29 March 2001:
Add 60 pages of documents 45, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 65, 66, 67, and page 2 of 76.Since March 23, 2001, all TIFF images of filings have been removed from the Western Washinton District Court Web site.
It appears that many pages of Jim Bell's filings were deliberately omitted from the Court's TIFF images, with only the first page provided of documents 55, 56, 65, 66 and 67 and other documents not offered at all. The missing pages vividly describe alleged collusion by Bell's attorney, Robert Leen, the federal prosecutor, Robb London, and Judge Jack Tanner to deny Bell his legal rights to a fair trial.
Add docket entries through March 28, 2001.
26 March 2001:
Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2001 16:24:04 -0500 From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com> Cc: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net Subject: Re: Screwing Jim Bell Royally On Sat, Mar 24, 2001 at 06:50:32PM -0500, John Young wrote: > What's up with Declan's fighting his subpoena? Is the press My lawyer is talking to the Feds... -Declan ----- From: Gordon Jeff TIGTA <Jeff.Gordon@tigta.treas.gov> To: "'jya@pipeline.com'" <jya@pipeline.com> Subject: Bell trial postponed 1 day Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2001 17:30:35 -0500 John The Judge has decided he will not actually start Bell's trial until Tuesday, 4/3 - everyone's testimony will be delayed 1 day - So you will need to be at the Federal courthouse in Tacoma by Wed, 4/4 at 9:00am, and you should be done no later than Thursday afternoon If you want to be reimbursed for your expenses, you will need to make travel arrangements through the US Attorney's office, Dru Mercer, (206) 553-7970 Jeff -----
25 March 2001
Selected recent case filings by James Bell provided after the court docket and linked to it.
See original federal complaint, Docket No. 1: http://cryptome.org/jdb111700.htm
The trial is scheduled to begin April 2, 2001.
Source: The site of Western Washington District Court by way of the PACER
subscription service.
| Docket as of March 23, 2001 3:15 am | Web PACER (v2.3) |
Case Referred to: Law Clerk Gregory Leever
JAMES DALTON BELL (1) Wayne Clark Fricke
defendant [term 02/16/01]
FTS FAX
FAX 1-253-572-1441
[COR LD NTC cja]
LAW OFFICES OF MONTE E HESTER
1008 S YAKIMA AVE
STE 302
TACOMA, WA 98405
253-272-2157
Robert M Leen
FTS FAX
FAX 748-7821
[COR LD NTC cja]
CROWLEY LEEN
601 UNION ST
STE 4610
SEATTLE, WA 98101
206-625-7500
Pending Counts: Disposition
18:2261.F Interstate Stalking
(1 - 2)
18:2261.F Interstate Stalking
(1s - 2s)
18:2261.F Using Facilities of
Interstate Commerce of
Interstate Stalking
(3s)
18:2261.F Interstate Stalking
(4s - 5s)
Offense Level (opening): 4
Terminated Counts:
NONE
Complaints Disposition
For Violation of 18:2261A -
Interstate Stalking
[ 3:00-m -5172 ]
U. S. Attorneys:
Robert Louis Jacob London
FTS FAX
FAX 553-0755
[COR LD NTC]
U S ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
601 UNION ST
STE 5100
SEATTLE, WA 98101-3903
206-553-7970
11/17/00 1 COMPLAINT signed by Magistrate Judge J. K. Arnold
[ 3:00-m -5172 ] (tw) [Entry date 11/21/00]
11/17/00 -- DEFENDANT James Dalton Bell arrested
[ 3:00-m -5172 ] (tw) [Entry date 11/21/00]
11/20/00 2 MOTION to detain by USA as to James Dalton Bell
[ 3:00-m -5172 ] (tw) [Entry date 11/21/00]
11/20/00 3 MINUTES of Initial : JKA, Dep Clerk A Swan, AUSA B Sievers
for R London, Def Counsel Wayne Fricke for B Leen, Tape #
JKA 695, USPT Julie Busic, dft present in custody; Dft
advised of rights/charges; first appearance of James
Dalton Bell , Attorney Wayne Fricke for Robert M Leen for
this hrg only appointed/present; detention hearing set
for 3:30 on 11/22/00; preliminary exam set for 4:00 on
11/29/00; Dft remanded. (cc: counsel, PTS, USMO, Min Bk)
[ 3:00-m -5172 ] (tw) [Entry date 11/21/00]
11/20/00 6 FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT as to James Dalton Bell; Qualified by
JKA
[ 3:00-m -5172 ] (tw) [Entry date 11/28/00]
11/22/00 4 MINUTES of Detention Hrg : JKA, Dep Clerk A Swan, AUSA H
Berry for R London, Def Counsel Robert Leen, Tape # JKA
696, USPT Joe Mendez, dft present in custody; dft
stipulates to detention; dft ordered DETAINED w/o prej to
review [2-1]; Dft remanded. (cc: counsel, PTS,
USMO, Min Bk)
[ 3:00-m -5172 ] (tw) [Entry date 11/27/00]
11/22/00 5 DETENTION ORDER of James Dalton Bell pending Trial by
Magistrate Judge J. K. Arnold (cc: counsel, PTS, USMO)
[ 3:00-m -5172 ] (tw) [Entry date 11/27/00]
11/27/00 12 ARREST Warrant returned executed as to James Dalton Bell
11/17/00 (tw) [Entry date 12/04/00]
11/28/00 7 CJA Form 20 (Appointment of Counsel)for James Dalton Bell;
appointing Wayne Clark Fricke for purposes of the initial
appearance only.
[ 3:00-m -5172 ] (kam) [Entry date 11/28/00]
11/28/00 8 CJA Form 20 (Appointment of Counsel) for James Dalton Bell ;
appointing Robert Leen; terminating attorney Wayne Clark
Fricke.
[ 3:00-m -5172 ] (kam) [Entry date 11/28/00]
11/29/00 9 INDICTMENT by USA Robert Louis Jacob London. Counts filed
against James Dalton Bell (1) count(s) 1-2 (car)
[Entry date 11/30/00]
11/29/00 10 ORDER CONTINUING DETENTION by Magistrate Judge Monica J.
Benton as to James Dalton Bell (car) [Entry date 11/30/00]
11/29/00 11 MINUTES of Arraignment on Indictment:JKA, Dep Clerk:Kelly
Miller, AUSA:Cpt Gordon for Robb London, Def Counsel:
Robert Leen, Tape #JKA 698, USPT/USPO:none. D' pres in
custody. D' James Dalton Bell arraigned; PLEADS NOT
GUILTY TO CHARGES. Attorney present. Pretrial motions
cutoff ddl set 12/20/00 and jury trial set for 9:30 a.m. on
1/22/01 for James Dalton Bell. D' remanded. (cc:
counsel, Judge, PTS, USMO, USPO) (car) [Entry date 11/30/00]
12/11/00 13 MOTION for in camera hearing re: legal cnsl by D' NOTED
FOR 12/22/00 (car) [Entry date 12/11/00]
12/11/00 14 LETTER by D' Bell re: cnsl (car) [Entry date 12/12/00]
12/14/00 15 MOTION to suppress by defendant; ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
NOTED FOR 12/22/00 (car) [Entry date 12/18/00]
12/14/00 16 MOTION to continue trial date by defendant NOTED FOR
12/22/00 (car) [Entry date 12/18/00]
12/14/00 17 MOTION to dismiss indictment by defendant; ORAL ARGUMENT
REQUESTED NOTED FOR 12/22/00 (car) [Entry date 12/18/00]
12/14/00 18 MOTION to change venue by defendant; ORAL ARGUMENT
REQUESTED NOTED FOR 12/22/00 (car) [Entry date 12/18/00]
12/22/00 20 MOTION for pretrial conference by defendant James Dalton
Bell NOTED FOR 1/5/01 (ec) [Entry date 12/27/00]
12/26/00 19 CJA Form 20 (Attorney Payment Voucher) by Wayne Clark
Fricke for James Dalton Bell Voucher #: 001215000163
Amount Paid: 126.00 (ec) [Entry date 12/26/00]
12/28/00 21 MEMORANDUM by defendant re motion for in camera hearing
re: legal cnsl by D' [13-1] (ec) [Entry date 12/28/00]
12/29/00 22 MINUTE ORDER by Judge Jack E. Tanner ; motion hearing is
1:30 on 1/4/01 for James Dalton Bell (cc: counsel, Judge)
(ec) [Entry date 12/29/00]
1/3/01 23 PROPOSED COLLOQUY by Gov't for use at Faretta Hrg on D'
request to proceed pro se [13-1] (car) [Entry date 01/04/01]
1/3/01 24 RESPONSE by Gov't to motion to change venue by defendant
[18-1] (car) [Entry date 01/04/01]
1/3/01 25 RESPONSE by Gov't to motion to suppress by defendant [15-1]
(car) [Entry date 01/04/01]
1/3/01 26 RESPONSE by Gov't to motion to dismiss indictment by
defendant [17-1] (car) [Entry date 01/04/01]
1/3/01 27 MOTION for competency evaluation for D' Bell by USA (car)
[Entry date 01/04/01]
1/3/01 28 DECLARATION of Robb London in support of motion for
competency evaluation for D' Bell [27-1] (car)
[Entry date 01/04/01]
1/3/01 -- LODGED ORDER re: motion for competency evaluation for D'
Bell by USA [27-1] (car) [Entry date 01/04/01]
1/3/01 29 MINUTES of Hrg on Mtn for Competency:JET, Dep Clerk:Debby
Harrison, AUSA:Robb London, Def Counsel:Robert Leen,
CR:Teri Hendrix. D' pres in custody. Hrg held. Court
continues matter to 1:30 p.m. on 1/5/01. (cc: counsel,
Judge, PTS, USMO, USPO) (car) [Entry date 01/04/01]
1/5/01 30 MOTION to require D' to furnish handwriting exemplars by
USA as to James Dalton Bell (car) [Entry date 01/05/01]
1/5/01 -- LODGED ORDER re: motion to require D' to furnish
handwriting exemplars by USA as to James Dalton Bell
[30-1] (car) [Entry date 01/05/01]
1/5/01 31 MINUTES of Hrg on Mtn for Competency:JET, Dep Clerk:Debby
Harrison, AUSA:R London, Def Counsel:R Leen, CR:L Luce
(Vernon). D' moves to excl witnesses. Court signs Order
for competency evaluation and directs Gov't to file Order
re Discovery procedures. (cc: counsel, Judge, PTS, USMO,
USPO) (car) [Entry date 01/08/01]
1/5/01 32 ORDER by Judge Jack E. Tanner GRANTING motion for
competency evaluation for D' Bell by USA [27-1] medical
examination ordered for James Dalton Bell. **SEE ORDER FOR
DETAILS** excludable started. (cc: counsel, Judge) (car)
[Entry date 01/08/01]
1/8/01 -- Gov't's proposed ORDER on Non-Disclosure of Discovery (car)
[Entry date 01/10/01]
1/8/01 34 MOTION to reconsider Court's restriction on D' access to
discovery by defendant NOTED FOR 1/19/01 (car)
[Entry date 01/10/01]
1/9/01 33 ORDER by Judge Jack E. Tanner RULING ON motion to require
D' to furnish handwriting exemplars by USA as to James
Dalton Bell [30-1] is STAYED. (cc: counsel, Judge) (car)
[Entry date 01/09/01]
1/11/01 35 ORDER by Judge Jack E. Tanner that no materials disclosed
by the Gov't as part of its disc obligation shall be shared
by def cnsl w/the dft until further ntc of the Court.(cc:
counsel, Judge) (car) [Entry date 01/11/01]
1/16/01 36 RENEWED MOTION for Court to address D' concerns re:
counsel NOTED FOR 1/26/01 (car) [Entry date 01/17/01]
1/17/01 37 ORDER by Judge Jack E. Tanner that D' motion to reconsider
Court's restriction on D' access to discovery defendant
[34-1] is STAYED. It will be considered after it is
determined whether or not the D' is competent to proceed in
this matter. (cc: counsel, Judge) (car)
[Entry date 01/17/01]
1/17/01 38 ORDER by Judge Jack E. Tanner that D' renewed motion for
Court to address D' concerns re: counsel [36-1] is stayed.
It will be considered after it is determined whether or not
the D' is competent to proceed in this matter. (cc:
counsel, Judge) (car) [Entry date 01/17/01]
1/25/01 39 SUPERSEDING indictment James Dalton Bell (1) count(s)
1s-2s, 3s, 4s-5s (car) [Entry date 01/26/01]
1/25/01 40 ORDER CONTINUING DETENTION by Magistrate Judge Monica J.
Benton as to James Dalton Bell (car) [Entry date 01/26/01]
1/29/01 41 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 1/3/01;
CR initials: T Hendrix (mw) [Entry date 01/31/01]
1/31/01 42 ARRAIGNMENT LETTER by US Attorney (car)
[Entry date 01/31/01]
2/1/01 43 DECLARATION of James Dalton Bell re: mental competency (car)
[Entry date 02/02/01]
2/6/01 44 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 1/5/01
(Re: Mental Evaluation/Exam) CR initials: Laura A. Gjuka
(car) [Entry date 02/07/01]
2/8/01 45 MTN for sanc & recuse various ofcrs of the Court incl
Atty's Leen & London & the Court by D'; OA REQ NOTED FOR
2/16/01 (car) [Entry date 02/08/01]
2/12/01 46 NOTICE OF COMPETENCY HEARING by Judge Tanner Competency
hearing scheduled for 10:00 a.m. on 2/16/01 for James
Dalton Bell. (cc: Judge, all counsel) (car)
[Entry date 02/12/01]
2/15/01 47 NOTICE and ALERT by D' James Dalton Bell of Violation of
Speedy Trial Act (car) [Entry date 02/16/01]
2/16/01 48 MEDICAL REPORT received for James Dalton Bell **FILED UNDER
SEAL** (car) [Entry date 02/16/01]
2/16/01 49 MINUTES of Hrg on Competency:JET, Dep Clerk:Debby Harrison,
AUSA:Robb London, Def Counsel:Robert Leen, CR:Teri Hendrix.
D' pres in custody. As to competency, D' requests
witnesses: Dr. (not present), Mr. London, DENIEDt. No obj
to report. Court FINDS D' competent. To dismiss Mr. Leen
- DENIED. To recuse JET - DENIED. To recuse Mr. London -
DENIED. All other D' mtns (filed prior to competency issue)
DENIED. Court signs Order re Handwriting exemplars.
Doctor's report ORDERED sealed. (cc: counsel, Judge, PTS,
USMO, USPO) (car) [Entry date 02/16/01]
2/16/01 50 ORDER by Judge Jack E. Tanner GRANTING motion to require D'
to furnish handwriting exemplars by USA as to James Dalton
Bell [30-1] (cc: counsel, Judge) (car)
[Entry date 02/16/01]
2/16/01 51 LETTER by cnsl for D' re: D' refusal to sign speedy trial
waiver (car) [Entry date 02/16/01]
2/16/01 52 LETTER by defendant James Dalton Bell re: attorney (car)
[Entry date 02/16/01]
2/16/01 53 MINUTES of Arraignment on Superceding Indictment:JKA, Dep
Clerk:Donna Smith, AUSA:Robb London, Def Counsel:Bob Leen,
Tape #JKA 710. D' pres in custody. D' James Dalton Bell
arraigned; PLEADS NOT GUILTY TO Superceding CHARGES.
Attorney present. Pretrial motions cutoff set for 3/9/01
for James Dalton Bell and jury trial set for 9:30 a.m. on
4/2/01 for James Dalton Bell. D' remanded. (cc:
counsel, Judge, PTS, USMO, USPO) (car) [Entry date 02/20/01]
2/23/01 54 MOTION for a bill of particulars on original & superceding
indictments by D' NOTED FOR 3/9/01 (car)
[Entry date 02/26/01]
2/23/01 55 MTN to recon recusal of Court and on-the-record instr of
D' to his unwilingly imposed appt cnsl by D' NOTED FOR
3/2/01 (car) [Entry date 02/26/01]
3/1/01 56 MOTION to appt an exp wit on Search Warrants & Evidence to
Ass't D', testify at evid hrg by D' NOTED FOR 3/9/01 (car)
[Entry date 03/01/01]
3/1/01 57 MOTION to order the psychological eval of 3 gov't wits by
exp wit appt'd for D' Bell by defendant NOTED FOR 3/9/01
(car) [Entry date 03/01/01]
3/1/01 58 STATEMENT by defendant James Dalton Bell and On-the-Record
instruction to Atty Robert Leen RE Disc & Other issues (car)
[Entry date 03/01/01]
3/1/01 59 MOTION for hearing re substitute counsel on behalf of D'
NOTED FOR 3/16/01 (car) [Entry date 03/01/01]
3/7/01 60 MOTION to compel discovery by defendant James Dalton Bell
NOTED FOR 3/16/01 (ec) [Entry date 03/07/01]
3/7/01 61 RESPONSE by Gov't to Dfts' pro se motions [54-1], [55-1],
[56-1], & [57-1] (car) [Entry date 03/09/01]
3/7/01 62 RESPONSE by Gov't to D' motion for hearing re substitute
counsel on behalf of D' [59-1] (car) [Entry date 03/09/01]
3/7/01 -- GOV'T LODGED ORDER re: motion to compel discovery by
defendant James Dalton Bell [60-1] (car)
[Entry date 03/09/01]
3/8/01 63 OBJECTIONS by D' to Gov't proposed order re: Governing D'
access to Discovery Materials [0-0] (car)
[Entry date 03/09/01]
3/8/01 64 MOTION to adopt previously filed mtns; mtn to adopt D' pro
se pleadings NOTED FOR 3/16/01 (car) [Entry date 03/09/01]
3/12/01 65 MOTION to compel disclosure of Gov't extortion of officers
of the court by defendant NOTED FOR 3/23/01 (car)
[Entry date 03/12/01]
3/12/01 66 MOTION to strike trial date by defendant NOTED FOR
3/23/01 (car) [Entry date 03/12/01]
3/12/01 67 MOTION to dismiss 1/25 superceding indictment due to
vindictiveness by defendant NOTED FOR 3/23/01 (car)
[Entry date 03/12/01]
3/13/01 68 MTN to adopt D' mtn to cmpl discl of Gov't Extortion of
Ofcrs of the Court; mtn to str trial; mtn to dism re
vindictiveness NOTED FOR 3/16/01 (car) [Entry date 03/13/01]
3/13/01 69 MOTION to continue trial by D' NOTED FOR 3/23/01 (car)
[Entry date 03/14/01]
3/13/01 70 EX PARTE FILING D' 1/11/01 discovery letter **FILED UNDER
SEAL** (car) [Entry date 03/14/01]
3/14/01 71 ORDER by Judge Jack E. Tanner GRANTING motion to adopt
previously filed mtns; mtn to adopt D' pro se pleadings
[64-1], DENYING motion for a bill of particulars on
original & superceding indictments by D' [54-1], DENYING
motion to recon recusal of Court and on-the-record instr of
D' to his unwilingly imposed appt cnsl by D' [55-1],
DENYING motion to appt an exp wit on Search Warrants &
Evidence to Ass't D', testify at evid hrg by D' [56-1],
DENYING motion to order the psychological eval of 3 gov't
wits by exp wit appt'd for D' Bell by defendant [57-1] (cc:
counsel, Judge) (car) [Entry date 03/14/01]
3/14/01 72 TRANSCRIPT FILED of 2/16/01 proceedings CR: T Hendrix (ec)
[Entry date 03/16/01]
3/15/01 -- LODGED AMENDED/REVISED ORDER by Gov't re: D' motion to
compel discovery by defendant James Dalton Bell [60-1] (car)
[Entry date 03/19/01]
3/16/01 73 REPLY by defendant TO RESPONSE to motion to compel
discovery by defendant James Dalton Bell [60-1] (ec)
[Entry date 03/16/01]
3/16/01 74 MOTION to suppress evidence associated w/search of dft's
car by defendant James Dalton Bell,EVIDENTIARY HRG REQ
NOTED FOR 3/30/01 (ec) [Entry date 03/16/01]
3/16/01 75 MOTION to deny witness, suppress evidence, and dismiss
certain charges by defendant James Dalton Bell NOTED FOR
3/30/01 (ec) [Entry date 03/16/01]
3/16/01 76 RESPONSE by defendant to Leen's motion adoption, govt's
improper response to Leen's representation motion (ec)
[Entry date 03/16/01]
3/16/01 77 MOTION to reveal identity of informants, request discovery
of govt surveillance activities by defendant James Dalton
Bell NOTED FOR 3/30/01 (ec) [Entry date 03/16/01]
3/20/01 78 MTN to adopt D' mtn to supr; D' self filed suppl resp; D'
Bell's mtn to deny wits; mtn to reveal the id of informants
by defendant NOTED FOR 3/30/01 (car) [Entry date 03/20/01]
3/20/01 79 PARTIAL WITNESS LIST submitted by defendant (car)
[Entry date 03/20/01]
3/20/01 80 MTN to Order Gov't to rapidly return material taken from
the D' after or before trial by D' NOTED FOR 3/30/01 (car)
[Entry date 03/20/01]
3/22/01 81 ORDER by Judge Jack E. Tanner hat D' mtn to compel
discovery [60-1] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The
mtn is GRANTED insofar as it allows the D' access to disc
under the rules. **SEE ORDER FOR DETAILS** (cc: counsel,
Judge) (car) [Entry date 03/22/01]
[Add followoing docket items, 29 March 2001]
3/23/01 82 NOTICE by defendant of Continuing "Brady" discovery
violation as of 3/20/01 (car) [Entry date 03/26/01]
3/23/01 83 RESPONSE by Gov't to D' Bell's mtn to order Gov't to
rapidly return material taken from the D' after or before
trial [80-1] (car) [Entry date 03/27/01]
3/23/01 84 RESPONSE by Gov't to D' Bell's motion to reveal identity of
informants, request discovery of govt surveillance
activities [77-1] (car) [Entry date 03/27/01]
3/23/01 85 RESPONSE by Gov't to D' Bell's motion to compel disclosure
of Gov't extortion of officers of the court (dkt #65) (car)
[Entry date 03/27/01]
3/23/01 86 RESPONSE by Gov't to D' Bell's mtion to compel request of,
production of, and disclosure of discovery material to D'
Bell (dkt #60) (car) [Entry date 03/27/01]
3/23/01 87 RESPONSE by Gov't to D' Bell's motion to dismiss 1/25
superceding indictment due to vindictiveness [67-1] (car)
[Entry date 03/27/01]
3/27/01 88 EX PARTE MOTION for court to order Marshal Svc to Srv Def
Subpoenas at Public Expense by D' (car)
[Entry date 03/27/01]
3/27/01 -- LODGED ORDER re: motion for court to order Marshal Svc to
Srv Def Subpoenas at Public Expense by D' [88-1] (car)
[Entry date 03/27/01]
Source of filings: TIF images from the site of Western Washington District Court by way of the PACER subscription service.
[Docket No. 35]
[See also March 22 Order at Docket No. 81]
FILED
JAN 11 2001
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, |
Plaintiff, |
| Case No. CR00-5731JET
v. |
| ORDER ON NONDISCLSOURE
JAMES DALTON BELL, | OF DISCOVERY
Defendant. |
___________________________________|
THE COURT, being advised by the Government of the defendant's
stated intention of publishing discovery materials in this case
on the Internet, which discovery materials include voluminous
private information and personal addresses of various
individuals, HEREBY ORDERS that no materials disclosed by the
government as part of its discovery obligation shall be shared
by defense counsel with the defendant until further notice of
the court.
DATED this 11th day of January, 2001.
[Signature]
JACK E. TANNER
SR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Presented by:
[Signature]
ROBB LONDON
Assistant United States Attorney
_____________________________________________________________________
car
United States District Court
for the
Western District of Washington
March 14, 2001
* * MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK * *
Re: 3:00-cr-05131
True and correct copies of the attached were mailed by the clerk
to the following:
Robert Louis Jacob London, Esq.
U S ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
STE 5100
601 UNION ST
SEATTLE, WA 98101-3903
FAX 553-0755
Robert M Leen, Esq.
CROWLEY LEEN
STE 4610
601 UNION ST
SEATTLE, WA 98101
FAX 748-7821
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 45; added 29 March 2001]
[ASSUMED FILED
FEB 8 2001]
Jack E. Tanner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
)
) Motion to Sanction and
v. ) Recuse Various Officers
) of the Court including
) Atty's Leen and London and
James Dalton Bell ) The Court, Judge Tanner.
Defendant ) [oral argument requested]
_______________________________) [Notice Feb 16, 2001]
Comes now the Defendant, James Dalton Bell, who declares that
he is effectively and unwillingly unrepresented, and that
his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel has been repeatedly and
intentionally violated since on or about December 1, 2000.
Defendant Bell has repeatedly sent letters to the court asking
for substitute counsel, and two separate motions by attorney
Robert Leen have been essentially ignored since mid-
December, 2000.
Comes Defendant Bell, on his own motion, made necessary by
his lack of effective legal representation, requests three
individuals be recused from further participation in legal
proceedings in this case, and furhter that they be cited
and sanctioned for repeated intentional and serious
misconduct both individually and in combination. In
support thereof, Defendant Bell states as follows:
1. Defense attorney Robert Leen was assigned
to Defendant Bell in early November 2000, subsequent to a
disguised burglary by government agents on November 6,
2000 at Bell's residence.
2. Attorney Leen, in conference with Defendant Bell,
on or about the first week in December, refused to agree with
Bell's objectives of representation, and repeatedly
acknowledged of representation were very different that
Defendant Bell's.
3. Immediately Leen was presented by Bell with a copy of
Local Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2 (a), whereupon
attorney Leen acknowledged that this rule ("Scope of 20
representation") legally and ethically obligated him to agree
with Defendant Bell's objectives of representation, but
astonishingly went on to say he would not obey that rule.
Further, and gratuitously, he said "...and no one will make
me." Leen even referred, derisively, to what he called the
"Hyde Amendment" which specifically required (he said) that
attorneys practicing in Federal Court obey the Local Rules
applicable to their particular district.
4. Defendant Bell immediately informed attorney Leen
that he (Leen) was "fired." Leen's response was to refuse
to be fired. Defendant Bell, over the next week, repeatedly
orally informed Leen that he was fired and that he did not
represent Bell any more. Meeting further resistance from
Leen, Bell wrote the Court December 8, pointing out that
he wanted Leen fired and immediately replaced. In this
letter, Bell pointed out that Leen had repeatedly told
Bell that "you should represent yourself," a foolish
suggestion that Bell repeatedly and increasingly angrily
rejected. Leen's highly unwelcome suggestions came
repeatedly over a number of days in the late-November/
early December 2000 period.
5. Not being immediately aware of Defendant Bell's
letter to the Court, attorney Leen sent an intentionally
misleading motion simply asking,for a hearing to discuss
a conflict concerning "objectives of representation."
Such a motion, Leen knew, would quietly alert both the
Court and prosecutor Rob London that he (Leen) was refusing
to allow Defendant Bell the defense he wanted and was
entitled to according to the rules: One that would expose
criminal and improper actions on the part of both government
personnel and private individuals acting on behalf of the
government. As important, this motion was intended to
later diffuse the blame that might otherwise befall Leen
or the Court, particularly now (February 6, 2001) since
nearly 2 mon ths have passed without even a hearing on the
serious change-of-representation issue. Leen will try to
claim, "I asked for a hearing, didn't I?", while at the
same time the Court can claim "The Court didn't realize
that this motion was intended to be one seeking an emergency
replacement of counsel due to counsel's intentional misconduct."
Naturally, Leen "forgot" to mention that he had pointedly
refused to obey Local Rule 1.2(a), and would continue to
do so as long as he hadn't been replaced. This refusal
continues to today, February 6, 2001.
6. Any doubt that attorney Leen was attempting to
contaminate the court record was eliminated when he filed
(December 28, 2000) a motion titled .... Memorandum Re: Defendant's
Right of Self-Representation" in outrageous and malicious
disregard for the fact that in response to repeated and
unwelcome suggestions weeks before by Leen that Defendant
Bell represent himself, Bell repeatedly and unambiguously
rejected those foolish and malevolent suggestions.
7. Also on or about the first week in December,
according (at the time, in conference with Bell, Leen
related this) to Leen, Prosecutor London asked for Leen's
agreement to an (apparently improper) agreement to show
little or virtually none of the defense-requested discovery
materials to Defendant Bell. Leen agreed to this, he said.
The intended time-frame of this agreement was not disclosed
to Bell, but it apparently continues to this day. (Feb 6)
and there is no immediate prospects of its ending.
Defendant Bell immediately objected to what appeared to him
to be a highly questionable "deal" to his extreme detriment,
but since Leen was already "fired" (both verbally multiple
times to Leen himself, and once in writing to the Court)
Bell had apparently done all he could to remedy this
increasingly outrageous sham. All these examples of defense-
counsel misbehavior would presumably be exposed, shortly,
in court in a representation-change hearing, Defendant Bell
believed then. This hearing has, astonishingly, not even
come as of the date of this motion. Indeed, the Court has
not seen fit to rule on even a single one of defense's
motions, while at the same time shoe-horning an apparently
emergency motion by the government (Dec 29) into a hearing
on January 3, 2001, an amazingly short time.
8. That government Dec 29 de-facto emergency motion
has a fascinating history. It was preceeded by an unscheduled,
apparently-emergency visit by attorney Leen to Defendant
Bell at Seatac Jail on Christmas Day. At the very beginning
of that meeting, Leen nervously displayed a large stack of
documents, which he identified as Discovery materials in
Defendant's case. After engaging a minute or two in
pleasantries, Leen asked Defendant to read a document: It
turned out to be a waiver of my Speedy Trial rights. Bell
read it, and handed it back to Leen. Leen handed it back,
telling Bell to sign it. Leen immediately said, "If you
don't sign it, I won't show you any more discovery documents."
Defendant Bell doesn't respond well to extortion, and refused
yet again. Attorney Leen got up, took all his paperwork
including the Discovery materials, and left. It has been
about 40 days since then, and Leen has delivered on his
threat: Defendant Bell has been shown no more discovery since
then.
9. Only one day later, on December 26, attorney Leen
rushed an emergency letter to the Court and prosecutor London,
which (falsely) claimed that Defendant Bell had made "earlier
representations" that he would sign a "speedy trial waiver."
Even had this claim been true this letter seemed to defendant
to be an outrageous violation of his attorney-client
confidentiality: Whatever essential information Leen had to
deliver did not include prior communications between
Defendant and Leen, and certainly not false claims.
In this letter, Leen also compounded his false assertions,
claiming that "It appears that Mr. Bell intends to represent
himself at trial pursuant to Feretta vs. California".
On the next available opportunity, Defendant Bell compliained
bitterly to Leen about his repeated misrepresentations of
fact in various letters and motions including this one,
and-futilely demanded that Leen correct the record so as to
reflect the truth. This, attorney Leen repeatedly refused to
do.
10. While Defendant's copy of Leen's December 26
emergency letter does not show whether government's copy was
sent by mail or fax or both, it does contain attorney London's
fax number. So on either Dec 26 or 27, and no later, government
was informed of the incipient emergency: Barring some trick or
fraud, the government would get no extra time under the "Speedy
Trial" law to prepare its case, which had to occur within
seventy (70) days of the November 29 indictment. (Apparently,
February 8th, 2001.)
This apparently led to a "crash" project to misuse a rarely-
used (particularly when initiated by the prosecution) procedure
to challenge the competence of the Defendant to assist in
his defense, by preparing a motion document containing
numerous (but highly selective) third-and fourth-hand relations
ostensibly portraying Defendant in a bad. light. This document
carefully avoided, however, including any material that
showed to the contrary; The latter material would have been
in FAR greater quantity than the former. No direct quotes by
anyone in contact with Defendant Bell were included, and
in some cases such people had been actively intimidated
by visits from government personnel.
This document also carefully avoided including any observational
material from Seatac Jail itself, whose personnel had, at
that time, had about forty (40) days to observe Bell,
and of course, to note and record any apparent problems.
Either the prosecution didn't bother to contact Seatac at
all (which would have been revealing enough) or they did
contact Seatac and nothing supporting their foolish
position existed.
While as defendant recollects (having not seen this document
for weeks) that it was dated Dec 29, 2000, the fact that
neither the defendant nor attorney Leen had been given a copy
until literally minutes before the January 3 hearing says
a great deal about the "extreme-rush"nature of this
competency-challenge motion.
Fortunately for those who hurriedly prepared the document,
neither its accuracy nor its legitimacy was allowed (by
the Court) to be even slightly tested, not at the abortive
January 3 hearing nor the well-planned "railroad" hearing
on January 5. (Defendant Bell was reminded of an old
tongue-in-cheek description of a trial: "The policeman
pretended to tell the truth, and the Judge pretended to
believe him.") When the Court made its "decision" to order
the examination (after refusing to hear any challenge to
that order from Defendant or Leen, despite the fact that
such a challenge would have been easy and straightforward,
and was specifically offered by Bell), all haste vanished:
The examiner took well over two weeks to make the arduous
10-mile drive from Seattle, no doubt pleasing prosecutor
London immensely by seemingly giving him the delay he coveted.
11. Given the contents of this Recusal Motion up to
this point, it should be obvious that by January 5, prosecutor's
gentlemen's agreement" with attorney Leen to deny defendant
access to virtually any Discovery materials (without the
explicit approval of, and ostensibly without even the knowledge
of, the Court), an agreement that by then was about one
month old, was drifting from "sleazy" to "outrageous,"
particularly because the Court had been denying Defendant Bell
access to genuine legal representation since no later than
December 11. Long before, and certainly no later than the
first week in December, Defendant Bell had come to the
conclusion that attorney Leen had begun to "hijack" Bell's
legal case, and was actively involved in sabotaging it.
(To sabotage a criminal case, a "defense" lawyer rarely
seems to do more than to FAIL to do things, intentionally.)
Defendant suspects that to call Leen's and London's actions
"ethically tenuous" would have been an extreme understatement.
By January 5, both Leen and London were apparently looking
for some judicial robes to hide behind. That is why, on
January 5, 2001, seemingly unprompted by any prosecution or
defense motion or pretrial conferencel the Court stepped in
to rescue both counsels by acting on his own motion to
officially deny Defendant Bell's access to any discovery
materials. Thus, the original "gentlemen's agreement"
lasts to this day (February 6) at least.
The written order, dated January 8, contains an apparently
false claim that "defendant's state intention [is to
public] the Discovery materials on the Internet." a claim
apparently written by prosecutor London. Despite its
falsity, this claim strongly appears to Defendant Bell to
reflect concerted violations of Bell's attorney-client
confidentiality by Leen and London. This would have been
quite consistent with Leents recently-prior misbehavior
along these lines.
12. For space reasons, Defendant Bell has only barely
delved here into Leen's misdeeds. However, as an example it
is useful and necessary to relate how Leen has stubbornly
refused augment his initial "boilerplate" discovery-request
document to include numerous important case-specific items,
since early December, 2000. Defendant Bell was shown a
copy of the "boilerplate" document, called it "a start,
but just a start" and immediately offerred to make a more
extensive list of material he knew would be absolutely
necessary to bring the defense that was consistent with
his chosen objections of representation. Leen refused,
claiming that the list would be augmented "later." Well,
"later" came and went, and by early January Leen's continued
failure and apparent refusal to even request this discovery
became a further source of heated friction between Defendant
and Leen. Around January 5, Leen even abortively tried to
claim that somehow, the prohibition against showing Defendant
discovery prohibited asking for more discovery. Leen's
argument withstood only about 10 seconds of counter-argument
from Defendant Bell, but even making this foolish claim
showed how malevolent Leen had become.
Finally, Leen appared to relent, and said he was willing
to accept a list of discovery from Defendant to present to
the government. Defendant generated this list and gave it
to Leen about January 10, but despite numerous rancorous
reminders in mid-to-late January, Leen has not done anything
about it as of today, February 6. Defendant Bell believes
that attorney Leen never had any intention of allowing Bell
to add to Leen's intentionally-inadequate and general-purpose
discovery-request document, and by doing so both sabotage
Bell's choice of defense and delay its progress, hoping
to (initially) force Bell to accept and sign the "Speedy
Trial Waiver" as prosecutor London desired, and later when
that extortion failed, to guarantee that no defense consistent
with Bell's objectives could possibly be completed.
13. Attorney Leen has engaged into virtually no non-
discovery research into facts, including interviews with
witnesses, subpoenas of third-party records, civil- and
criminal case records relevant to this case, and others.
14. On January 31, 2001, attorney Leen came for a so-
far "final" visit to Defendant Bell, where Leen made a
startling revelation: He said that he has been threatened
by "many" government people. Defendant asked him if he'd
reported these threats to any authorities and said "no." Def't
told him to report them, but he refused. Had Defendant not
"fired" Leen in early December, he would certainly have had
no-choice but to do so at this moment.
15. Defendant Bell believes that his Constitutional
Rights have been repeatedly and intentionally violated by
the both the individual and coordinated actions of attorney
Leen, apparently acting on behalf of and with prosecutor
Rob London, as well as with the knowledge and assistance of
the Court, Judge Tanner. The lock-step coordination of each
of these actors, particularly in the denial of effective
representation; the denial of discovery materials; the
blatant attempt at forcing Defendant Bell to sign the
Speedy Trial waiver; the emergency examination that the
failure of this extortion made necessary; and the failure of
the Court to rule on essential motions such as Change of
Venue and Representation; All of these make it impossible
to separate the responsibility and distinguish the misbehavior
of these players.
15. Defendant Bell would like to remind those who read
this motion that he has written every single word of it,
and believes that it will go far to show that, despite his
very arguable lack of tact, that he is quite capable of
assisting in his defense and is even more capable of
identifying sham proceedings.
16. Whereupon Defendant Bell motions the court for
the following sanctions to be imposed on the corresponding
officers of the court:
Attorney Leen: $5,000 per day subsequent to December 1, 2000,
and continuing until his removal by appropriate authority;
payable to Defendant Bell.
Prosecutor Rob London: $10,000 per day subsequent to
approximately December 1, 2000, and continuing until his
removal by appropriate authority; payable to Defendant Bell.
The Court, Judge Tanner: $5,000 per day subsequent to December
11,) 2000, and continuing until his recusal; payable to
Defendant Bell.
17. Defendant Bell motions the Court for immediate
removal of attorney Leen and prosecutor London by appropriate
proceedings.
18. Defendant Bell motions the Court, Judge Jack
Tanner, for his immediate recusal from this case.
Signed [Signature] 02/06/2001
Defendant, James Dalton Bell
(denied effective legal representation)
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of this motion
to the Court's Office, to the United States Attorney's office,
and to Attorney Robert Leen's office this 6th day of
February, 2001.
[Signature]
Robert Leen
601 Union Street Suite 4610
Seattle WA 98101-3903
Rob London, Assistant United States Attorney
601 Union Street Suite 5100
Seattle WA 98101
The Court, Jack E. Tanner
1717 Pacific Avenue
Tacoma WA 98402
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 54, added 29 March 2001]
[ASSUMED FILED
FEB 23 2001]
Jack E. Tanner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
)
) Defendant's Request for
v. ) a Bill of Particulars on
) riginal and Superceding
) Indictments
James Dalton Bell )
Defendant )
_______________________________)
Comes now the Defendant, James Dalton Bell, who declares that
he is effectively and unwillingly unrepresented, and that
his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel has been repeatedly and
intentionally violated since on or about December 1, 2000.
Defendant Bell has repeatedly sent letters to the court asking
for substitute counsel, and two separate motions by attorney
Robert Leen have been essentially ignored since mid-
December, 2000.
2. Comes Defendant James Dalton Bell, unwillingly
unrepresented by effective counsel since on or about
December 1, 2000, who requests from the government to
prepare and deliver to Defendant (as well as a copy to Robert
Leen) Bill of Particulars on both the November 29, 2000 and
the January 25 (delivered February 16) Superceding Indictment.
3. This is because the indictments are lacking in
essential detail, including but not limited to:
Date and time the various alleged victims of each Count became
aware of each of the Defendant's alleged actions.
Physical location (including address) of same.
Method and/or source of information by which claimed victim
became aware of Defendant's alleged actions, including the
names of all intermediaries and people aware of this
communiction.
Date, time, and subject of any contact between alleged victim
and any Federal Government agency personnel prior to, or
during, or subsequent to Defendant Bell's alleged actions.
Addresses at which each "victim" "feared."
Specific and unambiguous identification of each alleged
victim sufficient to identify him from all others of the same
or a similar name: Full name, any aliases used, date of birth,
city and state of birth, address of residence, and identificatioi
of employer including agency and department and group.
This is made necessary by the government's multiple
references in Complaint to one alleged victim as well as
three or more other people apparently with the same name,
but omitting addresses or other distinguishing information
for any of them. It is also made necessary by another
alleged victim's suspected use of multiple phony names,
including at least one instance of registering a vehicle under
a false name, and also suspected of falsely claiming his home
address as his work address. Further, the third alleged
victim may have falsely registered his vehicle under his
employment address.
4. Defendant's example of the need for a Bill of
Particulars is not intended to be a complete statement of the
information requested in that document.
[No signature]
Defendant, James Dalton Bell
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of this motion
to the Court's Office, to the United States Attorney's office,
and to Attorney Robert Leen's office this _________ day of
February, 2001.
[No Signature]
Defendant, James Dalton Bell
Robert Leen, 601 Union Street Suite 4610, Seattle WA 98101-3903
Rob London, Assistant United States Attorney, 601 Union St.
Suite 5100, Seattle WA 98101
Tacoma Court Clerk, 1717 Pacific Avenue, Tacoma WA 98402
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 55]
FILED
FEB 23 2001
Jack E. Tanner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
)
) Motion to Reconsider
v. ) Recusal of Court and
) On-the-record
) instructions of Defendant
James Dalton Bell ) to his unwillingly-imposed
Defendant ) appointed-attorney.
_______________________________)
Comes now the Defendant, James Dalton Bell, who declares that
he is effectively and unwillingly unrepresented, and that
his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel has been repeatedly and
intentionally violated since on or about December 1, 2000.
Defendant Bell has repeatedly sent letters to the court asking
for substitute counsel, and two separate motions by attorney
Robert Leen have been essentially ignored since mid-
December, 2000.
[29 March 2001: Add 7 pages from hardcopy]
1. On February 16, the Court appeared to virtually totally
disregard the arguments in Defendant's self-written-and-filed
motion to Sanction and Recuse Various Officers. In particular,
the Court (in a very brief "consideration" of the motion for the
Court's recusal) referred only to the possibility that the
Defendant had ever come before the Court before. Answering
his own question immediately in the negative, the court concludec
he had no such contact and therefore denied the motion. (The
Court apparently didn't even consider the Motion for Sanctions,
despite the fact that it was a separate and distinct issue from
the recusal motion issue.),
2. Current law on a judge's recusal, however, is Liteky, v.
U.S. 510 U.S. 540. Quoting from Liteky:
"Opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts
introduced or evens occurring in the course of the current
proceeding, or in the prior proceeding, do not constitute a
basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep
seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible." [emphasis mine]
This sort of bias is exactly what Defendant is alleging. From
the failure or refusal to hear essential motions (including
representation, change of venue) for over 2 months (and
perfunctorally deny them) to the lightning-fast hearing of the
government's motions; Further, the virtually totally unsupported
granting of the competency-evaluation allowing no counter-
arguments. In fact, however, there is indeed an "extra-
judicial" source of bias: Judge Tanner is well aware that he
considered Defendant Bell's motion to recuse Judge Burgess in
1999, and he did so (refusing the motion) apparently having been
associated with Judge Burgess in the past.
According to the book "Defending a Federal Criminal Case," 1998
edition, page 6-266:
"However, the Supreme Court's opinion in Liteky significantly
expanded Conforte [U.S. v. Conforte, 624 F.2d, 869-881] using
the terms 'bias' and 'prejudice' in the recusal statute connote
any wrongful, disfavorable or inappropriate disposition towards
a case. Thus, the bias may, but need not necessarily, stem from
an itextrajudicial"source in order to require recusal."
and
"Title 28 USC 455(a) also provides grounds for recusal.
Section 455 (a) was substantially amended in 1974 to complement
Canon 3(c) of the U.S.C.C.A.N. The amendment to 455(a)
abolished the standard that permitted a challenged judge to
decide if, in his or her own opinion, recusal was appropriate.
Under the current reasonable-person standard, a judge's personal
opinion relating to his or her ability to impartially decide
issues is irrelevant. [emphasis mine]
and
"The amendments to 455(a) focus on the mere appearance of
impartiality. Although 455(a) focuses on the judge's
disqualification without the need for a motion, case analysis
clearly indicates that a party may bring a motion for recusal
under this section."
You may not respect my reading, as a non-lawyer, of the
meaning of these words, but I conclude that it says that it
was and is entirely INAPPROPRIATE for the Court to reject my
recusal motion, due to the "reasonable person" standard the
quotes above refer to. Apparently the current practice in this
case would be to deliver the question to a different forum: A
three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. Defendan,
Bell surmises that the Court's failure to do so constitutes
"plain error."
Further, in order to remove any doubt or ambiguity,
Defendant Bell alerts the Court that whether or not the Court
rules properly on his motions or future motions, he will file
a complaint against the Court in the appropriate Judicial
Ethics panel based on the Court's past misconduct in this case.
According to "Defending a Federal Criminal Case" '98ed, page
6-2679
"Further, where contumacious conduct so provokes a judge,
where the judge becomes personally embroiled in controversy,
where there is a likelihood of bias or appearance of bias such
that the judge is unable to maintain the balance between
vindicating the interests of the Court and the interests of
the accused, or where the conduct involves an insulting attack
on the integrity of the judge, recusal is required. In re
Jafree, 741 F-2d (7th Cir 1984). In Jafree, the defendant
in a contempt proceeding accused the Chief Judge of the
Northern District of Illinois and other judges of corruption,
drunkenness, and taking bribes. Appellant's motion for recusal
was found to be proper."
Defendant Bell reminds the Court that accusations do not
need to be false in order to be "insulting attacks."
3. Defendant Bell also asserts his strong belief that the
Court's concerted actions reflect a total and intentional
abandonment of any pretense of defensibility on appeal, and
reveal a clear intent to simply "go through the motions" of
a sham trial in order to improperly convict Defendant Bell
as quickly as practical. Once the Court had made its first
egregious error (to the Defendant's knowledge), by assisting
prosecutor London and appointed Defense attorney Leen by taking
up their burden by ordering Leen to not share any discovery
with Defendant (thus destroying Bell's 6th amendment right to
independant and effective counsel) functionally it was arguably
virtually irrelevant hhow many further errors the Court made.
However, the Defendant's loss of time was and is irreversible
and irreplaceable: As the Court knows full well, a round
of post-conviction appeals could take a year or more, which
makes the Court's short- and medium-term misbehavior essentially
irreversible and unreviewable for nearly a year. [But see
"interlocutory appeals"]
Defendant Bell also points out that the tactics he describes in
Item 3 above work "well" (i.e., quietly, without much registered
complaint) only if the defense attorney is either scared and
intimidated (See item 14 of my Motion to Sanction and Recuse:
Leen has been threatened by "many" government personnel, he
said) or has so abandoned any pretence of a serious, full-
throated defense of his client that he decides to not register
any sort of complaint at the procedurally-correct time and
under the proper circumstances. Or, that Leen registers weak
and minimal procedural complaints that merely serve to make
Defendant's appeal case stronger but do not (and are not
intended to) fix the problem at the current time. Leen's
complaints are probably intended to just "cover his ass"
from an ethical standpoint.
Yet, while not an attorney, Defendant Bell strongly believes
that it must be unethical for an attorney like Leen to even
appear to be "representing" a defendant under the current
circumstances, when his continued presence actually serves
only to allow the government and Court to proceed with a
carefully-planned sham trial by his (Leen's) warming his
Defense-table chair at appropriate moments. I'm told the
word "abandonment" would come to the mind of a competent,
ethical attorney. But I suspect that Leen's actions qualify
as actually worse that mere "abandonment": Quite literally,
Defendant Bell would be vastly better off if Leen simply died
or disappeared, because at that point a replacement for him
would clearly be necessary.
4. Therefore, Defendant Bell reiterates his Motion for
Sanction and Recusal, particularly of the Court, expanded in
this Motion to Reconsider: Defendant believes the Court is
not allowed by current law to summarily reject a motion for his
recusal, although presumably he may accept it: Another forum
is necessary. Further, Defendant Bell is not required to form
these complaints into a motion (28 USC 455(a) but he has done
so for the record, and to preserve whatever meager rights he
still has.
The fact that Defendant Bell has been forced to write and file
this motion (and others) himself demonstrates the terrible
conflict of interest attorney Robert Leen how has. During the
February 16 hearing, he even objected to my self-generated
motions and filings! Given his treatment of me and his clear
function at recent hearings, such a reaction is sadly predictabla.
6. Defendant Bell also notifies the Court that he wishes
to have competent, unbiased counsel immediately appointed for
him to (among many other things) explain to him the legal
possibilities of an "interlocutory appeal". Bell also states
here, for the record, that he believes that he will want such
an interlocutory appeal filed almost immediately, well-within
the statutorially-defined period to the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals for all the issues arguably appropriately appealable
stemming from the February 16, 2001 hearing (including all
motions filed or rejected) and all previous motions and hearings
where possible. This will include evidentiary motions,
presumably, change-of-representation issues and motions,
change-of-venue motions, and any issue addressable in this
interlocutory appeal.
For purposes of this motion , which was unaided in its
preparation by professional and unbiased legal counsel, and to
ensure that his rights are protected, Defendant Bell hereby
gives legal notice of his intent and desire to have such an
appeal prepared and filed, and requests that he be immediately
notified if any further steps are necessary to perfect this
notice.
However, Defendant Bell reminds the Court that he continues
to believe that assigned attorney Robert Leen has not actually
represented him properly since approximately December 1, 2000,
despite the fact that he continues to show up at hearings as
if he did. Defendant Bell has stated numberous times his
continuing desire to have Leen "fired" and replaced, but the
Court (as recently as the February 16 hearing) has steadfastly
refused.
Defendant Bell suspects that any such proper interlocutory
appeal will include issues such as representation, intentional
appointed-attorney "negligence", abandonment, threats by
government personnel against attorney Leen, and others which
by necessity cannot be advocated by Leen for various conflict-
of-interest reasons. Further, Defendant Bell justifiably expects
that Leen would not even respond, let alone properly, to any
type of request or suggestion or order by Defendant Bell even
if Bell asked and was willing to accept Leen's highly-
questionable "assistance" at this late date and under these
terribly strained circumstances. Attorney Leen has also
pointed out to many other clients that "[he doesn't] do
appeals." (apparently, he just makes them necessary.)
Nevertheless, Defendant Bell feels that lacking trust-
worthy legal advice, he must still go through the motions of
making such a request, in order to avoid any later claim that
he was intentionally failing to call "Bell's officially-
appointed-and-up-to-now-unreplaced attorney" for assistance.
At the same time, Bell cautions that this request in no way
should be interpreted as any sort of "acceptance" of Leen
as his current counsel, nor a weakening of his strenuous and
continuous rejection of Leen, nor an end to Bell's continuing
request for a replacement. Furthermore, Defendant Bell still
believes that Leen is and should be ethically prohibited from
preparing that interlocutory appeal for ethics reasons.
So for completeness reasons alone, Defendant Bell asks
attorney Leen to immediately and officially Notice an
interlocutory appeal to whatever extent Defendant Bell has
not already done so, with copies to Bell, the Court, and the
government and to any other body or bodies (such as the 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals) that such a notice must be delivered
to, well-within the legally-prescribed time and manner.
Or, if in the alternative Leen feels he cannot or will
not do this for any reason, he immediately responds in writing
to all such parties of his unwillingless or inability to notice
this interlocutory appeal, and the reason(s) he feels he cannot
act as requested.
Further, again for purposes of completeness, Defendant Bell
hereby requests that Leen prepare such an interlocutory Appeal
or at least covering as many issues as Leen himself by ethically
do, giving very early prior notice to Bell and the Court of
any issues and arguments he cannot cover for any reason, ethical
or otherwise.
Signed [No Signature]
(Defendant, James Dalton Bell.)
(Denied effective legal representation)
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of this motion
to the Court's Office, to the United States Attorney's office,
and to appointed-attorney Robert Leen's office this _______ day
of February, 2001.
Robert Leen, 601 Union Street Suite 4610, Seattle WA 98101
Rob London, Assistant United States Attorney, 601 Union St.
Suite 5100, Seattle WA 98101
Tacoma Court Clerk, 1717 Pacific Avenue, Tacoma WA 98402
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 56, added 29 March 2001]
[ASSUMED FILED
MAR 01 2001]
Jack E. Tanner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
)
) Defendant's Motion to Appoint
v. ) an Expert Witness on Search
) Warrants and Evidence to
) Assist Defendant, Testify
James Dalton Bell ) Evidentiary Hearing
Defendant )
_______________________________)
Comes now the Defendant, James Dalton Bell, who declares that
he is effectively and unwillingly unrepresented, and that
his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel has been repeatedly and
intentionally violated since on or about December 1, 2000.
Defendant Bell has repeatedly sent letters to the court asking
for substitute counsel, and two separate motions by attorney
Robert Leen have been essentially ignored since mid-
December, 2000.
2. An evidentiary hearing is a very common event prior to
a trial, and Defendant Bell intends that his be no exception.
Very uncommonly, however, Bell has for nearly three months
been denied virtually all access to discovery materials and
thus, among the very items that any evidentiary hearing would
normally study and address. This delay has tended to cripple
Defendant's ability to identify the specific items in question,
as well as the pattern of evidence taken.
3. Nevertheless, Defendant Bell can already anticipate
the need to challenge both the propriety of the search warrant
as-requested and as-issued, but also the propriety of the
specific execution of the warrant itself: Highly improperly
and indeed quite astonishingly, a so-called "victim" of Bell's
claimed activities was actually allowed to participate in the
search, and appears to have been almost exclusively instrumenta-
in deciding what items to take and not take. The motive, means
and opportunity to engage in evidence-tampering, property
theft, planting of evidence, and improper pre-view of numerous
critical items of evidence were all present. In addition,
the "victim" present had a powerful motivation to seek out
and select for taking numerous items that were in no way
justified by the as-written search warrant.
4. In fact, Defendant Bell anticipates that when the
items of evidence (term used broadly: The items are not
actually evidence of any crime) are eventually disclosed
pre-hearing and compared to the supposedly-inflexible
dictates of the search warrant itself, it will be "discovered"
that at least 95% of the items taken, and more likely 100%,
were taken in total disregard for the authorization limits
contained in that search warrant.
5. Defendant Bell is certainly aware of the sad state of
disrespect the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution is in,
particularly by people who have taken an oath to defend that
Constitution. Nevertheless, Bell intends and fully expects to
be able to easily show that the warrant itself cannot
legitimately support more than a tiny fraction of the items
taken, and perhaps even none at all.
6. Defendant Bell anticipates and believes, for example,
that by law and ostensible practice a warrant must stand on its
own, especially when it is the only document present at the
search scene: On November 6, 2000, the searchers were
repeatedly asked for a copy of the search warrant affidavit
and they repeatedly answered that the did not have a copy of
it with them. By law and practice, the officer or officers
executing the search warrant cannot depend on or use any
prior knowledge to accomplish this task. Bell further
understands that the law intends to give them no flexibility
in deciding what to take and what to leave behind: Depending
on the item and the warrant alone, an item either MUST be
taken, or MAY NOT be taken. Any deviation from this ideal
signals mishandling of the warrant.
7. For this reason, Defendant Bell requests the
appointment of an unbiased expert witness, for Bell, to study
the specific items of evidence taken in the search, and to
determine whether or not the search warrant alone would have
been adequate to force a determination that the items had to
be taken according to the instructions in the warrant itself.
(Such an expert witness will be able to testify, which an
attorney involved in the case cannot do.)
8. Further, should it turn out that some or all of the
items taken do not qualify under the dictates of the search
warrant, the expert witness can and will study those same
items with Bell, and determine if their taking was not merely
an accident or random, but in fact evidences a pattern:
Defendant Bell forsees that the items taken will clearly
demonstrate a powerful desire among those who decided what to
take to sieze and study and forever deny to Bell material
he collected that the government agents knew was information
that was going to incriminate and/or expose their own
colleagues and their improper actions.
9. This will impeach the entire motivation for the
search itself.
It may also impeach the credibility of the individual "victims"
that Bell's indictment claims, because neither they nor the
government should have any interest in improperly siezing such
non-warrant-justified material unless it incriminated or
exposed their own people. The person or persons who chose to
take the items will have to explain why each individual item
was taken given the inflexible dictates of the warrant,
exposing their real yet illegitimate motivations.
10. Since such a revelation will dramatically affect
the credibiity of numerous potential witnesses, Bell asserts
that the careful study of the siezed evidence by an expert
witness and subsequent testimony will clearly satisfy
Rule #401 of the Federal Rule of Evidence which says:
" 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."
11. Therefore, Defendant Bell requests the appointment
of an expert witness that Bell or his designee will select,
for purposes of studying evidence with Bell, advising Bell,
and testifying at trial.
Signed [No Signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of Llils document
to the Court's office, to the UniAed States ALtorney's office,
and to Robert Leen s office this __________ day of February,
2001.
[No signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Robert Leen, 601 Union Street Suite 4610, Seattle WA 98101
Rob London, Assistant UniLed States Attorney, 601 Union Street,'
Suite 5100, Seattle WA 98101
Tacoma Federal Court Clerk, 1717 Pacific Avenue Tacoma WA 9802.
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 57, added 29 March 2001]
[ASSUMED FILED
MAR 01 2001]
Jack E. Tanner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
)
) Motion to Order the
v. ) Psychological Evaluation
) of Three Government
) Witnesses; By Expert
James Dalton Bell ) Witness Appointed for
Defendant ) defendant Bell
_______________________________)
Comes now the Defendant, James Dalton Bell, who declares that
he is effectively and unwillingly unrepresented, and that
his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel has been repeatedly and
intentionally violated since on or about December 1, 2000.
Defendant Bell has repeatedly sent letters to the court asking
for substitute counsel, and two separate motions by attorney
Robert Leen have been essentially ignored since mid-
December, 2000.
2. Comes Defendant James Dalton Bell, unwillingly unrepresented,
on his own motion to the Court to order three government
witnesses to undergo psychological evaluations and depositional
questioning by a psychologist selected by the Defendant and
appointed by the Court.
3. Background: Both of the two original Counts in the
November 29, 2000 indictment and the three Counts subsequently
added in the January 25 (stayed until the February 16 hearing)
Superceding Indictment share a distinct commonality: Each
claims that the Defendant James.Bell's alleged actions "placed
[a person] in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury
to himself and to his immediate family."
4. Apparently this claim, repeated separately for each of
the five counts, constitutes an "element of the crime":
Specifically, it is an alleged fact which if it is not true, or
if it is not alleged, then no crime has even arguably occurred by
the rules of the court. Thus, the prosecution is procedurally
obligated to prove these elements "beyond a reasonable doubt,
and correspondingly the defense is legally entitled to examine the
prosecution's evidence and witnesses and call witnesses of its
own to challenge the prosecution's witnesses, evidence, and
arguments.
5. This "element of the crime" contains at least three
explicit assertions bound up inside it: One, that the "fear,
if present, was actually and only the result of Bell's actions.
(As opposed to, for instance, a reaction to an exaggerated,
incomplete, misleading, or even totally false set of information
related by biased or malicious people: In particular, government
investigators.)
Two, that the person actually "feared.": The possibility
that a witness might lie is, of course, always existent,
particularly when the subject he is testifying about is his own
emotional reaction. Put simply, if he lies when he claims he
"feared," he knows it would be at best difficult (but still
possible) to disprove it. Also, if the witness is a government
employee, testilying" on the side of the government, he knows
with a virtual certainty that he will never be prosecuted for
perjury and thus will not fear to lie. Indeed~ he may "fear"
NOT TO LIE: Pressure from co-workers, fear of future job
evaluations, fear that his name and address will be publicized
(particularly if he works for a government agency which is
generally or commonly hated by the American public or even the
world's public), fear that his as-yet unprosecuted misdeeds or
even crimes will be publicized, and so forth.
Three, that these fears are "reasonable": "Reasonableness"
is inherently subjective, but is usually supposed to be based
on the presumed reactions and-opinions of a large portion of
a defined population, e.g. the citizenry of America.
Unfortunately, what is finally claimed to be "reasonable" is
not the entire public's opinion by actual survey, but is in
fact a speculation (usually by a judge or an appeals panel)
of what the public thinks or even ought to think, quite possibly
biased, more or less, in the direction of what the "speculator"
himself believes.
6. Complicating and confusing the issue even further is
this: If it turns out that some or all three claimed victims
are employees of government, more specifically, the Federal
government, and even more specifically, employees of one of the
various often-hated "alphabet agencies" such as IRS, ATF, CIA,
DEA, FBI and so forth, there may arise the question of what
subset of the world's population should be considered relevant
to what a "reasonable" reaction means. The world's population?
Just America's? Just Oregon or Washington state? Just America
government'employees? Just America's Federal government employee's?
Just the employees of the Federal government's "alphabet
agencies"? Or, even, the latter group, less the proportion who
are secretaries, floor-sweepers, file-clerks, and others who
would generally be considered relatively innocent of the
government's or the agency's misdeeds?
Is short, whols opinion of what is "reasonable" is considered
valid, here?
This question can't be avoided: In the government's
January 3, 2001 "Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on
First Amendment Grounds, it prosecutor London implicitly admits
that one person's generally-recognized exercise of his
Constitutional right to travel, occupy public places, and
investigate crimes and misdeeds of others might and very
likely would be interpreted (by a very narrow subset of the
country's population, those Federal Government employees
of"alphabet agencies," most likely the IRS, ATF, and CIA,
and in fact the sub-subset of those who (in at least two
cases) interact with and intimidate the public) as
"intimidation."" Quoting prosecutor London:
"The evidence at trial will be that he knew perfectly
well that locating home addresses and showing up at
those residences was a form of intimidation."
While Defendant Bell explicitly disclaims the converse, that
the exercise of one's Constitutional rights can EVER be
considered legally actionable, it is clear from the above
quotation that London was specifically referring just to
those residences") Government employees and their reactions,
and not those of ordinary citizens.
In George Orwell's famous book, "Animal Farm," the Pigs
are the self-appointed leaders whose gradual moral decay led
them to modify the'farm's original principle that "All animals
are equal" to the book"s most famous quotation, "All animals
are equal, but some are more equal than others."
Prosecutor London will be unable to explain why Defendant
Bell was charged with actions in which government employees
are named "victims " while "neglecting" to claim as crimes
any other contacts Bell had with numerous other non-government-
employee people. Will London admit to bias in the charging
process? Or will he admit that nobody else considered Bell's
investigations (even if they were aware of them) bothersome
in the slightest, let alone even arguably criminal? Indeed,
did anyone even attempt to contact anyone OTHER THAN government
employees to determine their reactions? Perhaps London already
knew what their reaction would be, or perhaps he simply didn't
care to "protect" anyone who did not share his employer.
It is clear that prosecutor London believes that "some
people are more equal than others." It is equally clear that
he believes that the reactions of government employees (of a
very specific kind and subset) are different and distinct from
those of ordinary citizens, and further that legally,_their
reaction is to be the definition of "reasonable," in extreme
contrast to that of the vast majority of American citizens.
Defendant Bell asserts that he cannot and should not be judged,
legally, by the extremely biased standards of a tiny portion
of the country's population, particularly when that portion
is predictably extremely biased against Bell's political desires
and goals.
7. Defendant Bell understands and claims that as a
defendant in a criminal case, he has an inalienable right to
challenge each and every portion of a criminal charge, each
of element of the crime" alleged, and to confront and examine
all witnesses and evidence, both inculpatory and exculpatory.
Defendant Bell also understands that Federal Rule of evidence
#401 defines "Relevant Evidence" as follows:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."
According to an explanatory comment on page 165 in section
"Relevancy and its Limits, the book "Federal Rules of Evidence
Manual" (by Saltzburg, Martin, and Capra; published by the
Michie Company, 1994 edition.) states:
"the definition provides that evidence is relevant if it has
any tendency to make the existence of a material fact more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
The question for the Trial Judge is whether a reasonable person
would find the probability of a consequential fact to be altered,
one way or another, by the proffered evidence."
8. Defendant Bell is also aware of.Federal Rule of Evidence
#402, which states:
"All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of
"[]Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible."
9. Defendant Bell also understands and claims the right
to call witnesses in his favor, including expert witnesses
who have specialized knowledge and skills not necessarily
possessed by~Defendant or even trained legal counsel,
(Attorneys.) to study all such witnesses and evidence pre-
trial, and render opinions to Defendant, both before and during
trial (including giving testimony) concerning all subjects
that they are competent to give testimony on.
10. Indeed, the government is already planning to use
an expert witness, and will do so based on little more than
a mere desire to do so. Defendant Bell is similarly entitled
to have appointed and call ~expert witnesses, having a need to
prove assertions based on the evidence.
11. Defendant Bell believes that all five Counts in the
Superceding Indictment contain as elements of the alleged crimes
the intimate and personal reactions (called, simplistically,
it fear", in all cases) of potentially-biased, potentially mistaken,
potentially lied-to (by people who are themselves irrevocably
biased), and potentially functionally-paranoid and secretive
people. Bell also believes that these charges contain assertions
and implications which are inextricably bound up to issues of
alleged victims' psychological reactions, such as bias, hate,
concern about loss of employment and future benefits, social
dependency and peer pressure, desire for revenge against
Defendant, unusual or pathological desire for secrecy or power
over others, clannishness, misinformed fear, guilt or shame,
paranoia (both individual and of a group) and numerous others.
Defendant therefore believes and asserts that due to the
specific nature of the charges and elements of the alleged
crimes, and to the likely behaviors, beliefs, and associations
of the claimed victims, Bell has a right to examine (with the
assistance of expert witnesses selected by Bell and appointed
by the Court) any witness who has been identified as having been
put in a position of having "reasonable fear or death or serious
bodily injury to himself and to his immediate family,"
12. Defendant Bell states that his concern about the
alleged victims' behavior and biases and hyper-secretiveness
is based on quite-real facts, not mere speculation. (This is
true, even though due to the nearly 3-months denial of discovery
evidence to Defendant his ability to collect further facts in
this area'have been seriously impeded.), as well as the fact
that the government has not yet responded to his request for a
Bill of Particulars.
Very preliminary investigation shows that there have been
behaviors by the alleged victims such as: The use of multiple
phony names, including registering vehicles under such phony
names; Falsely claiming on vehicle registrations.one's work
address as if it were his home address; and for a different
claimed victim providing his home address as if it were his
work address; Contacting government database maintainors and
asking for (and getting) special treatment about one's exclusion
from a database of publicly-available (purchaseable as a matter
of government policy from the government organization) information.
These concerted actions go far beyond the typical privacy-
concerned citizen's tactic of obtaining an unlisted telephone
number.
Such behaviors may and probably do signal hyper-sensitivity
to public exposure and identification. Defendant Bell has a
right to investigate. and pursue such evidence to challenge the
testimony of the claimed victims, because their actions may reveal
a pattern of extreme-over-reaction to privacy issues.
Oddly, these claimed "victims" who react so extremely to
any perceived loss of anonymity happen to work for an employer
that thinks nothing of maintaining massive databases on personal
and private information on virtually every citizen in the country,
and arrogates so much power to itself and its agents that it
orders private organizations and business to disclose (without
permission, and secretly, astonishingly enough) any information
it desires to have. The term "hypocrisy" doesn't even come
close to describing the full extent of this situation.
Indeed, at least one of these alleged victims has expressed a
self-serving desire to prosecute Defendant Bell for a claimed
violation of a highly-questionable statute (which apparently
utterly violates the Constitution's First Amendment) that
attempts to criminalize the disclosure of so-called "private"
information that is regularly contained in certain publicly-
purchaseable state-published and issued databases.
13. Defendant Bell believes that legal "guilt" in this
case is, by law, necessarily absolutely conditional on the
overall mental credibility of (as the evidence will show)
functionally-paranoid people wh ' o share the same employer as
the Prosecutor, London, the Judge, Tanner, and (indirectly),
my appointed-but-highly-unwanted ostensible legal counsel,
Leen, as well as numerous other government employees who
(except, apparently, for Leen himself) share their extreme
desire for anonymity. There is a clear pattern here, and as
a defense Bell is entitled to investigate and expose it to
challenge the charges and testimony against him.
14. Therefore, Defendant Bell motions the'Court for
the appointment of an expert witness to act on Bell's behalf,
selected by Bell or his designee, and to order at least three
government witnesses (Jeff Gordon, Mike McNall, and Steve
Mueller) to submit to detailed psychological and depositional
questioning in the presence of both Bell and the expert witness
with appropriate preparation-time between Bell and the expert
witness, for the purpose of addressing the numerous psychological
issues raised by the government's claim of its witness'
victimhood, and potential challenges to those claims, some
of which have been noted in this motion.
[No signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of this document
to the Court's office, to the United States Attorney's office,
and to Robert Leen s office this __________ day of February,
2001.
[No signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Robert Leen, 601 Union Street Suite 4610, Seattle WA 98101
Rob London, Assistant United States Attorney, 601 Union Street',*
Suite 5100, Seattle WA 98101
Tacoma Federal Court Clerk, 1717 Pacific Avenue, Tacoma WA 98402.
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 60, added 29 March 2001]
[ASSUMED FILED
MAR 07 2001]
Jack E. Tanner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
)
) Motion to Compel Request of,
v. ) Production of, and Disclosure
) of Discovery Materials to
) Defendant Bell
James Dalton Bell )
Defendant )
_______________________________)
Comes now the Defendant, James Dalton Bell, who declares that
he is effectively and unwillingly unrepresented, and that
his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel has been repeatedly and
intentionally violated since on or about December 1, 2000.
Defendant Bell has repeatedly sent letters to the court asking
for substitute counsel, and two separate motions by attorney
Robert Leen have been essentially ignored since mid-
December, 2000.
2. At a hearing on February 16, 2001, the Court
ordered appointed-attorney Leen and prosecutor London to
of work it out": to begin the disclosure of discovery inaterials
provided by the government, to Defendant Bell. Also, a trial
date was set, quite prematurely and improperly in the opiniou
of Bell: Having been improperly denied access to virtually
all discovery for over 2.5 months as of February 16 (and
over 3 months at the time of this writing)in order to delay
his progress preparing his defense, Bell sees no reason to
believe that London and Leen would change course and let the
process begin.
3. As of March 2, 2001, Defendant Bell still has not
seen any more discovery. Nor has he seen even an estimate
of the time that will be necessary to read, study an(]
discuss that discovery, an estimate that only Leen can know
but so far won't give Bell despite repeated requests.
4. Bell, having not seen any discovery materials at all
since mid-late December, cannot know whether "complete"
discovery (even by the woefully inadequate standards of
Leen's "boilerplatet'late-November discovery request) has even
been attempted, let alone completed. Bell also has seen no
indication that appointed-but-unwanted attorney Leen has
turned Bell's January 10 four-handwritten-pages of discovery
request notes (which includes references to "nun-discovery it
evidence gathering, material which was never asked or ruled
to be off-limits to Bell) have been turned into a proper
request and acted upon.
5. Attorney Leen, having apparently followed prosecutor
London's desires and demands since very early December, 2000,
and having been apparently intentionally inflicted on Bell
by the Court's inactions and actions since December 11, and
by the Court's explicit orders since January 3-5, is
acting not at all like an attorney and far more like an agent
of Prosecutor London, with the vital assistance of the Court
as well.
6. Defendant Bell, therefore, feels that for the
purposes of this motion, Leen and London are acting as, and
should be treated as a single legal entity. 'Fherefore, Bell
motions the Court to order both Leen and London to:
a) Produce all currently-requested discovery and
disclose it to Bell, without omissions or redactions.
b) Produce discovery based on Bell's January 10, 2001
request notes, and disclose it to Bell without omissions
or redactions.
c) Provide the previously-requested but Currently
undelivered "Bill of Particulars."
d) Continue to accept further discovery requests from
Bell, responding with prompt delivery and disclosure.
e) Accept and endorse Bell's request to de-schedUle the
currently-scheduule April 2 trial date, without premature
re-scheduling. (until enforced discovery requests and
disclosures and study have been handled completely and
properly.)
f) Pay sanctions for past and future tardy and
obstructive behavior in getting discovery materials disclosed
to Defendant Bell, and for intentionally delaying a trial
and preventing Bell from utilizing these delays for defense
progress.
Signed, [No signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of this filing
to the Court's office, to the United States Attorney's office.,
and to Robert Leen's office this __________ day of March,
2001.
[No signature]
Defendant, James Dalton Bell
Robert Leen, 601 Union Street Suite 4610, Seattle WA98101
Rob London, Assistant United States Attorney, 601 Union
Street Suite 5100, Seattle WA 98101
Tacoma Court Clerk, 1717 Pacific Avenue, Tacoma WA 98402
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 63]
FILED
MAR 8 2001
HON JACK E. TANNER
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
)
) OBJECTION TO GOVERNMENT'S
v. ) PROPOSED ORDER GOVERNING
) DEFENDANT'S ACCESS TO DIS-
) COVERY MATERIALS
JAMES D. BELL )
Defendant ) [ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED]
_______________________________)
COMES NOW ROBERT M LEEN, court appointed counsel for the
Defendant, JAMES D. BELL, who files this objection to the
Government's Proposed Order Governing Access To Discovery
Materials as follows:
The Government's proposal is completely unacceptable to the
defense. If the Court granted the Government's proposed order
defense counsel would have to spend hundreds of hours at the
Federal Detention Center showing the defendant each of the
thousands of pages of discovery that have been produced.
The defense proposes that instead of the Government's
proposal that a complete copy of discovery in the case be left
ROBERT M LEEN
WSBA#14208
ATTORNEY AT LAW
TWO UNION SQUARE
601 UNION STREET SUITE 4610
SEATTLE WASHINGTON 98101 3903
(206) 748-7817 FAX (206) 748-7821
[Balance of document not available.]
[Docket No. 64]
FILED
MAR 8 2001
HON JACK E. TANNER
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
)
) MOTION TO ADOPT PREVIOUSLY
v. ) FILED MOTIONS; MOTION TO
) ADOPT DEFENDANT'S PRO SE
) PLEADINGS
JAMES D. BELL )
Defendant ) Note. March 16, 2001
_______________________________)
COMES NOW the Defendant, JAMES DALTON BELL, by and through
counsel, who moves to adopt the defense motions previously filed
before the Government obtained a superseding indictment. These
motions are equally applicable to the charges in the superseding
indictment.
Defense counsel also moves to adopt the recent spate of pro
se pleadings filed by the defendant. The defendant's pro se
motions should be addressed at the same time when the Court
addresses the defendant's access to discovery. These motions are
noted for March 16, 2001.
Respectfully submitted,
[Signature]
Robert M. Leen WSBA #14208
Attorney for Defendant
ROBERT M LEEN
WSBA#14208
ATTORNEY AT LAW
TWO UNION SQUARE
601 UNION STREET SUITE 4610
SEATTLE WASHINGTON 98101 3903
(206) 748-7817 FAX (206) 748-7821
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 65]
FILED
MAR 12 2001
Jack E. Tanner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
)
) Motion to Compel Disclosure
v. ) of Government Extortion of
) Officers of the Court
)
James Dalton Bell )
Defendant )
_______________________________)
Comes now the Defendant, James Dalton Bell, who declares that
he is effectively and unwillingly unrepresented, and that
his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel has been repeatedly and
intentionally violated since on or about December 1, 2000.
Defendant Bell has repeatedly sent letters to the court asking
for substitute counsel, and two separate motions by attorney
Robert Leen have been essentially ignored since mid-
December, 2000.
[Add 3 pages 29 March 2001.]
2. On January 31, 2001, Robert Leen stated to Defendant
Bell that he (Leen) had been "threatened" by "many" government
agents, but he hadn't (and despite Bell's immediate instructior
refused to) report that extortion directly to appropriate
authority.
3. On February 24, he repeated his claim, saying that
he is subject to government "coercion."
4. Defendant Bell has been unable to "fire" Leen since
early December 2000, despite his numerous statements to Leen
himself, two letters to the Court, two motions by Leen in
December and at least one in January.
5. Therefore, Bell has had a coerced attorney
unwillingly inflicted on him, presumably in violation of his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
6. The Court, Judge Tanner, has done (and failed to do)
an increasingly odd set of acts, such as:
Failing to respond promptly (greater than 2 months) to an
increasingly desperate series of messages requesting that
Leen be replaced; Failing to rule on vital motions such as
change of venue, dismissal on constitutional grounds; Both
scheduling (within 3-4 days workdays) and ruling on (without
opposition argument allowed, and within 2 days) a flimsy
prosecution motion claiming that the prosecution thought Bell
was unable to assist in his defense; Granting his own
discovery-denial motion, with no explanation as to how he
knew this was strongly wanted by Prosecutor London, at least
not without improper ex-parte communications; Granting no
motions by Defendant Bell; Refusing no motions by Prosecutor
London.
7. Even Prosecutor London has acted oddly and perhaps
even irrationally: Approaching Robert Leen to get him to
agree to deny Bell access to discovery without explicit
approval or even debate in court; Doing this, without
either setting a termination date or working to achieve
substantial redacted discovery disclosure for 2.5 months;
London apparently felt the so-far unexplained need in early
2001 to get the Court's approval for what he'd been doing
for one month without: Denying Bell access to discovery.
Why? Asking for a competency evaluation for Bell, yet
later telling the psychologist to not even bother showing
up for the February 16 hearing.
8. Without some sort of external knowledge of the goals
of the hypothetical agency doing the threatening, neither
Judge Tanner or Prosecutor London wouldn't know to act in ar
odd fashion. These irrational and unusual and odd acts makE
perfect sense, however, if they were also subject to the same
kind of government-sourced extortion, blackmail, or other
threats that attorney Leen claims he is subject to.
9. Defendant Bell believes and asserts that he has a
right to effective counsel, as well as an unbiased judge,
at all phases of the judicial process. (Defendant Bell
doesn't know, however, if government threats to Prosecutor
London also violate Bell's rights.)
10. Therefore, Defendant Bell motions the Court to
order London and Leen to state under oath the nature and
extent of all threats they are subject to. Bell also
requests that the Court make a corresponding statement of
government threats against him, as well.
Signed [No signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of this motion
to the Court's Office, to the United States Attorney's
office, and to assigned Attorney Robert Leen's office this
__________ day of February, 2001.
[No signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant.
Robert Leen, 601 Union Street Suite 4610
Seattle WA 98101-3903
Rob London, Assistant United States Attorney
601 Union Street Suite 5100
Seattle WA 98101
Tacoma Federal Court, Attn: Court Clerk/Tanner
1717 Pacific Avenue, Tacoma WA 98402
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 66]
FILED
MAR 12 2001
Jack E. Tanner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
)
) Motion to Strike Trial
v. ) Date of April 2, 2001
)
)
James Dalton Bell )
Defendant )
_______________________________)
Comes now the Defendant, James Dalton Bell, who declares that
he is effectively and unwillingly unrepresented, and that
his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel has been repeatedly and
intentionally violated since on or about December 1, 2000.
Defendant Bell has repeatedly sent letters to the court asking
for substitute counsel, and two separate motions by attorney
Robert Leen have been essentially ignored since mid-
December, 2000.
[Add 7 pages 29 March 2001.]
2. During the February 16 hearing, the Court set a trial
date of April 2, 2001, despite the lack of any motions
requesting such, and let alone any discussions of the
practicality of such a schedule.
3. Defendant Bell states that setting any court date
now, particularly April 2, is extremely premature and
intentionally prejudicial to the Defendant. That is because
there are numerous tasks which must be accomplished prior to
trial, where it either appears highly unlikely that they can
be done until long after this date (for example, due to
Prosecutor London's stonewalling on pr6viding discovery) due
to London and Leen's collusion to deny virtually all discovery
to Defendant Bell, in violation of his Sixth-Amendment rights.
This denial continues until today.
4. In fact, since December 1 Defendant Bell has been
denied by Leen not merely the contents of discovery, but even
such crucial (to Bell) and innocuous (to the prosecution)
details such as the quantity (in pages, for instance) of
so-far provided discovery. Defendant Bell has already
publicly and privately instructed Leen to calculate an
approximate number of calendar-weeks which will be required
just to review and discuss the existing batch of so-far-
provided (only to Leen) discovery, based on a preliminary
estimate of 3 minutes of reading and discussion per page.
Defendant cannot do this calculation himself, partly
because he does not know the current size of paper or
computer-disk discovery, but also because he does not know how
much time per week Leen will be willing to commit to this
preliminary but crucial activity, and whether or not Leen will
honor any such committment over time.
5. Furthermore, since early December Leen has, himself,
been stonewalling in unwilling and de-facto "client" and
sabotaging his case, for example by refusing from December 1
to present to even request important needed discovery
frequently and insistently requested by Bell. This material
was in addition to material requested by Leen's boiler-plate
discovery request.
6. Leen's persistent obstructionism only appeared
to change when, on about January 7, 2001, Leen claimed to be
willing to accept notes on newly-requested discovery to be
prepared by Bell (and delivered to Leen January 10), saying he
would immediately convert those notes to a formal updated
discovery request (which would be copied, he said, to Bell
and the government). However, to date (February 26) Bell
has neither seen any such formal request nor been alerted of
its preparation, let alone delivery to the government, nor has
he heard any news of any newly-received discovery whose
receipt was a consequence of such a request.
7. Defendant Bell, as might be expected from his 4
unabased writings, has in no way been shy about raising and
challenging the issue of Leen's so-far-apparent lie, to
Leen himself. Defendant Bell believes that Leen is taking
intentionally-abusive and opportunistic advantage of Judge
Tanner's repeated fusal to allow Bell to fire Leen.
Strategically, Leen can "blame" the Court for his forced and
supposedly unwilling representation, for example, while
probably carefully trying to ensure that he can later take
advantage of any statutory immunities he may claim from any
incidents of arguable (but actually intentional) "negligence."
8. In addition, Leen has failed and refused to engage
in most-if-not-all defense evidence-gathering: Subpoenaing
privately- and publicly-available (from government agencies)
records, including telephone records, county police records,
work records, contacts with witnesses and others.
9. Worse, despite the Court's February 16 hearing order
to both Leen and London to "work it out" (to finally start
showing'discovery to Defendant Bell) as of more than a week
and a half later (and despite Leen's first visit to Bell sinco:~
January 31) on February 24, no more discovery material has
yet been delivered or shown to Bell. This continued delay
was quite intentional, Bell believes.
Further, a cutoff date for motions (mid-March) was
apparently announced during the February 16 hearing, despite
the obvious fact that some vital motions (suppressing
evidence, compelling disclosure of as-yet unprovided discovery
etc). cannot possibly be known to be unnecessary unless and
until all-known discovery has been provided to both Defendant
and proper legal counsel, and it has been read and studied
and discussed by them.
10. Just as clearly, vital research and preparation
must be done over a period after this discovery is disclosed,
and in fact by law the defense is supposed to get a guaranteed
30-day trial-preparation time, which cannot possibly begin
until full discovery delivery and disclosure has been made.
Defendant Bell reminded Leen about many of these vital
considerations and requirements on February 24, but Leen
responded with a hostile answer, which Defendant paraphrases
as "I'll only take as much time as I want." Given Leen's
hostile, deliberately unhelpful, and sometimes even borderline
nasty behavior to Defendant Bell during numerous meetings as
early as December 1, and his obvious unwillingness to make any
substantial progress in Bell's case (particularly when the
evidence of that intentional "negligence" does not get directly
reflected in the court record) it is virtually certain that
Bell will be denied access to a large majority of the discovey
materials (due to what will be called "time constraints")
even if this material is ever ostensibly 11provided" to Bell.
11. It is clear that the government has not been in
hurry for a trial. Prosecutor London initiated the any
illegitimate delay process by asking for an gettingl(with
no dissent, debate, or court order) an agreement with
Leen to deny Bell access to virtually all discovery, a plan
which apparently continues until today. Such a practice
could not possibly allow-any sort of a trial (except, perhaps,
a fraud), until substantially after was totally provided
and fully disclosed. This agreement (in unavoidable effect
and thus certainly in intent) "froze" the defense's progress
and yet did nothing to hamper the government's efforts, which
is clearly heavy thumb on the "scales of justice."
12. Later, on or about December 26 or 27, when the
government found out that Leen's attempted extortion of Bell
failed (Leen threatened to show Bell no more discovery
materials despite having brought some December 25) to get
Bell to agree and sign the much-prized "waiver of Speedy
Trial Act rights" form, they rushed a motion claiming to
challenge Bell's "competency" to "assist in his own defense."
Such a test would normally have required a glacially
slow transfer and a 30-day evaluation (which Bell had already
undergone in late 1998) or a total delay of likely 12 weeks
or more, except that Bell himself immediately insisted on
a local process. Even so, the examiner took well over 2
weeks past the January 5 order to make the "arduous" 10-
mile drive from Seattle to Seatac, showing the extreme lack of
hurry now that the order had been granted. Bell's action,
however, cut 10+ weeks off the whole process, proving beyond
doubt that he abhors unnecessary delays.
13. Putting the final "nail in the coffin" of any claim
that the government whad serious interest in anything other
than the much-needed delay that this process would have
provided them, the prosecutor London himself told the examiner
not to even bother to show up for the scheduled February
16 competency hearing: Bell's competency was (yet again)
acknowledged with no debate whatsoever, precisely as you
would expect once they had achieved their desired delay, if
delay was their only goal.
14. The progress so far can be analogized thus: In
this "footrace" between prosecution and defense, the
prosecution has gotten the referee (the Judge) to chain a
heavy ball to Bell's feet until the prosecution is over 3/4
of the way to the finish line. Even today, the ball hasn't
been unchained from Bell, and it is unclear when or if ever it
will be. Even should the ball be unchained, Bell's unwanted
and unwillingly imposed and maintained "coach" (lawyer Leen)
stands ready and willing to block, trip, and otherwise
impede Bell's progress down the footpath.
15. Defendant Bell has caused no delays so far in this
case, and in fact has not even asked for any sort of delay
up until this motion. Quite the opposite. The reasons he
must, now, ask for the unfairly and prejudicially-set trial
date of April 2 to be stricken are entirely the collective
fault of the government, the Court, the government investigator3,
(who asked Rob London to deny Bell access to the discovery in
this case) and Bell's "hijacker," lawyer Robert Leen, who
(despite the government's serious coercion he says he faces),
has worked well beyond those demands in order to sabotage
Bell's case and curtail Bell's ability to expose government
misdeeds.
16. Defendant Bell contends that he clearly has no
illegitimate reason to delay a trial unnecessarily, since he
is currently in custody and has been since mid-November 2000.
He also points out that neither the government nor the Court
has ever expressed any reason or desire to accelerate the
trial, let alone in a way that would even arguably overcome
Bell's need (and, indeed, right) to ensure that numerous
pieces of critical unfinished business be accomplished. (Blame
for which falls squarely on Leen, London, and the Court.)
Quite the opposite: They have each "asked for" (by improper
motions, unfairly granted) and "stolen" (by delaying Bell I s
access to discovery for so-far nearly three months) at least
2.5 months of extra delays, in ways which were carefully
or chestrated to help them but be unusuable by Bell as well.
17. Defendant Bell further points out that the
government has powerful but highly illegitimate reasons to
speed the trial now that they've achieved the progres's THEY
want, while denying Bell the progress he is Constitutionally
entitled to. The government wishes to conceal the types of
secret surveillance they've used on Bell and others, and
particularly the dates on which they have commenced it,
because a complete revelation of those facts will clearly
show that contrary to their assertions, the Federal government
investigators were actually, themselves, stalking Bell (both
physically and electronically) long before they have even
claimed that Bell was "stalking" them.
18. For these reasons, Defendant Bell believes that he
has an unchallengeable right to a proper opportunity to
prepare for trial, including an amount of time sufficient to
actually do that preparation. Bell cannot define a date-
certain on which the preparation will be known to be done,
partly because of inflicted-attorney Leenis past unwillingness
to even commit to do the work, nor discuss with Bell the
amount of work to be done (e.g. the number of pages of
discovery) or the amount of time per week Leen can and will
schedule towards this end. Bell also can't know how many
further impediments to his progress will be placed in his path
by Leen and London.
19. Defendant Bell understands that justified trial
and other continuences are nearly always granted unless there
are extraordinary reasons NOT to do so. In this case, there
are many excellent reasons to strike the trial date, and no
good reasons to not do so, and yet there are plenty of quite
illegitimate though' powerful reasons why the prosecution
(and Leen) would like to improperly hamper the Defendant's
trial preparations. It is unknown whether Prosecutor London
would be willing to put even one of them down on paper,
however.
20. Defendant Bell does not request oral argument on
this motion, but he does strenuously request an expedited
response, particularly if the government does not challenge
this motion. Defendant Bell is not simply asking for a
rescheduling: Working together, Leen and London have already
been able to waste three months of time as well as to deny it
to Bell, and any fixed scheduled date will merely encourage
them to repeat this performance. The Court can be assured
that the Defendant has absolutely no reason to unnecessarily
delay further, and will use only enough time to prepare the
defense of his choice, as he is entitled to by Local Rule
1.2(a).
21. The February 28 very serious (6.8 Richter) Tacoma
earthquake (epicenter about 15 miles from Tacoma) may have
substantially affected schedules not merely of the Court
itself, but also other attorneys and their schedules as well.
Defendant Bell also sees that his access to resources to prepare
his case are also curtailed. Tt would be grotesque to force
the Defendant to attempt to hit an April 2 deadline under these
circumstances, or for that matter any fixed deadline, withOLIt
substantially more information than anyone has or will have
for many weeks.
Signed [No signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Certificate of service
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of this Motion
to the Court's office, to the United States Attorney's office,
and to Robert Leen's office this __________ day of March, 2001
[No signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Robert Leen, 601 Union Street, Suite 4610, Seattle WA 98101
Rob London, Assistant United States Attorney, 601 Union Street,
Suite 5100, Seattle WA 98402
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 67]
FILED
[Date illegible]
Jack E. Tanner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
)
) Motion to Dismiss
v. ) January 25 Superceding
) Indictment due to
) Vindictiveness
James Dalton Bell )
Defendant )
_______________________________)
Comes now the Defendant, James Dalton Bell, who declares
under penalty of perjury that he is effectively and
unwillingly unrepresented, and that his 6-th Amendment
Right to Counsel has been repeatedly and intentionally
violated since on or about December 1, 2000.
Defendant Bell has repeatedly sent letters to the Court
asking for substitute counsel, and two separate motions by
assigned-attorney Leen have not been considered since
mid-December, 2000.
[Add 8 pages 29 March 2001.]
1. Defendant Bell asserts that the Superceding
Indictment on January 25, 2001, is vindictive. The latter
three Counts are new, while the former two Counts appear
to duplicate the only two counts in the Novemher 29, 2000
indictment.
2. The Due Process clause protects defendants from
vindictive treatment based on the exercise of their
Constitutional rights. A defendant makes a showing of
vindictiveness by pointing to an increase in the severity
of charges due to the exercise of a right. (Goodwin 457
U.S. 3681 372 1982)
3. In Defendant Bell's case, Bell exercised a right
to a speedy trial, despite the fact that the government has
(so far, "successfully") attempted to thwart that right:
First, from about December 1, 2000 to January 5, 2001, by
collusion with Defendant Bell's assigned defense attorney
Robert Leen to keep virtually all discovery from Bell, thereby
preventing virtually all progress in verifying and completing
discovery. Second, an apparently ex-parte request and
subsequent acceptance of the Court's aid in reinforcing this
denial of discovery, revealed by the Court's ostensible
own motion of January 5 (oral) and January 8 (written)
denying Defendant Rell access to all discovery.
4. Defendant Bell's assigned attornev Leen informed
both the Court and government about the lack of a signed
Speedy Trial waiver, but Leen did it in an iMDroper and
unethical. fashion: Leen falsely claimed that Bell had
earlier "represent[ed]" that he [Bell] would sign, which
even if true would have violated Bell's attorney-client
confidentiality.
5. In any case, Leen's hurry (one day later, on Dec.
26, 2000) to inform Prosecutor London of this news shows
clearly that previous to December 26, the government believed
they were certain to get a delay they wanted. Of course,
given that the ongoing denial of discovery existed, the
government had to have believed that an on-time trial was
going to be impossible, particularty after assigned-
attorney Leen's Motion to Continue (mailed Dec 14, not
December 22) (which was filed without even Bells prior
review, let alone iDermissi-on) begging for more time. It
is odd that Leen would be asking for more time while
at the same time helping prosecutor London to ensure thnt
a large amount of time was being wasted.
6. Defendant Bell believes that the exceedingly odd
circumstances and actions during the period Dec 1-Jan 25
raise a very strong, presumption of vindictiveness to due
Bell's insistence on his Speedy-Trial rights. (U.S. v.
Garza-Juarez 992 F.2d 896-906.) Clearly, Defendant Bell.
was not "cooperating," with the Speedy Trial delay that
the government, Leen, and the Court were trying to force
on him.
7. However, all doubt can be removed that the
government was acting vindictively: To determine whether
there have been independant and intervening circumstances
to justify increased charges, Courts have traditionally 1ooked
at whether the second indictment is based on facts and circumstances,
known to the government at the time of filing the first indictment.
Ruesga-Martinez 534 F.2d 1369-70; Blackledge v. Perry, 417 US
211 94 S.Ct 20987 40.Ed.2d 628 (t974); United States v Gerard,
491 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Jamison, 164
U.S.App.D.C.300, 505 F.2d 4077 41.5 (1974).
8. Count Three of the January 25 Superceding, indictment
clearly refers to a "fax" specifically identified in item
32 on the "Complaint for Violation" dated November 17, 2000.
Since that item refers to an October 3t fax, it is obvious
that government agents learned about this fax as early as
October 31 or a day or two later, and the US Attorney's
office knew of it no later than November 17, 2000. This
count is, therefore, not based on new information and thus
this count is presumed to be vindictive.
9. (Skip to count 5, then back to Count 4) Count
Five of the January 25, 2001 Tndictment clearly refers
to an incident described in items 39-40 of the November
17 "Complaint for Violation". This shows the government
knew of this incident as of that date. Further, due to
the intentionally incomplete and misleading nature of the
November 17 Complaint, Ttem 39 fails to mention that the
"Clackamas County, Oregon" Sheriff's deputies were actually
instructed to stalk and stop "Bell's vehicle" without any
probable cause, an instruction which came from an unknown
person (but apparently a Federal government employee)
who had (from a fixed location) been electronically
stalking nefendant Rell, with the assistance of vehicles
both on and above the ground.
Thus, this incident was also well-known to Federal Government
employees, and Clackamas County emplovees on November 10,
2000. This count is, therefore, not based on new information
(subsequent to November 29) and so the Count is vindictive.
10. Count 4. No clear reference to this claimed
incident is found in the November 17 "Complaint for
Violation". Note that this is very odd: Counts 1, 3, and
5 at least refer to some sort of "evidence" (physical or
witness) which is said to explain part of what the
investigators thought and why and when they claimed to
believe it.
The Complaint's explanation for Count 2 is very vague
and indirect, involving a visit that no one is claimed to
have seen, mail that no one is claimed to have found or
even looked for, an email with no claimed. proper destination
address, and a location freely admitted by the government
to have nothing to do with a person the government claims
was it stalked." The government doesn't even claim that
it found the addresses of people said to be "stalked" within
any evidence collected during any search!
It will eventually be revealed that much of the reason behind
the fact that the government's case is confusing and
inconsistent is the fact that Defendant Bell, far from being
a "stalker," is actually a victim of the government's
stalking, using improper, illegal, and unconstitutional
means.
Strangely, Count 4 claims to have occurred on a verv specific
day (November 3, 2000) but left totally unexpl6ined is how
the government can be so certain of that date yet do not
mention it in the November 29 indictment. It claims "travel
placed Scott Mueller in reasonable fear of death..." but it
DOES NOT SAY WHEN Mr. Mueller became aware of anything that
gave him "reasonable fear."
11. Defendant Bell asserts that government agents were
electronically and/or physically stalking him since
substantially before the November 2000 time frame due to their
fear that Bell was collecting evidence of various go vernment
agents' prior illegal. and improper activities. Bell further
asserts that the government's failure to include the Count 4
of the eventual January 25 indictment in the Novemher 29
indictment was simply due to the government's need to not
expose their improper activities and the dates on which they
occurred. As it did for other counts, an expanded November
17 Complaint would have had to include background material.
revealing how they know things and when they learn them.
(This was information pointedly absent for Count 4 in the
January 25 Superceding indictment.)
As of November 17, the government could not think tip
any "innocent" explanation for its knowledge of issues in
Count 4, particularly an explanation that wouldn't virtually
automatically lead to more questions that would "blow the
cover" of te government's stalking activities, so it
omitted all reference to it, intending to keep it a secret.
But on January 10, 2001, Defendant Bell delivered
detailed notes on an amended discovery request to still-
assigned (but still undesired; being, unable to fire him
for over 30 days) attorney Leen (one that had been
strenuously resisted by Leen for over a month previous), a
request that was finally promised by Leen to be turned into
a formal updated discovery request. Despite the apparent
subsequent failure of Leen to live up to his promise, the
gist of the request did apparently get to Prosecutor London
and others, alerting them that the government's improper
activities (for example, early November and pre-November
stalking) was no longer a secret, and that the discovery
request that Defendant Bell would eventually and
inevitably get to file (once Bell had manage to fire Leen
successfully) Would blow the secrecy wide open.
Defendant Bell believes that at that point, the
government realized that keeping this information hidden
was no longer a benefit, but was in fact a potentially
explosive embarrassment. Tn order to "de-fUse" this
eventual. revelation, the government sought and received the
assistance of attorney Leen, who further delayed the officInI
delivery of the new discovery request indefinitely. Th(-n ,
the government amended the indictment to inclUde Count
4, keeping quiet about the real reasons behind this Tate
addition.
Count 5 also omits explanations of the underlyIng
stalking that was going on, and like Count 4 was going to
expose it, making its presence in the November 29 indictment
a problem.
12. For these reasons, Defendant Bell believes that
counts 3,4, and 5 of the January 25, 2001 Superceding
indictment were fully based on information available to
the government on November 29, and in fact likely (for
Count 4) known on November 3, 2000. Bell also asserts that
Counts 3, 4, and 5 were brought due to his excercise of
his Speedy Trial rights (known by government on December
27) but also (for Counts 4 and 5) because Rell's exercise
of his complete discovery rights which were going to
inevitably expose the government's electronic and physical
stalking activities.
Therefore, Defendant Bell motions the Court to dismiss
the January 25, 2001 Superceding Indictment as presumptively
vindictive.
13. defendant Rell has suffered actual prejudice,
having been incarcerated since mid-November, so Bell
further motions the court that this dismissal be WITH
Prejudice.
Signed [No signature]
Defendant, James Dalton Bell
(denied effective legal representation.)
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of this motion
to the Court's Office, to the United States Attorney's
office, and to assigned Attorney Robert Leen's office this
__________ day of March 2001.
[No signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant.
Robert Leen, 601 Union Street Suite 4610
Seattle WA 98101-3903
Rob London, Assistant United States Attorney
601 Union Street, Suite 5100
Seattle WA 98101
Tacoma Federal Court, Attn: Court Clerk/Tanner
1717 Pacific Avenue, Tacoma WA 98402
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 68]
FILED
MAR 13 2001
HON JACK E. TANNER
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
) MOTION TO ADOPT DEFENDANT'S
) MOTION TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE OF GOV-
v. ) ERNMENT EXTORTION OF OFFICERS OF THE
) COURT, MOTION TO STRIKE TRIAL, MOTION
) TO DISMISS RE: VINDICTIVENESS
JAMES D. BELL ) Note: 03/16/01
Defendant )
_______________________________)
COMES NOW the Defendant, JAMES D. bell, by and through
counsel, who moves to adopt the defendant's pro se motions.
Respectfully submitted,
[Signature]
Robert M. Leen WSBA #14208
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of
this pleading to the United States Attorney's Office
this 12 day of March 2001.
[Signature]
Robert M. Leen
Robb London
Assistant United States Attorney
601 Union Street
Seattle, WA 98101
FAX: (206) 553-0882
ROBERT M LEEN
WSBA#14208
ATTORNEY AT LAW
TWO UNION SQUARE
601 UNION STREET SUITE 4610
SEATTLE WASHINGTON 98101 3903
(206) 748-7817 FAX (206) 748-7821
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 71]
FILED
MAR 14 2001
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, |
Plaintiff, |
| Case No. CR00-5731JET
v. |
| ORDER
JAMES DALTON BELL, |
Defendant. |
___________________________________|
THIS MATTER comes on before the above-entitled Court upon
several motions by the defendant.
Having considered the entirety of the records and file
herein, the Court rules as follows:
1. Defendant's Motion to Adopt Previously Filed Motions
(doc. #64) is GRANTED.
2. Defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars (doc. #54)
is DENIED.
3. Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration (doc. #55) is
DENIED.
4. Defendant's Motion to Appoint... (doc. #56) is DENIED.
5. Defendant's Motion to Order the Psychological Examination
... (doc. #57) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The clerk of the court is instructed to send uncertified
copies of this Order to all counsel of record.
DATED this 14th day of MARCH 2001.
[Signature]
JACK E. TANNER
SR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
_____________________________________________________________________
car
United States District Court
for the
Western District of Washington
March 14, 2001
* * MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK * *
Re: 3:00-cr-05131
True and correct copies of the attached were mailed by the clerk
to the following:
Robert Louis Jacob London, Esq.
U S ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
STE 5100
601 UNION ST
SEATTLE, WA 98101-3903
FAX 553-0755
Robert M Leen, Esq.
CROWLEY LEEN
STE 4610
601 UNION ST
SEATTLE, WA 98101
FAX 748-7821
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 73]
FILED
MAR 16 2001
Jack E. Tanner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
) Defendant's Self-Filed
) Supplemental Response to
v. ) Government's Proposed Order
) Concerning Defendant's
) Access to Discovery
James Dalton Bell ) Material
Defendant )
_______________________________)
Comes now the Defendant, James Dalton Bell, who declares that
he is effectively and unwillingly unrepresented, and that
his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel has been repeatedly and
intentionally violated since on or about December 1, 2000.
Defendant Bell has repeatedly sent letters to the court asking
for substitute counsel, and two separate motions by attorney
Robert Leen have been essentially ignored since mid-
December, 2000.
2. The arrogance strongly implied in the government's
proposed ORDER GOVERNING DEFENDANTS ACCESS TO DISCOVERY
MATERIALS CONTAINING HOME ADDRESSES AND OTHER PERSONAL
INFORMATION is truly astounding. (Hereafter I refer to this
monstrosity as the Proposed Access Order, or PAO.)
3. The government has said exactly nothing supporting,
detailing, or explaining their desires. Which addresses
are they trying to "protect"? How many? Whose? For what
reason? For how long? Does the government believe that
these addresses were somehow obtained "illegally" or that
their mere possession is somehow illegal? Why has essentially
all discovery material been denied Defendant Bell for 3+
months due merely to a few "addresses"?
4. The government hasn't even said, openly, where this
material came from: Defendant Bell suspects that all of the
material (at least that portion containing the "addresses"
came from the November 6 search and thus, from the Defendant
himself by the thinking of the government. Is the government
entitled to bar the defendant from doing (legal) things
with this information? Permanently?
5. Is the government suggesting that this material
or any of it is somehow "illegal information"? Or would the
government like it to be considered illegal information?
That would certainly explain some of the government's odd
behavior over the last 3+ months.
6. Could it be that the real reason this material was
taken November 6 had nothing to do with any crime then-
suspected or later-charged, but in fact was taken in a ruse?
Defendant Bell reminds the Court and government that he has
not yet been given an Evidentiary Hearing, which due to the
highly unusual specifics of this case must occur many weeks
before any anticipated trial. Bell anticipates that this
hearing will reveal that all the material taken November 6
will be easily provable to have been entirely-legal
information, but taken by an illegally-requested and illegally
executed search done by people who intended at all times
simply to deprive Bell of his properly-owned information.
7. Defendant Bell concurs with Leen's conclusion that
"The Government's proposal is completely unacceptable to the
defense." However, Leen's proposed "solution" clearly reflects
an inadequate and incomplete level of objection to the
government's wholly outrageous proposal. Defendant Bell
suggests that America's history and practice of "public trials"
with public testimony and public evidence, is supposed to be
primarily intended to protect a defendant's rights, but is
secondarily and strongly intended to protect the public (and
NOT simply the government-employed public!) against crooked
government officials and employees and their practices.
Indeed, for example one of the most direct impediments to
espionage trials is the usual requirement that "classified"
evidence must be de-classified to be used at trial. This makes
it public information! Prosecutor London is apparently
treating this case as if it were a spy trial, but at the same
time he is cutting corners, legally, by asking for (and
receiving, if the sham continues) the luxury of keeping the
"classified information (in reality, people's addresses) secret
both during and (presumably?) after trial! So far he won't even
say how many such addresses he wishes to protect in this way!
(less than a dozen? Hundreds? Thousands?)
8. Even more oddly, London's PAO clearly anticipates
showing all of this material to Defendant Bell, presumably
including the addresses he wishes to "protect," while the more
"obvious" solution in such cases would be to redact (black out
in a copy, or cut out, etc) whatever information he doesn't
wish Bell to have.
While Bell can't endorse either system for obvious reasons,
he can at least point out that the latter system would have
the major advantage of not impeding his access to the vast
majority of materials where there is no arguable problem,
including not prohibiting him from even taking notes (!)
which would seem to be a thoroughly obnoxious attack on his
ability to prepare a competent defense!
Defendant Bell has already argued and accused the
government in his other filings of simply intending to delay
his case and impeding his preparation of his defense for 3+
months (as of 3/10/01) on the flimsy fabricated excuse of
denying him access to a few "addresses." If the government
is now willing to show him all of discovery including those
addresses (but with extreme impediments to his access to and
use of all of it, including the vast and presumably non-
controversial majority) but is not willing to give him
unimpeded access to a redacted version, this will prove beyond
all doubt that Bell's accusations were absolutely true.
9. Defendant Bell also points out that unless he is
able to keep permanently the discovery material actually
delivered to him, he will be unable to later prove the
government's improper denial of discovery (even just that
subsequent to this date) later on. Some criminal case appeals
stand or fall based on the government's failure to have
produced to the defendant all evidence including exculpatory
evidence, so without a record of what's given, there is no way
to prove what's been omitted.
This reminds Bell that in whatever form the material is
actually provided, the government should also include an
indexing system which will prove (or disprove) the inclusion
of any given piece of discovery should other material later
appear. Bell suggests a microfilming process, perhaps.
Signed [Signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of this document
to the Court's office, to the United States Attorney's office,
and to Robert Leen's office this 14th day of February,
2001.
[signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Robert Leen, 601 Union Street Suite 4610, Seattle WA 98101
Rob London, Assistant United States Attorney, 601 Union Street,
Suite 5100, Seattle WA 98101
Tacoma Federal Court Clerk, 1717 Pacific Avenue, Tacoma WA 98402.
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 74]
FILED
MAR 16 2001
Jack E. Tanner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
) Motion to Suppress Evidence
) from and Associated with
v. ) November 17th Search of Def't
) Bell's Car; Discovery
) Requested. Evidentiary
James Dalton Bell ) Hearing Requested.
Defendant )
_______________________________)
Comes now the Defendant, James Dalton Bell, who declares that
he is effectively and unwillingly unrepresented, and that
his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel has been repeatedly and
intentionally violated since on or about December 1, 2000.
Defendant Bell has repeatedly sent letters to the court asking
for substitute counsel, and two separate motions by attorney
Robert Leen have been essentially ignored since mid-
December, 2000.
2. On November 17, 2000, Defendant Bell was arrested
20 feet from his legally-parked (on private property) and
locked car. Bell hadn't been "pulled over" pursuant to any
"traffic stop." No other persons were in or near Bell's car.
There were numerous witnesses to this incident: It was done
in the parking lot of a "Burgerville" restaurant on Mill
Plain road in Vancouver Washington, in the Heights area.
At least 10 minutes after Bell had been handcuffed and
locked in a (Vancouver City?) police car, an unidentified
officer told Bell that his car was going to be searched.
Bell immediately responded that the police had no probable
cause nor even reasonable suspicion to do any search, and that
no search was then necessary for any so-called "security" or
to officer safety" reasons.
The officer then smirked and chuckled, and said that the
car was going to be searched anyway, regardless.
Defendant Bell believes that this search was, in fact,
ordered to be done, even illegally, without any warrant,
simply based on their desire to get into the car. Bell
suspects that the police were illegally instructed by others,
not at the scene, to take at least one, and probably more than
one object from the car, and that they did so. Further, they
apparently did so without benefit of warrant or other actual
or apparent justification.
3. Further evidencing their illegal intent, those
doing the known-to-be-illegal search did not leave (or give
to Bell) any receipt or listing describing any objects taken
from the car. Defendant Bell believes that the reason the
police felt so free to do an illegal search is that those
instructing them did not intend to use anything found in the
search as evidence in court. Their intent was simply to
steal.
This makes them (and the people feeding them the
instructions) guilty of burglary, done under the color of law.
A further significance of this illegal entry is that it may,
and likely does, render illegal the fruits of a warrant partly
served November 6, 2000.
Therefore, Defendant Bell specifically demands as
discovery, records of all communication or co-operation
between Federal employees and Washington State or local
(Clark County, or Vancouver Washington) law-enforcement
or government employees in direct or indirect association
with this case.
Defendant Bell also demands an evidentiary hearing
which includes local and non-local (those in radio, telephone,
computer, or other communication with those at the scene or
intermediary dispatchers or officers, etc) witnesses to this
incident which may include a number of Vancouver Police
Department and/or Clark County Sheriff deputies, as well as
any government employees and others feeding the local officers
information and instructions. Bell also demands the disclosure
of the list of objects taken or placed November 6th or
November 17, or any secretly-placed object known to be present
in the car (later to have been purchased by Bell) during
the period of January 1997 and December 2000.
Defendant Bell requests suppression of any evidence
derived (regardless of date and time) from or with the
assistance of (including radio transmissions) any object
retrieved during the search of his car November 17. Bell
also requests a sanction from both the Federal government
and the local police agency (Vancouver PD) doing the illegal
search, of $20,000, payable to Bell and owed jointly and
severally.
4. Defendant Bell asserts that according to 18 USC 3504
the US must disclose the existence of evidence obtained as
the primary product of an alleged unlawful act, or because it
was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act. Bell
asserts that an unknown government agency (not necessarily
the same one or ones associated with the current charges)
illegally planted objects in multiple vehicles associated
with Bell's friends and family, the former group of which is
best represented by a "beeper" (tracking transmitter) placed
on the car of "J. Copp," as well as placement of a similar
(or identical) device on defendant's car some unknown time
BEFORE the November 6 search.
5. Defendant Bell asserts that these acts were illegal
because they were done for political (opposition to Bell's
political/social philosophy and ideas) reasons, EVEN IF it
is argued that normally no warrant is necessary to place a
"beeper" while a vehicle is in a public spot: The device
was placed for an illegitimate reason, rather than a legitimate
one. Another illegal reason was to be able to monitor Bell's
progress as he collected incriminating evidence against various
government employees: The pattern of the specific items taken
during the November 6th search proves this easily.
6. An aircraft following a vehicle in which Bell was
travelling about 9:00 PM on November 16, 2000 from the
Troutdale, Oregon area to the Mount Tabor, Oregon area
(east Portland, Oregon), done with a Cessna 150 aircraft
usually parked in the open approximately 100 feet away from
the east gate of the Troutdale airport demonstrated the
obvious existence of electronics-assisted tracking: Bell
asserts that this following of that vehicle constitutes
"stalking" within the legally-accepted meaning, which was an
illegal act no matter who did it.
To support and demonstrate this claim, Defendant Bell
demands as discovery the air-traffic control radar tapes
for the Portland area from 7:00 PM to 11:00 PM on November
16, 2000, as well as audio-tape copies of all voice ATC
radio communication frequencies covering the Portland and
Troutdale airport areas for this time period.
7. Defendant Bell also demands the flight logs
(including scheduling data kept elsewhere) for this Cessna
150 aircraft as well as all other similar aircraft in the
Portland Metro or nearby area used to track "beepers" or
follow vehicles on the ground.
Defendant Bell also demands the processed data obtained
from any such flight (including data collected by satellite)
showing the location of any vehicles and their movements,
over time, of any vehicle being tracked in any way "associated"
with Bell's case, including family and friends and other
associates.
Defendant Bell also demands technical details, including
all user- and technical manuals for each piece of hardware
used (including transmitters, receivers, uplinks and down-
links, computer readouts, and others) in order to process
and deliver the location information.
The data delivered to Bell may, and probably will,
require the provision and inclusion of appropriate software
to convert that data to human-interpretable form. Defendant
Bell demands this, as well.
Signed [Signature]
Defendant, James Dalton Bell
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of this Motion
to the Court's Office, to the United States Attorney's office,
and to assigned Attorney Robert Leen's office this
14 day of March, 2001.
[Signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Robert Leen, 601 Union Street Suite 4610 Seattle WA 98101
Rob London, Assistant United States Attorney 601 Union Street
Suite 5100 Seattle WA 98101
Tacoma Federal Court, Attn: Court Clerk, 1717 Pacific Avenue,
Tacoma WA 98402
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 75]
FILED
MAR 16 2001
Jack E. Tanner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, ) No. CR00-5731JET
)
) Defendant Bell's Motion to
) Deny Witness, Suppress
) Evidence, and Dismiss
) Certain charges Due to
v. ) Violation of Fed, Rules of
) Evidence, Rule 615:
) Exclusion of Witnesses
James Dalton Bell )
Defendant )
_______________________________)
Comes now the Defendant, James Dalton Bell, who declares that
he is effectively and unwillingly unrepresented, and that
his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel has been repeatedly and
intentionally violated since on or about December 1, 2000.
Defendant Bell has repeatedly sent letters to the court asking
for substitute counsel, and two separate motions by attorney
Robert Leen have been essentially ignored since mid-
December, 2000.
In the November 17, 2000, Complaint and the November 29 indictment
a "Jeff Gordon" is claimed as a victim in Count 2. Later, in
Count 3 of the Superceding Indictment (January 25, 2001 originally
filed; accepted February 16) "Jeff Gordon" was named as a
victim. [No paragraph 2.]
3. Participating in the November 6 search of Defendant
Bell's residence was one "Jeff Gordon" previously known by Bell
as a government agent. He was apparently intimately involved
in the search through and selection of items to take.
4. Attending the Jan 3 and Jan 5 hearings, and during
other hearings since then was Jeff Gordon, same as the one
present at the November 6th search. During these appearances
he was at all times sitting in the visitor's area, not at the
prosecution table.
5. During one of these two hearings (probably January 5)
and due to strong prompting by Defendant Bell, assigned-
attorney Robert Leen requested the exclusion of all potential
witnesses from the hearing. (Leen "played dumb" to Bell,
pretending to want to know from Bell the reason for such an
exclusion, in particular the justification rule involved. Now,
Bell can report that it's Rule 615, "Exclusion of Witnesses.")
The Court didn't even bother officially "refusing" the request,
not even commenting on it!
6. As Defendant Bell understands it, the 1972 proposed
rules for Rule #615 pointed out:
"The efficacy of excluding or sequestering witnesses has
long been recognized as a means of discouraging and exposing
fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion. 6 Wigmore 1837-1838.
The authority of the Judge is admitted, the only question being
whether the matter is committed to his discretion or one of right.
The rule takes the latter position. No time is specified for
making the request."
7. Rule 615 begins:
"At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses
excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other
witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion."
[underline mine.]
Apparently the Court had no discretion to refuse or ignore
appointed-attorney Leen's request, but it did so anyway,
particularly since at the date it was requested offending
potential-witness Cordon was in the room.
Defendant Bell considers this to be an egregious and
outrageous violation of his rights, as well as being quite
intentional violation of Rule 615, particularly and especially
because the "victim"-"witness" in question was actually also
present and making vital decisions at the November 6, 2000
warrant-search of Bell's residence. His ability to tamper
with evidence, read and/or take material not properly described
as seizable evidence in the warrant, plant objects or documents
for later "discovery," retrieve objects previously illegally
planted, and other misfeasance and malfeasance was essentially
unhindered and virtually encouraged.
Defendant Bell believes that a careful study of the items
of "evidence" taken November 6, 2000, will show that virtually
all of them were taken without proper justification, and that
Jeff Gordon motivated this highly improper process.
8. Therefore, Defendant Bell motions the Court to exclude
all evidence obtained in the November 6 warrant-search from
the prosecution's use, due to its intentional contamination during
the search process by the known-improper participation of "Jeff
Gordon." Defendant also motions the court to exclude all
evidence derived from this search.
9. Defendant Bell motions the Court to exclude from the
prosecution's case the testimony of Jeff Gordon, due to the
government's intentional allowing of Gordon to participate in,
control, and direct the case, as well as having access to and
power over evidence-collection processes and results.
10. Defendant Bell motions the Court to dismiss all charges
naming Jeff Gordon as a "victim," due to the extremely unusual
and improper nature of his access to and participation in and
control of this already-odd criminal case, including the Court's
failure to exclude (Pursuant to F.R.E. Rule 615) Cordon from the
courtroom on multiple occasions since January 3, despite the
proper request of Defendant's appointed attorney.
Signed, [Signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of this document
to the Court's Office, to the United States Attorney's office,
and to Robert Leen's office this 14 day of March, 2001.
[Signature]
JameS Dalton Bell, Defendant
Robert Leen, 601 Union Street Suite 4610, Seattle WA 98101
Rob London, Assistant United States Attorney, 601 Union Street,
Suite 5100, Seattle WA 98101
Tacoma Federal Court Clerk, 1717 Pacific Avenue, Tacoma WA 98402
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 76]
FILED
MAR 16 2001
Jack E. Tanner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
) Bell's Response to: Leen's
) motion adoption; Govt's
v. ) Improper "Response" to Leen's
) Representation Motion;
) Bell's objection to Court's
James Dalton Bell ) self-representation suggestion;
Defendant )
_______________________________)
Comes now the Defendant, James Dalton Bell, who declares that
he is effectively and unwillingly unrepresented, and that
his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel has been repeatedly and
intentionally violated since on or about December 1, 2000.
Defendant Bell has repeatedly sent letters to the court asking
for substitute counsel, and two separate motions by attorney
Robert Leen have been essentially ignored since mid-
December, 2000.
[Add Page 2, 29 March 2001.]
----->
2. Leen has "adopted" a series of filings by Defendant Bell.
Those filings had been immediately previously questioned by the
government: The government didn't want to have to answet- Lhem-
In itself, and superficially, this "adoption" sounds okay, but
lacking trustworthy legal advice Defendant Bell feels the need
to respond as follows.
3. However, Leen stated in his March 8th filing that
Bell's motions were "noticed" for the 16th of March. There are
a number of problems with such a notice date, only some of which
can be listed here.
First, the March 16 hearing has been set (according to one
of Leen's recent communications) as an "in camera" hearing: It
is excluded from the public. Defendant Bell objects to excluding
the public from routine matters in this case.
Second, the government (astonishingly) filed a response to
Leen's motion concerning his replacement. Defendant Bell
certainly cannot stop prosecutor London from having an opinion
on his representation, but he strongly believes that the
government can't legitimately have any sort of "say" in the
matter. If Bell had legal counsel he could trust, perhaps he
would be told this in more specific, detailed, and accurate terms.
Giving London a "say" in whether or not Bell gets a new attorney
is something like giving the fox a say in the type of lock used
to close up the henhouse.
What makes London's behavior particularly inflamatory is the
face that he has repeatedly attempted (and to varyinp, degrees,
succeeded) in tampering with the relationship between Bell and
his assigned attorney: In early December 2000 lie induced Leen to
agree to a deal where Bell wasn't to be given access to virtually
any discovery, a deal unapproved by the Court until over a month
later. This deal continues today, and perhaps even for the
forseeable future. The eventual claimed reason for this was that
there were some "addresses" in the discovery (material originally
taken in the November 6 search) which the government wanted to
deny Bell. Quite oddly, in the subsequent 3.5 months there has
apparently been no attempt to redact (blank out) those few (?)
addresses and deliver the remainder of the thousands of pages of
----->
discovery to Bell: Defendant Bell suspects and suggests that the
real goal was simply to delay the entire process of the defenses
progress, and they considered "a few addresses" to be a good-
enough excuse to justify the denial of the enormous remainder of
discovery for 3.5 months. The fact that the government's most
recent proposal actually anticipates showing ALL discovery to
Bell (though presumably not giving him even 1/100 of the time
necessary to study it, and denying him even the right to take
notes) while presumably (7) rejecting Bell's counter-idea to
simply redact the offending addresses, strongly confirms Bell's
suspicions.
Prosecutor London further tampered with Bell's relationship
with Leen by even challenging Bell's competency to "assist in his
defense", a claim that was laughable when originally made and
becomes ever more ludicrous with each of his subsequent filings.
London improperly resisted Leen's replacement in January 3-5
by making false claims about Bell's previous relationships with
his assigned attorneys: Contrary to the implications of London's
claims then and recently, Defendant Bell has never (before Leen)
attempted to fire his attorney, on any prior matter. London
knows full well that both attorneys Avenia and Mandel resigned
(Avenia "successfully"; Mandel was actually forced on Bell, and
seemingly vice versa, by Judge Burgess in a two-day hearing
in May-June 1999. Prosecutor London was on that case, by the way.)
In Avenia's case, Bell wasn't allowed to comment substantially
on Avenia's motion to resign (many of Avenia's comments were
false or misleading) but at the time Bell saw no reason to air
his complaints since Avenia was going to be replaced, anyway,
and belaboring the issue was not (then) vital to that case.
For prosecutor London to cite that change-of-representation in
this current matter is detestable. The fact is, Avenia had
repeatedly lied and misrepresented to Bell his claimed intent to
actually follow through on an investigation he had promised to do
late-July 1998. Avenia also covered-up a small portion of this
abortive investigation done late-January 1999, resigning within
a week, and claiming that his investigator Sharon Callas (who had
travelled 150 miles each way to Vancouver/Portland) had resigned
and "disappeared" also within a week or two of this investigatory
trip. Bell hasn't been able to get a straight answer out of the
Federal Public Defender's office in confirming those claims or
providing specific dates of resignations, but it has been
confirmed that no evidence of any sort of report or notes
concerning that trip were in the file. Defendant Bell suggests
that Attorney Avenia's sudden and unexpected resignation (after
about 1 3/4 year of representing Bell) along with Callas, less
than a week after a trip to collect evidence expected to be
potentially highly embarrassing to various government personnel
or even incriminating, strongly suggests that Avenia and Callas
were either frightened off by what Callas found or they were
warned off by potential targets (government personnel) of their
investigation.
In Mandel's case, she did essentially nothing to prepare
Bell's probation-revocation case, and (astonishingly) even
refused to call ANY witnesses for Bell despite Bell's repeated
insistence over 9 months (to Avenia) and the next two months
(to Mandel) that three vital government personnel present at an
illegal (warrantless, Linder circumstances where the law ostensibly
requires a warrant) search on about June 23, 1998 be called as
witnesses. It should be noted that this matter is currently on
appeal: Defendant Bell was denied a meaningful hearing to
determine exactly why Mandel refused Bell's numerous though
normal and reasonable requests for investigation and witnesses.
Indeed, Mandel's request for resignation was REFUSED by Judge
Burgess, and she was forced against her will (and also against
the will of Bell) to continue to represent Bell during a 2-day
very strained hearing.
Oddly, and quite suspiciously according to Bell, this
"forced representation" has virtually become a hallmark of Bell's
cases, as has been true of Leen since early December, 2000.
Bell suggests that this is by no means an accident: By installing
a "warm body" attorney next to Bell, the court proceedings can
continue regardless of the lack of a real defense, and the
officers of the court can pretend that they are going through
the various motions of hearings, etc.
4. Bell reminds the Court that virtually no useful work has 4
been done on his case (other than that done by Bell himself,
and even Bell regrets his relative inability to collect evidence,
contact witnesses either in person or by telephone, subpoena
various records, etc.) since very early December 2000 due to Leen's
continued (mis-)"representation" of Bell,
Further, contrary to a previous suggestion of the court that
Bell might choose to represent himself, Bell points out the
virtually-total impossibility of his actually doing so,
particularly in a pre-trial setting: Even ignoring for the
moment Bell's lack of any legal education, the conditions under
which he is currently incarcerated virtually totally prevent and
prohibit him from resources and communications channels that are
generally considered vital to a "real lawyer" in today 's world:
Email, fax, electronic data search, word-processor, unmonitored-
telephone, unmonitored mail to witnesses and experts, easy
travel to various sites for research, and so forth. Even worse,
Defendant Bell has seen three incidents in the last 2 weeks
(one directed against himself personally) where BOP guards not
merely rummaged through an inmate's legal files, but it fact
took them to his office and carefully read page after page,
in total violation of any hope of confidentiality.
Quite simply, Bell cannot generate nor keep any document
in his case that has sensitive information on it that the
government shouldn't see, in EXTREME contrast to "real lawyers"
whose work-product is guaranteed secure not merely by the U.S.
Constitution, and law, but also hundreds of years of legal
tradition in America. Bell cannot contact virtually anyone
without the total knowledge of the government, a situation which
would be considered totally untenable for a "real lawyer."
Bell shouldn't have to remind "real lawyers" that being
pro se (doing one's own legal work) is dramatically different
depending on whether it is an appeal (post-conviction) or pre-
trial situation. Appeals don't usually have witnesses, evidence,
or even a need for secure communication. Pre-trial work requires
ALL these things, as well as the need for secure (untampered by
the sticky fingers of guards and others) storage. Since Bell
is allowed none of these things and won't be in his current
situation, the "choice" given to him by the Court is entirely
meaningless and untenable.
5. Many of Bell's pending motions were written for and
ought to be heard only after counsel and Court are substituted.
(See: Motion to Reconsider Recusal of Court...") and these
substitutions (particularly counsel) has had time to study
them for a reasonable period, including other filings and
evidence. (Defendant suggests 2-3 weeks at least, or more
depending on replacement's attorney.)
6. Defendant has already noted and requested (But Leen
has apparently done nothing on) an interlocutory appeal on various
appealable matters. Defendant Bell believes that it may be
inappropriate to deal with some (but not all) of these matters
while the appeal is pending.
7. Defendant has motions pending (Recusal of Court) that
current law prohibits the Court from refusing without a hearing
in another forum. If decided for Defendant, it would be
inappropriate to refuse subsequent matters until a replacement
is appointed.
8. Despite Leen's "adoption" of these motions, the
government has not responded to them, and it may claim it has
not had the time to do so, at least since Leen's delayed
"adoption." Defendant Bell expects and requests a written
response for each of these motions well before any hearing,
which he believes is common court courtesy. Having not gotten
such a response to all of them as of March 13, Defendant Bell
believes those motions are either uncontested (and should,
therefore, be granted) or yet more delay needs to be requested
by the government.
9. Defendant Bell is aware that the defense is guaranteed
a 30-day trial preparation period, which he has previously
referred to as being impossible to start'until all discovery
has been provided DEFENDANT (NOT merely his claimed attorney).
Bell suggests that since essentially no discovery has been
provided as of March 12, that 30 day period has not begun.
10. Sadly, Defendant Bell strongly suspects that unless
Leen is replaced and the currently-scheduled (?) trial date of
April 2, 2001 is struck, this is a clear signal that the Court,
the Prosecutor and Leen himself have decided to do an "end run"
around not merely the U.S. Constitution, current law, but
virtually every ethical principle and precept that modern
judicial practice dictates. These court officers need to consider
for themselves and decide why it is that no matter how much
they may hate Defendant Bell's writings and political opinions,
why they simply won't give Bell the opportunity to defend himself
by exposing the misdeeds of others. Do they really believe that
the exposure of a few years of politically-motivated spying
against one individual would, itself, wreck the system? Bell
reminds these people that the extensive spying system and secret
files done by late FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, done over many
decades and involving perhaps thousands of now-admitted-illegal
wiretaps and bugs eventually was revealed and publicized, and
to Bell's meager knowledge no government employee was ever tried
or convicted for participation in this thoroughly illegal
practice. So what do these guys have to fear about revealing
their actions against just one man?
Signed, [Signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of this Declaration
to the United States Attorney's office, the Court's Office, and
to Robert Leen's office this 14 day of March, 2001.
[Signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Robert Leen
601 Union Street Suite 4610
Seattle WA 98101-3903
Rob London, Assist. U.S. Atty, 601 Union St Suite 5100, Seattle
WA 98101
Tacoma Federal Court, Court Clerk, 1717 Pacific Avenue, 98402
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 77]
FILED
MAR 16 2001
Jack E. Tanner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
)
)
v. )
)
)
James Dalton Bell )
Defendant )
_______________________________)
Comes now the Defendant, James Dalton Bell, who declares that
he is effectively and unwillingly unrepresented, and that
his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel has been repeatedly and
intentionally violated since on or about December 1, 2000.
Defendant Bell has repeatedly sent letters to the court asking
for substitute counsel, and two separate motions by attorney
Robert Leen have been essentially ignored since mid-
December, 2000.
2. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rule 12 (b)(1)
allows the defense to move for pretrial disclosure of an
informant's identity. The Ninth Circuit has held that the
government must reveal the informant's identity if the defendant
meets the burden of proving that disclosure would be helpful to
his defense or essential to the fair determination of the case.
U.S. v. Sanchez, 908 F.2d 3443 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Roviaro
v. U.S., 353 U.S. at 60-61)
3. On January 29, 2000 the government wrote to assigned-
attorney Leen citing Fed. R. Evidence 404 (b): It intended to
show "similar acts" evidence by defendant. Defendant Bell
believes that this stated intention by government "opens the
door" (if it wasn't already open) to the Defendant's need to
demonstrate "prior bad acts" ' by the government and its own agents
during the 1995-2000 time frame; In general, Defendant alleges
that government personnel and their agents/informants engaged
in a series of (usually secret, or at least intended to be so)
hostile acts against Bell and others for purposes of harassing
him and them, and punishing him and them for taking political/
social positions and publicizing them in a fashion intensely
disliked by government.
These bad government acts include:
a) Stalking of Bell both electronically and physically
(interception of cordless telephone transmissions, illegal
eavesdropping, tracking transmitter use) for "political"
reasons: Because they did not like the fact that Bell had
written and published his essay, "Assassination Politics"
and that it became easily obtainable on the then-emergent
Internet. this stalking included close intrusion into Bell's
nearby neighborhood in collusion with private individuals,
violating electronic surveillance laws.
b) Infiltration by a confidential informant, calling himself
Steve Wilson, of the meetings and organization of the
Multnomah County Common Law Court, whose members and attendees
were known or presumed to be highly unsympathetic to the actions
of various governments and their agencies such as the U.S.
Federal government. This infiltration was motivated by
political/social reasons, not legitimate law-enforcement
purposes.
c) Later, Steve Wilson in May 1997 violated Washington State
anti-eavesdropping laws by recording a private conversation
without the consent or knowledge of all parties to the
conversation, which legally constitutes a conspiracy to
violate the law.
d) In collusion with the Federal Government, the Portland Police
in 1996 began a campaign of harassment of attendees of the
Multnomah County Common Law Court meetings, including thinly-
disguised "traffic stops" of those people, hoping to seize
their cars on a pretext.
e) Engaged in a stalking campaign (April-May 1997) against Bell
and others, including acts such as following them by aircraft
and following by road in a harassing and dangerous fashion.
f) Misused confidentially-obtained information to improperly
obtain a wiretap warrant. (circa August 1997)
g) Illegally gave a number of informants in Kitsap County Jail
Bell's personal and confidential information, in violation of
both Federal law and binding prior agreement.
g) [sic]Instructed thug and fellow inmate Ryan Thomas Lund (DOB
10/27/71) to assault Bell due to his "uncooperativeness",
which Lund did on November 25, 1997. (This incident has
been referred to in government papers filed in this case, BUT
significantly it was never denied.) This four-time felon
(Clark County, Washington, 1994, and Clackamas County Oregon,
1994; illegal drugs; possession of sawed-off shotgun; grand
theft) was discovered to possess a 9-shot New England Arms
revolver and illegal drugs (apparently methamphetamine) on
about July 2, 1997 on a state search warrant also attended by
Federal BATF agent Mike McNall, in Clark County Washington.
Extremely oddly, however, despite the fact that Lund was
legally prohibited from owning the gun and admitted his
ownership during the search, Lund was not arrested as a
result of the search. Arrested in October 27 near Eugene,
Oregon, an astonishing three days after issuance of the
arrest warrant on October 23, 1997, Lund was transferred
first to Portland, Oregon, where he spent a week in proximity
to various Federal government investigators interested in
Defendant Bell's case. Subsequently he was transferred to
Seatac Federal Detention Center. Lund's reward for his
government service was approximately 8-10 years off the
sentence he should have received, a trick accomplished by
misrepresenting his criminal history (specifically, ignoring
two prior controlled substance felonies in handling sentencing
rule 2K2.1) as if he should have been sentenced as 2K2.1 (a)
(6) when in fact the rules, if followed, would have required
2K2.1 (a) (2). Also, they discounted the appropriate adder,
2K2.1 (b) (5) which, if followed, would have added four
more "offense level" points to Lund's crime. Lund was
offered and received a 27-month deal, rather than about
120 month (10 years), a "discount" of at least 8 years.
h) Improperly allowed another fellow inmate/informant to keep
approximately $10,000 improperly-obtained Federal Government
money as motivation for his improper assistance against
Defendant Bell. (Summer/Fall 1997, at Pierce County Jail and
later Seatac FDC.)
i) Engaged in electronic and physical stalking behavior against
Bell and various relatives in the days before June 23, t998,
at various locations including: Wintler County Park, David
Douglas Park, and three other locations on the same day in
Vancouver, Washington.
j) Sent an ugly bald man to spy on Bell at a political meeting at
about 7:00 PM June 19, 1998, in Orchards Washington, with
two attempted-infiltrators passing as people interested in
the meeting. Same ugly bald man was pretending to read a
paperback book, titled "MGH".
k) Defendant Bell contends that this campaign has continued
in the Summer of 2000 using tracking transmitters.
4. Defendant Bell believes that the pattern of stalking,
spying, and harassment against him by the Federal government
and its lackeys (and, specifically, the dates on which it occurred)
will convince a jury that the Federal government declared a
secret "war" against Bell and his ideas as early as 1995
(using almost-unbelievable tactics strongly reminiscent of its
works against recently-accused FBI spy Hanssen) and that its
failure to find any justification to file charges against Bell
until nearly two years later (April 1997) after this campaign
began shows that their actions were not for any legitimate
law-enforcement reason. Quite simply, they were spying on what
they saw as a "political" opponent, one they feared would
ultimately shut down their system. (the extent of this spying
still hasn't been admitted or disclosed.)
5. Therefore, Defendant Bell motions the Court to order
the government to reveal the identities of all informants related
to the case(s) related above: Any person, whether or not a
government employee, who acted in any fashion to observe, contact
(including to assault), follow, or otherwise monitor (locally
or remotely) Bell or his family or friends, provide information
about same, or allowed surveillance equipment or people to be
installed in (or remain installed) in their houses (whether
rented or owned) to surveil Bell, his family or friends, during
the period of December 1994 to date; and the same for all such
people doing the same to the Multnomah County Common Law Court
and any of its participants or attendees.
6. Defendant Bell asserts that it is not merely the actions
of any single individual which will expose and challenge the
highly improper nature of the government's "war," but the pattern
of such activity showing a concerted campaign, behavior that
would have been expected of the Gestapo, the KGB, or Iran's
Savak.
7. Defendant Bell also requests discovery from the
government concerning records of all such surveillance, including
employee work records, airplane flight records, surveillance
tapes (both audio and video), tracking-device-derived information
("beepers"), surveillance logs, aircraft flight records doing
any such surveillance, and other information relating to these
cases.
Signed, [Signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of this document to
the Court's office, to the United States Attorney's office,
and to Robert Leen's Office this 14 day of March, 2001.
[Signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Robert Leen, 601 Union Street Suite 4610, Seattle WA 98101
Rob London, Assist. United States Attorney, 601 Union Street,
Suite 5100, Seattle WA 98101.
Tacoma Federal Court Clerk, 1717 Pacific Avenue, Tacoma WA 98402
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 78]
FILED
MAR 20 2001
HON JACK E. TANNER
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
) MOTION TO ADOPT DEFENDANT'S
) MOTION TO SUPPRESS, DEFENDANT'S SELF
v. ) FILED SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE, DEFENDANT BELL'S
) MOTION TO DENY WITNESS, MOTION TO REVEAL THE
) IDENTITY OF INFORMANTS; BELL'S RESPONSE TO
JAMES D. BELL ) Note: 03/30/01
Defendant )
_______________________________)
COMES NOW the Defendant, JAMES D. bell, by and through
counsel, who moves to adopt the defendant's second set of pro se
filings dated March 14, 2001 as defense motions.
Respectfully submitted,
[Signature]
Robert M. Leen WSBA #14208
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of
this pleading to the United States Attorney's Office
this 19 day of March 2001.
[Signature]
Robert M. Leen
Robb London
Assistant United States Attorney
601 Union Street
Seattle, WA 98101
FAX: (206) 553-0882
ROBERT M LEEN
WSBA#14208
ATTORNEY AT LAW
TWO UNION SQUARE
601 UNION STREET SUITE 4610
SEATTLE WASHINGTON 98101 3903
(206) 748-7817 FAX (206) 748-7821
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 79]
FILED
MAR 20 2001
Jack E. Tanner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
) [Handwritten]
) 3/18/01 Partial Witness
v. ) List
)
)
James Dalton Bell )
Defendant )
_______________________________)
Comes now the Defendant, James Dalton Bell, who declares that
he is effectively and unwillingly unrepresented, and that
his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel has been repeatedly and
intentionally violated since on or about December 1, 2000.
Defendant Bell has repeatedly sent letters to the court asking
for substitute counsel, and two separate motions by attorney
Robert Leen have been essentially ignored since mid-
December, 2000.
[Handwritten]
1. Due to Leen's refusal to do substantial work on my
case, and to preserve my rights, I submit the
following partial witness list:
Ryan Thomas Lund
Joane Maida
Robert Gombiner
Steve Wilson
Charles Vollmer
Lisa Stevenson
Ernest "Ernie" Grissell
David King
Alverna King
Daniel J. Saban
Leslie Spier
Jeff Gordon
Mike McNall
Steve Mueller
[Signature]
James Bell 3/18/01
Certificate of Service
Copies mailed to Court, Prosecutor London on 3/18/01
[Signature]
James Bell
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 80]
FILED
MAR 20 2001
Jack E. Tanner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff, )
)
) No. CR00-5731JET
)
) Motion to Order Government
) to Rapidly Return Material
v. ) Taken from the Defendant
) After or Before Trial
)
James Dalton Bell )
Defendant )
_______________________________)
Comes now the Defendant, James Dalton Bell, who declares that
he is effectively and unwillingly unrepresented, and that
his 6th Amendment Right to Counsel has been repeatedly and
intentionally violated since on or about December 1, 2000.
Defendant Bell has repeatedly sent letters to the court asking
for substitute counsel, and two separate motions by attorney
Robert Leen have been essentially ignored since mid-
December, 2000.
2. On November 6, 2000, government agents executed a
search warrant at Defendant Bell's residence, apparently taking
many hundreds of pages of documents with no even arguable
support from the wording of the search warrant.
3. Some of these documents were, in fact, legal-case
files legally purchased from Federal and State courts: For
example and specifically, a case from Seattle (civil) Federal
Court (Lund v. U.S.) and (criminal) Tacoma (a Lund criminal
case from 1997) and numerous copies from Clark County, Washington
District and Superior courts. Also a specific police traffic
report from early 1998 from Bremerton, Washington.
Defendant Bell believes and asserts that, contrary to proper
search-warrant execution practice and rules, many if not most of
the documents taken in that search were not described in the
search Warrant itself, and despite numerous requests by Bell
during the search itself, no search warrant affidavit was
present to guide or alert those doing the search. Bell believes
that specialized knowledge by one government agent present,
Jeff Gordon (also named, apparently, as a "victim" in the
subsequent November 29, 2000 indictment) was improperly relied
on to identify and select for taking most if not all of the
documents actually seized in the search.
Defendant Bell should not have to remind the officers of
the Court, presumably all lawyers with the commensurate training
of such, that proper service of a search warrant is intended to
not allow any ambiguity or leeway: Given a particular search
warrant and a given collection of objects/documents to be looked
through, different searchers should choose the same set of objects
to take. This intended policy and practice requires, of course,
that special knowledge of the intent of that search is not only
not required, but is in fact totally unusable: An object not
described by the warrant cannot legitimately be seized simply
because the officer involved "knows" that its omission from the
warrant was undesired.
4. Other of these documents were printouts from publicly-
available Internet data sources (if online Yellow pages" and "white
pages"), and internet-derived (and thus, openly available) online
websites, and others.
5. Defendant Bell has been denied virtually all access to
the documents actually taken, and has generally been limited to
seeing the short, vague description (one page, total) of the
material taken (generated on-scene). Bell believes that if
and when he is given more detailed access, he would be able to
easily prove that the materials taken in the November 6 search
essentially bear no resemblance to the dictates and descriptions
in the search warrant.
6. In fact, Bell believes that the vast majority of the
documents taken (and perhaps all of them) share a distinct
characteristic undescribed and defined by any issued search
warrant: They were taken precisely because they were believed
(by special knowledge of officer Gordon) to be material collected
as evidence of improper activities and crimes by Federal officers,
as well as secret, undercover and quite possibly illegal
government and government-personnel activity.
7. The American Revolution was fought over, among other
things, the issuance of British so-called "General Warrants,"
or "Writs of Assistance," which were documents granting authority
to the agents of King George III to enter a house or other
building and do virtually anything they wanted, and to take
anything they wanted. In the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, this activity was prohibited: Warrants had to
specifically describe items to be seized. Despite major abuse
over the last few years by courts, this principle remains valid
even today, even if honored more in the breach than the observance.
8. Unless the Court is willing to acknowledge the common
view among scholars that the Fourth Amendment is virtually dead
today, Defendant Bell believes that he has a right NOT MERELY to
challenge and prohibit the USE of the material taken in that
November 6 search in a trial, but he also has a right to pursue
and study a pattern in the taking of that material which, in reality
reveals a highly-illegitimate motivation not merely in the minds
of people as they chose what to take, but also challenges their
sincerity about their intentions with respect to the entire
search before it started.
Thus, Defendant Bell alleges an intent on the part of those
planning and participating in the search to do a "burglary under
color of law."
9. Except in specific and predictable cases (seizing
stolen goods, illegal drugs and other contraband, or illegally-
possessed "classified" information) the purpose of the "seizure"
in "search and seizure" is NOT supposed to be the permanent, or
that matter necessarily even the temporary deprivation of the
material (and, in particular, the documents) involved from the
person searched.
For example, modern photocopier technology has long been
capable of duplicating documents, and if police (term used
generically) had any intention of following the dictates of the
U.S. Constitution, they would be and in fact would feel themselves
obligated to make copies of all warrant-justified documents and
to leave the copies (or for that matter, the originals) in the
person or people searched.
Likewise, modern computer technology allows for complete
copies of a computer's hard drive to be made in minutes, and
likewise, they would not "take" any computer, but in fact would
at most merely copy its contents.
But as the late comedian John Belushi was famous for saying,
"But Noooooooo!!!" Government investigators have learned that,
with the connivance of like-minded judges through the legal
system, they can harass, impede, and disrupt, and in fact
PUNISH (before trial!) targets of investigations by not simply
copying information, but in fact intentionally depriving that
target of the information for months or even years.
10. This is by no means a theoretical problem: On April
1, 1997, a swarm of over 20 Federal government investigators
acting on a wildly overbroad warrant (which was, in fact,
further executed in a a wildly overbroad manner) essentially
robbed Defendant Bell of virtually anything they wanted to take
regardless of its inclusion on a search warrant. The also used
a "boilerplate," "everything but the kitchen sink" computer-
generated warrant that would have horrified any of the Founding
Fathers of the US Constitution: Those honest men, long dead,
never intended to allow police to simply describe any sort of
item they might want to seize in ANY search, combine all such
descriptions in a document without any support for every or
even any particular line-item, and re-generate that document
automatically whenever they need a warrant. Yet, sadly, this
is the current state of what passes for "the law.
Most of those items taken were returned only in the late-
summer of 2000, well after 2 years past the time they were
obligated to do so. Worse, they still haven't returned the two
computers, having occasionally claimed (without benefit of a
judge's order, or even asking for same!) that they "had to" keep
them for vague, unstated reasons. Numerous repeated complaints
by Defendant Bell to his traitorous then-lawyers Peter Avenia
and (later) Judith Mandel achieved exactly nothing: They either
did nothing, or what they did had no effect.
Bell asserts that this incident demonstrates clearly the
illegitimate practice of, in effect, "robbing" a person to be
searched, under color of law and a search warrant (even if the
warrant is assumed to be valid) simply for the purposes of denying
the property.
11. Demonstrating their illegitimate reasons for wanting to
keep/deny the contents of this information, on December 12, 1997
(the same day Bell was sentenced on a crooked, already-seriously-
violated plea agreement) the then-prosecutor Anne Marie Levins
actually "carried water" for the government investigators by
asking for and receiving (without allowing Defendant to challenge)
permission from then-Judge Burgess to erase names and addresses
from Bell's property before it was returned, despite the fact
that this had never been agreed-to by Bell in any plea-agreement
negotiations, or for that matter had never even been requested.
Defendant Bell points out that this action clearly demonstrated
the "We can do anything we want, we're more important than you"
attitude prevalent among Federal government employees.
But quite revealingly, this shows a powerful and secret
motivation for the November 6, 2000 search: These investigators
obviously believe that anything they take from a victim of their
thinly-disguised burglaries can be permanently denied to him: This
means that the investigators have every (illegitimate) reason to
take numerous items regardless of the requirements of the law and
of the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution.
12. Defendant Bell challenges the government to provide,
as a part of required discovery, statistics on the number of
government investigators (if any) actually punished (by fine,
imprisonment, etc) for the last 10 years, as a percentage of the
total, having engaged in activities during a warranted search
beyond what that warrant actually authorized.
Bell believes that these meager statistics will destroy the
credibility of those doing the abusive search on November 6:
Not one of them would have even felt the slightest fear of
punishment, no matter how improper or illegal their actions
became that day.
13. Defendant Bell asserts that Prosecutor London's actions
provide clinching proof of the government's illegitimate intent:
Any intent on November 6 to permanently deny Bell access to the
materials taken in the search would have to have been followed
by further denial of access to this material, which is in fact
precisely what has happened. But even the latter denial is
illogical, at least for the reason given (a false claim that Bell
intended to publish this material on the Internet, particularly
since a contrary statement by Bell in court was pointedly ignored
and not challenged) because implicitly a temporary denial would
still eventually end and then the material could still be published
should Bell (or anyone else) wish to do so.
The real reason, Defendant Bell accuses, is that the government
has always intended to (illegally) deny Bell access to this taken
material permanently , but they did not and do not want to admit
this and certainly not before any sham trial: Such an admission
could strongly suggest to any jury that the real reason for the
November 6 search was simply to rob Bell of material that would
expose, embarrass, or even incriminate government employees and
and agencies, and further (as has been quite consistent with
London's unethical acts since then) to even deny Bell the ability
to use the illegal and improper nature of and intent behind that
search to defend himself.
13. Therefore, Defendant Bell motions the Court to order
the government to relinquish all discovery material and seized
property/evidence to Bell (or if he chooses, his designee)
immediately after trial, without exception or excuse or other
delays including appeal issues if any.
14. Further, Defendant Bell motions the Court to order the
government to deliver copies of all this discovery material to
Bell's designee by April 10, 2001, regardless of the occurrence
or non-occurrence of a trial up to that point.
15. Further, Defendant Bell motions the Court to order the
government (and every employee, agency, contractor, or other)
to deliver all copies of any such materials they have to Bell
or his designee, keeping nothing, in any form for themselves or
their agencies, and delivering to Bell or his designee a complete
and accurate inventory of that material and the time and reason
it was obtained by them, on or before May 20, 2001.
16. Bell asks the Court to issue substantial penalties for
even temporary non-compliance with this order.
Signed, [Signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I forwarded a true copy of this document to
the Court's office, to the United States Attorney's office, and
to Robert Leen's office this 16 day of March, 2001
[Signature]
James Dalton Bell, Defendant
Robert Leen, 601 Union Street Suite 4610, Seattle WA 98101
Rob London, Assist. United States Attorney, 601 Union St Suite
5100, Seattle WA 98101
Tacoma Federal Court Clerk, 1717 Pacific Avenue, Tacoma WA 98402
[End of document.]
[Docket No. 81]
FILED
MAR 22 2001
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, |
Plaintiff, |
| Case No. CR00-5731JET
v. |
| ORDER
JAMES DALTON BELL, |
Defendant. |
___________________________________|
THIS MATTER comes on before the above-entitled Court upon the
Defendant's Motion for Discovery.
Having considered the entirety of the records and file herein,
it is now
ORDERED that the defendant's motion is (doc. #60) is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part. The motion is GRANTED insofar as it
allows the defendant access to discovery under the following rules:
1. Defense counsel is permitted to make copies of the discovery
materials only to the extent necessary to aid in the preparation of a
defense, and any person given access to the materials must agree to
the following restrictions on the dissemination of these materials.
2. Defense counsel and the defendant shall not be permitted to
distribute the discovery materials to third parties or the public
without prior approval of the Court.
3. The defendant shall be permitted to view such materials in a
conference room designated by the staff of the Federal Detention
Center at SeaTac, and shall not be permitted to remove from that room
any of the discovery material or any notes that he makes while
reviewing the material.
4. At the conclusion of the instant case, the original discovery
materials and all copies shall be returned to the Government.
The clerk of the court is instructed to send uncertified copies
of this Order to all counsel of record.
DATED this 22nd day of MARCH 2001.
[Signature]
JACK E. TANNER
SR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
_____________________________________________________________________
car
United States District Court
for the
Western District of Washington
March 22, 2001
* * MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK * *
Re: 3:00-cr-05131
True and correct copies of the attached were mailed by the clerk
to the following:
Robert Louis Jacob London, Esq.
U S ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
STE 5100
601 UNION ST
SEATTLE, WA 98101-3903
FAX 553-0755
Robert M Leen, Esq.
CROWLEY LEEN
STE 4610
601 UNION ST
SEATTLE, WA 98101
FAX 748-7821
[End of document.]
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