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23 June 2000

Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2000 13:48:05 +0100
To: cypherpunks@algebra.com
From: ryan@havenco.com (Ryan Lackey)
Subject: CPUNK "havenco weapon choices"

Our security model is fairly simple.

HavenCo's security comes from tamper-resistance and redundancy across multiple locations, as well as an operational security model which prevents HavenCo staff from interacting with customer machines directly. We rely on Sealand's security to protect our machines from theft, and to the extent possible to prevent denial-of-service, but against an all-out military threat, they would primarily be a speedbump, just like the guards guarding US nuclear weapons armed with M-16s.

Sealand's security is multi-layered:

1) Proximity to Britain prevents any power from bringing in serious weapons (other than Britain, or with British assistance/complicity/trust).

2) British court precedent and strong legal tradition assure that any challenges from the UK will come in the UK courts, where we are confident of our ability to fairly defend.  The British are decidedly not terrorists.

3) Sealand has the ability to defend against rogue NGO/terrorist attacks using weapons which could secretly be brought into the waters near Sealand.

4) Sealand's onsite security policy prevents staff/accident/visitors from taking over Sealand or affecting HavenCo operations.

The question of what weapons we use to accomplish #3 is relatively minor. "Not creating security incidents themselves" is one of the key factors in the decision...defending against #3 should not make #1, #2, or #4 more difficult.  This is why we don't do things like storing large quantities of toxic waste onsite, etc. -- it's more likely to just leak for accidental reasons than for us to be attacked militarily.  We will not purchase/install/use weapons which by their purchase/installation/use lower our overall security.

The primary threat on Sealand is something minor, like someone falling down a shaft, or burning themselves in the kitchen, or falling overboard, just like any other site.

Of course sensors/detection are much more important than response.  It was not up to me what content Wired's editors chose to include in the final revision of the article.  It would be pointless for us to spend huge amounts of money on weapons and none on sensors.  We've discussed putting some information from our sensor systems, particularly those inside machine rooms, up on the Internet, in real time.

Someone mentioned poles over the helipad; this has been done for 20+ years. I believe some of the photographs include some of the poles.  You could still try fast-roping, but having experienced the high wind endemic to the location, I personally wouldn't want to do it from the height required.

I only concern myself with the security of HavenCo and customer operations; we have dedicated security staff to handle Sealand and physical security.

--

ryan@havenco.com    
Chief Technical Officer
HavenCo, Ltd. ||| Secure Offshore Colocation ||| http://www.havenco.com/
1024D/4096g 0xD2E0301F B8B8 3D95 F940 9760 C64B  DE90 07AD BE07 D2E0 301F