4 July 1998: Link to "Future Weapons Systems: Technolgies Required," provided by Peter Leitner
29 June 1998
Source: Hardcopy from the
U.S.
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
See related news report
BXA Dual Use Web site: http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dualuse.htm
HEARING
before the
Committee on Governmental Affairs
on
The Role of DTSA in Approving
Critical Technology Exports
Thursday, June 25, 1998
10:30 a.m.
342 Dirksen Senate Office Building
WITNESS LIST
Panel I
DR. PETER LEITNER
Senior Strategic Trade Advisor
Defense Technology Security Administration
Panel II
MR. FRANKLIN C. MILLER
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction
Dr. Peter M. Leitner
before the Committee on Governmental Affairs
of the United States Senate
June 25, 1998
10:00 a.m.
Dual Use Technology Export Licensing Process: Wired to Fail
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today to discuss the transfer of so-called dual-use technologies to potential military adversaries and countries engaged in nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation. I would like to state for the record that I am appearing here today in response to a subpoena and not as a spokesman for DoD or the U.S. government.
For the past 12 years I have been a senior strategic trade advisor within DoD's Defense Technology Security Administration. I have served as international negotiator for export controls over machine tools, controllers, robots, industrial equipment, software, and navigation and guidance equipment. I was also the chairman and head of the U.S. delegation to the Paris-based eight-country study group on Advanced Materials for Weapons Systems and the study group on Defense Production Technology and Equipment. In addition, I have been a licensing officer overseeing exports to various proscribed countries including China, Libya, Iraq, former Warsaw Pact countries, Iran, and India. Currently, I am DoD's representative to the Subcommittee on Nuclear Export Controls (SNEC). My tenure has given me the opportunity to witness the birth, development, maturity, and premature death of DoD's credible role as the guardian of U.S. technology security.
Let me state up front that over the past six years the formal process to control exports of dual-use items has failed its stated mission -- to safeguard the national security of the United States. On several levels, what passes for an export control system has been hijacked by longtime ideological opponents of the very concept of export controls. Six years ago, opponents of export controls were granted direct responsibility for managing the Defense Department' s role in this important process. DoD has suffered the greatest damage. Unfortunately, the wrecking ball is still swinging, and on October 1, 1998, it will level the last vestiges of DoD's role in the process.
1
Through a tireless campaign, the opponents of export controls have managed to destroy the 16-nation Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (CoCom) and decontrol vast arrays of critical military technology, rewire the U.S. domestic export control process so that it is structurally unsound and unable to safeguard our security, and erect a series of ineffectual domestic regulations and international working groups designed to project a false impression of security, deliberation, and cooperation. This Potemkin Village has been constructed to deceive both the Congress and the American people and lull us all into a false sense of security while short-sighted business interests line their pockets at the expense of future generations of American soldiers and citizens alike
Mr. Chairman, the single point of greatest failure in maintaining a credible export control system was the neutering of the Defense Department's traditional role as the conservative anchor. First, DoD's key staff were effectively removed from the chain of command and the decision-making process within DoD. DoD abandoned its traditional role and instructed DoD employees to side with the Commerce Department and isolate the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) on many issues.
The campaign to isolate DTSA began in earnest with the arrival of David Tarbell as the director of DTSA. DTSA personnel were cut off from most technology security-related activities in the Defense Department. Whereas DTSA was once the linchpin for these issues within the department it was quickly marginalized by its own leadership. To clamp down this quarantine, DTSA management instructed the Pentagon to, in effect, prohibit DTSA personnel from receiving the USDP Daily Report, a summary of a broad range of issues important to DoD staff (see Attachment 1). This cut-off was both malicious and damaging to the organization's mission. It should be noted that the Daily Report, an E-mail distributed document, is available to hundreds of other OSD personnel, including interns.
As if these steps were not enough, as part of the campaign to marginalize but maintain the illusion of an effective organization -- DTSA management placed staffers with little to no experience or technical aptitude in key positions representing DoD in interagency meetings. DTSA representation has become the joke of the interagency process due to its putting its weakest foot forward. In addition, the revolving door of compliant military personnel being hired into DTSA civilian vacancies has helped to undermine the morale and competence of the entire organization. It should be noted that these practices were among the dozens of findings in a devastating 1992 DoD/IG report.
2
As the purpose of today's hearing is to review the licensing process, I would like to begin by describing the current process, how it has changed over time, and the impact of these changes upon our national security. The three charts in Attachment 2 [here shown within text] are designed to illustrate these issues.
Chart 1
___________________
As shown in Chart 1, Pre-1992, a typical export license application followed a relatively straightforward path. The process began when an application was submitted to the Commerce Department. If Commerce deemed it appropriate the case was staffed to State, Defense, Energy, ACDA, or the NRC for review. Each agency provided its recommendation to approve, deny, or refer to one of the specialized interagency subcommittees on nuclear, missile, or chemical-biological warfare (CBW) issues. If agencies could not arrive at a consensus-based position, then the case would be escalated to the Operating Committee. If the WMD-focused subcommittees failed to agree, then the case would be escalated directly to the Advisory Committee on Export Controls (ACEP).
Chart 2
___________________
Chart 2 depicts the erection of the first of the firewalls that have come to dominate the process. This invisible barrier represents the unwillingness of DoD officials to escalate disputed cases beyond the ACEP. Unfortunately, in this process, failure to escalate and fight on behalf of a minority view means you lose. Commerce was quick to sense DoD's lack of resolve. Then the predictable took place. Commerce began pushing the envelope on virtually all issues and boldly overruled a weak and ineffectual DoD. It wasn't long before DTSA staff began receiving stunning instructions from their director to support DoC on a variety of issues. DoE and ACDA increasingly distanced themselves from DoD positions because of DoD' s failure to protect its own mission areas. It should be noted that national security-minded staff in DoE were being similarly undermined.
Chart 3
___________________
Chart 3 shows the process calcifying with the promulgation in December 1995 of Executive Order 12981. This highly deceptive document purported to broaden DoD's role in export licensing by increasing the number of cases DoD would be permitted to review. But what the right hand giveth, the left hand taketh away. The Executive Order divorced the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) focused committees from the ACEP and elevated the Commerce-chaired Operating Committee to new heights of power and influence by breaking the peer relationship with its sister committees and making it the only committee to report to the ACEP. The Missile Technology Export Committee (MTEC), the Subcommittee on Nuclear Export Controls (SNEC), and the Shield (Chem/Bio issues) committee were all relegated to insignificant positions as they lost the ability to vote a case directly to the ACEP. Thus a second firewall was erected and serves as a barrier to prevent the most knowledgeable participants in the interagency process from being able to directly inform policymakers on the most profound technology transfer issues of the day.
3
As if these changes weren't enough, the Executive Order also shortened the time available for the USG to screen license applications. Combined with a further draconian shortening of the time allowed by DTSA management to review cases within DoD, the system is designed for failure. For example, when a case comes to DoD for review DTSA's internal engineering staff have approximately four hours to undertake a technical review of perhaps 20 to 30 cases each day. Approximately 70 percent of the cases are approved outright based upon the meager information contained in the license. The technical reviewer generally does not get a second look at the case. Agencies have only 10 days to ask questions. After that no questions are allowed.
As the charts in Attachment 3 reveal, at the same time that the December 1995 Executive Order was handed down, DTSA's role in the process was further diminished. DTSA in turn slashed the role played by the armed services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency by limiting the number of licenses referred for their review. These organizations, of course, possess the most credible and critical decision support information. DTSA's shutting them out cripples efforts to discern the national security implications of licensing decisions. In addition, DTSA management began arbitrarily dismissing valid intelligence information because "it was over one year old." Thus when faced with evidence that would have traditionally been termed "a smoking gun" the chain of command now capriciously rejects intelligence data and technical analysis when it suits them.
Matters are even worse in the case of supercomputer licensing.
The Defense Department was the leader in successful efforts to decontrol exports of supercomputers capable of processing vast quantities of complex information and supplied funding and other forms of assistance to contractors hired to justify preconceived policy initiatives in this regard In a strategic context, such computer systems typically figure in weapons development la'~oratories, nuclear weapon simulation and modeling facilities, ICBM warhead design activities, and a host of other critical military applications. DoD's leadership harked right back to the role played by the new DoD chain of command in decades-long efforts to reform [read scrap] the export control system centered at the National Academy of Sciences.
Was it any wonder that DoD officials were unhappy when the Congress mandated, in Section 1211 (a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, that Commerce was required to forward to the Defense Department all computer license applications for systems exceeding a certain level of performance? This new authority was an unwanted gift to some in DoD who led the charge to decontrol the very computers Congress addressed in the law. The White House immediately sought to
4
neutralize this congressionally mandated requirement by requiring the signature of an under secretary in order to object to such an export (see Attachment 4). The Commerce Department narrowed the window even more by refusing to recognize the right of DoD officials to delegate authority internally.
As we meet today, the administration appears poised to announce yet another round of unilateral supercomputer decontrols. This time many fear that administration excesses will extend well above the current unjustifiable 7,000 MTOPS level. In 1995, "President Clinton [unilaterally] decontrolled computers up to 2,000 MTOPS [from the previous CoCom ceiling of 260 MTOPS] for all users and up to 7,000 MTOPS for civilian use in countries such as Russia" and China. This will enhance proliferators ability to pursue design, modeling, prototyping, and development work across the entire spectrum of weapons of mass destruction. The weapons design establishments of Russia and the People's Republic of China stand to reap the greatest benefit from further decontrol.
Just last year, DoD officials went along with a proposal from a minor DoE office director to decontrol oscilloscopes -- an item controlled for nuclear nonproliferation concerns. Remarkably, rather than opposing this reckless initiative, which was not coordinated with higher-level authorities, DoD counter-proliferation and DTSA officials supported it. DTSA officials even went so far as to bar its employees from addressing the vital nuclear weapons applications for oscilloscopes and limited position papers to the non-nuclear military uses of these instruments -- a weak argument at best, as they were controlled for nuclear non-proliferation reasons only.
A quick peek inside the instrumentation trailers and shacks set up around the Indian and Pakistani nuclear test sites would likely reveal scores, if not hundreds, of advanced oscilloscopes, reflectometers, computers, transducers, spectrometers, and other data-capture instruments whose export decontrol was championed by the administration. The United States developed and pushed decontrol both domestically and in the already ineffectual international regimes known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar dual-use technology regime. The oscilloscope decontrol took effect in 1997, just in time for India and Pakistan to freely procure as many oscilloscopes as they needed to install at their test sites. The Department of Defense became the incongruous champion of the wholesale decontrol of advanced computers while the Department of Energy promoted the decontrol of oscilloscopes despite the fact that they were originally invented to support DoE's nuclear test program. The main beneficiaries of these decontrols were intended to be the U.S. oscilloscope manufacturers and their Swiss affiliates which lobbied the Clinton administration in an effort to freely export their nuclear-proliferation sensitive products to India and China.
Nothing can more graphically illustrate how deeply embedded is the refusal to say no in DoD's current psyche than the DTSA internal routing sheet in Attachment 5. This
5
sheet is used to solicit and coordinate positions and recommendations on important issues including Memoranda of Understanding (MoU's), international agreements, data and exchange meetings, exemptions to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) policies, waivers and exemptions to established policies -- including satellite launch policies. As you will notice, there are only two possible options given for DTSA analysts to return: Approval or Approval. The analyst who seeks to deny an export has no avenue to express an objection.
On October 1, 1998, the final death knell will sound for DoD's role in the export control process. The pending merger of DTSA into the new Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is a national security disaster in the making. This reorganization will result in the removal of DTSA from OSD Policy and place it within the Acquisition part of DoD.
First, historically, DTSA and Acquisition have been bitter adversaries over sanctions and export controls. Acquisition's primary interest naturally lies in lowering the unit cost of goods they procure for the military and in maintaining a healthy defense industrial base. Exports are seen as important profit centers, and overseas markets have long been viewed as a primary means of achieving economies of scale and lower unit costs. Export controls, sanctions, and embargoes appear, through Acquisition's lens, as running contrary to their mission.
Second, the merger will create a basic conflict of interest. DTSA is often asked to express an opinion/judgment on export license requests that Acquisition is sponsoring. This is true for both dual-use and ITAR items and involves several organizations. Placing DTSA under the command of parties that are net exporters raises the serious specter of conflicts.
Third, calling for the physical relocation of DTSA from its traditional Crystal City location and dropping it out at Dulles airport will be the coup de grace. DTSA personnel have been key players in interagency meetings and activities including SNEC, OC, MTEC, Shield, NEVWIG, missile launch arrangements, Wassenaar, etc. Personnel will no longer attend a great many meetings, planning sessions or crisis teams, which are essential if DoD is going to regain its former status as a credible player in the interagency process.
Fourth, the new director of DTRA is a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory staffer who will occupy the position for a few years as an IPA fellow. This creates yet another conflict of interest as DoD staff often deny cases bound for DoE-financed programs within the former Soviet Union. Most of these programs are administered by DoE labs including Livermore. These denials have generated considerable anger throughout DoE in spite of the fact that DoE refuses to turn over evidence, repeatedly
6
requested by DoD of a technology security plan for U.S. financed technology transfer programs. These programs alone are deserving of a major round of congressional oversight hearings.
For the Defense Department, both uniform and career civilian personnel, the philosophy of containment and technical superiority endures as an echoing mantra. The philosophy of the Department of Commerce, however, is one of economic engagement. This philosophy is generally agreed with, if not vigorously endorsed, by high level political appointees in all departments and agencies -- including DoD.
These philosophies are, of course, diametrically opposed. Technology sold to a potential adversary that can be used to close the technical gap between its military systems and ours diminishes our national security. Any short-term gain in our economy would, with this result, represent at best a Pyrrhic victory. The flip side to the argument is that by engagement our economy is improved. This provides incentives for increased R&D to maintain the technical gap. The biggest beneficiary in such a cycle would be the defense industry, which would be called upon to save us from our own trade policy.
The National Science and Technology Council Committee for National Security listed three conclusions in its Phase 1 Progress report briefing (28 April 1997):
1. Government controls over controlled technology are effective within legal and regulatory guidelines, but license decisions are generally made based on narrow evaluation factors and so do not include analysis of multidimensional and long-term effects2. The government does not have a comprehensive understanding of the effects on U.S. national security interests of the international flow of both controlled and uncontrolled technology.
3. Collecting and analyzing sufficient data to develop a comprehensive understanding of the international flow of both controlled and uncontrolled technology and its effects on U.S. national interests to determine if adjustments to policy are called for would be a major undertaking.
Controlled technology is being redefined as uncontrolled technology at an unprecedented rate and is being exported despite the fact that the government does not have a comprehensive understanding of the effects on national interests. While claims of "regulatory effectiveness" are made relative to controlled technology (again, which is being nearly defined out of existence), the government has no clue concerning multidimensional and long-term effects. Why? -- it would be a major undertaking and would almost certainly expose the recklessness of current export control policy.
7
The export control system works only when there is a strong degree of creative tension between agencies. This natural adversarial approach ensures full and open debate. In addition, it is vital that higher echelons be regular participants in the process, and this is only achieved through escalation of issues to their level. Pre-emptive surrender because one does not want to involve higher authorities or because one is afraid that escalation may be misinterpreted as a personal failure to resolve issues does a great disservice to the agency's mission, the process, and this nation's physical security. DoD's consistent pattern of weak or no opposition, capitulation, and failure to escalate issues is the single greatest factor in the loss of tension from the system and its consequent failure to execute its mission.
Tragically, nowhere in this government are analyses being performed to assess the overall strategic and military impact of the technology decontrols I have described in my testimony before the Joint Economic Committee on June 17, 1997 and April 28, 1998. Nor are any analyses being performed on the impact of the day-to-day technology releases being made by the dysfunctional export licensing process. Yet it is precisely at the "big picture" level where the overall degradation of our national security will be revealed. Without such assessments the government will continue to blunder along endangering the lives of our citizens unnecessarily.
8
USDP DAILY REPORT FOR
09 April 1997
SPECIAL OPS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
(U) FY 1996 REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO I0 U.S.C. 2011, TRAINING OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES WITH FRIENDLY FOREIGN FORCES.
(U) PRESIDENT'S TRAVEL TO THE CARIBBEAN.
STRATEGY & REQUIREMENTS
(U) NDP DIRECTOR JEHN SPEAKS TO NORWEGIAN DELEGATION:
(U) PEACEKEEPING TRAINERS CONFERENCE:
(U) FAILED JUSTICE SYSTEMS:
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
(C) [ blank ]
(C) [ blank ]
(U) ZAIRE HEARING.
2
(C) [ blank ]
(C) [ blank ]
(C) [ blank ]
(U) POTUS CARIBBEAN SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE DRAFTING MEETING.
(S) [ blank ]
(U) HAITI/LABOR UNREST.
(U) MEETING WITH GUATEMALAN DATT.
(U) PANAMA.
(C) [ blank ]
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
(U) CWC UPDATE.
3
(FOUO) NSC COMMENTS ON AIRBORNE LASER:
POLICY SUPPORT
(FOUO) ENCRYPTION.
(U) USAF SPECIAL OPERATIONS SCHOOL.
ATTACHMENT 2 [See three charts within text]
[Five full-page bar charts converted here to text]
Percent of Cases Referred to DIA
1992: XXXXXXXXXXXX 51
1993: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 63
1994: XXXXXXXXX 35 1995: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 62 1996: XXXXXXXXXX 39 1997: XXXXXX 24 1998: XXXXX 18
Percent of Cases Referred to NSA
1992: XXXXXXX 27
1993: XXXXXXXXX 37
1994: XXXX 16 1995: XXXXXXX 27 1996: XX 8 1997: XX 9 1998: XXX 10
Percent of Cases Referred to AIR FORCE
1992: XXX 12
1993: XXX 11
1994: XXXXXXX 27 1995: XXXXXXX 28 1996: XXX 10 1997: XX 6 1998: X 2
Percent of Cases Referred to ARMY
1992: XX 7
1993: XX 8
1994: XXXX 18 1995: XXXXXX 24 1996: XX 6 1997: X 4 1998: X 1
Percent of Cases Referred to NAVY
1992: XXXX 15
1993: XXXXXXXXX 36
1994: XXXXXXXX 32 1995: XXXXXXXXXXX 44 1996: XXX 12 1997: XX 7 1998: X 5
|
[ATTACHMENT 5 not provided; however, the text appears to describe Attachment 4]
HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS |
|
[Image of supercomputer] |
The decontrol of all computers below the 500-CTP threshold would
suddenly make available to any proliferant state-of-the-art CAD/CAM or
signal-processing workstations that are more capable than anything in the
US defense sector. An example of the strategic importance of such access
can readily be seen in the aerospace/missile development field. High-speed
ultra-precise and graphic-intensive workstations employing advanced (but
recently decontrolled) software such as Computational Fluid Dynamics or Finite
Element Analysis would obviate the need for expensive thermally conditioned
wind tunnel facilities. The ability to rapidly model and alter size, shape,
density and material characteristics in three dimensions and real time is
what these workstations were designed for. A proliferant country could then
totally conceal its R&D efforts for, say, ballistic or cruise missiles
until it has developed a flyable prototype. Workstations at this level also
play a pivotal role in the design and development of microprocessors integrated
circuits dense memory etc., thus providing the critical enabling technology
for indigenous commercial and military devices.
A severe impact would also occur in the areas of ASW, STEALTH,
C3I, C4I, Tactical Weather Forecasting, Nuclear, Chemical,
Biological weapons development as well as each of the 21 critical military
technologies identified in the DoD Critical Technologies Plan (see below).
This impact is directly related to the computational, memory, speed, storage,
networkability, communications and graphics performance of systems in the
range decontrolled. |
| STRATEGIC IMPACT
An analysis of the technology embodied in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) reveals that the continual erosion of export controls has resulted in the decontrol of virtually every system or sub-system at the heart of this nations strategic and ballistic missile defense capability. Examples include:
NORAD has just brought up to operational status an upgraded computer system to receive and integrate data from its region and sector operations control centers. This $10 million system consists of two types of Hewlett-Packard computers rated at 189 and 99 - 300 MTOPs respectively. This newly decontrolled system is illustrative of the strategic applications which will quickly be made available to potential adversaries. The decontrol of such powerful computing/analytical platforms obviates the need for large computing facilities or mainframe supercomputers such as a CRAY for weapons design, testing or command and control. Coupled with the recent and anticipated relaxations in the area of telecommunications, this makes rapidly relocatable and survivable C3I possible and testing of advanced weapons highly portable, concealable and inexpensive. |
The 21 Critical Technology areas:
|
| © 1997 Peter M. Leitner | |
IMPACT OF HOT SECTION DECONTROL |
||
| Decontrol by metaphor will yield the greatest results. Terms
such as "Hot section" have no intrinsic meaning and can be defined to fit
a particular audience. In addition, use of the term carries a certain rhetorical
appeal as it can be argued that limited risks are being taken because it
is only for one small part of an engine and will be limited to civil engines.
This will effectively mask the equal utility of the underlying technology
in military engines. Technologies, Materials, and components which will be
become free from export restraints by decontrol of "civil" hot sections include:
|
||
| Materials: Superalloys Ceramic Matrix Composites Metal Matrix Composites Organic Matrix Composites High Temperature Bearing Steels Intermetallics Powder Metallurgy Florinated Polymides High Modulus Organic Fibers Elastomers, Monoplasts, Phenolic Resins Carbon/Carbon Matrix Silcon Carbide Matrices
Coatings: |
Coating Systems: Chemical Vapor Deposition (CVD) Physical Vapor Deposition (PVD) Thermal-Evaporation PVD (TE-PVD) Electron-Beam PVD (EB-PVD) PVD-Resistive Heating PVD-Cathodic Arc Discharge Pack-Cementation Plasma Spraying Slurry Deposition Sputter Deposition Ion Implantation Ion Plating Laser Hardening
Bearings:
Software: |
Technology: Thin Wall Cooling Hot Isostatic Presses Machine Tools Electro-discharge Machines Ceramic Core Manu. Equip. Ceramic Shell Wax Pattern Prep. Equip. Gas Turbine Brush Seal Manu. Equip. Tools, Dies, & Fixtures for Solid State Joining Precision Hole Drilling Single Crystal. Directionally Solidified Blade Manu. Equipment Precision Investment Casting Water Jet Machining Forging Diffusion Bonding Cooled & uncooled turbine blades Airfoil to disk techniques
Components: |
Synergistic Effect of Decontrolling
|
||
Solutions |
Costs |
Effectiveness |
| Sealed Cockpit: No windows or protective shell around pilot when entering high threat environment. | Tens of $ Billions | Most Effective. Technology does not yet exist. Current sensors are as vulnerable as human eye to laser exposure. |
| Brilliant stand-off weapons: Autonomous fire and forget, high precision, munitions carriers using multi spectral sensor arrays. | $ Billions | Poor Tactical Substitute. Extreme cost, small warheads, on-board sensors vulnerable. |
| Volumetric on-board defense system: Mini-lasers on aircraft project diffuse Laser pattern to polarize or ionize flight envelope as barrier to hostile Lasers. | $ Billions | Doubtful utility. Technology does not yet exist. Special sensors needed to "see through defense barrier, active barrier will increase electro-optical detectability of aircraft. |
| Countermeasures: Reflective, scattering, absorptive, material deployed between laser source and target. | Hundreds of $ Millions | Doubtful utility against fixed targets, ineffective against mobile targets. |
| Anti-Laser homing missiles: Detect and ride beam back to source and destroy it. | Hundreds of $ Millions | Minimally Effective, easy to counter. |
| Personal protective devices: Eyeglasses, shutters, visors, etc. | Tens of $ Millions | Least effective, narrow bandwidth |
| © Peter M. Leitner | ||
[Note: Peter Leitner has provided hardcopy of the following Future Weapons Systems tables. See: http://jya.com/dtsa-fws.htm]
FUTURE WEAPONS SYSTEMS: Technologies Required [3 pages]
48 technologies matrixed for 78 weapons systems, marked Essential, Important, HelpfulAerothermo-dynamics
Bearingless Rotor
Burn Through Shroud
CAD/CAE/Simulation
Ceramics
Cesium checks
Chemistry
Coatings
Compact Cryogenics
Composites
Correlation Sonar
Crystal Growth
Displays
Elastomerics
Electronics, High-power
Encryption
Explosives Chemistry
Fiber Optics
Gas Bearings
Heat Lamp
High Power Battery
High Pressure Pumps
Hydraulic Press Design
Hydraulics
Instrumentation
Know-how
Laser Detector
Laser
Machining
Magnetostrictive devices
Manufacturing
Materials
Matrix Detector Production
Metals
Microelectronics
Monomolecular Fluid
Optics
Phase Shifters
Piezoceramics
Power Source
Radar Sensors
Receiver
Sensors
Signal Processor
Software
Spectroscopy
Superconductors
Telecommunications
FUTURE WEAPONS SYSTEMS: Microelectronic Technologies Required [3 pages]
24 technologies matrixed for 78 weapons systems, marked Essential, Important, HelpfulAutomated Production
CAD Equipment
Chemical Plasma Etchers
Clean Room Design and Filters
Czochralski Crystal Pullers
E-Beam Mask Makers
Epitaxial Growth (VPE, MBE)
High-Power Packaging Know-how
High-Purity Polysilicon
High-Speed Gate Know-how
Ion Implanters
Ion Millers
Know-How to Optimize for Military
Low-Pressure CVD
Magnetically-Enhanced Sputtering
Materials Characterization
Optimized Layout Know-How
Parametric Testers
Reactive Ion Etchers
Scanning & Stepping Proj. Aligners
VSLI Circuit Testers
Wafer Probe Testers
Wire Bonders
100+ Pin Packing Know-How
06/24/98 WED 08:53 FAX
SUBPOENA
000002
To Dr. Peter Leitner
Pursuant to lawful authority, YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear before the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS of the Senate of the United States, on June 25 , 1998, at 10:00 o'clock a.m., at its Committee Room, 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building Washington, D.C. 20510, then and there to testify what you may know relative to the subject matters under consideration by said Committee.
Hereof fail not, as you will answer your default under the pains and penalties in such cases made and provided.
To ____________________________________ to serve and return.
Given under my hand, by authority vested
in me by the Committee, on this 17th day of
June, 1998.[Signed Fred Thompson]
Chairman, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
[Two page resume]
Dr. Peter M. Leitner
|
|
| PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT | |
| February, 1998 to Present |
CO-EDITOR IN CHIEF, JOURNAL OF POWER & ETHICS. New journal sponsored by the Southern Public Administration Educational Foundation dedicated to exploring the nexus of power and ethics in the formulation, administration, and implementation of a wide variety of public and private policy initiatives. The initial volume is scheduled to be released in 1999. |
| September, 1996 to Present |
SENIOR STRATEGIC TRADE ADVISER, DEFENSE DEPARTMENT. Principal Policy analyst and international negotiator for all aspects of export controls over machine tools, controllers, robots, industrial equipment, software, navigation and guidance equipment. Former Chairman and head of US delegation to Paris-based 8-country study groups on Advanced Materials For Weapons systems and Defense production Technology and Equipment. Licensing officer for US exports to: China, Libya, Iraq, former Warsaw Pact countries, Iran and India. Currently, DoD representative to the Subcommittee on Nuclear Export Controls (SNEC). |
| October, 1984 to September, 1986 |
COMPUTER SPECIALIST, US GENERAL SERVICES ADMIN. Managed reimbursable computer programming, maintenance and support program. Supervised team of specialists, system analysts and programmers in the development of databases, E-mail, local area networks and security services. |
| May, 1984 to Present |
ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY (CURRENTLY), MOUNT VERNON COLLEGE (95-PRESENT) AND SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY (84-88). Taught the following MBA level courses: Export/Import Management, Marketing Management, Information Resource Management, International Marketing, Intercultural Management, International Finance, International Relations and Developing Nations. Student populations are culturally diverse and largely international. |
| May 1973 to October, 1984 |
CONTRACT AUDIT SPECIALIST, US GENERAL SERVICES ADMIN. Responsible for overseeing conduct and follow-up of all audits performed by the Office of the Inspector General in the National Capital Area. |
| June 1977 to May, 1973 |
GAO EVALUATOR, US GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. Team leader/member for a wide variety of multi-country reviews of U.S. military, foreign aid and represented GAO in several ongoing international negotiations. Supervised, coordinated, trained and directed audit staffs based in Panama, Bangkok, Frankfurt and Washington. Assignments included the following issues: Law of the Sea Treaty, host nation support for U. S. military forces, military assistance to Egypt, the Egyptian defense industry, the Sinai Field Mission, access to the suez Canal for nuclear-powered ships, accounting education in the Third World, and maneuver damages caused in the FRG. |
| EDUCATION | |
| 1994 DPA 1992 MPA 1977 MA 1976 MA 1975 MA 1974 BS |
Public Administration, University of Southern California Public Administration, University of Southern California International Relations, Northern Arizona University Science & Public Policy, Washington University American History, State University of New York Political Science/History, State University of New York |
| MILITARY SERVICE | |
| 1970/71 | U. S. Army, Army Security Agency, Honorable discharge. |
| PERSONAL | |
| Top Secret and SCI security clearances Health: Excellent Married 4 Children Professional Affiliations: Society of Manufacturing Engineers, American Political Science Association, Air Force Association, disabled American Veterans, American society for Public Administration |
|
Publications |
|
| Books | Decontrolling Strategic Technology, 1990-1992: Creating the Military
Threats of the 21st Century. (Lanham, Md: University Press of America,
1995).
Reforming the Law of the Sea Treaty: Opportunities Misses, Precedents Set and U.S. Sovereignty Threatened. (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 1996). NANSHA War in the South China Sea. (Forthcoming) [Fiction] Handbook of Public Quality Management. (New York, N.Y.: Marcel Dekker Publishers, Inc., Fall 1998) Co-edited volume under contract with publisher. Fighting Back: Waging Guerrilla Warfare Within Large Organizations. (In progress. Projected publication, Winter 1999) |
| Articles: | "Ethics, National Security and Bureaucratic Realities: North, Knight,
and Designated Liars," American Review of Public Administration. Vol.
27 No. 1, March 1997: 61-75. Coauthored with Ronald Stepak.
"A Bad Treaty Returns: The Case Against the Law of the Sea Treaty," World Affairs. Vol. 160 No. 3, Winter 1998: 134-150. "Feeding the Dragon: Technology Transfer and teh Growing chinese Threat, in Economic Espionage, Technology Transfers and National Security," U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, June 17, 1997, S. HRG. 105-240: 62-118. "Decontrolling Technology: Striking at the Heart of U.S. National Security," U.s. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, April 28, 1998, Senate hearing report forthcoming. "Supercomputers, Test Ban Treaties, and the Virtual Bomb, " World Affairs, Vol. 161 No. 2, Fall 1998. "Japan's Post-war Economic Success: Deming, Quality, and contextual Realities," Journal of Management History, Vol. 5 No. 4, October 1999. "Eyewitness to History: Methodological Suggestions, Public Servant Perspectives, and Professional Publications," International Journal of Theory and Behavior. (Forthcoming Fall 1998). "Caspian Sea: Opportunities and Challenges for U.S. Policy." (Forthcoming) |
| Testimony & Interviews |
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, April 28, 1998, 10:00 a.m.
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, June 17, 1997, 10:00 a.m. Video Available. Mary Matalin Show, CBS RAdio Network, June 20, 1997. Interview concerning technology transfer and future Chinese threats. Recording Available. Blanquita Cullum Show, Radio Network of America, July 22, 1997. Interview on supercomputer technology and possession by potential adversaries. Recording Available. Blanquita Cullum Show, Radio Network of America, September 11, 1997. Interview on teh evolving Chinese military threat. Recording Available. |
[End Peter Leitner package]
TESTIMONY OF
MR. FRANKLIN C. MILLER
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
STRATEGY AND THREAT REDUCTION
BEFORE THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
June 25, 1998
Mr. Chairman, I am here today in response to a request by the Committee to discuss how the Office of the Secretary of Defense is organized to review the national security implications of the potential export of arms and dual use goods, technologies and services from the United States under licenses granted by the Department of State and the Department of Commerce, respectively. In my opening remarks today, I would like to summarize my responsibilities within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy since 1993 and outline the reporting chain during that time for the Defense Technology Security Administration, which has the principal responsibility with the Department for developing and coordinating Department of Defense positions on export controls.
From mid-1993 until September 1996 I served as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. Dr. Ashton B. Carter was the Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy. The portfolio of that office was broad and included: nuclear forces policy; counterproliferation policy, which includes export control policy; DoD-MoD interaction in Russia,
[2]
Ukraine and Eurasia; and threat reduction policy, including arms control and cooperative threat reduction. From September 1996 until November 1997 I was the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. The position of Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy was eliminated under Defense Reform Initiative announced by Deputy Secretary of Defense Hamre in November 1997. At that time the functions of the office of International Security Policy were combined with other functions to form the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction. I became a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction in November 1997. The Assistant Secretary is Dr. Edward L. Warner, III.
Mr. Chairman, DoD plays an active role in the development and implementation of US export control policy. Within DoD, this role is undertaken by the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA). With a staff of less than 120, DTSA performs this role in a variety of ways including reviewing over 21,000 export licenses per year referred by the State and Commerce Departments, ensuring that items and technologies that are important to our security interests are adequately controlled by reviewing export control lists and regulations, and assisting U.S. government efforts to enforce export controls through safeguards. DTSA is an active and vociferous spokesman in the interagency process for protecting national security interests. DTSA is respected by other agencies and the exporting business community as an organization that brings solid technical
[3]
analyses to bear on export control matters in a manner that is effective in protecting U.S. national security interests.
From 1993 until November 1997, the DTSA, which is a field organization of the Department of Defense, reported ultimately to the Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy. In the same manner, DTSA now reports to its successor, the Assistant Secretary for Strategy and Threat Reduction. Under the Defense Reform Initiative, DTSA will become part of the new Defense Threat Reduction Agency reporting directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, with day-to-day oversight provided by the Director for Defense Research and Engineering. Policy oversight and direction will continue to be provided from the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, primarily by the Assistant Secretary for Strategy and Threat Reduction.
When Dr. Carter reorganized the office of International Security Policy shortly after he became Assistant Secretary in 1993, DTSA was assigned to report to Dr. Carter through the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterproliferation, Dr. Mitchel Wallerstein. This was done to provide greater day-to-day oversight of export control policy directly from International Security Policy. Dr. Wallerstein, with a more limited span of responsibility than Dr. Carter, could devote a greater part of his time to export control issues than Dr. Carter. When difficult or controversial issues arose, Dr. Carter -- and I, on occasion -- were consulted on the issues by Dr. Wallerstein in order for Dr. Carter to provide direction. When Dr.
[4]
Carter departed in 1996 and I assumed the position of Acting Assistant Secretary, any controversial issues were brought to me by Dr. Wallerstein.
Following the Defense Reform Initiative's changes and until DTSA is moved to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, DTSA reports to Dr. Warner through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cooperative Threat Reduction, Dr. Susan Koch and then through me. In the reorganization, Dr. Koch assumed Dr. Wallerstein's responsibility for non-proliferation issues. Mr. David Tarbell, the Current Director of DTSA, assumed that position in August 1994.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my summary of organizational and individual responsibilities for export controls within the Department of Defense and the role of the Department in protecting United States national security interests in the interagency export control process. I will be pleased to answer questions by the members of the Committee.
[Two page resume]
JUN-24-1998 17:06 DASD LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS 703 697 8299 P.02/03
FRANKLIN C. MILLER
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Strategy and Threat Reduction
Franklin C. Miller is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction. In this capacity he is responsible for formulating Department of Defense policy for nuclear deterrence, nuclear targeting, bilateral and multilateral nuclear and conventional forces arms control, US-UK and US-NATO nuclear weapons cooperation, military space operations; cooperative threat reduction in the NIS and countering global proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and missile weapons.
Mr. Miller was born in New York City in October 1950, where he completed both elementary and high school. He received his bachelor of arts degree, Phi Beta Kappa, with honors in history and highest honors in political science from Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts, in 1972. He also earned a Master's in Public Affairs in International Relations from the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, in 1977.
After graduation from Williams, Mr Miller entered active military duty with the United States Navy. Following completion of officer training, he was designated a distinguished naval graduate at Naval Officer Candidate School and was commissioned as an ensign in the regular Navy. From December 1972 until fall 1975, he served as communications officer and later, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) officer on board the USS JOSEPH HEWES (DE-1078), with deployments in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. He earned the Surface Warfare Officer designation while aboard the HEWES. Mr. Miller transferred to the United States Naval Reserve in the fall of 1975 in order to pursue his graduate education. While in the reserves, he served as Assistant Weapons Officer on the USS Johnston (DD-821-NRF) and as an Intelligence Watch Officer at the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center, Suitland, Maryland.
In 1977, after completion of his graduate program at Princeton, Mr. Miller joined the State Department's Politico-Military Bureau, where he worked for two years on a variety of nuclear policy and arms control issues. In this position he was responsible for analyzing and recommending various aspects of naval support of US diplomatic initiatives. He was also a principal State Department action officer on the nuclear weapons deployment plan and various SSBN/SLBM matters.
In 1979, Mr. Miller transferred to the Department of Defense as an Assistant for Theater Nuclear Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In this position, he was involved in NATO's decision to modernize its long-range nuclear forces and in a wide variety of other nuclear policy issues relating to short-range, intermediate-range, and naval tactical systems.
In late-1981, Mr. Miller was appointed as the Director, Strategic Forces Policy. In this position, he was responsible for the formulation and review of US nuclear deterrence policy and ensuring that US strategic force capabilities and nuclear targeting plans were consistent with national policy objectives.
As of Monday 04, 1998
In December 1989, Mr. Miller was promoted to be Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy. He directed the formulation of DoD policy with respect to strategic offensive forces and strategic targeting, theater nuclear forces and arms control, and strategic nuclear arms control. in this position, Mr. Miller made major contributions to the START I and START II treaties, to the September 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiative and to changes in NATO's nuclear posture. he led the Department of Defense's 1989-1991 overhaul of the nuclear planning process and of the US nuclear contingency plan (SIOP).
Mr. Miller was promoted to the position of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy) in May 1994. In September 1996, Mr. Miller became the acting Assistant Secretary of Defense For International Security Policy, a post he held for 14 months.
In 1985, 1988, 1989 and again in 1993, Mr. Miller was awarded the Defense Department's highest civilian award -- the Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal; in January 1997, in lieu of a fifth award, he was presented with the Department of Defense Medal for distinguished Public Service. He was also awarded the Department of State's Meritorious Honor Medal in 1993 for his contributions to the START II Treaty. In September 1996, Mr. Miller was made an honorary graduate of the United Kingdom's Joint Services Defence college; he is the fourth American, and the only US civilian, to have received this honor. A career member of the Senior Executive Service, Mr. Miller was awarded the rank of Meritorious Executive by the President in 1989 and the rank of Distinguished Executive by the President in 1997. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
He is married to the former Alice Sweeney of south Freeport, Maine. They have two sons: Franklin, Jr. and Cameron.
[Organizational chart of the Defense Technology Security Administration omitted. See online source: http://www.dtsa.osd.mil/orgchart.html ]
[Text of Executive Order 12981 omitted. See: http://jya.com/eo12981.txt ]
[End Franklin Miller package]
[End testimony]
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