11 December 1999: Add December 10 press briefing.
9 December 1999
Source:
http://www.usia.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/latest&f=99120907.wlt&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml
US Department of State
International Information Programs
Washington File
_________________________________
09 December 1999
(Cite "very aggressive" Russian intelligence operation in U.S.)
(4,930)
Security officials from the Department of State and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) briefed reporters in Washington December 9 on
the status of their investigation into the alleged
intelligence-gathering activities of Russian Embassy employee
Stanislav Gusev.
Gusev, who has been in Washington since March 1999, was detained near
the main State Department building December 8 and released several
hours later into the custody of two Russian consular officials. Gusev,
described as an attache at the embassy, claimed diplomatic immunity
from arrest. The United States has declared him persona non grata.
Conducting the briefing were Assistant Secretary Of State for
Diplomatic Security David Carpenter and Assistant Director in Charge
of the FBI National Security Division Neil J. Gallagher.
Before answering questions, Gallagher told reporters that the Gusev
incident, by itself, "sends a strong message that there is a very
aggressive Russian intelligence presence operation inside the United
States," which the U.S. government continues to be concerned about.
Carpenter said the episode "should be a stark reminder to all of us at
government that, despite the thawing of tensions between competing
nations, government facilities and personnel remain a desirable target
for foreign intelligence services." He added that this matter
"reinforces the Department's belief that its counter-intelligence
program must remain a cornerstone of its overall security posture."
Carpenter and Gallagher said they could not provide many details of
the incident because the investigation is ongoing. However, they did
describe several aspects of what took place:
-- Investigators located what they believe to be a listening and
transmittal device, but not a recording device, inside the main State
Department building in Washington.
-- The device was not located in the Secretary of State's suite of
offices or in any principal State Department official's office.
-- To date, access records do not show that Gusev ever entered the
building.
-- The "whole focus" of the investigation is to understand how the
device was introduced.
-- The assessment of investigators is that Gusev "did not have inside
information as to what was happening at the location where the device
was located."
-- An "aggressive sweep" of offices at the State Department turned up
no other potential intelligence-gathering devices.
-- The detention of the Russian embassy employee in Washington was
"absolutely not" connected to the recent case of an American diplomat
in Moscow accused of spying by the Russian government.
Following is the State Department transcript of the briefing:
(begin transcript)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
December 9, 1999
ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAVID CARPENTER
AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR IN CHARGE OF THE FBI [FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION] NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION NEIL J. GALLAGHER
Washington, D.C.
FOLEY: Welcome to the State Department. Let me just note for the
record, before we move to the subject matter at hand, that we have
scheduled a briefing for 11 o'clock on the State Department's release
today of its Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo Report. That may slip by a few
minutes because we have pressing business at hand, but we need that to
start by 11:15 so I'm going to try to bring this briefing to an end by
about 11 o'clock, maybe 11:05, if some of you may need a few minutes,
and we'll need to allow time to transition to the next briefing.
As to the purpose of this briefing, as you know, we announced last
evening that a Russian diplomat has been declared persona non grata
here in Washington. I would make a correction for the record. He was
listed as a Second Secretary in the announcement. He is not a Second
Secretary. He's an embassy employee enjoying diplomatic immunity of
the embassy of the Russian Federation.
With us today are two gentlemen who have worked very closely together
on this matter over the past period, namely Mr. Neil Gallagher, who is
the Assistant Director of the FBI, and Mr. David Carpenter, who is
Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security here in the State
Department. Assistant Secretary Carpenter will begin with brief
remarks. Assistant Director Gallagher will also have brief opening
remarks and then we will open the floor to your questions.
Obviously, the matter at hand is sensitive. It's a matter involving
intelligence. It's a matter that is subject to ongoing investigation
so there are inherent limits as to the degree of specificity with
which they can answer your questions. But we felt it was opportune to
give you an opportunity to ask those questions.
David.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: As Jim said, I just want to read a
brief statement, then Neil has some comments, then we'll answer your
questions.
Counter-intelligence agents of the FBI and the State Department's
Diplomatic Security Service have worked jointly to neutralize this
intelligence-gathering effort. This counter-intelligence operation
could only have been accomplished through the cooperative efforts of
these two outstanding organizations.
Secretary Albright takes this opportunity to acknowledge the superb
investigative work of the FBI throughout this operation. In the
Secretary's view, the successful resolution of this case is a classic
example of what can be accomplished when law enforcement agencies
cooperate with each other.
This episode should be a stark reminder to all of us at government
that, despite the thawing of tensions between competing nations,
government facilities and personnel remain a desirable target for
foreign intelligence services. This matter reinforces the Department's
belief that its counter-intelligence program must remain a cornerstone
of its overall security posture.
Neil.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: Let me at the beginning also introduce
Assistant Director Jimmy Carter from our Washington Field Office and,
sitting off on the side, should be on the side, SAC Tim Caruso of our
Washington Field Office responsible for counter-intelligence in
Washington Field Office.
At a time when we talk about sensitive technologies and advancements,
I want to tell you a story of a classic counter-intelligence
investigation. This is also a story of very good street work by a
group of professional surveillance team members assigned to Washington
Field Office.
When you think of the FBI's counter-intelligence mission, our mission
is to identify and to neutralize hostile intelligence service activity
in the United States, and I would like to go back over the two main
parts of this, identify and neutralize.
Back in the summer, several months ago, a Washington Field Office
surveillance team on a routine surveillance, completely unrelated to
this matter, made an observation. They made an observation that
Stanislav Gusev was standing in the vicinity of State Department. And
it took them as a little bit odd and they just remembered that very
brief observation and came back and developed a surveillance strategy
to determine if there was any significance to this, again, very brief
observation.
Over a period of some time, what they identified was that on a rather
frequent basis, each week, Mr. Gusev would show up in the vicinity of
State Department, literally just walking around the surrounding
street. They also noticed that his manner in parking his car and the
way that he located it, where he located his car, was a little bit
unusual and it suggested to them that this may take on some more
significance.
We initiated some extensive coverage of Mr. Gusev. We also identified
every time that he showed up in the area of Department of State. We
documented his activity around the State Department and concluded at
the time that this may, in fact, be some sort of a technical
operation. That assumption was based upon the frequency of his
presence around the State Department, his personal movement, and the
activity surrounding his car.
Obviously, because of the association with the Department of State and
the proximity of the Department of State, it was necessary to then
consider could there be a technical penetration in the State
Department, and where could it be. It was literally attempting to find
a needle in a haystack and to do so without compromising the
investigation, without alerting unnecessarily all of the employees in
State Department, so we began a technical survey utilizing very
sophisticated, very sensitive, technical equipment and were able to
locate what we believed to be a listening and transmittal device.
The goal was to clearly establish whether or not there was, in fact, a
Russian intelligence service technical penetration of the Department
of State. We left the device in place. We took steps to protect it. We
took steps to minimize any loss that would result of its continued
presence in State Department.
We also utilized the technical expertise of several different US
Government agencies to attempt to fully understand and to exploit this
device while it remained within State Department. That led to the
second part of the FBI's counter-intelligence program, the
neutralization of the device and that is, in essence, what occurred
yesterday.
Again, we needed and wanted to clearly establish that this was a
Russian intelligence technical penetration and then stop it, and to
prevent any further loss from Department of State. What this depended
upon was one individual, and that's Mr. Gusev, to in fact show up at
the vicinity of State Department. So as to the timing of when we would
take this down, it was completely dependent upon him showing up at
Department of State and, for the first time in a period of several
days, that was December 8th.
At 11:34 a.m. yesterday morning, Mr. Gusev was detained by FBI and
Diplomatic Security agents. He was transported to the Washington Field
Office, arriving there at 11:50 a.m. After being informed that he
claimed diplomatic immunity, at 1:32 p.m. I contacted the Russian
embassy and informed them that we had an individual that was at our
Washington Field Office who claimed to be both a Russian and a
diplomat. I asked that they dispatch someone over to our Washington
Field Office to confirm both events.
They did so. They called back at 1:56 p.m. and we made arrangements
for them to arrive and identify themselves at our Washington Field
Office. This occurred at 2:30 p.m. Two Russian embassy officials
arrived at our Washington Field Office and by 2:39 p.m., we had turned
Mr. Gusev over to their custody. At 5:10 p.m. last night, I was
contacted by the Russian embassy confirming that, in fact, it was a
diplomat assigned to the Russian embassy that was turned over to the
two consular officials.
There are several parts of this investigation that I would now like to
address and tell you about that remain outstanding. First of all, I
should have said it at the beginning. Not only is this a classic
counter-intelligence story, it is also a classic story of cooperation
between the Diplomatic Security and the FBI. Because when we first
made these observations several months ago, we came to Diplomatic
Security, we came to them with a serious problem of a potential
penetration within the State Department and the obvious difficulties
of conducting this investigation in a covert manner to protect the
investigation and be able to get to the ultimate resolution, and that
is whether or not it was a Russian intelligence penetration.
That demanded and received the fullest of cooperation between
Diplomatic Security and the FBI and we were able to do that
investigation without unnecessarily alerting the Russian intelligence
service or the general public that we were conducting this
investigation.
What remains is we need to fully understand how the device was
introduced into State Department. With the Diplomatic Security we
initiated a series of interviews and investigation yesterday in a more
overt fashion immediately upon Mr. Gusev being detained, and not only
are we conducting the investigation to understand how it was
introduced, the second part of that is to do a damage assessment with
Diplomatic Security as to what potentially could have been lost by the
introduction of this device.
The last issue is a very obvious issue. We have recovered the device
in State Department and will be doing a very extensive technical
exploitation of that device to fully understand and appreciate it.
Perhaps, in conclusion, a simple statement that this is not only a
story of effective counter-intelligence and cooperation but it is also
a very important story of the aggressive activity of Russian
intelligence presence inside the United States. The fact remains that
a foreign intelligence service introduced a device within Department
of State on US soil.
We'll entertain any questions.
QUESTION: Could you tell us where the device was located? There have
been reports that it was in a conference room.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: Let me, because that is part of the
ongoing investigation, it would be inappropriate for me to give the
specific location of where the device was located, but perhaps Dave
can address some other concerns because there has been some
speculation as to where it could have been located that may help
answer the question.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: To further confuse you, what I'll try
to do here is tell you where it wasn't. Some of the reports, that at
least I read, was that it was in the Secretary's suite of offices,
what we call our executive section. It clearly was not in that area or
any other principal's office or suite of offices.
Q: Can you tell us what floor it was on, David?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: Under the same proviso that Mr.
Gallagher just mentioned, I would prefer to not while this
investigation is ongoing.
Q: Can you tell us where he was arrested, specifically what he was
doing at the time?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: Mr. Gusev had driven up to the vicinity
of State Department, had parked his car, based upon our understanding
of his prior activity had activated some equipment and had begun a
collection operation within eyesight of Department of State, and it
was at that point that we detained him.
Q: Mr. Gallagher, you say the timing of the arrest was dependent on
the Russian's arrival. Are you saying that there is no connection then
with the recent case in Moscow of the American diplomat?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: Absolutely not. This was a long-term FBI
investigation. What drove the decision to bring this investigation to
closure was the need to ensure that there would be no continued loss
of any information from Department of State. We were working against,
on one side, allowing the Russian intelligence service to continue to
attempt to collect information; at the same time, trying to clearly
establish that this was a Russian operation.
Once I met my threshold, I had no reason to ask of Department of State
or Diplomatic Security that we continue to allow this operation to
continue. There was no other further intelligence benefit that I was
going to get.
Q: Could you spell his last name, please?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: It's in his statement.
Q: Mr. Carpenter, I wonder if you can tell us if DS is going to
institute any additional security measures in the building, given that
this appears to be a penetration inside the building itself.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: First of all, let me just say that the
method by which this penetration was accomplished is still under
investigation so that's one thing that should be made very clear. As
all of you should be aware that come to work here at this building
every day, we are in the process right now and have been in the
process for the last year and a half since I've been here of upgrading
our security here, both our physical security and our technical
systems, but to suggest that we are doing anything in addition to
those upgrades would be wrong at this point.
Q: Can you tell us whether the timing of Mr. Gusev's arrival to
activate the listening devices keyed to some knowledge of activities
inside State that would suggest some sort of sophisticated knowledge
of the operations inside the State Department? Can you tell us the
make of the car and can you tell us whether when he was in the car he,
you know, had headphones on or had a tape recorder going? Can you give
us any kind of physical picture of what he was doing in the car?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: A lot of questions. Let me try to answer
them. First of all, your first question?
Q: Whether he had some knowledge of what was going on in State that
keyed him to arrive at a certain time?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: No. That was an issue that we looked at
extensively because we asked ourselves many of the same questions that
you're asking yourself. Our assessment was that he did not have inside
information as to what was happening at the location where the device
was located. It was somewhat sporadic coverage. I don't have the exact
description of his car and I would defer to, I guess, the Russian
embassy if they want to provide that to you. The activity around his
car, there was some activity that suggested that he was utilizing and
adjusting technical equipment at various times. That was one of the
developments that caused us to determine that, in fact, this appeared
to be a technical collection operation.
I wouldn't want to go into other details because, obviously, we are
continuing our evaluation of the technical equipment associated with
this operation.
Q: You said that one of your concerns was obviously to prevent any
further loss, which implies that you believe there certainly was a
loss before that time. Can you give me an idea or an estimation of how
long the device had been in place before you discovered it and also
what kind of conversations generally take place in the room where it
was discovered?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: Again, the nature -- and I think Jim
said it early on before he introduced us -- the nature of this type of
investigation, counter-intelligence, really prohibits us discussing
exactly those issues that you bring up. Those are under investigation.
The answers will be made available but, at this point, we are not in a
position to discuss those.
Q: (Inaudible) -- about the device, or a year? Can you give us any
sort of estimate?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: We've known about the device for several
months. And in direct response to your question, recognize that we
have had the device for less than 24 hours so, as far as the full
understanding of the length of time in the room, there are technical
examinations which may begin to answer some of those questions. But
you'll have to bear with us because we need to have a very
sophisticated evaluation of that piece of equipment and we just need
time.
Q: Is there a search underway for other potential devices?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: That has already been accomplished. We
expanded -- we have a program here that deals with this type of issue.
Once this device became known to us, we began a very, very aggressive
sweep of our principals' offices in this building to ensure that there
was not another device.
Q: Mr. Gallagher, you had said that there was a particularly
aggressive presence of Russian intelligence in the United States.
Could you give us some sense of the extent of that, the aggressiveness
of that and how disturbing that is to the FBI?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: I think this incident, by itself, sends
a strong message that there is a very aggressive Russian intelligence
presence operation inside the United States. That is an issue that the
US Government has and continues to be concerned about.
As to the numbers and extent, that is probably a larger issue that is
beyond this particular operation. There have been some discussions
concerning the Russian intelligence presence and I'm sure they'll
continue, but it just points to the seriousness and the need for the
FBI to maintain a very aggressive counter-intelligence program. I
know, SAC Caruso will probably ask me to remind -- he reminds me that
we also need a very professional surveillance capability in and around
the Washington, D.C., area and will probably ask me for more
resources.
Q: (Inaudible) -- technology changing, fast-moving, there is something
that seems rather crude about the operation you have described in the
sense that someone was walking around the building, parking a car,
sitting right outside the State Department. Why would it be necessary
to engage in this type of surveillance that could so obviously be
discovered, as opposed to something, longer-range listening devices or
like that?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: The initial assessment, the equipment is
very sophisticated.
Q: Recovered inside?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: Right. We may describe his movements as
crude. However, you've got to be careful here. It was effective.
What he did -- think yourself of someone seeing someone sitting on a
park bench outside State Department or along anywhere on these streets
during the summer. Do you really take a second look at them? You had
trained professionals that saw something different than what the
ordinary citizen may see and it was the fact that they knew of him,
knew him to be an intelligence officer and saw him sitting there that
draws attention.
His activities, in itself, wouldn't have drawn unusual attention
either by State Department or the ordinary citizen walking back,
seeing someone walking up on a sunny day for an hour or so.
Q: The activities he was involved in were not actually listening but
perhaps adjusting the device in some form or fashion?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLGHER: It would appear that.
Q: Can you confirm that Mr. Gusev was, in fact, arrested from a bench
or was it from his car? And, secondly, you said that he was not a
Second Secretary? What's his title? Do any of the State Department
records reflect that he had access to the room in which the device was
found?
MR. FOLEY: In terms of the title, I've been informed that he was
referred to as an attache of the embassy. If that requires further
refinement I'll get back to you later, but we just learned that before
coming in.
Q: How long has he been in Washington?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: Since March of this year.
Q: What about the bench? Was he arrested from a bench or from his car?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: He was detained in the vicinity of his
car.
Q: (Inaudible) -- records of his access to the State Department, do
you show that he was in the location where the device was found? Did
he work with somebody else who may have had access and he monitored
the device?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: We're still going over those access
records. To date, we don't show a record of him being in the building.
Q: Mr. Gallagher, your description of the device as still requiring
more sophisticated analysis indicates that it's some sort of device
you haven't seen before, if you could confirm that. And, secondly,
since it seems to give sporadic coverage, did it have any recording
capability and was putting out maybe voice-actuated bursts?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: The device -- I wouldn't want to
characterize that we have not seen a device of that sophistication
before. Using our engineering research facility, we are certainly
going to afford it very extensive technical evaluation to understand
its full capabilities.
The second part of your question?
Q: Whether it might have had some recording capability where the
recordings picked up later when Gusev came.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: We know that there were technical
emanations coming out of State Department at the time that Mr. Gusev
was in the vicinity. That would suggest that it's not a recording but
it's a transmitter, but I wouldn't want to go any further than that.
Q: You talk about an aggressive program that you've had over the last
year and a half to improve security and, yet, I'm wondering if you
regularly sweep principals' offices and conference rooms for devices
and, if so, how come you didn't pick this one up. And does that
suggest that you need to improve your program?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: The answer to your first question, do
we regularly sweep, the answer to that is yes, we do -- albeit, I
would prefer not to get into where we do sweep and where we don't
sweep, for obvious reasons. We are somewhat limited in our
capabilities to be -- I think you used the word "aggressive" or I used
the word "aggressive" in this by our manpower. We do have limitations.
This is a big building. So I don't want to understate the difficulty
in doing something like this, but we have a program that ensures
specific offices that we feel would be most vulnerable are, in fact,
swept on a regular basis, on a reoccurring basis.
Q: A couple of small questions. You said you had an aggressive search
for other devices. You didn't say whether you actually found any. Did
you find any in this effort and how often do you find them on your
other sweeps?
And then, also, I was wondering if you could give us an idea of how
big this device was and where was it in the conference room, under a
piece of furniture or whatever -- something like that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: Your first part is have we found any
other devices?
Q: In the search that was prompted by the discovery of this device
and, secondly, how often do you find devices when you do these regular
sweeps?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARPENTER: Clearly, if we found other devices we'd
probably be meeting on a much more frequent basis. The answer is we
have not. As a result of the search that was done after this device
was discovered, we did not find other devices.
Again, it's an ongoing process. I might be -- I might try to be
brutally honest with you. There are some instances if a device were to
be found, because of the investigative leads that would come out of
that, it might take quite some time before it would be made public and
we would not publish that fact that other devices had been found until
that investigation had been, in this case, concluded.
Neil.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: As to the size and disguise of the
device, I mean, let's step around it just a little bit. It was an
extremely sophisticated device and was professionally introduced into
State Department. I would not want to go any further until we complete
our full technical evaluation. It's just not slapped on here where
we're looking at it. You would not -- an ordinary person would not see
it.
Q: So was it in a wall or a ceiling?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: Again, I would not want to go any
further until we complete -- what began yesterday at noon, Diplomatic
Security and the FBI was able, for the first time, to go aggressively
into an overt investigation to begin to understand how the device was
introduced into State Department. We're less than 24 hours into the
investigation. We need as much time as we can to begin to answer many
of the questions that both you and I have.
Q: Two quick questions. Mr. Gallagher, can you tell us, you said that
there was some pattern that he used parking his car. Can you tell us
what this pattern was, or the strange way in which he parked his car?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: Oh, his pattern?
Q: Yes. And also, if I may, how often were his visits around the
building?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: Okay. His pattern of activity was such
that on times he would park his car, he would move his car around the
block and come back to another location. It appeared to us that he was
trying to position his car in an ideal location. It's not an
observation that you see just on one visit or two visits. It comes
over a period of time that you begin to see this repeated time and
time again.
We also -- as to the visits, they varied. He had several days of the
week that he favored. Whenever he showed up, we knew it. He would go
for periods of time that he would not come. So there was no unique
pattern that either suggested he had inside information or was there a
unique pattern that he always showed up on the same day, the same
time. It was, again, the difficulty was developing this pattern over
an extended period of time to fully understand it.
Q: Is this diplomatic license plates or plates that could identify him
as a member of -
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: Yes, his car had diplomatic plates.
Q: Do you have any reason to believe that this was installed after he
arrived in March or was it before March?
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GALLAGHER: It's far too premature to even
speculate. That's the whole focus of the Diplomatic Security-FBI
investigation to understand how the device was introduced. And what's
ongoing today in State Department, there are teams of FBI agents
working with Diplomatic Security agents conducting interviews,
reviewing records, trying to get an answer to that question.
(The briefing concluded at 11:05 A.M.)
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State)
December 11, 1999
Source: http://www.usia.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/latest&f=99121005.tlt&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml
State Department Press Briefing, December 10, 1999
Briefer: James Foley
[Excerpt]
Q: Different subject. On the spy investigation, can you tell me how
the investigation is going? Are you continuing to interview people in
this building and out?
MR. FOLEY: I'm not going to be able to comment in any kind of detail
about the work of law enforcement, the work of the FBI, the work of
the State Department's Office of Diplomatic Security. I can certainly
underscore what was said here yesterday, which is that there has
really been exceptional cooperation between the FBI and the State
Department's Diplomatic Security Office in the months preceding the
apprehension on Wednesday. And you saw that displayed here at the
podium yesterday and that cooperation is continuing.
I can confirm, because Mr. Gallagher and Mr. Carpenter yesterday told
you, that the process of the investigation has shifted and they are
now interviewing people in order to determine or develop leads in the
case. I can't comment, though, on the specifics of how that is going
and we'll have to see how that goes. I think Secretary Albright, in
some of her TV interviews this morning, I think, pointed out the fact
that there are different phases of this case and we've now entered a
new phase and that it has to be done in a sequential way; that it was
necessary in order to protect our ability to detect and neutralize the
operation, that a certain approach be taken up until the time that it
was shut down. And Mr. Gusev was apprehended on Wednesday. And now
we're in a new mode and a more open investigation is underway to
determine everything that needs to be known about the incident.
Q: Are you absolutely confident that there are no other bugs in this
building?
MR. FOLEY: I'm glad you asked the question because one of your fellow
networks - a major network - in its report last evening, made the
rather remarkable claim that people in the State Department are
pulling their hair out over the possibility that there are many bugs
here in the State Department and that walls are going to be torn down
to look for those bugs. And that, of course, was at complete variance
with what Mr. Carpenter said yesterday.
He made it crystal clear; (a) that we had a program of sweeps that did
not cover the entire building - and he explained that - underway
before the incident but that, upon learning of the existence of the
bug, a very thorough going sweeping effort was undertaken throughout
the Department. And so I checked when I saw that television report and
I checked not only in this building, but elsewhere and the reaction
was one of dismay. I can assure you that Diplomatic Security has
undertaken extensive sweeps and believes that there are no such
instruments here in the building at this time.
Q: And what about any of the other numerous buildings that this
Department occupies around town?
MR. FOLEY: Certainly it's an ongoing effort and it's one that has to
be prioritized, as Mr. Carpenter indicated yesterday. Given that we
have only so much manpower, one has to concentrate in the first
instance on the most sensitive and important areas of the State
Department. Although, let me back up and underline what Secretary
Albright said this morning and what Mr. Carpenter said yesterday that
the effort to ensure the integrity of the most sensitive areas of the
State Department had been ongoing even before this incident and that
the bug that was found was not in any such area. But the effort to
complete the task of sweeping all of our facilities, I believe, is
ongoing.
Q: I just wanted to ask you quickly, the Russian foreign ministry
today has made a statement that the way that this accused Russian spy
was treated was a crude violation of the Vienna Convention, that he
has been improperly treated and this is clearly a tit for tat, any
reaction?
MR. FOLEY: There are two parts to the question. On the allegation of a
tit for tat action on our part, I think that the briefing that you had
yesterday was fairly compelling in that regard, that indeed this was
something that was spotted and identified many months ago. Secretary
Albright indicated this morning she had been briefed a number of
months ago; it was something that we were watching and watching in a
way so that we could, at the right moment, neutralize the operation.
And our briefers yesterday indicated why the timing occurred as it did
and when it did.
In terms of the first part - and so therefore this was not a
retaliatory exercise by any means. In terms of the first part of your
question, I have not heard or seen that quotation from the Russian
authorities. Was it the foreign minister you are referring to? I have
not seen that. But, certainly, without seeing it, I can reject the
claim. I think that Mr. Gusev was treated very responsibly. He was -
because he enjoys diplomatic immunity - was given back into the
custody of consular officials of the Russian embassy. He will not be
charged. Because he has diplomatic immunity, he will - has been
required to leave the United States within 10 days, starting
Wednesday, last Wednesday, so he has eight days to go.
Q: One of the Russian folks here in Washington told me that Gusev was
going to leave today. Have you heard that?
MR. FOLEY: I have not heard that.
Q: The room where the bug was, can we confirm that it was the Oceans
Conference Room, the Department of Oceans and Environmental -
MR. FOLEY: I don't know whether you can confirm that, but I'm
certainly not going to confirm that.
Q: You're not going to confirm that?
MR. FOLEY: No.
Q: Okay. And the room in which the bug was found, who met in that
room? What kind of level of people and what kind of discussions? Were
there diplomats from other countries who met in that room?
MR. FOLEY: That is all subject to the current, ongoing investigation.
I am not in a position to talk about that.
Q: There was a report that 50 to 100 meetings took place in the room
before the bug was discovered. Can you confirm that?
MR. FOLEY: I'm sorry. This is certainly a matter that is under active
investigation at the moment. But, as was indicated yesterday, this is
something that we have to let the investigators work on and we're not
going to be able to talk about it publicly for different kinds of
reasons until their work has advanced and been completed.
Q: And I've asked and been turned down to visit this Oceans and
Environmental Conference Room on the seventh floor. Would you allow us
to visit this room?
MR. FOLEY: I would have to look into the question. I frankly doubt it.
Q: Can you confirm that you all called the Russian Ambassador in again
yesterday and could you describe what the reason for that meeting was?
MR. FOLEY: I will have to look into that and get back to you after the
briefing.