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30 March 1998
To: cryptography@c2.net Subject: cryptography and permissive action links Date: Sat, 28 Mar 1998 22:35:41 -0500 From: Steve Bellovin <smb@research.att.com> Several months ago, following the release of the British papers on their early work on public key cryptography, and my posting of NSAM-160, a brief discussion started on how permissive action links work, and how they secure nuclear weapons. Since then, I've done a fair amount of reading and research on the subject. I've written up what I've learned; see http://www.research.att.com/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html if you're interested.
3 November 2006 Update link to Bellovin's report: http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html