and technical information.
  Fourth, the amendment expresses the sense of Congress that the
People's Republic of China should not be permitted to join the Missile
Technology Control Regime as a member until Beijing has demonstrated a
sustained commitment to missile nonproliferation and adopted an
effective export control system.

  The amendment expresses strong support for stimulating the expansion
of the commercial space launch industry in America. This amendment
strongly encourages efforts to promote the domestic commercial space
launch industry. That is why we have seen more of this activity occur
in other countries, particularly China and even Russia, because we do
not have that domestic commercial space launch capability here. We
should eliminate legal or regulatory barriers to long-term
competitiveness.
  The amendment also urges a review of the current policy of permitting
the export of commercial satellites of U.S. origin to the PRC for
launch.
  The amendment requires the Secretary of State to provide information
to U.S. satellite manufacturers when a license application is denied.
  The amendment also requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an
annual report on the military balance in the Taiwan Straits, similar to
the report developed earlier this year and was delivered to the
Congress.
  The amendment proposes a mechanism for determining the extent to

[[Page S5985]]

which classified nuclear weapons information has been released by the
Department of Energy. It proposes putting the FBI in charge of
conducting security background investigations of DOE Laboratory
employees versus OPM. It seems to me that really is beyond the
capabilities of the Office of Personnel Management. Surely, the FBI
would be better conducting the security background investigations. This
does not call for putting the FBI totally in charge of security at our
Labs, for instance. That is something we need to think about more. I
had thought the FBI should be in charge, and there are some limitations
in that area. That is an area we should think about a lot more. We
should work through the committee process. We should think together in
a bipartisan way about how to do it.
  Clearly, the security at our Laboratories has to be revised. We have
to have a much better counterintelligence process, and our committees
are working on that.
  Last, the committee proposes increased counterintelligence training
and other measures to ensure classified information is protected during
DOE Laboratory-to-Laboratory exchanges.
  These are pieces that I think Senators can agree on across the board.
They are targeted at dealing with the problem, not trying to fix blame,
not claiming that this is going to solve all the problems. But these
are some things we can do now that will help secure these Laboratories
in the future and get information we need and give enhanced
capabilities to the intelligence communities.
  I urge my colleagues to review it. It has been, of course, considered
by the committees that have jurisdiction. We have provided copies of it
to the minority, and we invite their participation. I believe this is
something that can be bipartisan and can be accepted, after reasonable
debate, overwhelmingly. I certainly hope so. I appreciate the
opportunity to offer this amendment. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished majority
leader for this initiative. We have had in his office a series of
meetings with the chairmen, as he enumerated, and this piece of
legislation has been very carefully crafted drawing from each of the
committees the work they have done thus far.
  The Senate Armed Services Committee, as the majority leader has said,
has taken an active role in addressing the issues. I refer colleagues
to page 462 of our report, which is on each desk. In there, we have a
subtitle (D) related to this subject. We are bringing this together.
  I thought it was important--and I consulted with the majority leader
this morning--to lay this down so all Senators have the opportunity to
view it. Our distinguished colleague, the ranking member, has sent it
out to the various Departments and agencies of the Federal Government
for comment. In the course of the day, as I am sure my colleague from
Michigan will agree, we will basically try to allow Senators at any
time to address this particular amendment by Senator Lott and, indeed,
the provisions that we have in our bill.
  This is an important subject. It is a timely subject. All Senators
hopefully will strive to achieve bipartisanship because we recognize
that this problem goes back several administrations, although I have my
own personal views that this administration must account for some
actions which I find very disturbing--in other words, why corrective
measures were not brought about more expeditiously. But time will tell.
  Also, I believe it is important to recognize that the United States
of America in the next millennium will be faced with an ever-growing
and ever-important nation, China. We as a nation must remain engaged
with China, whether it is on economic, political, human rights, or
security issues. China and the United States are the two dominant
leaders, together with Japan and, indeed, I think South Korea, in that
region to bring about the security which is desperately needed.
  So let us hope that in due course we can, on this bill, put together
a bipartisan package. We already have one amendment in there, and it
passed our committee with bipartisan support.
  Mr. LEVIN. Would the Senator yield while the majority leader is on
the floor so I could give a 30-second comment?
  Mr. WARNER. Absolutely.
  Mr. LEVIN. We welcome the proposal of the majority leader. We have
worked very closely, on a bipartisan basis, on the committee on what is
in the bill already and to which the majority leader has made
reference. We will continue and look forward to working with the
majority leader, on a bipartisan basis, on his proposal. The committees
of jurisdiction and I are reviewing that. We got it last night. We
welcome very much these kinds of suggestions and will address them in
the same kind of bipartisan approach that the good Senator from
Virginia, our good chairman, has just made reference to.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, if the Senator would yield?
  Mr. WARNER. Of course.
  Mr. LOTT. I just say, I appreciate your comments and your attitude.
If we have problems, we can address those problems in a bipartisan way
to deal with the future. And that is my intent. I will be glad to work
with you. Thank you for your comments.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the chairman for yielding.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague.
  If I may note, with a sense of humility, Senator Levin and I are now
entering the third day on this bill. To the best of my recollection--
which is 21 years that we have been working together on authorizations
bills--we may have set a record thus far. That record is not
necessarily owing to the efforts of the ranking member and myself but
all Senators in cooperating in moving this bill along; the record being
we only had one quorum call, this being the third day.

  We started on a Monday, when ordinarily things do not move as
quickly; but we had one single quorum call, I think, for about 3 or 4
minutes on Monday. Yesterday, throughout, we stayed here until close to
9 o'clock last night working on amendments. So I thank the Senator, my
colleague, my friend from Michigan. I thank all Senators.
  We just had another Senator come on the floor in a timely way. He is
right on the split second of when he is due to bring up his amendment.
  So with the cooperation of other Senators, I am hopeful we can finish
this bill tonight. I have discussed that with the majority leader, and
he is going to give us total support. We will just drive this engine,
hopefully into the early hours of the evening, and complete it.
  But I do bring to the attention of Senators that I will place on the
majority leader's desk here, as I manage the bill, three pages of
amendments. There they are. We have to work our way through these
today. My colleague, Mr. Levin, and I will be here throughout the day
to assist Senators in accommodating them with their desire regarding
these amendments.
  Mr. LEVIN. If the chairman would just yield for a comment?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I commend him for his leadership, which made our good
progress possible. When he points out how few quorum calls we have had
on this bill, the only suggestion I have in addition to the ones he has
made is that there is a lot of wood around here to knock on, and we
need to knock on wood that this will continue along the lines it has
with very few quorum calls and significant progress.
  I do see the Senator from Nebraska on the floor. We look forward to
his offering that amendment. Then I believe at 11:45, under the current
unanimous consent agreement, we are going to return to the BRAC
amendment and then have a vote on that. That would be the first vote,
as I understand the UC.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is correct.
  Mr. LEVIN. That would be at 1:45.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on the subject of BRAC, again, the
distinguished Senator from Michigan, the distinguished Senator from
Arizona, Mr. McCain, the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, Mr.
Reed, the distinguished Senator from Maine--my recollection is there
was one other Senator who spoke last night in the debate on the BRAC
process, so we have had a considerable amount of debate. There are 2
hours allocated. I am not certain that all 2 hours will be needed. But
I urge Senators to come over as quickly

[[Page S5986]]

as possible when that amendment comes up on the schedule, and we can
hopefully move through that debate and on to other matters.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be
laid aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
  Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.

                           Amendment No. 395

     (Purpose: To strike section 1041, relating to a limitation on
   retirement or dismantlement of strategic nuclear delivery systems)

  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment of the
Senator from Nebraska.
  The legislative assistant read as follows:

       The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Kerrey] proposes an
     amendment numbered 395.

  Mr. KERREY. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 357, strike line 13 and all that follows through
     page 358, line 4.

  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, first of all, let me say that this piece
of legislation being considered right now, in my view, of all the laws
we write and all the laws we consider, is the one that is most vital.
If we do not have a defense that is able to defend not just the United
States of America but our interests, all the rest of it is secondary,
in my view.
  I am very impressed--I came to this Senate in 1989, and I came to the
Senate without the experience of having gone to law school. I was
trained in other matters. The longer I am here, the more impressed I am
both with the law itself and the power of this law. I cannot help but,
as I begin to describe my own amendment, take a little bit of time to
describe the connection between the law and things people see in their
lives that they may not see as having been caused by the law itself.
  We do not have an Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps without this
piece of legislation, which is, I think--I don't know--500-and-some
pages long, with a report with it as well. This law creates our
military. It authorizes appropriations to be made. It authorizes us to
go out and recruit people to serve in our Armed Forces.
  We are going into the Memorial Day weekend during which I guess many,
if not most, of us are going to be called upon to comment upon the
meaning of Memorial Day--what does this day mean to us in our lives.
  For me, it is a time to reflect and say that these 1,360,000 men and
women who are currently serving our Nation, and the half million
Reserve and Guard men and women who are out there as well, are part of
a long tradition of American men and women who have given up their
freedom, because in the military they have a different code than we
have in the private sector. The standards of justice are different. The
expectations are different.
  In the military, the command structure is such that if I have
command--which I did many, many years ago--if I have command and do
well, I get a medal. But if I do poorly, my fitness report will be so
bad I will be looking for a private sector opportunity. We have a
responsibility we cannot delegate. That imposes upon an individual who
is in the military real burdens that are different from what we have in
the private sector--real responsibilities that are completely
different.
  A man or woman who serves us today, who serves the cause of freedom
today in our Armed Forces, does something that is much different from
most private sector citizens. I begin my comments on this amendment by
saluting them, by thanking them for taking what, unfortunately, today
is almost a nonmainstream action, and that is based upon their love of
country and their love of freedom, saying: We're willing to sacrifice
our freedom; we're willing to give up rights that most private sector
citizens have.
  Furthermore, nobody should doubt that in normal training operations
it is possible to be injured or to even lose your life. A lot of these
training operations are dangerous. So they are risking their lives on a
day-to-day basis. Obviously, they are involved today in Kosovo; they
are involved in the Balkans; they are involved with containing Saddam
Hussein; they are involved on the Korean peninsula; they are forward
deployed in areas around the world where we have interests, not just
interests that are only of the United States, but interests in values
that we hope will spread worldwide.
  All of us had the opportunity--I did; I took advantage of the
opportunity--to sit and listen to Presidents Kim Dae-jung of South
Korea and Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic and Nelson Mandela of
South Africa when each spoke at a joint session of Congress across the
way in the House of Representatives, and looked down to every
representative of the people and said: Thank you, American people. You
put your lives on the line, and we are free in South Korea today as a
consequence. You put your lives and resources on the line, and we are
free in the Czech Republic because of it. You have put your lives and
resources on the line in South Africa, and we are free there as well.
Your efforts enabled us to be free, these three individuals said. Many
others have said the same thing.
  It is not a cliche that freedom is not free. This piece of
legislation, this important piece of legislation, has us supporting
1,360,000 men and women in the military, and half a million Reserve and
Guard people who are actively involved in the cause of defending
freedom in the United States of America and throughout the world. This
is an extremely important piece of legislation. I argue if we don't get
this one right, all the rest of it is secondary. If this piece of
legislation, if this law is not written correctly, all the rest of it
doesn't matter.
  I begin my comments this morning praising Chairman Warner and the
ranking member, Senator Levin, who have led the Armed Services
Committee to give us this piece of legislation. They understand this
piece of legislation keeps America safe. This is about security. We
can't cut corners. We can't scrimp. We can't say we will just go
partially there. We have to answer the question: What do we need to do
to keep the people of the United States safe? How do we keep them
secure and try to write laws that accomplish that objective?
  With great respect to the committee, there is one provision in
subtitle D called ``Other Matters'' on page 357 that I am proposing to
strike. That language provides a 1-year extension of a requirement that
I think causes the United States of America to be less safe than it
would without this provision. Let me get to it specifically.
  What this provision does is say that the United States of America
must maintain a nuclear deterrent that is at the START I levels, that
we have to have warheads deployed, land, sea, air, that are at START I
levels; that the President of the United States cannot go below those
START I levels. In the cold war, perhaps even a few years after the
cold war was ended, when we were trying to err on the side of safety,
this made sense because the No. 1 threat then was a bolt out of the
blue, an attack by the Soviet Union that might occur when we least
expected it. We had to maintain an active deterrence and prevent that.
The capacity to survive that bolt-out-of-the-blue attack and
counterattack was an essential part of our strategy.

  Today, the No. 1 threat is not a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack. The No.
1 threat today is an accidental launch, a rogue nation launch, or a
sabotage launch of a nuclear weapon. One of the things that causes me a
great deal of concern in this new era of ours is that I think we in
Congress and the American people as well have forgotten the danger of
these nuclear weapons. We have been talking about new threats to
America. We have a threat in the form of chemical weapons, a threat in
the form of biological weapons, a threat in the form of cyber warfare,
lots of others things like that, terrorism, that cause people to be
very much concerned.
  My belief is that the only threat out there that can kill every
single American, and thus the threat that ought to be top on our list
of concerns is nuclear weapons. The nation that possesses the

[[Page S5987]]

greatest threat of all in terms of an accidental launch, a rogue nation
launch, or a sabotage launch is Russia.
  I appreciate the fine work that Congressman Cox and Congressman Dicks
did. They presented a report yesterday. I think they have laid out a
roadmap that will enable us to change our laws and increase security at
the Labs, increase the security of the satellite launches and increase
the security, in general, with the transfer of technology through
export licenses. I think they gave us a good roadmap, but one of the
concerns I have with the report--I think it is unintentional--strike
``I think.'' It is unintentional--it has left the impression that China
is a bigger threat to the United States in terms of nuclear weapons
than Russia is. Nothing can be further from the truth.
  In China, they prevent the possibility of an accidental launch by
saying we are not going to put our warheads on the missile. According
to published reports, it would take at least 24 hours and probably a
minimum of 48 hours, from the moment an order was given to launch, to
put the warheads on the missiles. In China they have no more, according
to published reports, than 13 weapons headed in our direction. They are
categorized as city busters. They are not as accurate as the Russians
are. They are not as deadly as the Russians are. They are not as
likely, as a consequence of organized systems, to be launched in an
accidental fashion. Even though they can reach us, even though China is
a serious threat as a consequence of their behavior in the
proliferation area--and we should not have trimmed in areas of export
licenses or satellite launches on Long March or the operations of our
Laboratories or other areas that would put America at risk--the threat
assessment today says that the No. 1 threat to us is the threat that is
posed by Russia as a consequence of their having strategic weapons that
could reach the United States in a matter of hours and could reach the
United States in a devastating fashion not through intentional launch
but accidental launch, rogue nation launch or sabotage launch.
  I think that part of the problem in all of this is, again, that we
have been lulled into a false sense of security that, well, maybe these
nuclear weapons aren't that big of a problem. Let me say that in the
former Soviet Union, that may have been the case, because their economy
was much stronger than it is today. They had a much greater capacity to
control those weapons systems that they have.
  One of the reasons, the biggest reason that I want to change this is
that I believe we are forcing Russia today to maintain a level of
nuclear weapons beyond what their financial system will allow them to
maintain. They are currently required at START I levels to have 6,000
strategic warheads. Again, according to published accounts from their
own military people, they would prefer to be at a level of 1,000 or
lower, because they simply don't have the resources. I can go into some
rather startling problems that are created as a consequence of that
inability, but they simply don't have the ability, the resources to
allocate to maintain those 6,000 warheads as we do. Ours are safe. Ours
are secure. We have redundant switching systems and all kinds of other
protections to make certain that we don't have an accidental launch, to
make certain that there is no rogue transfer, to make certain that
there is no terrorism that could take over one of these sites and be
used either against the United States itself or against some other
country.

  One of the baseline problems that we have as Americans is that we are
the most open society on earth. We are the most successful society
measured by our economy, measured by our military, measured by even our
democracy, which can be a bit frustrating from time to time. We take
sides on issues worldwide, which I think we have to do if we want to
continue to fight for the freedom of people throughout this world. But
as a consequence of all those things, there are lots of people on this
Earth who hate Americans, who have in their hearts a desire to do
significant damage to us. It is a problem created from our own success.
So as we try to decide how we are going to keep our country safe, one
of the things that I believe we need to think about when it comes to
Russia is, is it possible for somebody who hates America, who is
willing to do damage to America and willing to die in the act of doing
it--what kind of risk is there as a consequence of a policy under law
that requires Russia to maintain a nuclear force that is higher than
either they can afford or they want to maintain?
  Well, I will describe a couple of scenarios in length here, but many
years ago, sort of a Stone Age time for me, I was trained in the U.S.
Navy SEAL team. I do not argue that I was an exemplary special
operations person. I had a relatively short experience in the war
before I was injured, so I didn't have enough time on task to become
really good at it. But you always have these sort of imaginary
fantasies that you are still 25 years of age, and there are times when
you sort of think that way.
  I believe it is possible for somebody who is well trained and well
organized to raid a silo site of a Russian missile in the Russian
wilderness and take that site over. You will have a scenario on the
opposite side that says that it can't be done. I believe it can be
done.
  One of the things that you have to do when you are planning, writing
a law to defend the people of the United States of America, is you have
to think about that small possibility and you have to plan for it. We
didn't expect that the Russians were high probability going to come
through the Fulda Gap during the 40-plus years of the cold war, but we
defended against it, and it was an expensive defense because it was
possible that it could happen.
  Mr. President, I believe it is possible for a small band of
discontents or terrorists to raid a silo site of a Russian missile in
the Russian wilderness. I believe that there are soldiers today in
Russia who are poorly trained, who are sparsely equipped, and who are
irate at not having been paid in well over a year in some cases. I
think they are vulnerable and easily overtaken, and as a consequence,
willing to cooperate in things that would put the United States of
America at risk.

  What you have to do is sort of then say to yourself: What would
happen? Imagine what would happen if that were to occur.
  Well, I again have to underscore with a story why I think we are
lulled to sleep by nuclear weapons. In the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, on which I have the honor of serving as a result of
Senator Daschle appointing me to that and serving on behalf of the
Senate, I once asked some analysts of the CIA to tell me what the
impact would be of a single missile being launched and hitting a U.S.
city. The answer was we are really not sure. We haven't thought it
through lately. We don't put it up on our radar screen as being the
sort of thing to worry about.
  I find that not only alarming but illustrative of the general
problem. We are not thinking about this threat.
  We are not imagining what could happen in a worse case scenario and,
as a consequence, we are sort of allowing ourselves to be dragged along
with yesterday's policy, not thinking about how we can do this
differently to substantially reduce the threat to the people of the
United States of America, and I believe, by the way, in the process,
freeing up resources that could be used on the conventional side where
there is much more likely scenarios where American men and women are
going to be called on to defend the cause of freedom and fight for the
cause of freedom.
  A single Russian rocket could be launched over the top of the world
from the north, and it would go across the Arctic pole, and in less
than an hour it could be in over Chicago. On a bad day, it might come
within 100 yards of its target. On a good day, it would probably come
within 10 to 15 yards of its target. I am talking about something about
which, again, people will say this is alarmist.
  It is not an alarmist scenario. This is what nuclear weapons do. We
have sort of forgotten that, in my view. Back in the 80s, during the
cold war, all of us understood the danger of nuclear weapons, but today
I don't think we do. I think we have forgotten what kind of damage they
can do.
  A single nuclear weapon would vaporize everything. The surrounding
air is instantaneously heated to a temperature of 10 million degrees
Celsius. It

[[Page S5988]]

looks brighter than the sun and shoots outward at a few hundred
kilometers per second. It would be sufficient to set fire to anything
in Chicago that is combustible at a distance of 14 kilometers. Anybody
within 80 kilometers would be blinded as a consequence of the blast.
  After the fireball, the blast effect force follows, traveling out
from ground zero. Those within 3 kilometers, who had not already been
killed, will die from the percussive force. At 8 kilometers, 50 percent
of the people will be killed, and every building within 2 kilometers
will be completely destroyed. Major destruction of homes, factories,
and office buildings would extend out to 14 kilometers.

  In the farthest reaches of the immediate blast zone--encompassing
everything in Chicago--structures would be severely damaged, and 15
percent of the people in Chicago would be dead, 50 percent would be
injured, and most survivors would suffer second- and third-degree
burns.
  This is the damage that would be done from a single Russian nuclear
weapon exploded above an American city. This is just one city.
  Again, I point this out not to be alarmist but to say that this is a
real threat. This is not an imaginary threat. This weapons system
exists. There are 6,000 of these in Russia today that were needed in
the cold war; they were needed in a deterrent strategy that the
Russians had developed. We have drawn down, and they have drawn down to
the 6,000 level--a bit higher than that still today. They are drawing
down to that 6,000 level.
  But, again, if you ask either our intelligence or the Russians
directly, they will tell you they don't have the resources to maintain
even 1,000. They don't have the resources to maintain 1,000, let alone
6,000-plus, and in the kind of secure environment the people of the
United States of America will need in order for themselves to be safe
and secure as a consequence.
  I tell the story out of what I think is a loss of focus on the danger
of nuclear weapons. I am very concerned that the American people have
been lulled into a false sense of security as a consequence of our
elected leaders repeatedly telling them the threat no longer exists. In
the Presidential campaign of 1996, the President correctly kept saying
that for the first time in the history of the Nation we are not
targeting the Russians and they are not targeting us.
  Well, you can retarget in a couple of minutes, max. This retargeting
task is a fairly simple task. Critics of the President pointed that
out, and I think correctly. It caused people to be sort of lulled into
a sense that, gee, this wasn't a problem. If we are not targeting them
and they are not targeting us, this is great news, so we don't have to
worry about this threat any longer; thus, we can sort of stop worrying
about nuclear weapons. We can worry about other threats that we have to
the United States.
  Again, I am calling my colleagues' attention to this problem not
because I believe there is going to be a deliberate nuclear attack from
Russia, because I don't think that is likely, or even plausible.
Indeed, Russia has made extraordinary progress in their effort to
transform their economy and political system. Though they have a long
way to go to complete the transition, they need to be applauded for it.
But this transition is going to take decades--back, forward, stop, go.
It is going to take a fair amount of time to transition from an old
command economy to a market economy. In the meantime, they are finding
it increasingly difficult to maintain the military infrastructure they
inherited from the collapse of the Soviet Union, including, dare I say,
their stockpile of thousands of nuclear weapons--estimated to be close
to 7,000 on the strategic side and a comparable amount on the tactical
side. There are 14 storage facilities, according to published reports,
where they store fissile material. We don't know what is going on
inside those buildings. It is a serious problem that our former
colleague, Sam Nunn, has said is a threat not coming from Russia's
might but from its military weakness.

  If a single one doesn't bother you, there was an incident that
occurred recently on September 11, 1998. I appreciate that some will
say that Kerrey is dreaming, this isn't a real danger. I don't think
there is a greater danger than an accidental launch of a nuclear weapon
at the United States of America. I think it is the most dangerous
problem we face, and it is a scenario that could happen. If it happens,
I believe we are going to regret not having developed a different
strategy than the old arms control strategy that we have had in the
past. I am not going to describe an alternative strategy. I think one
is needed, and I think one is more likely to occur if we strike this
language from the defense authorization bill and allow the President to
go below 6,000, similar to what President Bush did in the early 1990s,
getting a reciprocal response from Russia as a consequence.
  Let me describe a real time scenario, a situation that happened on
the 11th of September--does the Senator want to say something?
  Mr. WARNER. I didn't mean to interrupt the Senator, but I am hopeful
that we can listen to the important debate. I would like to have the
opportunity to respond to the Senator so that Senators following this
debate can have framed in their minds where we have a difference of
views, and I would like to complete this by 11:45 so we can keep on our
schedule. I hope our colleague will try to accommodate as best he can.
  This is a very important subject. I share some of the views that he
has made. I think what he said is a very important reminder to Senators
on this subject. It has somewhat drifted from the minds of the Senators
given that, regrettably, this stalemate thus far in Russia could move
to ratification. Let us proceed, hopefully, in a timely way.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, let me describe an event that occurred on
September 11, 1998. Maybe colleagues didn't notice it; it was written
up with a fairly small amount of attention. There was an 18-year-old
Russian sailor who seized control of a Russian nuclear submarine near
Murmansk. He killed seven fellow crewmembers and held control of the
submarine for 20 hours. Russian authorities say that there were no
nuclear weapons aboard the submarine. But it would not be difficult to
imagine a scenario in which a similarly distraught member of the
Russian navy might choose to express his frustration by seizing control
of a submarine loaded with long-range, nuclear-tipped missiles. It is
widely recognized that command and control of weapons on Russian
submarines is much more problematic than even with their ground-based
forces.
  There was a recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine,
which conducted an analysis of the effects of an unauthorized launch
against the United States from a--and I emphasize just one--Russian
Delta IV submarine. This submarine is capable of carrying 16 SS-N-23
missiles. Each of these missiles is equipped with four 100-kiloton
warheads. The study examined the consequences of 48 warheads being
detonated over eight major U.S. cities. It is likely that this
scenario may not be right. It is likely that they would say we have 64
warheads and will put one in each State in the United States of
America--that leaves me 14 more--and they will put a couple in New
York, a couple in Florida, a couple in other States. Imagine 64,000
kiloton weapons being detonated within a couple of hours in the United
States. That is a scenario that could be very real.

  Is such a scenario likely to happen? It is less likely to happen than
the sun coming up tomorrow, but it could happen. It is a scenario that
we need to think about as we think about the danger of these nuclear
weapons. And because we don't think about them, it is not likely that
we will consider an amendment like this terribly important. We will
sort of drift along, as I think we are doing now, saying we are going
to wait for the Duma to ratify START II. They are threatening not to
ratify for every possible reason. I don't know what the next anger
point is going to be. I personally don't believe that the ratification
of START II by the Duma is necessarily terribly important.
  That we need to look for an alternative way to reduce these threats,
to me, is painfully obvious if you examine the danger that this threat
poses to us.
  When you think about the danger of an accidental or a rogue nation or
a

[[Page S5989]]

sabotage launch, I think you come immediately to the conclusion that,
my gosh, we have far more than we need to keep America safe, and the
Russians clearly have far more than they need not only to keep their
country safe but to reduce this risk of accidental launch. They do not
control their weapons in the same way that we do. They don't have the
capacity to control them in the same way that we do, as well.
  Imagine, I ask my colleagues; put it on your radar screen. You have a
Delta IV submarine with 64 100-kiloton weapons that could be in the
United States in 2 hours. They are not like the Chinese nuclear
weapons. The Chinese nuclear weapons take several days to get together.
Again, part of the published reports is that they have 13 or so aimed
at the United States--aimed at our cities. They are nowhere near as
accurate as the Russians, or as deadly as the Russians, and nowhere
near as likely to be launched either through an accidental launch or
through an organized effort to come through sabotage and take over a
single facility, or to take over one of these submarines that are much
more at risk as a consequence of their lax security.
  If you do not think the scenario is possible, I would like to quote
the words of former a Russian Navy captain following this particular
incident with the Russian sailor that I described earlier on the 11th
of September 1998. He said, ``It is really scary that one day the use
of nuclear arms may depend on the sentiments of someone who is feeling
blue, who has gotten out of bed on the wrong side and who does not feel
like living.'' The probability of this today is higher than ever
before.

  The news has been filled recently with stories regarding nuclear
weapons. Unfortunately, the stories have been causing us to be
concerned about our security relative to the Nation of China. The
findings that China, over the past 20 years, has methodically stolen
U.S. nuclear secrets from our National Laboratories are very
disturbing, to put it mildly. We were very lax in our security in our
Laboratories. We are very lax in our security with our export control
licenses. We are very lax in our security in monitoring satellites that
are being launched on the Long March system of the Chinese, and as a
consequence, the United States of America suffers. There is no question
that is true. But U.S. security has suffered against a nation with
considerably less capability than Russia and considerably less risk of
an accidental launch as a result of the way the two nations organize
their weapon systems.
  In the uproar surrounding this story, I fear that we may be losing
touch with reality concerning the size of the threat we face in China
relative to the far greater Russian nuclear threat. Press accounts
indicate that China may have no more than 20 land-based nuclear
missiles capable of reaching the United States.
  Also, again, according to the media, as I said, Chinese nuclear
weapons aren't kept on continual alert. Their nuclear warheads and
liquid fuel tanks are stored separate from their missiles. Again, it
would take them a considerable amount of time to fuel, to arm, and to
launch these weapons. That just one of these weapons would cause
immense pain and devastation to the United States of America ought to
be obvious. But, again, it is a much smaller threat than the threat of
an accidental rogue nation, or a sabotage takeover of a Russian site
that could be launched with a devastating impact against the United
States of America and would put our people at considerable risk.
  As of January 1999, my colleagues, with reference to this issue--I
remember campaigning for the Senate in 1988. In 1988, you had to know
all of this stuff. You had to know all of these in numbers, because
arms control advocates were asking you, and opponents of arms control
were asking. The freeze was going on. The MX missile was being debated.
It was a hot issue in 1988.
  In 1999, it is not a hot issue. It is not on the radar screen. You
have to hunt around to find someone who cares about it and asks you
about it and express a concern about what I, again, consider to be the
most dangerous threat to the people of the United States of America.
  I repeat that this is the only threat that could kill every single
American. Just a single Delta IV submarine that I talked about
earlier--you put 64 100-kiloton weapons on top of 64 sites in the
United States of America, and you are no longer the strongest economy
on Earth.
  We would have considerably more, to put it mildly, than 4.2 percent
unemployment. We would not be screaming along with an economic
recovery. The stock market would react, I would hazard a guess, rather
adversely to that piece of news. There would be devastation and
destruction and considerable loss of life, and the United States of
America would be set back a considerable amount of time. We would not
be as safe and as secure as we once were, and the world, as
consequence, would suffer the loss of our leadership.
  A single Delta IV submarine owned by the Russians in a very insecure
environment, in my judgment, would set the U.S. back considerably.
  I keep citing it only because I believe that we have taken nuclear
weapons, unfortunately, off our radar screen, and we don't think about
this much. I say to the distinguished chairman and to the ranking
member, Senator Levin, and Senator Smith, who is the chairman of the
Strategic Subcommittee, that I know each of you are very concerned
about this. I am talking about the general population. I would hazard a
guess that if one of these news media outlets that does polls all the
time did a poll and asked the question about whether the Chinese
nuclear threat is a greater threat to the United States of America than
the Russian nuclear threat, it is likely to be that a large number of
the people would say yes, given what they have heard recently in the
news.
  China may evolve into a serious military threat to the United States
in the future. They are unquestionably a proliferator of weapons, and
all of us should be dismayed and angry at the lax security that we have
discovered through the Cox report and other reports over the last 20
years, and should move with legislation and action to tighten up and
make sure that we reduce that threat. But the Chinese threat is nowhere
near the danger that the Russian nuclear threat poses to the people of
the United States of America.
  What I am attempting to do with this amendment by striking the floor
that we have imposed for 3 years in a row in the defense authorization
bill--this provision that prohibits the United States from going below
START I force levels until START II enters into force--is that I am
suggesting that this floor increases the threat to the United States of
America because we are waiting for the Russian Duma to ratify START II.
We are still, in my view, in the old way of thinking about how to deal
with nuclear weapons and how to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons
and keep the people of the United States of America safe.
  Let me provide a little bit of history of arms control.
  Again, the chairman of the committee asked for some time to respond.
Earlier, I was asked if I was going to wrap this thing up at 11:45. I
say to my friend from Virginia that I had much more to say on this
matter, and it may be that I am not able to agree to a time agreement
and have the vote at 11:45. I would like to be able to do that. Maybe
what I should try to do is abbreviate my comments and give the chairman
a chance to respond briefly, if he chooses to do so.
  I see the chairman of the subcommittee is here. He may have some
opposing points of view that he would like to offer. I want to give him
a chance to do that. I think it is highly unlikely that I will be able
to agree to a vote immediately after the BRAC vote at 11:45.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are under a time agreement, are we not?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no time agreement.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct. We want to give the Senator as much
latitude as we can. We will find such time as I believe the Senator
desires. I am just anxious to frame this issue, because the Senator has
given a brilliant speech, as he always does. I do not say that
facetiously. I enjoy listening to my good friend and colleague and
fellow naval person. But I was listening, and he is making a good
speech for ballistic missile defense, which is splendid. I hope that we
are going to draw

[[Page S5990]]

on this Record for future debates on ballistic missile defense systems.
I take note of Senator Cochran's bill now that has become law.
  But the point I wish to make is that this provision, which the
Senator wishes to strike, has been in five successive defensive bills.
It is in there in accordance with the administration's wishes to try to
show to Russia that we mean business about getting START II ratified.
Were we to strike it, it is this Senator's opinion--I think it is
shared by the Secretary of Defense, and others--it would weaken the
efforts to get START II ratified.
  We have here the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces. All I would ask is, if we could just have a few
minutes to frame the debate into a focus of Senators following it, I
think they can come to some sort of closure in their own minds on this
issue.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I appreciate that. Why don't I take
another 5 or 10 minutes here.
  Mr. WARNER. We interrupted the Senator. Would he yield for an
additional question on procedure?
  Mr. KERREY. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I believe this debate will take longer than 35 minutes,
and there is no time agreement on this debate. There are others who
want to speak on both sides.
  I address this to the chairman, because this seems to me likely to
take more than 35 additional minutes. Since the debate is scheduled to
restart on BRAC at 11:45, I wonder whether the chairman might want to
delay that for perhaps 15 minutes or half an hour.
  Mr. WARNER. Fifteen minutes. We had such great cooperation from all.
We have a string of Senators ready to be here at 11:45. Let's say we
will conclude at 12 noon; is that agreeable?
  Mr. LEVIN. I am not suggesting we have a time limit of 12 noon. I am
suggesting if we delay the beginning of the BRAC debate until noon,
there is at least a chance that this debate could conclude by then. If
it does, we could vote on this amendment immediately after BRAC.
  I don't think the Senator from Nebraska is willing or should be
willing to agree to a time agreement yet because he has not heard the
debate on the other side.
  I suggest the debate on BRAC begin at noon--we change the unanimous
consent--instead of 11:45, and hope that at least there is a chance
that this debate could in 35 minutes be completed but not ``bake'' that
into the unanimous consent.
  Mr. WARNER. I want to accommodate our distinguished colleague. If we
don't proceed, I say to my copartner, in getting time agreements, we
are likely to get this whole bill slowed down.
  I wonder if we could just enter into a time agreement to debate on
this amendment, that it would conclude at 12 noon.
  Mr. KERREY. I would very much like to accommodate and do that, but my
problem is----
  Mr. WARNER. Let me help. The distinguished chairman of the
subcommittee says 10 minutes; I may take 2 minutes. That is 12 minutes.
The Senator would have a full half hour left.
  Mr. LEVIN. Before the Senator from Nebraska answers, if he yields, I
will speak for perhaps 5 or 10 minutes on the subject. I know the
Democratic leader wants to speak on this amendment, I believe, if
possible, around 11:30. There may be others, too. We ought to find out
if there are others before any such agreement is propounded.
  Mr. KERREY. Again, I appreciate very much what the chairman is trying
to do. I certainly have no intent to sit out here forever talking.
Eventually I will agree to a time agreement. I am not willing to do
that at the moment. I am beginning to lay out a case that has not been
laid out before.
  Mr. WARNER. We will continue with the debate and hope we can begin to
bring this thing to some proportion of closure. We will take a
relatively short time on our side, because it is a bill provision; the
Senator is on a motion to strike. It is very clear what we are trying
to do on this side, to help this administration get ratification, help
America get ratification of START II.
  That is the sole purpose for this provision. It has been in there 5
years for that purpose.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, again I am not trying to make an argument
here for or against strategic defense. I will work with Senator Cochran
to try to fashion some assistance to bring additional Democrats. I
supported what Senator Cochran was trying to do.
  The problem is, missile defense is not prepared today. The problem
is, we don't have missile defense today. We are not sure when we will
have it. I don't want to get into necessarily arguing that. I am saying
that within a matter of hours it is possible for the United States of
America to suffer an attack the likes of which I think very few people
are imagining.
  It is a real threat. It is not an imaginary threat. It is a real
threat, and it is a threat that is getting larger, not a threat that is
getting smaller. It is not the old threat. The old threat--and I
appreciate what I think the administration's stated policy says. They
prefer repealing the bill's general provisions that maintain this
prohibition first enacted in 1998, but maybe the administration
supports this amendment and maybe they don't support the amendment.
  I believe this floor makes it less likely that we will consider an
alternative to arms control as a method to reduce this threat. I am
willing to look at alternatives such as star wars for which I voted.
The strategic defense system is not in place today. I don't know when
it will be in place.
  In the meantime, the capacity to control Russia's nuclear system is
declining and putting more and more Americans at risk as a consequence.
  This is the third year, as I understand it, that this provision has
been here.
  Let me talk about strategic arms reduction. It has been the leading
edge of our effort to try to reduce the threat. Back in the cold war,
it was considered to be the only way that we will do it. I am not going
to go through all the details of the history, but the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty was signed between the United States and the Soviet
Union, START I, in 1991 and entered into force in 1994. It commits both
sides to reducing their overall force level to 6,000 deployable
warheads by December of 2001. Both sides are well on the way to meeting
this deadline. The START II treaty signed in January 1993 and requires
both the United States and Russia to deploy no more than 3,500 warheads
by no later than December of 2007. The Senate ratified START II in
1996, but the Russian Duma has yet to take up the treaty.
  Section 1041 of this authorization bill extends for another year the
limitation on retirement or dismantlement of strategic nuclear weapon
systems until the START II treaty enters into effect. Let me put this
another way: The bill we are debating allows a foreign legislative body
the final say on U.S. nuclear force levels. I do not believe this is
how we should set our defense policies. Our military decisions should
be based solely on what we need to protect and maintain our national
security interests.
  While I understand this provision was originally intended to
encourage Russian ratification of START II, I think it is time to begin
to rethink our strategy. For the foreseeable future, START II is dead.
We can all make the case that the Duma should have acted, that
ratification was more in their interests than in ours, or that the
reason it failed was domestic Russian politics. All that is true. But
we now need to begin to ask ourselves if the current policy of waiting
for Russian action on START II is the best way to confront the dangers
presented by the Russian nuclear arsenal.
  I believe the answer is emphatically no. The provision in this bill I
am trying to strike is forcing the United States to maintain an
unnecessarily large nuclear arsenal. By keeping more weapons than we
need to defend ourselves, we are encouraging the Russians to keep more
weapons than they can control. That is the heart of the argument that I
am making.
  We are keeping more in our arsenal than we need, and as a
consequence, forcing the Russians to keep more in their arsenal than
they can control, increasing the risk of an accidental launch, a rogue
nation launch, or a launch that comes as a consequence of an act of
sabotage.
  The determinant of adequate U.S. force levels should be left up to
the men and women who are in charge of protecting the United States.
While Pentagon officials have said they have

[[Page S5991]]

no plans to go below START I levels during fiscal year 2000, they have
clearly stated their preference for lifting these artificial
restrictions. In the recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, the current commander in chief of the Strategic Command,
Adm. Richard Mies, said:

       We believe that we ought to report to you on an annual
     basis on exactly what we plan to do, but we would prefer not
     to have the specific mandating of the force levels by
     delivery systems.

  Our Armed Forces are more than capable of protecting U.S. national
security with significantly fewer strategic nuclear weapons. In fact,
Gen. Eugene Habiger, former commander of STRATCOM, said:  ``There is no
reason to stay at the START I level from a military perspective.'' Our
nuclear policy has become completely detached from the military
requirements of defending America, and is now being used simply as a
bargaining chip with Russian politicians.

  Ironically, this is occurring at a time in which the Russian military
is having problems maintaining its current force levels. The Russians
foresee a time, in the near future, when drastic cuts will have to be
made. In fact, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev has said publicly
he sees the future Russian strategic nuclear arsenal in terms of
hundreds, not thousands, of warheads. There are even some U.S. analysts
who have calculated within 10 to 15 years Russia will be able to
maintain a force no longer than 200 warheads.
  I believe it is clearly in the Russian interest to work with the
United States to achieve reciprocal reductions in forces, and I am
disappointed the Russian Duma has chosen domestic politics over its
best interests. However, it is just as clear that it remains in our
interests to work with Russia to find new ways to reduce the number of
nuclear weapons in a parallel, reciprocal, and verifiable manner.
  We have a historical precedent to show that an adjustment in our
nuclear forces, based solely on an evaluation of our defense needs, can
help achieve the goal of reducing nuclear dangers. There is a precedent
for this. On September 27, 1991, then President George Bush announced a
series of sweeping changes to our nuclear force posture. After
assessing our national security needs, Bush ordered all strategic
bombers to stand down from their alert status, he de-altered all ICBMs
scheduled for deactivation under START I, and he canceled several
strategic weapons development programs.
  On October 5--just one week later--President Gorbachev responded with
reciprocal reductions in the Soviet arsenal.
  President Bush acted, not out of altruism, but because it increased
U.S. national security. In his announcement, he said:

       If we and the Soviet leaders take the right steps--some on
     our own, some on their own, some together--we can
     dramatically shrink the arsenal of the world's nuclear
     weapons. We can more effectively discourage the spread of
     nuclear weapons. We can rely more on defensive measures in
     our strategic relationship. We can enhance stability, and
     actually reduce the risk of nuclear war. How is the time
     to seize this opportunity.

  I believe the same is true today in 1999. The longer we wait to act--
the more years in which we extend this legislative restriction--the
more likely it is one of these weapons will fall into the hands of a
person willing to use it to kill American citizens.
  In addition to endangering the safety of the American people, our
continued insistence on staying at START I levels is costing the
American taxpayer. They are paying more to be less safe.
  Estimates on the annual cost of maintaining our nuclear arsenal vary
widely. The Pentagon contends the total cost is in the neighborhood of
$15 billion a year. A more inclusive figure would put the cost in the
area of $20 to $25 billion. This represents a significant portion of
our yearly national security spending. For now, it continues to be
necessary to maintain an effective, reliable nuclear force--a force
capable of deterring a wide array of potential adversaries.
  But if, as our military leaders have indicated, we can maintain that
deterrent capability at much lower force levels, I am concerned we are
wasting precious budgetary resources. The Congressional Budget Office
recently conducted a study in which it found we could have between
$12.7 billion and $20.9 billion over the next ten years by reducing
U.S. nuclear delivery systems within the overall limits of START II.
Both the Pentagon and the Armed Services Committee have already
recognized that potential savings exist in this area. The bill before
us allows the Defense Department to decrease the number of Trident
Submarines from 18 to 14--producing a significant cost savings in our
deterrent.
  I am sure further savings could be realized with further cuts. I am
certain our military has the ability to determine the proper formula in
which we can reduce our nuclear arsenal, save money, and still maintain
a healthy triad of delivery systems that will maintain our deterrent
capabilities. I am confident much of this planning has already
occurred.
  I am also confident the distinguished members of the Armed Services
Committee would be able to find ways in which to redirect these savings
into other defense priorities such as preventing the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism and narco-trafficking,
or improving the readiness of our conventional forces to confront the
challenges of the 21st century.

  My amendment does not mandate any reductions in the U.S. strategic
nuclear arsenal. Rather, it simply eliminates the provision in this
bill requiring us to maintain our forces at START I levels--a level
that is unnecessarily high.
  The greatest danger facing the American people today is Russian
nuclear weapons. We have been given a moment in history to reduce this
threat. Rather than acting on this opportunity, we are preparing once
again to tie our own hands. The rapid pace of change in Russia and
around the world will not wait for us in the United States Senate to
debate for another year whether or not to seize this opportunity. We
know what our relationship with Russia is today, We can predict, but we
cannot know what it will be like in a year, or two, or ten.
Circumstances may never again be this favorable for reducing the threat
posed by nuclear weapons. We must act. If we do not, history may judge
us harshly for our failure.
  I see the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire is here, the
chairman of the subcommittee. I think what I will do is yield the floor
and allow my friend to speak for a while, and listen to what is likely
to be his considered and well-spoken words.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I thank my colleague. I
indicated I am more than happy to have the Senator from Nebraska finish
his remarks, but if he chooses to have me proceed now, I will be happy
to do that.
  Section 1041 of this bill, which is in question here in the amendment
of Senator Kerrey, does prohibit the retirement of certain strategic
delivery systems unless START II enters into force. The amendment by
the Senator from Nebraska just strikes that entire section, section
1041.
  For the last several years, the Defense Authorization Act has
included a provision limiting the retirement of strategic delivery
systems. Recently, it has specifically prohibited reductions below 18
Trident submarines, 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, and
71 B-52s. This year the provision has been modified to allow the Navy
to reduce the number of Trident submarines from 18 to 14. This change
was made after close consultation with U.S. Strategic Command, the
Navy, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. On April 14, 1999,
the Strategic Subcommittee conducted a hearing on this matter. We did
agree to reduce the number of Tridents from 18 to 14, with my support.
  The overall intent of the provision is to send a signal to Russia,
that if they want the benefits of START II, then they ought to ratify
the treaty. I think this is where I part ways, respectfully, with my
colleague. This really is a unilateral implementation of START II--or
to make even deeper reductions that would fundamentally undermine the
arms control process and our national security.
  I believe I am correct, the Senator supported START II. If he is
going to make unilateral reductions as part of our policy, I do not
think it leaves much incentive for the Russian side to do what they
have to do to get to START II.

[[Page S5992]]

  But section 1041 is a very flexible provision. Since it must be
renewed each year, there is ample opportunity to take into
consideration proposals by the administration and to make our force
structure adjustments as necessary.
  This was demonstrated this year in the way the Armed Services
Committee responded to the Navy's proposal, which was to retire four of
the oldest Trident submarines.
  With all due respect, the adoption of the Senator's amendment I
believe could be interpreted as a sign that Congress no longer supports
the policy of remaining at START I levels until START II enters into
force. It seems to me the Senator is advocating that explicitly, but I
could be wrong. I note that the administration does not support such a
change in policy and, indeed, the administration's budget request fully
funds the forces at the levels specified in the section in question
that the Senator wishes to strike, section 1041.
  The provision does not preclude the administration from making any
changes in U.S. force structure that it is currently planning to make.
Section 1041 does not require the administration to retain any
strategic delivery system that it otherwise would retire. It is clear
that the principal objective of this amendment is to encourage
unilateral arms reductions outside the framework of existing arms
control agreements.
  My concern is this is a very dramatic departure from existing U.S.
policy. Essentially, this approach would amount to an abandonment of,
or certainly a significant deviation from, the formal arms control
process.
  I may support a change in U.S. policy that would base our strategic
force posture on a unilateral definition of U.S. military requirements
rather than on the arms control framework, but I believe that as long
as formal arms control agreements govern our force posture, we ought to
adhere to a policy of not unilaterally implementing such agreements.
  Also, just as a bit of a side discussion here, the issue of what has
happened now with China may also sound an alarm bell that these
agreements with the Russians--were the Soviets, now the Russians--may
not be the major issue before us if things keep going.
  One has to remember that an agreement, START I, START II agreements
with the then Soviets, now Russians, for arms control reductions
between two countries in a bilateral world, could very well now expand
to something beyond just the bilateral agreements with the Russians to
the Chinese and perhaps to Syria and Libya and even Iran, or some other
nice countries out there that are now, thanks to the Chinese, going to
be receiving a lot of our secrets, if you will, nuclear weapons. That
furthers the case for not unilaterally reducing these systems without
the Russians agreeing first.
  I therefore urge my colleagues to oppose the Kerrey amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I just spoke with Senator Kerrey. I know he
will want to say something in response to Senator Smith and what I will
have to say. I will take my 5 minutes right now, with his indulgence.
  I appreciate the spirit of his amendment. In fact, I just advised
Senator Kerrey I regretted very much having to speak in opposition to
his amendment because I admire him as vice chairman of the Intelligence
Committee on which I sit. We agree on a great many things. In fact, we
are introducing legislation as cosponsors today on another matter.
  But on this matter, I do differ with his approach because it to me
reflects the approach to defense preparedness, to national security,
that has been characterized, as Charles Krauthammer has said, as
``peace through paper'' rather than peace through strength, which
Ronald Reagan made popular and which we think helped to win the cold
war--the notion, in other words, that treaties should define what the
United States of America does to provide for its defense rather than
the United States deciding what it must do to provide for its defense
and then seek through treaties to limit what other countries might do
and what we might do in the future as a part of that but following what
our initial determination is with respect to necessities for our
national security.
  This is true with respect to the START I and START II levels of
nuclear weaponry, our strategic deterrents. The START I levels are
where we are right now, and historically the administration and the
Congress have taken the view that we need to maintain our START I
levels as long as that is the prevailing status of treaties, and that
is precisely where we are today.
  START II has not been ratified by the Russian Duma, and until it is
and until Russia begins to comply with its obligations under START II
to bring the number of warheads permitted under START I down to levels
authorized by START II, we have viewed it important not to unilaterally
bring our levels from START I down to START II, because holding out the
possibility that we would stay at START I has been an effective way for
us to deal with the Russians.
  Robert Bell, speaking for the administration, has testified that it
has been helpful for us to let the Russians know that we are going to
maintain our forces at the current levels. While we are willing to
reduce them to START II levels, it is going to require concomitant
action by the Russians for us to do that. In other words, if the
Russians are prepared to go from START I down to START II, then the
United States will be prepared to do that. But until then, we should
not be taking the action unilaterally.
  As a matter of fact, I was going to offer an amendment to this bill
which would ensure that our Trident forces would not be reduced,
because that is also permitted under this bill. The Trident submarine
forces are the most robust leg of our triad of strategic deterrence
because they are the most secure. Our submarines are nearly impossible
to track, so they are clearly the most survivable leg of the triad. The
majority of our boats in the fleet can carry the D-5 missile, the most
advanced missile we have.
  What I have focused on here is trying to make sure that our country
maintains our START I level capability and that we do not begin to
erode that, simply because it is expensive to do as long as Russia is
not willing to reach those same levels.
  An example of why this is important is that if we were to reduce the
Trident force, for example, we would be relying upon the B-52s--as a
matter of fact, our plan, and I hope our American citizens appreciate
that the current defense plan is to use an 80-year-old B-52 bomber into
the future as part of the triad for our nuclear deterrence. That is
relying upon a very old and not very survivable system, which is why I
think we have to maintain the Trident system.
  Our vulnerable land-based ICBMs are the other leg, and they are also
quite vulnerable to attack. We ought to be maintaining rather than
giving up our Trident forces.
  Were it not for arms control considerations and a desire for the
United States to implement the START II agreement that has not even
been ratified by the Russian Duma, I do not think we would be taking
the step that is being suggested by the Armed Services Committee today
and the even larger or further step that Senator Kerrey takes to have
it apply to all of our strategic forces.
  I have been concerned for a long time about the administration's
desire to protect our Nation's security primarily by relying on arms
control measures, and I said this has been described by Charles
Krauthammer as ``peace through paper.'' Let me use the words of the
administration. Under Secretary of State John Holum explained the
administration philosophy in 1994. This is a revealing explanation. He
said:

       The Clinton administration's policy aims to protect us
     first and foremost through arms control--by working hard to
     prevent new threats--and second, by legally pursuing
     development of theater defenses for those cases where arms
     control is not yet successful.

  That is exactly backward. First, you develop your security forces,
and then, to the extent that you can do so, you cut back on those
through arms control treaties that are agreed to and implemented by the
other side. But what you do not do is start out by saying arms control
is going to drive your development and deployment of national security
measures. It is exactly backward.

[[Page S5993]]

  Arms control is not a new idea. In 1139, the Catholic church tried to
ban the crossbow. Like a lot of other well-intentioned arms control
measures, it did not work. The Kellogg-Briand treaty--I know the
Senator from Virginia, the distinguished, esteemed chairman of the
Armed Services Committee, is not quite old enough to remember that--in
1929 outlawed war.
  Well, it does not work. Peace through strength works. Then you do
what you can with arms control.
  The main point I want to make is that our defense planning should
proceed on the basis of assessing the threat, evaluating alternative
means to defeat the threat, and funding the requisite weapons systems
and force structure. We should not permit arms control agreements to
drive our defense programs and our force structure. It is particularly
true with respect to the START II treaty which this Senate ratified in
December of 1995. Despite our action, the Russian Duma has refused to
take action on it. The likelihood it will do so is highly uncertain.
START II has become a political liability in Russia in spite of its
advantages to them.
  As I said before, I would apply this not only to the amendment
offered by Senator Kerrey but also to the language in the Senate bill
which would permit the administration to withdraw our nuclear Trident
force down to 14 boats. I quoted Robert Bell who stated that the
provisions in law requiring the maintenance of the U.S. forces at START
I levels are helpful in convincing the Russians that the only way that
U.S. force levels will decline is if the Russian Duma ratified START
II. While I understand he is going to be taking a new position soon,
Bell is the President's Special Assistant for Arms Control and Defense
Policy.
  I was going to offer an amendment to highlight my concern about a
provision of the Defense authorization bill that I believe undermines
the strength of America's strategic nuclear deterrent. The specific
provision that I am concerned about is paragraph (2) of section 1041 of
the bill, which would allow the Clinton administration to reduce the
number of Trident nuclear submarines operated by the U.S. Navy from 18
to 14 boats. Unfortunately, I fear the acceptance of this cut by the
Defense Department was driven primarily by a desire to conform to
prospective arms control agreements rather than a hard-nosed assessment
of the best way to respond to current threats, and the best means of
compelling Russia to meet its commitments to reduce its nuclear
arsenal.
  The Trident force, armed with nuclear-tipped submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, forms a critical part of the United States nuclear
triad, which also includes long-range bombers and land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles. When deployed at sea, Trident
submarines are nearly impossible to track, making them most survivable
leg of our nuclear triad. Furthermore, the majority of the boats in our
Trident fleet carry America's most modern missile, the D-5, and our
most advanced nuclear warhead, the W88.
  The bill before the Senate calls for the maintenance of U.S. nuclear
forces at a level that closely approaches the limits imposed by the
START I treaty. The bill, however, allows the Administration to reduce
the number of Trident submarines and instead to rely more heavily on
the current fleet of aging B-52 bombers and more vulnerable land-based
ICBMs to maintain U.S. nuclear forces at START I levels.
  I do not believe a reasonable person could argue that placing greater
reliance on the venerable fleet of B-52 bombers, which are approaching
one half century old, instead of maintaining the current force of
Trident submarines would enhance the effectiveness and survivability of
the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent. Were it not for arms control
considerations and a desire to implement the START-2 agreement that has
not even been ratified by our Russian treaty partners, I do not believe
we would be taking this step.
  As many of my colleagues know, I have been concerned for some time
about the Clinton administration's desire to protect our nation's
security primarily by relying on arms control measures in a philosophy
that Charles Krauthammer aptly describes as ``Peace thru Paper.'' Under
Secretary of State John Holum explained this philosophy during a speech
in 1994, stating,

       The Clinton Administration's policy aims to protect us
     first and foremost through arms control--by working hard to
     prevent new threats--and second, by legally pursuing the
     development of theater defenses for those cases where arms
     control is not yet successful.

  Of course, as I said before, arms control is not a new idea. After
all, in the year 1139, the Catholic Church tried to ban the crossbow.
Like so many other well intentioned arms control measures, this one was
doomed to failure from the start. And who can forget the Kellogg-Briand
treaty, ratified by the U.S. in 1929, that outlawed war as an
instrument of national policy. This agreement and others spawned in its
wake left the United States and Britain unable to deter and unprepared
to fight World War II. Yet despite these and many other notable
failures, the Clinton administration still looks to arms control as the
best way to safeguard our security.
  The main point that I want to make is that our defense planning
should proceed on the basis of assessing the threat, evaluating
alternative means to deter and defeat the threat, and funding the
requisite weapons systems and force structures. We should not permit
arms control agreements to drive our defense programs and force
structure. This is particularly true with respect to the START II
treaty, which the Senate ratified in December, 1995. Despite the
Senate's action, the Russian Duma has refused to take action on the
accord. The likelihood that it will do so is highly uncertain. START II
has become a political liability in Russia in spite of its advantages
to them.
  Adherence to START I warhead limits, as called for by the Senate in
its Resolution of Ratification for the START II treaty, and retention
of the Trident fleet at 18 boats, gives us the best leverage we are
likely to have to persuade Russia to move toward ratification and
implementation. And the Clinton administration agrees with this point.
During a briefing for Senate staff in January, the President's Special
Assistant for Arms Control and Defense Policy, Robert Bell stated that
the provisions in law requiring the maintenance of U.S. forces at START
I levels are helpful in convincing the Russians that the only way U.S.
force levels will decline is if the Duma ratifies START II.

  The U.S. repeatedly purchased START II ratification with aid or with
concessions permitting Russia non-compliance with other arms control
agreements or with unilateral limits on our own defense programs. In
fact, Russia seems to be moving even further from the arms control
framework so dear to this administration. Russian leaders have recently
spoken of reconstituting Russia's tactical nuclear forces, potentially
reversing moves that the U.S. and Russia undertook during the Bush
administration. On April 30th of this year, the Washington Times
reported that Russia's Security Council ordered its military to draw up
plans for the development and use of tactical nuclear weapons in what
may be a response to NATO's heightened profile due to its involvement
in Kosovo. Russia also continues to channel a high proportion of its
declining military budget into its strategic nuclear forces and now
places greater reliance on nuclear forces in its military doctrine. And
furthermore, Russia appears to be conducting tests on new nuclear
weapons. As the Washington Post reported on January 24th of this year,
``Three small underground nuclear tests Russia conducted last fall have
prompted some government intelligence analysts to suggest that Moscow
may be trying to design a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons.''
  Nor is Russia the only concern. China is also modernizing its
strategic nuclear forces with the benefit of warhead designs stolen
from our nuclear labs and missile technology sold by the Clinton
administration. The Cox committee had concluded that these thefts
enabled China to design, develop, and successfully test modern
strategic nuclear weapons and that these designs will make it possible
to develop multiple independent reentry vehicles or MIRV warheads for
their missiles. As the summary of the Cox committee report notes, ``The
People's Republic of China has stolen design information on the United
States' most advanced thermonuclear warheads. Specifically, the

[[Page S5994]]

W-88 (Trident D-5 SLBM); W-87 (Peacekeeper ICBM); W-78 (Minuteman III,
Mark 12A, ICBM); W-76 (Trident C-4 SLBM); W-70 (Lance SRBM); W-62
(Minuteman III ICBM); W-56 (Minuteman II ICBM). These thefts, primarily
from our national laboratories, began in the 1970s, continued in the
1980s and 1990s and almost certainly continue today.'' The Cox report
concludes by saying, ``These thefts enabled the PRC to design, develop
and successfully test modern strategic nuclear weapons.''
  Furthermore, I would point out to my colleagues that rogue states and
gangster regimes are also working hard on nuclear weapons and the means
to deliver them. As the Rumsfeld Commission noted last year, the
strategic threat to the U.S. from rogue nations is growing rapidly. And
one need only look at last summer's launch of a North Korean missile
that overflew Japan that has sufficient range to reach the United
States for validation of the Rumsfeld Commission's conclusions.
  Mr. President, I have offered an amendment to retain the Trident
fleet at 18 boats. We should remember that the world remains a
dangerous place and should size our nuclear forces accordingly. As I
have outlined before, the Trident fleet is vital to the maintenance of
our strategic nuclear deterrent. This is too important a step to be
entrusted to an administration in thrall to its bankrupt Russia policy
and its naive approach to arms control.
  I ask unanimous consent that a copy of my amendment be printed in the
Record.
  There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

       Beginning on page 357, strike line 23 and all that follows
     through page 358, line 4, and insert the following:
       (b) Minimum Level for B-52H Bomber Aircraft.--Subsection
     (a)(1) of such section is amended by striking ``71'' and
     inserting ``76''.

  Mr. KYL. Again, I fully respect the vice chairman of the Intelligence
Committee and what he is attempting to accomplish. It is my view you
first build your defense structure, and you stick with it until you see
signs that the potential adversary has reduced his force structure in a
competent way. Until you do that, you are better off keeping what you
have in place rather than unilaterally giving it away.
  Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, let me say that although we reach
different conclusions, I completely agree with the Senator from
Arizona. I do not think we should tie our defense policies to arms
control agreements. I do not think we should do anything other than
assess the threat and then try to put a force structure together that
meets that threat, that keeps that threat as low as is possible. We
should not cut corners. We should not get tied up in ideological knots.
  We should decide what is necessary to keep Americans safe. I do think
that it is much more likely that will occur if the U.S. military is as
strong as we can possibly make it. There are significant new threats in
the world that need to be met. I support the budget that has been
proposed here.
  I supported earlier the rampup in pay and other benefits. I think all
that needs to be done. I think we have less in our intel budget than is
necessary to both collect and analyze and disseminate the information
to our warfighters and national policymakers.
  What we are doing, as I see it, with this proposal is saying we are
not going to do anything that might be in our interest, that might keep
our country safer, because the Russians have not ratified START II. We
are letting the Russians decide what our force structure is going to
be.
  We have been told by former General Habiger, who was the head of
STRATCOM, that he thinks the United States of America will be safer and
more secure if we went below START I levels. That is his assessment. He
did not care what the Russians think about that. He thinks America
would be safer and more secure if we did.

  I am not going to read all through it. I will do it later because I
see the distinguished Democratic leader is here and would like to make
some comments. I am going to read some things that ought to give
Americans a great deal of concern about this ``loose nuke'' issue where
the Russians are experiencing a deterioration in their capacity to
control their nuclear weapons, and we are requiring them to be not only
at a higher level than they need but we are requiring ourselves to be
at a higher level than we need to be as a consequence of saying we are
not going to do anything until the START II Treaty is ratified.
  Let me set the record clear about the administration's position.
  Senator Levin, for the record, in the Armed Services Committee, on
the 3rd of February, asked General Shelton:

       Would you oppose inclusion of a provision in the Fiscal
     Year 2000 Defense Authorization Act mandating strategic force
     structure levels--specific numbers of Trident Submarines,
     Peacekeeper Missiles and B-52 bombers?

  He said:

       Yes, I would definitely oppose inclusion of [that].

  And a further statement of the administration about their attitude
towards the defense authorization bill said:

       The Administration [would] appreciate the bill's
     endorsement of our plan to reduce the Trident submarine force
     from 18 to 14
     boats. . . .

  But they go on to say:

       [W]e prefer repealing the bill's general provision that
     maintains the prohibition, first enacted in the FY 1998
     Defense Authorization Act, against obligating funds to retire
     or dismantle any other strategic nuclear delivery system
     below specified levels unless START II enters into force. The
     Administration believes this provision would unnecessarily
     restrict the President's national security authority and
     ability to structure the most capable, cost-effective force
     possible.

  They have announced no intent to go below START I levels, but they
have indicated they prefer not to have this prohibition in there.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator will withhold, we have a
previous order at this time to begin debate on amendment No. 393.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Democratic leader.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to speak on
the Kerrey amendment. Did the Senator from Nebraska want additional
time as well?
  Mr. KERREY. After the other amendment is disposed of, we will come
back to it, and I will have time then.
  Mr. DASCHLE. If it would be appropriate, I ask unanimous consent to
address the Kerrey amendment at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from
Nebraska for his advocacy and his leadership on this issue. This is
probably one of the most important debates that we are going to have
this year with regard to nuclear proliferation. This amendment could be
one of the most important amendments that we will have the opportunity
to vote on this year with regard to nuclear proliferation. So his
advocacy of this issue and this amendment is greatly appreciated. I am
very impressed with his command of the facts as we consider its
advocacy this morning.
  Much of the current debate on national security issues these past
several weeks has focused on two issues, as we all know: Kosovo and the
alleged Chinese espionage of our national weapons laboratories. That
concentration is very understandable.
  In the first instance, the courageous men and women who make up
America's military forces are risking their lives daily in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia to reverse the genocidal policies practiced by
that country's leader. That is a just cause.
  For the sake of hundreds of thousands of refugees made homeless by
Milosevic's reign of terror, as well as the future of NATO, we simply
cannot afford to fail.
  As for the safety of our nuclear secrets, this, too, is an issue of
vital national security. It is alleged that for the last two decades
the Chinese Government has systematically engaged in efforts to gain
access to some of our most important nuclear weapons scientists and the
knowledge they possess.
  Although all agree that classified information has fallen into the
hands of the Chinese Government, it certainly

[[Page S5995]]

remains unclear who is involved and exactly how much of our national
security suffered as a result of these activities. The administration,
the Congress, and law enforcement agencies are vigorously exploring
answers to these troubling questions.
  But as important as these issues are, as I noted just a moment ago, I
submit there is an issue of equal or greater importance to America's
immediate and long-term national security interests, and this amendment
addresses it. The issue is the U.S.-Russia relationship and the fate of
tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, and hundreds of tons of nuclear
weapons material possessed by each side.
  The Kerrey amendment recognizes the importance of that relationship.
The Kerrey amendment proposes that the United States take a small step
to improve this relationship by acknowledging that the Russian nuclear
arsenal is shrinking, and adopting the view of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff that our security will not be jeopardized if we do the same.
  I strongly support this amendment and ask my colleagues to join me.
  It is difficult to point to a period of time since the end of the
cold war when relations between the United States and Russia have been
under greater stress. Protests and public opinion polls in Russia
demonstrate that anti-American feeling is on the rise in that country.
The tension in this critical relationship has grown as a result of both
Russia's internal economic and political troubles and actions by this
Government.
  At the very time the U.S.-Russia relationship is under unprecedented
stress, the need to work with Russians to reduce the threat posed by
nuclear weapons and the spread of nuclear weapons material and
expertise has never been greater.
  Nearly a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States
and Russia still possess roughly 12,000 strategic nuclear weapons,
thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, and hundreds of tons of nuclear
weapons material. Even more alarming, both sides keep the majority of
their strategic nuclear weapons on a high level of alert--something I
addressed in past comments and, for the life of me, cannot understand.
  And reports are growing that Russia's government lacks the resources
to properly maintain and control its nuclear weapons, nuclear
materials, and nuclear know-how. Consider these recent events.
  In September of 1998, roughly 47,000 nuclear workers protested at
various locations around Russia over the Atomic Energy Ministry's
failure to provide them their wages for several months. Russian Atomic
Energy Minister Adamov told the workers that the government owed the
ministry over $170 million and had not provided a single ruble in two
months.
  Again late last year, Russian radio reported that the mayor of
Krasnoyarsk-45, one of Russia's closed nuclear cities, where enough
nuclear material to build thousands of bombs is stored, warned that
unless urgent action was taken, a social explosion in the city was
unavoidable.
  More recently, guards at nuclear facilities reportedly left their
posts to forage for food. Others have been reluctant to patrol facility
perimeters because they did not have winter uniforms to keep them warm
on patrol.
  At some nuclear facilities, entire security systems--alarms,
surveillance cameras, and portal monitors--have been shut down because
the facilities' electricity was cut off for non-payment of bills.
  According to recent testimony by senior Pentagon officials and
statements by senior Russian defense officials, Russia's nuclear
stockpile is faring no better than the workers hired to maintain and
guard it. According to Assistant Secretary of Defense Ted Warner,
Russia's force of roughly 6,000-7,000 strategic nuclear weapons will be
dramatically reduced regardless of whether Russia ratifies START II.
  By 2005, according to Warner, ``[Russia] will be hard pressed to keep
a force of about 3,500 weapons * * * and by about the year 2010, they
will be hard pressed to even meet a level of about 1,500 weapons.''
Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev recently stated that Russia is
``likely to have no more than 500 deployed strategic warheads by 2012
for economic reasons.'' Finally, in this weekend's newspapers comes the
latest evidence of Russia's nuclear troubles. Under the headline,
``Russia Faces `New Chernobyl' Disaster,'' the London Sunday Telegraph
reports,

       What a Russian energy minister has called a Chernobyl in
     slow motion is unfolding in [Russia's] far north where
     nuclear submarines are falling to pieces at their moorings
     and a decaying nuclear power station has been refused
     European Commission aid to buy vital safety equipment.

  According to the Russian chief engineer at the nuclear plant, ``We
are in despair.''
  Mr. President, while U.S.-Russia relations approach their nadir and
Russia struggles to keep the lid on its nuclear forces and workers,
what has been the response of the majority of the United States Senate?
  Unfortunately, for the last several years, a majority of the Senate
opted to legally prohibit the United States government from responding
by making modest reductions in our forces. A majority in the Senate has
prevented the U.S. government from reducing our nuclear forces below
the START I level until Russia has ratified START II. This majority has
chosen to include a similar provision in this year's defense
authorization. This provision further damages U.S.-Russia relations,
locks us in at nuclear weapons levels not needed for our security, and
drains much-needed resources away from higher priority defense
programs. Senator Kerrey's amendment wisely strikes this provision.
  As I noted earlier, our relationship with the Russian government and
Russian people is at a low point. Russians fail to understand our
actions on several fronts--from NATO enlargement to ballistic missile
defense. As Russians look at the inevitable decay of their own
strategic nuclear forces, they question why the United States insists
on holding firm at weapons levels Russia can never hope to match, let
alone exceed.
  As for whether mandating by law that we retain 6,000 strategic
weapons, our senior military leaders--current and former--have
decisively expressed their opinions on this issue. In testimony before
the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year, General Hugh
Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and this country's
senior military leader, opposed just such a requirement. According to
General Shelton, ``I would definitely oppose inclusion of any language
that mandates specific force levels.'' General Eugene Habiger, former
chief of all U.S. strategic nuclear forces, agreed with General Shelton
and went farther. General Habiger stated, ``There is no need to stay at
the START I level from a military perspective.''
  The Republican decision to keep our strategic weapons levels at an
artificially high level also has budgetary ramifications. The
Congressional Budget Office estimates that keeping U.S. strategic
nuclear weapons totals at START I levels will cost the Defense
Department $570 million in FY2000 and nearly $13 billion over the next
10 years. Resources are incredibly scarce, both in the Defense
Department and in other areas of the government. We should spend every
nickel necessary to ensure a strong defense. But we shouldn't spend a
nickel on weapons systems the military tell us they do not need.
  For all of these reasons, I oppose the provision in the underlying
bill. I support Senator Kerrey's amendment to strike this provision and
restore a modicum of sanity to an increasingly troubled state of
affairs. I ask my colleagues to do right by this important
relationship, by our senior military leaders, and by the U.S. taxpayers
who foot the bill for all we do. I ask for our colleagues' support on
the Kerrey amendment. I yield the floor.

[Balance on other topics omitted.]